"What if Bonaparte had Waited?" Topic

IMO why the French win so often is because they can actually see the British over the ridge and make counter moves that Napoleon had to guess at. The players knows what happen historically.

Yep, this. The French player usually wins Quatre Bras for the same reason – he knows there are no concealed Allied troops, so he just piles in.

Wellington's deployments were skilful enough that they enabled him to win a battle he should really have lost.

Yes, hindsight is a historian and wargamers luxury that those doing the actual fighting did not have in 1815.

I think we can only say that Wellington's deployments were skillful because the Prussians saved his bacon, so to speak. I doubt anyone would have been praising his deployment as much, had the Prussians not come and had Wellington been defeated or forced to retreat.

As usual! It all comes down to the Scooby-Doo, whinging, outed villain syndrome.

Dear old Nappy was out-generaled. His only success was the taking of a farm enclosure. Even that was with a bit of luck. But then, all generals have a bit of luck at times. All the other attacks failed. D'Erlon's hoards sent packing. Thousands dashing themselves at the gates and walls of Hougoumont farm. The Cavalry pell-melled about, getting nowhere. The Guard melting away like a bar of Cadburys Dairy Milk. And the whole army scattered into the night with Nappy running away faster than most.

Wellington only stayed to fight at the Mont St Jean position because he already had an agreement from Blucher that the Prussians would march to join him – I thought everyone knew this? They didn't just turn up in the Nick of Time Hollywood style when no-one was expecting them (well, Napoleon didn't).

Wellington's deployments were made to hold off the French until the Prussians arrived, and worked. Napoleon's deployments were made to destroy Wellington's army, and they didn't work too well. So Wellington and Blucher saved each other's bacon.

Lapsang, your first paragraph is a succinct summary of the situation, but your comment about 'saving each other's bacon' would only be apt if Wellington and Blucher had not had a plan and an agreement to unite their forces to defeat Bonaparte, but one of their armies had 'just turned up in the nick of time, Hollywood style, when no-one was expecting them'.

It might be more appropriate to say that Wellington and Blucher had a plan and – despite some difficulties which they overcame – succeeded in executing it and defeating their enemy, the mark of good generalship.

And it shows that good generalship is sometimes no more than having a simple plan and sticking to it. I doubt whether any of the other Prussians would have worked to come to Wellington's assistance.

One sad note is how after having mutually saved each other's predetermined and completely equal share of bacon, The Duke somehow wrote that the Prussians arrived later than they did and then, when confronted with proof of his error, refused to ever alter that position. It seems that after the battle, some bacon was deemed to be less in need of saving than others.

It's also true that although Napoleon was the best general of the three, he was the worst on that day.

"And it shows that good generalship is sometimes no more than having a simple plan and sticking to it."

Provided, of course, that it is actually a good, practicable plan in the first place!

And it really doesn't matter if one is not such a good general as one's opponent, based upon previous battles (and, Au Pas, I would not dispute your contention that Bonaparte was a more tactician than Blucher, though I might argue that he was not significantly better than Wellington), if one can win the final battle that decides the campaign and the war.

@Gazzola

I think we can only say that Wellington's deployments were skillful because the Prussians saved his bacon, so to speak. I doubt anyone would have been praising his deployment as much, had the Prussians not come and had Wellington been defeated or forced to retreat.

I'm involved in another discussion about whether Bruce Quarrie's open admiration for SS ideology colors his approach to rating Napoleonic nationalities as soldiers by intrinsically judging their martial abilities and competence based not solely on performance but also based on perceived intrinsic ethnic factors such as integrity, intelligence, bravery etc.

In any case, while reading his Napoleonic rule book, I came across this very interesting blurb:

The whole world knows the story of the battle of Waterloo…, and it can suffice here to say that it was unquestioningly Wellington's greatest victory, even though technically it was a Prussian rather than a British triumph since it was only the arrival of Bluecher's troops in the afternoon which staved off an allied collapse.

Bruce Quarrie: Napoleon's Campaign's in Miniature p.122

Au Pas, you wrote in the National Characteristics discussion:

"…when the same author [Quarrie] starts to talk about racial superiority, racial purity and intrinsic ethnic stupidity in order to rate the quality of soldiers by nation, I do wonder if his is the most objective template for national troop qualities."

Yet you now quote Quarrie, apparently approvingly, when he calls Waterloo a 'Prussian triumph'!

Au pas de Charge

I would disagree with Quarrie in that it was not a British or Prussian victory. It was an allied victory helped by Napoleon's commanders not achieving their tasks and ruining an excellent if not perfect plan.

But that is life. Had d'Erlon continued to obey the Emperor's orders and not that of a lesser commander, then the result of Napoleon's victory over the Prussians would probably have been decisive and they may not have been able to continue to march to Welly's aid on the 18th. And, had Grouchy been successful is preventing any Prussians reaching Waterloo, then again, the result on the 18th May have been different.

But the so called allied plan which some people love to praise almost failed, that's how feeble it was. The plan was for the allies to unite against Napoleon and come to each other's aid should they be attacked. But Ney, for all his faults on the day, prevented Wellington from saving Blucher's bacon on the 16th, and Napoleon, despite Ney and d'Erlon's screw ups, still defeated the Prussians and prevented them from sending any troops to aid Welly on the 16th. So the allied great plan was failing and it was only saved by Grouchy's failure to stop any Prussians reaching Waterloo on the 18th.

So it wasn't the allied plan that won the day but Grouchy, Ney and D'Erlon's failures and screw ups that created the situation in which they could restore their failed plan and make it work on the 18th. But I'm sure the French mistakes were not included in the pre-allied planning. LOL

Then again, Napoleon, as I think he admitted himself later on, should not have divided his forces or kept those troops or at least a large part of Grouchy command closer.