"How Nazi ‘fake news’ split Allied commanders in 1945" Topic

"Seventy-five years ago this week the Battle of the Ardennes began to draw to a close, with the Allies declaring victory. This was clearly an American victory, one that had come at the cost of more than 80,000 US troops killed, wounded and captured.

Ironically, although the Germans failed in their objective of punching a gap in the Allied front line to separate the American armies from their British allies, the British and Americans would become divided during the course of the Ardennes Offensive. Such would occur, not by force of German arms, but through a fake radio broadcast which, at a critical moment, helped to fuel an Allied public relations fiasco to a point where it went out of control…"
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Armand

Interesting.

Very interesting indeed. A clever build on the fact that Monty did not help himself in his relations not only with the Americans but with other British. There is no doubt that he was an arrogant individual devoted to his own image.

This is the first time I ever heard that this spat was due to "clever German propaganda".

Comprehensive thread on the subject at AHF and the German reworking of the original from 2011

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A clever build on the fact that Monty did not help himself in his relations not only with the Americans but with other British. There is no doubt that he was an arrogant individual devoted to his own image.

No man was more devoted to his image than Bradley and the fact Eisenhower gave Monty command of one of his Armies when he (Bradley) lost control so enraged him that he devoted years to slighting Mont in order to salve his wounded pride. The 'Monty claimed credit for winning the Bulge' version of history is an invention and the relentless post-war US Memoir attacks on Montgomery/'The British' are completely bogus and unwarranted.

Very interesting, never heard about this …

Happy you enjoyed it….

Armand

Nice find Armand.

I was hearing former GIs express their dislike for Montgomery before the movie Patton was released. I am betting that most of those former GIs didn't know Bradley had published a memoir. And didn't Brooke accuse Montgomery of "crass stupidity"? If it was all a German invention it was one that many American GIs were prepared to believe.

And didn't Brooke accuse Montgomery of "crass stupidity"? If it was all a German invention it was one that many American GIs were prepared to believe.

Up until then Montgomery had very positive Press in the USA. When I looked in period US Newspaper archives to find out if the claims that Monty was 'unpopular' were correct I found the exact opposite. It was not until until Jan 1945 that the character assassination really started and it went into overdrive with the post-war memoirs of US Generals and their staff. Ralph Ingersoll being one of the worst. For sure he had his detractors but so did most Generals. There was a shift in the degree of insult that started with Bradley's Press Conference that was seen as an his ill-advised reply to the completely imaginary criticism of him he imagined Monty's Press Conference contained.
This link to AHF has many of the contemporary Press Conference reports and a newspaper article on the German propaganda version.

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and it confirms than the claims Monty insulted, criticised of tried to grab glory from US Generals or that he disparaged US Soldiers is complete fiction. The most basic research into the claims would have exposed the lie but it appears no one cared enough to check. They preferred to believe the lies.

1945 Newspaper report of the German distortions:

NYT Jan 11 1945.

NAZlS' RADIO TRICK SEEKS ALLIED RIFT

London Warns of Foe's Faking British Broadcast to Stir U. S. Rivalry Over Montgomery .
LONDON, Thursday, Jan. 11
The British Broadcasting Corporation warned last night that the Germans were trying to sow dissension among the Allies by broadcasting to American troops on BBC wave lengths.
The warning by the British Government': radio agency referred specifically to a German broadcast Monday morning praising Field Marshal Sir Bernard L. Montgomery and bellttllng the American forces. The enemy broadcast, which was heard on tho United States Third Army front, led to criticism oi Britain in some American newspapers.
The Nazis' faked broadcast. said BBC. was apparently part of a German propaganda service known as "Arnhem Calllng." which ai times masquerades as a. British program. BBC sald that "such attempts by the enemy to mislead listeners can generally be detected if the substance of the broadcasts are weighed with a. little common sense.
" The Germans' fake broadcast Monday morning referred to Field Marshal Montgomery's appointment as Allied commander on the northern side of the Ardennes bulge. then added:
"Montgomery found no defense lines, the Americans somewhat bewildered, no reserves on hand and supply lines cut. He took over the scattered American forces, planned his action and stopped the German drive. The Battle ot the Ardennes can now be practically written off thanks to Montgomery.
" [A radio commentator of the German Transocean agency, as reported by The New York: Times from London Tuesday, used that day the same Goebbels divisive propaganda line of crediting to Field Marshal Montgomery the whole Allied strategy against von Rundstedt.]

Some U. S. Troops Disturbed
In a dispatch from the Third Army front yesterday . London Daily Telegraph correspondent said the enemy broadcast caused "considerabie comment" among our troops. Many of them dismissed lt as Nazi propaganda, "but many did not," the correspondent said, "and to those whn did not it left a very bad taste in the mouth." Two London Thursday morning newspapers commented editorially on the incident of the Nazis' fake broadcast. The News Chronicle labeled it a "warning‘ both to the public and to the authorities to be on their guard
." The Daily Mail said the enemy broadcast had been accepted in the United States as authentic "much too hastiiy,
" At the same time The Daily Mall in an editorial heeded "A Slur on Monty," criticized Lieut. Gen Omar N. Bradley'a statement to war correspondents Tuesday that Field Marshal Montgomery's new command, taking in American Ninth and First Army troops on the northern edge of the Ardennes bulge was temporary. Some things General Bradley said, The Daily Mail asserted, would be regarded by the British people as "unnecessarily offensive."
The Daily Mail, which has been fostering the idea that Field Marshal Montgomery should he Allied ground commander under Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, declared it would be unfortunate if a transatlantic "slanging match" were promoted about the names and achievements of the Allied military commanders.
Mail's "Defense of Monty"
Then, asserting that General BradIey's statement that the Montgomery command was only temporary, bore only one interpretation, the newspaper said:
"It is that Field Marshal Montgomery is good enough to be given the position of responsibility in an emergency, but when the danger is over and the ravages of the enemy are made good, his services are no longer required except in a. comparatively subordinate capacity.
"It can be said at once that the British people would view with dismay the relegatlon of this great soldier to the somewhat meager share of the front which he held before von Rundstedt's breakthrough. And this is no question of national pride or prestige."
Writing from Brussels. Alar Moorehead of The London Daily Express said that a story going around that Field Marshal Montgomery had insisted on his new command and forced General Eisenhower into it, was nonsense.
"General Eisenhower and `his staff themselves took the declsion early in the morning at the pitch of the crisis," Mr. Moorehead wrote. "Marshal Montgomery accepted briskly and had his plan ready within a few hours. The plan went before a meeting of field commanders and was immediately accepted.

It is astonishing that a known (as in known at the time) fake German propagana effort has been allowed to distort the history of the campaign and that 75 years later so many are still prepared to believe it to be fact.

For an interesting perspective on the ETO campaign in 1944, see "The Battle for Western Europe, Fall 1944 – An Operational Assessment" by John A Adams, University of Indiana Press, 2010.

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B

B

It is quaint that you believe during 1943-44 that the American press would have felt itself sufficiently free to print the thoughts of commanders and private soldiers without at least some political cover, assuming they could even have gotten the information. WW2 was not the ACW.

It is telling that in response to MONTGOMERY's statement, Churchill felt the need to make the following statement to the British Parliament:

I have seen it suggested that the terrific battle which has been proceeding since 16th December on the American front is an Anglo-American battle. In fact, however, the United States troops have done almost all the fighting and have suffered almost all the losses. They have suffered losses almost equal to those on both sides in the battle of Gettysburg. Only one British Army Corps has been engaged in this action. All the rest of the 30 or more divisions, which have been fighting continuously for the last month, are United States troops. The Americans have engaged 30 or 40 men for every one we have engaged, and they have lost 60 to 80 men for every one of ours. That is a point I want to make. Care must be taken in telling our proud tale not to claim for the British army an undue share of what is undoubtedly the greatest American battle of the war and will, I believe, be regarded as an ever famous American victory.

Churchill knew what had been going on behind the scenes, and he had a far better understanding of Americans than Montgomery. Churchill knew of Montgomery's efforts before the Bulge to get control of the ground forces, or as much of them as possible. Churchill understood that the average GI fighting in the Bulge didn't have contact with any British in the field.

This isn't a knock on Montgomery's generalship, or the role the British did play. Montgomery had lived through May of 1940. He had seen how things could go bad fast. The steps Montgomery took made sense in light of what could have happened.

Also while Bradley was offended by the idea of Montgomery taking command of the northern flank, he wasn't the only one. IIRC British Generals Strong and Whiteley of SHAEF suggested the idea to Beddel Smith on December 19. Smith response was to call them limey bastards.

For something earlier on August 17 Marshall wrote Eisenhower "The recent statement from your Headquarters that Montgomery continues in command of all ground forces has produced a severe reaction in the New York Times and many other papers…."

Also this from Allan Brooke: "Eisenhower had been lunching with him and had again run down Montgomery and described his stickiness and the reaction in the American papers. The old story again: ‘H.Q. was sparing British Forces at the expense of the Americans, who were having all the casualties.'"

The idea that things were great until Montgomery took over 1st and 9th Army doesn't hold up.

It is quaint that you believe during 1943-44 that the American press would have felt itself sufficiently free to print the thoughts of commanders and private soldiers without at least some political cover,

The fact is Monty's US Press coverage was highly complimentary and you have not provided a single source to the contrary.

This is the full account of the Monty Press Conference. I challenge anyone to find fault with it.

MONTGOMERY STATEMENT`
ON THE WESTERN FRONT

Jan. 7 the text of Marshal Montgomery's statement: ,

When Rundstedt attacked on Dec 16 he obtained a tactical surprise. He drove a deep wedge into the center of the United States First Army and the split might have become awkward: the Germans had broken right through a weak spot, and were heading for the Meuse. As soon as I saw what was happening I took. certain steps myself to insure that if the Germans got to the Meuse they would certainly not get over the river. I carried out certain movements so as to provide balanced dispositions to meet the threatened danger. These were, at the time, merely precautions-that is, I was thinking ahead. Then the situation began to deteriorate. But the whole Allied team rallied to meet the danger; national considerations were thrown overboard. General Eisenhower placed me in command of the whole northern front.
I employed the whole available power of the British group of armies: this power was brought into play very gradually and in such a way that it would not interfere with the American lines of comminication; Finally it was put into battle with a bang and today British divisions are fighting hard on the right flank of the United States First Army. You thus have the picture of British troops fighting on both sides of American forces who have suffered a hard blow. This is a fine Allied picture.

Battle "Most Interesting"
The battle has been most interesting-I think possibly one of the most interesting and tricky battles I have ever handled,`with great issues at stake. The first thing to be done was to "head off" the enemy from the tender spots and vital places. Having done that successfully, the next thing was to "seal him off"—that is to rope him in and make quite certain that he could not get to places he wanted, and also that he was slowly but surely removed away from those places.
He was therefore "headed off" and then "sealed off." He is now being "written off." and heavy toll is being taken of his divisions by ground and air action. You must not imagine that the battle is over yet. It is by no means over and a great deal still remains to be done.
The battle has some similarity to the battle that began on Aug. 31, 1942, when Rommel made his last bid to capture Egypt and was "sealed off" by the Eighth Army. But actually all battles are different because the problem is different.
What was Rundstedt trying to achieve? No one can tell for certain.
The only guide we have is the message he issued to his soldiers before the battle began. He told them it was the last great effort to try to win the war; that everything depended on it; that they must go "all out." On the map you see his gains- that will not win the war. He is likely slowly but surely to lose it all. He must have scraped together every reserve he could lay his hands on for this job, and he has not achieved a great deal.

Says Von Rundstedt Failed
One must admit that he has dealt us a sharp blow and he sent us reeling back. But we recovered. He has been unable to gain any great advantage from his lnitial success.
He has therefore failed in his strategic purpose. unless the prize was smaller than his men were told.
He has now turned to the defensive on the ground. and he is faced by forces properly balanced to utilize the initiative that he has lost. , Another reason for his failure is that his air force, although still capable of pulling a fast one, can not protect his army. For that army our tactical air forces are the greatest terror.
But when all is said and done. I shall always feel that Rundstedt was really beaten by the good fighting qualities of the American soldier and by the team-work of the Allies.
I would like to say a word about these two points
I first saw the American soldier in battle in Sicily and formed then a very high oplnion of him. I knew him again in Italy. And I have seen a. very great deal of him in this campaign. I want to take this opportunity to pay a public trlbute to him. He is a brave fighting man, steady under fire and with the tenacity in battle that stamps the first class soldier. All these qualities have been shown in a marked degree during the present battle.

Says Americans Stopped Foe
He[the US Soldier] is responsible really—he is basicaly responsible for Rundstedt not doing what he wanted to do and when the inner history is told you will find that because he held out in three places the Germans could not take advantage of their initial success.
The first was in the Elsenborn salient south of Monschau, which had to bear full the blow of almost a whole Panzer army and the Panzer army recoiled. They could not do it. With this great. blow, hitting the center of the American Army, Rundstedt did overrun a conslderable number of American formations and around St, Vith and south of it there were a great many American troops cut off and unable to get away. When I was brought into the party that was the situation. The American troops isolated and cut off were fighting and holding on to centers of road communication making it extremely difficult for the Germans to move and flow through the gap they had made.
I have spent my military career with the British soldier and I have come to love him with a great love. I have now formed a very great affection and admiration for the American soldier. I salute the brave fighting men of America I never want to fight alongside better soldlers.
Just now I am seelng a great deal of the American soldier. I have tried to feel that I am almost an American soldier myself so that I might take no unsuitable action or offend them in any way.
I have been given an American identity card. I am thus identified in the Army of the United States —by fingerprints being registered in the War Department at Washington-which is far preferable to having them registered at Scotland Yard. And now I come to my last point.

Call for Allied Solidarity
It is team work that pulls you through dangerous times; lt is team work that wins battles; it is victories in battle than win wars. I want to put in a strong plea for Allied solidarity at this vital stage of the war-and you can all help in this greatly.
Nothing must be done by anyone that tends to break down the team spirit of our Allied team: If you try to "get at" the captain of the team you are liable to induce a loss of confidence. and this may spread and have disastrous results.
I would say that anyone who tries to break up the team spirit of the Allies is definitely helping the enemy.
Let me tell you that the captain of our team is General Eisenhower. I am absolutely devoted to Ike. We are the greatest of friends. It grieves me when I see uncomplimentary articles about him in the British press. He bears a great burden, he needs our fullest support, he has a right to expect it and it is up to all of us to see that he gets it.
And so I would ask all of you to lend a hand to stop that sort of thing. Let us all rally round the captain of the team and so help to win the match.
No one objects to healthy and constructive criticism. It is good for us.
But let us have done with destructive criticism that aims a blow at Alliéd solidarity, that tends to break up our team spirit and that therefore helps the enemy.
I want you to weigh in with me and rally round the captain of the team. We must frown on any destructive criticism. Ike is a very great friend of mine. My own airplane was damaged the other day. I cried to Ike, "Can you lend me another plane?"
He sent me his own at once- wonderful. There is no doubt about it, he is a great chap; I am very distressed when I see anything uncomplimentary about Ike.

Gives Military Philosophy
This is my military philosophy. A fundamental point is shaping the battle to your design. I always maintain that you have got to decide what your design of battle is going to be before you start the battle and so you fight it your way and not anybody else's way and make the enemy dance to your tune. I maintain that is the way to fight battles.
Now, if you're going to fight battles that way, you've got to have balance of poise — so balanced that whatever the enemy may do, there will never be any need for you to react to him. That is the fundamental point in my military philsophy. If you've not got balance obviously you are easily pushed off by the other chap.
So I frequently examine my battle area and say to myself, "Now I am balanced for anything the enemy may do?"
If he put in a hard bang I have to be ready for him., That is terrifically important in this battle fighting. I learned it in Africa.
You learn all`these things by hard experience.
When Rundstedt put in his hard blow and parted the American Army, it was automatic that the battle area must be untidy. Therefore, the first thing I did when I was brought in and told to take over was to busy myself in getting the battle area tidy-getting it sorted out.

Regroups Allied Armies
I got reserves into the right places and got balanced and you know what happened. I regrouped the American and British Armies—a question of grouping is another important point mixed up with battle winning,
One of the things I had to do was to position an army corps in what I thought was going to be the line of approach of the German left hook toward Namur and Dinant. It looked to me as if Rundstedt was trying to do a big left hook to the River Meuse. There was not much there-there was damn little there so I collected here and there, pulled in divisions and formed an army corps under that very fine American General [J. Lawton] Collins.
It was that corps, which I had formed for offensive action, that eventually took the full blow of Rundstedt's left hook.
It took a knock -I said "Dear me, this can't go on. It's being swallowed up in the battle"
I set to work and managed to form the corps again.
Once more pressure was such that it began to disappear in a defensive battle.
I said: "Come, come," and formed it again and it was put in offensively by General [Courtney H.] Hodges after we had consulted together and that is his present job.
It is a question of getting balanced and putting reserves in such places that you don't mind what the enemy does because you have grouped forces to meet the problem.

Opposes Hasty Action
And you must not hurry. You have a well-balanced, tidy show when you are mixed up in a dog-fight.
You can't do it nohow-I do not think that word is English-you can't win the big victory without a tidy show.
It is very interesting to see both sides—the Germans and the Allies—use their airborne troops in land battles, not having dropped them from the sky. They use them with great advantage. The danger with an airborne force is that it is kept out behind somewhere. All their thought and training and philosophy is built up in flying over to the battle and ·landing there.
That is the approach to battle. It is what happens when they get on the ground that is difficult.
The Americans have two air-borne divisions, the 101st`and the Eighty-second, fighting on the ground and we have got the Sixth Airborne Division
It is OK to mention them. because I realize Germans have captured some of their wounded in Bure It was the Sixth Airborne Division that dropped in the Caen sector in Normandy. They came down on the eastern or left flank of the ‘invaslon around the vital bridges over the Orne.
I said; "Get that division out" but it was not relieved until a long time after.
It ls now fighting on the right flank of the northern battle and it is, fighting very well. In the use of airborne troops what really matters is how they fight on the ground, The Germans use their paratroops divisions too. The airborne men are jolly good chaps, all picked.

Praises U. S. Air Troops
The American soldiers of the United States Seventh Armored Division and the 106th Infantry Division stuck it out and put up a very fine performance. By jove. they stuck it out, those chaps,
And there was the 101st Airborne Division at Bastogne who held out magnificently. The places where these men fought were, I maintain, terrifically important.
I consulted with General Hodges of the United States First Army and there came a day about the 20th or 21st [ December], I said to Hodges: "I think we ought to get these chaps back if we can. They will be swamped. They will disappear. They have done their stuff. They are great fighting men."
During this time the Eighty-second Airborne Division had been moving slowly forward to try to get contact with cut off elements. We pulled them back, then withdrew the Eighty-second Airborne Division to a more secure line. They didn't want to come. They protested vigorously.
I said to Lieut. Gen. Omar N. Bradley: "They can come back with all honor." They came back to the more secure positions. They put up a wonderful show.
Rundstedt hit us a sharp blow but he was prevented from turning it in fullest gain and getting the maximum advantage from it because of the first-class fighting qualities of the American soldier. I take my hat off to him. I salute him willingly. It was a very remarkable thing to see how, at the moment of danger the complete Allied team rallied to the call. The writing-off process is going on now. I am prepared to say the initiative has passed from Rundstedt to us, and he is fighting on the ground now defensively and against troops who have recovered their balance and are properly poised to use the initiative the enemy has lost.

Cites Heavy German Loss
We have captured thousands of prisoners and we are killing a lot of Germans. One American armored division in a battle with the Second Panzer Division between Dlnant and Ciney inflicted the heaviest losses. Down in the Ciney area you can see eighty one knocked out tanks, about seventy-five guns and between 400 and 500 vehicles.
The Second Panzer Division cannot be feeling very well, and this American division was helped by the British in the Dinant area.
What about the German soldier? I think the German is a first-class professional soldier. I have always said that I never underrated him and this man Rundstedt is extremely good. I used to think that Rommel was good, but my opinion is that , Rundstedt would have hit him for six. Rundstedt is the best German general I have come up against in this war. He is very ·good. He knows his stuff.
I am not prepared to say that for the moment the Germans have wrested the initiative from the Allies in this war. The initiative lies with the Allies.
I would very much like to get myself into Rundstedt's brain for a couple of minutes. I have a picture of him in my room. I wanted a picture of Rundstedt very badly. The other day I was given one by Arthur Christiansen of the Daily Express. I am jolly glad to have it. It is extremely good.

Churchill knew of Montgomery's efforts before the Bulge to get control of the ground forces,

Montgomery had control from June 6 to Aug 31st. Were you not aware of this?

For something earlier on August 17 Marshall wrote Eisenhower "The recent statement from your Headquarters that Montgomery continues in command of all ground forces has produced a severe reaction in the New York Times and many other papers…."

I have a different wording for that message. Perhaps you could source the wording you posted so we can see which is the more accurate. Did you notice this telling sentence?

that it could become an important factor in the coming Congressional Elections.

Also while Bradley was offended by the idea of Montgomery taking command of the northern flank, he wasn't the only one. IIRC British Generals Strong and Whiteley of SHAEF suggested the idea to Beddel Smith on December 19. Smith response was to call them limey bastards.

Please source this claim.

This is how D'Este tells it:

Montgomery was likewise greatly disturbed from afar by the state of paralysis in First Army and by the serious situation in the north and conveyed his misgiving to the visiting Maj. Gen. J.F.M. "Jock" Whiteley, the SHAEF deputy G-3. Although occasionally one of the field marshal's sternest critics, Whiteley nevertheless returned to SHAEF the night of December 19 convinced that Montgomery must be given immediate command of the northern sector before it was too late. Placing a telephone call to Montgomery, Whiteley said, "If Ike asked you to take over First Army when could you do it?" Montgomery replied he could do so the following morning. Whiteley made it clear that nothing had yet been decided. Montgomery not only did not press the matter but also exerted no pressure in favor of the idea.
Whiteley found an ally in Strong who was receiving a steady stream of reports that led him to independently conclude it was "absolutely essential to inform Bedell Smith about my growing doubts whether the Allies were matching up to the situation," and his belief that neither Bradley nor his staff appreciated the severity of First Army's dilemma.

About midnight the two generals awakened Bedell Smith and explained the urgency of an immediate decision. After Smith's morning staff conference on December 20, he informed both Strong and Whiteley he would put their proposal to Eisenhower. During his own morning staff conference Eisenhower telephoned Bradley and emphatically stated, "Where is the line you can hold the best and the cheapest? I don't care how far back it is." Bradley was in no position to supply answers to Eisenhower. What had convinced Smith that a changeover was vital was that 12th Army Group had lost communications with First Army for more than forty-eight hours. Moreover, Bradley had no idea whatsoever if Hodges had the situation under control, which, as has been conclusively shown, he did not during the crucial, first days of the battle. The truth was that Bradley had nothing under control and was in no position to influence the outcome of the battle from his headquarters in Luxembourg. Smith called it "an open and shut case."
At this point Smith raised the question of a reorganization of command in the Ardennes. Eisenhower accepted Smith's recommendation to split the Ardennes front in two until the situation could be brought under control, with Montgomery to be given temporary operational command of all Allied forces (principally the U.S. First and Ninth Armies) in the northern half of the Bulge, and Bradley to command only the southern flank (Third Army).
Both Smith and Eisenhower would have preferred to leave Bradley in command. The reality of the situation that existed the morning of December 20 dictated that the shift of command was necessary, and Eisenhower immediately communicated his decision to Bradley by telephone. During the confrontation between the two, Strong could hear the other end of the conversation. Bradley was shouting, "By God, Ike, I cannot be responsible to the American people if you do this. I resign." Eisenhower pointed out that it was not Bradley who was responsible, then curtly noted, "Your resignation therefore means absolutely nothing." Bradley's protests continued vehemently until Eisenhower felt compelled to end the matter with, "Well, Brad, those are my orders." Once off the phone, Bradley reacted with uncharacteristic cold fury, pacing back and forth while cursing Montgomery, startling even his aide, Lt. Col. Chester Hansen.

Also this from Allan Brooke: "Eisenhower had been lunching with him and had again run down Montgomery and described his stickiness and the reaction in the American papers. The old story again: ‘H.Q. was sparing British Forces at the expense of the Americans, who were having all the casualties.'"

The idea that things were great until Montgomery took over 1st and 9th Army doesn't hold up.

No one said anything about things being great so going back to August 1944 neither excuses or explains the avalanche of unhinged anti-Monty bile that was unleashed in January 1945 and formed the bulk of the post-war US accounts of NWE 1944-45.

The Marshall quote comes from the The Papers of George Catlett Marshall, electronic version. Since you didn't provide your language for that message I cannot respond to any differences.

I don't see anything in Este's version of events that contradicts what I quoted, other than whether the initial conversation between Strong, Whiteley and Smith occurred around midnight or somewhat earlier in the evening of the 19th.

August 1944 explains early 1945 very well. Montgomery wasn't looking at what he did and what he said from the standpoint of how they would be perceived by Americans. After the emergency phase of the Bulge passed Americans were probably even more sensitive than they had been in August of 1944. It wasn't the time for "I"s. It wasn't the time for Montgomery to be talking about his own or the British contribution. The time to be doing that was later. It wasn't about being technically correct. It was about knowing his audience.

. Montgomery wasn't looking at what he did and what he said from the standpoint of how they would be perceived by Americans

Why should he? He was not American, did not answer to US Politicians and was not there to represent American interests.
Is there only one country allowed to puts its interests front and centre and demand all other nations conform to their wishes?

he Marshall quote comes from the The Papers of George Catlett Marshall, electronic version. Since you didn't provide your language for that message I cannot respond to any differences.

The version I have reads that Eisenhower is being asked to step in and take command of 'the American contingent' and not replace Monty as the 'Ground Force Commander'. Eisenhower declined and Monty continued until the end of the month as planned. It was Marshall trying to force American political campaign cycles into military matter and nothing at all to do with tactics/strategy.

As D'Este relates Mongomery could have had Hodge's relieved but he decided to wait a day before deciding not to. Hardly the actions of a man hell-bent on proving his 'superiority'

Montgomery found Hodges in a near state of exhaustion and had he been British, would have relieved him of command; as it was he tactfully suggested to Bedell Smith that it might be necessary to relieve Hodges. Smith did not disagree but said if it were necessary, SHAEF would do it. Montgomery suggested waiting twenty-four hours before any decision was made. The following day Montgomery's chief of staff telephoned Smith and said that, "Hodges is not the man I would pick, but he is much better [today]." Eisenhower later confirmed he would have agreed to Hodges' relief.

And this shows the claims of Monty's unpopularity with American Generals are simply not true:

The First Army staff, already resentful of the change of command, is alleged to have been less than pleased to be under British command. Such resentments, and many seem to be of postwar creation, were not evident to James Gavin, the 82d Airborne commander, when he dined with Hodges and his staff several days later. "The staff spoke of Montgomery with amusement and respect. They obviously liked him and respected his professionalism." For his part, Gavin was impressed with Montgomery as a soldier. "I took a liking to him that has not diminished with the years."

No mention of Patton in this criticism, I note.
The man who undermined Operation Fortitude with his whining about being placed in charge of 1st US Army Group.
Who wanted to be fully supported into Germany was through the heavily forested mountainous region at the end of the insanely long supply route.
Who stole supplies from other formations.
And when his supplies were zero (as in tanks literally couldn't move) had his forces easy pickings, saved only by the fact the Wehrmacht happened to be in such poor order for those few days they couldn't launch a counter attack?
The man who had a history of striking subordinates? Who had previously been demoted and passed over for promotion?
That Patton.

In contrast to the tales of Monty being disrespectful to his Ally we can read how Bedell Smith calmly dealt with a situation that reflected badly on his countrymen:

The ailing Smith had already retired to a cot installed in the room next to his office. Just after midnight he heard a knock on his door. "Whiteley added some operational details," Strong recounted, "saying that, to his sure knowledge, there had been no contact between General Bradley and the headquarters of his First Army in the north for two days." Whiteley also talked with one of Montgomery's liaison officers, who reported "considerable confusion
and disorganization" in First Army's rear. Smith listened to what the two British offcers said and then detonated, calling them "limey bastards" and "sons of bitches." "Why is it," he hissed, "whenever there is any real trouble, the British do not appear to trust the Americans to handle it effciently?" He found their recommendation "completely unacceptable," and since they clearly lacked confidence in SHAEF's ability to manage the battle, they "no longer [were] acceptable as staff offcers to Eisenhower and should consider themselves fired."
Would that we could all be so calm and reasonable when deserved criticism is taken as a mortal national slight.
Montgomery was not the problem rather it was the fragile ego of those who saw anything other than deference as a capital offence.

mkenny!

Remarkable work, Counselor!

This has been an eye-opening thread for me, at least, and your extensive (if not exhaustive) reliance on the original sources/record makes for potent and persuasive case.

I am no lover of Monty for a variety of reasons, but truth and fairness are more important than any prejudice.

I would hate to face you in court, Sir!

TVAG

Thanks!.

Armand