"Sherman vs Tiger - the realistic comparison" Topic

I am reading another book on the Sherwood Forrester's and the account of Sherman vs Tiger and the Tiger is clearly not all wargamere's see it to be. Even ignoring cost and reliability, in the real world the Tiger even if working, was not that perfect, certainly not in Europe with its generally closer terrain. There is an account in the book where the Sherman due to its much faster rate of aiming and firing, the book claims as much as 25 rounds per minute, but that even to me seems a lot. However the upshot was the Tiger was lost at no cost of Sherman's. The initial encounter was head to head but as the Sherman was faster on the draw it got the first hit. No penetration but some splinters from the hit on the gun mantlet so the crew were forced to evacuate.

The second effect noted that once a tiger was hit repeatedly especially with the Shermans rate of fire it could not easily respond and very quickly had external damage such as sight blocks which forced it to retreat blinded and could be taken out restively easily as it was almost blind or the commander risked being taken out be machine gun fire if he opened up. So while in ideal conditions (for the Tiger) at 1:1 the Sherman may struggle in the real world in Europe at short ranges, and almost always outnumbered it was far less effective.

This is made far worse if the encounter was with the Brits as they always had Fireflys in Europe and they could easily take out a Tiger at long range if necessary on pretty even terms.

Now it is an issue for wargames rules including our own. However our rules are less extreme than some and the additional rules needed to do better, too us do not justify the gain, as ours is a game centered on command and control, but for those more interested in very specific tank vs tank encounters this sort of effect would be important.

The Sherman didn't have an autoloader, so a firing rate of 25 RPM seems very suspect to me.

Agree.

Tiger was a long range sniper, so closer terrain would not work to it's advantage. It also is apparent to me, from reading many accounts, that on the eastern front, due to lack of training/poor quality of Soviet crews, tactical and operational planning, that there seemed to be a resort to just blindly moving forward in tight formations with the goal of just over running German defensive positions, which, given the terrain often allowed the Tiger to keep it's armor to its front, not have to maneuver much and permit aimed fire at very long ranges (compared to the western front) to severely punish such attempts. This a generalization, as German crews got worse as the war went on and Soviet crews that survived got better.

Given its limitations, small numbers due to cost of building and man hours/materials it took to do so, increasingly poor quality construction, frequently of mechanical break downs, low speed, heavy use of gas to move, shortage of replacement parts, weight (as in crossing bridges, difficult terrains, RR movement, being towed/recovered, etc.), it had a very narrow niche which it filled to a certain degree, but was not a major weapon system that might have changed the course of the war on either front.

From reading, Brits in NWE could often cope with a Tiger or similar vehicle with much superior armour… by blatting it with as many HE rounds as possible… if consequent damage did not cause crew bale, Firefly could work round to get in a shot.
But, that depended in seeing it first…

Tiger fanatics have yet to explain to me how the Sherman often had a favorable kill ratio against them, even while attacking…Zaloga has a nice piece exploring this "urban legend."

It seems obvious to me that the Tiger's reputation was built in 1942, not 1944.

I highly recommend reading "Spearhead" by Adam Makos. Life at the tank level for two tankers. One US and one German. Some unique ways Tigers were knocked out that you do not read elsewhere. Especially one by an tank destroyer, using a quick 3 shot NON armor piercing round, and another using phosphorus rounds. Also one of the tank battles for the US tanker, where he knocks out a Tiger in Cologne in 45, is captured on film and is out on YouTube. Highly recommend the book.

In previous discussions on this forum regarding the tiger, I referred to that specific action. You could also point to the action in which Wittmann was killed. A Firefly killed the 3 Tigers, but regular Sherman kept the others busy whilst the Firefly took the killing shots. No Sherman were hit in either action.

I've just received James Holland's Sherwood Forresters book and, though I've not read it yet, he has makes the same points on the 'We Have Ways' podcast and, I think, in his book on Normandy.

I'm playing around with writing some WW2 rules so have been thinking about this issue recently. Even small arms or weak HE fire (or the fear of them) forces the crew to close down, to the detriment of situational awareness and could wreck optics, jam the turret or damage mobility. Once closed down, not all tanks are equal in their ability to continue to operate. Differences in rate of fire and turret traverse rate determining who gets the first and second shot. A Tiger being struck by an AP shot won't know if all it faces is a particularly brave 2pdr of if it was just lucky and the next one will be a 17pdr APDS…

I'm not sure what the answer is but I'm moving towards thinking that a binary armour penetration or not from one shot v one shot isn't the only consideration but I need something for mission-kill damage forcing a withdrawal or crew bail out and suppression resulting in a reduced ability to target and fire at the enemy.

I read an account of the Lorraine battles in September that indicated that TD units tended to fire WP shells to blind/confuse German tanks, then hit them with AP or HE. Often supposedly convinced German crew to bail.

Seems I read somewhere about a US study of tank actions that it came down to crew quality, reaction time (crew and equipment) and who got the first shot in.

Assume that a Sherman/Firefly was "quicker", both hull and turret, as well as acquiring a target and had a higher ROF.

Also recall that the vast majority of tank combats were surprises/ambush type actions at very close range in nasty weather (fog, snow, rain) in closed terrain (Tiger/Panther had advantage in wide open terrain in good visibility).

35thOVI, that film was a Panther A in Cologne that knocked out a Sherman and was in turn knocked out by a Pershing.

Re this latest edition of "Sherman vs Tiger – the realistic comparison", how many respondents here have read "United States vs. German Equipment" by Isaac White?

Just curious.

B

Re this latest edition of "Sherman vs Tiger – the realistic comparison", how many respondents here have read "United States vs. German Equipment" by Isaac White?

I have. Here it is: link

Here is a first-person AAR of Sherman and Tigers:

Sherman's had many advantages that are normally not reflected in a game. A turret traverse of 25 deg/second, about 2x the Tiger I. The TC had a remote control traverse for the turret and some had a vane sight for the TC to line up the gun to aim and fire without the gunner. The Sherman gunner had a panoramic roof periscope for better Situational Awareness and quicker target engagement. German tanks did not have these. WP rounds were extremely effective too.

Most games don't reflect mission kills from armor spalling, jammed guns and turrets or crew WIA/KIA or concussions or crews bailing from non-lethal hits.

While the Sherman gun stabilizer was not used much for firing on the move it did stabilize the gun for quicker halt fire.

Another factor games rarely portray is recon by fire and suppression. American Sherman's were known to overload their tanks with HE rounds because they'd be shooting while advancing to contact. Shooting, even if you don't see a target, is good for morale. The.50cal HMG was excellent for this.

Sherman's were the only tank to have wet ammo storage which combined with a hatch for all crew members made the Sherman one of the most survivable tanks in the war.

Check out how well Lafayette Pool did against German armor.
I think a Sherman could have a rate of fire of about 8-10 rounds per minute. Rapid fire HE hitting the Tiger I mantlet is almost sure to score a mission kill.

Unfortunately, there is not much you can do when attacking defenders that are concealed and know the range you are at when they fire. That's almost a 100% chance of a first round hit within 600m.

One last item, if Sherman's did have enough armor to stop the 88 AP round it would have not been able to fulfill it's other missions around the world. Like any other design, there were compromised to be made and the Sherman is a pre-WWII design that stayed on active duty into the 1970's in numerous combat and non-combat roles.

Wolfhag

Machinehead. Yes that is true. The US tanker that is "spearhead" Central character is the gunner in that Pershing. They were originally in a Sherman, that Pershing was their late war replacement.

For those asking how the HE and Phosphorus rounds could and were used against the Tiger and Panther, please read this book. It also gives you the perspective from the inside of the tank in fire combat, what you can and cannot see and know. I think it will answer a lot of questions and make you look at the combat game rules a little differently.

Hi Wolfhag,
I'm not arguing or even implying that the Sherman tank was without merit. I am simply curious (and, hey, I might be all wrong here) about this sense I get from reading posts on discussion threads such as this that the later war heavy German tanks (Panthers, Tigers) were relatively inconsequential annoyances easily swept aside in tank versus tank combat.

Eisenhower's original March 1945 letter of request to White (excerpted) reads as follows -

My own experience in talking to our junior officers and enlisted men in armored formations is about as follows:

Our men, in general, realize that the Sherman is not capable of standing up in a ding-dong, head-on fight with a Panther. Neither in gun power nor in armor is the present Sherman justified in undertaking such a contest. On the other hand, most of them realize that we have a job of shipping tanks overseas and therefore do not want unwieldy monsters; that our tank has great reliability, good mobility, and that the gun in it has been vastly improved. Most of them feel also that they have developed tactics that allow them to employ their superior numbers to defeat the Panther tank as long as they are not surprised and can discover the Panther before it has gotten in three or four good shots. I think that most of them know also that we have improved models coming out which even in head-on action are not helpless in front of the Panther and the Tiger.

What I read in White's report back to Eisenhower does not square with the sort of broad gamer assessments I see here. That's why I'm interested to get a feel for how many posters are familiar with White's book.

B

Blutarski,
I get where you are coming from. Comparing the Sherman and a Tiger I is not really a fair comparison. They are two different tanks with two different missions that would use different tactics. The Tiger weighted about 40% more than a Sherman too.

Overall, in NWE, my opinion is the big advantage the Tiger had was concealment, ambush and getting off the first shot. After a few shots the Sherman's are maneuvering and firing WP, HE and AP rounds and have seized the initiative as the Tiger will most likely be withdrawing and hoping he does not break down or get caught in an artillery barrage.

Under the right conditions a single Tiger could hold off a Company of Sherman's knocking out most of them. The flashless powder was hard to spot at longer ranges (range finders helped) when the Tiger was camouflaged and concealed. Almost every hit would penetrate, especially in a flanking ambush. The Tiger could also perform a neutral turn pivoting the entire hull in place, something the Sherman was incapable of.

The Battle of Hochwald Gap is a good example of the Germans able to utilize their defensive tactics and the Allies being slowed and confined to roads and not able to capitalize on the Sherman advantage and combined arms tactics.

It's my understanding (as usual, correct me if I'm wrong) but the Tiger I was designed as a breakthrough tank to be used in a major offensive. The tactic was to have the formation in a wedge or inverted "Vee" with Panzer III's (the Panzer IV still had the 75L24) on the flanks. The Tiger would be in the middle and able to use it's long range advantage and the Panzer III's would protect it from infantry and anti-tank guns. Since it would be used for a short period of time just for the breakthrough the other tanks and personnel carriers would exploit the gap. The Tiger I's would be brought back to the rear to refit and be ready for the next offensive. Those combined arms tactics would the Tiger unstoppable.

Their inherent weaknesses were not going to be a factor as mechanical reliability and short range would not be a big factor using these tactics. Neither would a slow turret traverse as it would have it's flanks guarded.

Unfortunately for the Germans and fortunately for the Allies I think this tactic was used only in N. Africa and Kursk. In NWE they were fighting a strategic holding action and withdraw and the offensive capabilities of the Tigers and Panthers was never really tested.

What Whittmann did at Villers Bocage was admirable but he was killed because he deployed his tank without support. Of course there are many aspects to that action and reasons he did what he did, I understand. It's not a critique, just an observation.

When Tigers were deployed in small numbers with minimal support in NWE in the defense their weaknesses became evident. When being out flanked Sherman's could shoot first because of the slow traverse for the Tiger. The Germans did not have WP. When a tank is hit by WP it sticks to the tank, particles can get through the engine deck to start fires and smoke can be drawn into the fighting compartment forcing a bail out. Multiple HE hits can result in a mission kill or withdraw.

When falling back many Tigers were lost because of mechanical breakdowns and running out of gas (you hardly ever see that happen in a game). Up to 1/3 of the units strength were in repair depots. When these were overrun these tanks and spare parts were lost forever. Almost as many Tigers were lost to non-combat action as in combat and most were not recovered from a battle for a variety of reasons. These are all factors overlooked in games.

An aspect of gunnery hardly simulated in games is that once you hit a target the gun is ranged in to hit again if another target is close by, within about 100m. This factor alone could enable a Tiger under excellent conditions in an ambush could knock out 4-6 Sherman's with 4-6 shots in one minute with the Sherman's getting off only a few inaccurate shots. Tactics and first shot counts.

The Tiger also performed better in the mud which forced Sherman's to stay on roads eliminating the speed and flanking capability and funneling them into a kill zone and minefield.

Most discussions are comparing tanks and not tactics and offensive capabilities with the tank only being one branch. If the Sherman's had a spotter plane and FO in the area and the Tiger saw it he may not fire because he knew that if he did in a minute or so a Time on Target barrage would arrive.

I think the Allies were able to utilize Sherman's as designed to compliment the air, infantry and artillery assets they had. The Germans were forced to use an offensive weapon like the Tiger in defense with minimal combined arms support. It was at a severe disadvantage. Another disadvantage was that all German tanks were forced to move and deploy at night as the Allies owned the air during the day.

One disadvantage of the Sherman 76 gun was the large muzzle blast. In dry normal conditions it would kick up dust and debris that would not clear for 2-5 seconds. This means if the round missed high or low within 1000-1500m the TC would not be able to sense/spot the shot to make adjustments. He'd need a wing man to spot for him or be standing outside and to the side of the tank. The 76 also had a slower rate of fire than the 75 and less effective HE round.

Considering all of the above, how do you design a game that employs all of that? All of the weapons platform performance was measured in seconds. Otto Carius said, "normally seconds decide" in tank combat. Ideally you need to design a time competitive game using one-second timing increments to give a good simulation of the Sherman advantages because seconds count in 1:1 AFV combat. Of course, as we all know, a game using one-second time increments would be unplayable, right?

White's book is a good source to identify these advantages and disadvantages.

Wolfhag

Re Advocate post.
'In previous discussions on this forum regarding the tiger, I referred to that specific action. You could also point to the action in which Wittmann was killed. A Firefly killed the 3 Tigers, but regular Sherman kept the others busy whilst the Firefly took the killing shots. No Sherman were hit in either action.'

Accounts that I have read make no mention of the 75mm armed troop tanks… concentrating on the Firefly. If the Tigers were being plastered with fire, that could explain why Ekins Firefly survived to take out three Tigers.
Think other units were contributing also!

(Just imagine what the last moments in those 'invincible' Tigers may have been like?). :(

@ Wolfhag

Most games don't reflect mission kills from armor spalling, jammed guns and turrets or crew WIA/KIA or concussions or crews bailing from non-lethal hits.

Indeed. I am in the process of converting the old Quarrie WW2 rules into an Excel spreadsheet, for fun. For a number of reasons I wouldn't use these rules today, but the anti-tank fire procedures are a good example of the old school approach. Die roll to see the target, die roll to hit it, read off pen vs armour, die roll for effect. Repeat per round fired.

Three peculiar assumptions or outcomes feature. First of all, no damage is possible without armour penetration. A second is that while guns and traverses can be jammed as the outcome of a hit, it only happens with penetrating hits, and the crew stays by default in the tank and carries on fighting even though the enemy has found the range and damaged the tank. A third is that once armour is penetrated, it's penetrated on an equal basis. A 2-pounder hitting a Tiger I in the turret rear from 100 metres, or a 17-pounder doing so from 800 metres, will both penetrate and will then cause identical damage per die roll. 128mm or 20mm firing on a Tetrarch, same thing.

All of this strikes me as unrealistic. You can add an "overmatch" factor to the damage die roll, so that large shells or small targets increase the damage die roll. Another is to change all the "traverse jammed" results into "crew abandons" results.

The logical approach is to abandon penetration as a precondition of damage and just make it an input, with outputs including temporary blindness, involuntary retreat, crew baleout, etc.

Rate of fire is a challenge. Long move durations of a minute don't really work, because in that time, a Sherman could easily fire six or eight times, and modelling that entails subdividing moves into smaller chunks. For this reason, I have always favoured 1/76 vehicles and ten-second moves, which gets rid of move subdivision and also of the need to consult penetration tables as every weapon has one AP value where needed.

The Tiger weighted about 40% more than a Sherman too.

67% last time I looked: 55 tons to 33. As you say, different missions.

4th Cuirassier,
Thanks for the weight clarification, I was too lazy last night to do the math.

The 10 second turn sounds workable. It would also more accurately portray Opportunity Fire as a tank moving at 20kph moves about 55m in 10 seconds. That would force you to use a ground scale of 1" = 20m to 25m. But why not 5, 2, or even 1 second turns?

To determine damage I use the shell weight in kg as a damage die roll modifier. However, the shell must over penetrate the armor to get the modifier. If penetration = armor it causes spalling damage and crew suppression and no shell weight modifier as the shell does not fully enter the compartment.

I use a D20 for hit location with a 20 being a Critical Hit which can be a turret ring, hatch, weak spot, gun sight, machine gun, cupola, etc. No target is entirely safe.

Rate of fire is fairly easy to quantify after the first shot at a target. What can get complicated is the first shot because it should take into account the crew Situational Awareness/spotting, crew reaction time and engagement time (getting the gun on the target/traverse speed, estimating the range, aiming and firing).

In my readings crews in WWII were expected to engage a target and shoot within 10-15 seconds. Even with a 10 second turn you will end up needing a way to parse the action within those 10 seconds when two units are shooting at each other at the same time.

Ambush fire should be different. Normally the target was acquired at longer range and then tracked and fired on when it entered the "kill zone". So if a concealed unit in ambush spotted a target and did not fire it would assumed to be "tracking" the target and able to fire in any future 10 second turn without activation. That's how I see it anyhow.

Wolfhag

Dan Cyr:
The report you are referencing is "Data on World War II Tank Engagements Involving the U.S. Third and Fourth Armored Divisions" Memorandum Report 798, published by the Ballistic Research Laboratories, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland in June 1954.

Another document with some of the same conclusions is "A Survey of Tank Warfare in Europe from D-Day to 12 August 1944" a limited edition report prepared and distributed in May 1952. This report covered, and was based on, British data.

Sherman's were the only tank to have wet ammo storage which combined with a hatch for all crew members made the Sherman one of the most survivable tanks in the war.

Actually the design of the wet stowage racks did not substantially improve survivability of the Sherman tank. Testing after the war confirmed that moving ammunition storage out of the sponsons and placing it lower in the hull, which all wet stowage Shermans did, was the reason for the greater survivability. I remember reading that wet stowage Shermans in Korea did not even bother filling the racks with liquid.

Thanks, Marc33594, advancing years have left me with memories of what I read, not what the titles were or where I found the source. I've also gotten rid of nearly 7k books and documents as I finally retired and moved into a much smaller home. Sign of the times.

Close reading of Charles MacDonald's books on the Bulge and his experiences as an infantry company commander show the importance of getting in the first shot, viability and concealment, while the reports you list demonstrated the ability of US crews to use their weapon systems to exploit the advantages of their turret rotation speed, observation and targeting devices to get that first shot in.

Thanks, Marc33594, advancing years have left me with memories of what I read, not what the titles were or where I found the source. I've also gotten rid of nearly 7k books and documents as I finally retired and moved into a much smaller home. Sign of the times.

Close reading of Charles McDonald's books on the Bulge and his experiences as an infantry company commander show the importance of getting in the first shot, viability and concealment, while the reports you list demonstrated the ability of US crews to use their weapon systems to exploit the advantages of their turret rotation speed, observation and targeting devices to get that first shot in.

IMO, one item on the Sherman that does not get the credit it deserves, when getting down into the details of things like turret traverse speed, etc. WRT getting off the first shot, is the commander's override. At least I'm not aware that German tanks in WWII had it, but I could be wrong…

@Wolfhag I can answer your playability question – For that level of detail you want a PC tank sim and there are several good ones. In a miniatures game no thanks, I'll have fun with "What a Tanker".

Seriously though reading some of the above linked paper is interesting. I always thought the Sherman was in general more maneuverable and faster, not so according to LTC Hawkins 3-67 AR and his crews a captured Panther showed otherwise. They also felt that the sights were better which is not surprising. Given the choice his crews would have used the German vehicles, although no mention is made of the mechanics choices lol! One point that is apparent is that range of engagement made a big difference in a number of ways. Reading on….thanks for the link!

@ Wolfhag

10 seconds (and 1cm = 1m, i.e. the ground scale = the figure scale) are just approximations for convenience. The thinking really is that if you have to start splitting moves down into fractions, chances are, your move duration is too long. I just figured the right length of move is however long it takes to notice, aim at and fire on a target more or less ahead of you, which is probably about ten seconds. Arguably, it's maybe closer to five or seven seconds. Any more granular than that and as DeRuyter says you maybe want a PC game.

@4th Cuirassier,
I think you've got it about right. It seems like it would give a better portrayal of moving opportunity fire.

My question is does everyone fire at the same time in the 10 second turn or is there some way to determine the sequence based on a units crew, speed or technological advantage?

Are units always active and able to do something or do they need to be activated?

How would units sitting in ambush fit into the firing sequence in a turn?

@DeRuyte,
I'm glad you like it. Why wouldn't one or two second turns be playable?

@codiver,
So how would you give the Sherman an advantage for the first shot in a game because of the technical advantages it had?

I'm just trying to get some ideas. PC game, no way?

Wolfhag

I'd be a little cautious about writing off Tigers and Panthers as rolling junk, many of the tank crews at the time didn't think so.

I am always reminded of the comments made by an officer in 107th RAC in Normandy. "The Panthers weren't too bad as you could flank them, but the Tigers were a real sod".

Yes, the (much) heavier German tanks could be defeated by lighter allied vehicles, but only with a degree of effort and/or skill. The Panther and Tiger probably weren't very cost effective designs in terms of resources used, but being unable to reliably penetrate the enemies frontal armour was a bit depressing for 75mm armed tank crews.

After the war NATO went off and built a whole load of "Panthers and Tigers" of their own, and in the Chieftan, even managed to attain a similar level of mechanical reliability:)

@ Wolfhag

The rule of thumb broadly is stationary units fire first. But the sorts of points you raise, like the superior SA of certain units at certain times, make a lot of sense.

I have a couple of litmus tests of whether I'm going to get along with a rule set and one is how it handles certain encounters, eg Panzer III versus T-34, or Sherman versus Tiger. If all that's considered is the guns versus the armour, probably it's not an approach I'm likely to persist with.

Another, incidentally, is how often one shot produces one kill. My reading suggests that this was IRL actually quite rare. Unless we're talking Flak 36 versus Vickers Mk VI, or PaK 44 versus M5 or something, typically you would fire into and hit a tank several times to be sure it was finished, unless it catastrophically exploded or you had blown the turret off. You would not, as some rules allow you to do, hit it once, assume this destroyed it, then move to a new target. This was originally why I thought one-minute moves made sense – the damage isn't one hit but is rather the cumulative result of a minute's worth of firing. One-minute moves have other issues though as we've been discussing.

@ Martin

I often wonder if the advantage Tigers had somehow reflects that "there ain't no substitute for cubic inches". You can turbocharge a 1.6-litre engine and get 200bhp out of it or you can fit a big, lazy 5-litre engine and also get 200bhp out of it. Only by a limited definition of performance are they equals. In the same way, sloping 40mm of armour might make it nominally equal to 80mm of vertical armour, but when all's said and done, one box is made of thicker and more robust slabs of steel than the other. If I had to choose which to be behind it would tend to be the latter.

@Martin,
I don't think anyone is describing the Panther and Tiger as a POS. One of the interesting comparisons is what if the Tigers and Panthers were able to carry out their breakthrough mission as designed.

I think that would have eliminated much of the negative factors. By advancing and seizing the battleground they would have recovered all of those broken down tanks and would not have had to abandon and destroy vehicles like they did when withdrawing. Their repair depots would have remained operational. Destroying vehicles to prevent them from being captured was as high as 50% in some engagements. I wouldn't be surprised that is some engagements German crews destroyed more German tanks that Sherman's did. That's not reflected in games.

If they were able to attack as planned in an inverted "Vee" the Sherman's would not have been able to out maneuver them so easily and the German take advantage of their longer range. There are many AAR's of Sherman's caught in the open and taking 50% causalities in a few minutes from only one or two German tanks. The overall tactical situation can be more important than stats.

In NWE for the most part they were concealed and hull down to take advantage of their long range fire. On many occasions, the Sherman's were able to negate this advantage using smoke, WP and mortars/artillery. Using combined arms effectively they didn't need to be the equal of German tanks.

The Panther D (first model) was at a severe disadvantage when being surprised on their flanks because it had a turret traverse speed of 6 degrees per second. It would take 15 seconds to traverse 90 degrees and a Sherman could get off two and maybe even three shots before the Panther could fire one.

Panzer III's were able to take advantage of the early T-34/76 in the same manner because the two-man turret needed to be buttoned up when engaged giving poor Situational Awareness to detect the Panzer even though it had a faster turret traverse.

For me, these are the interesting factors to model rather than stating a Panther is a 8 and a Sherman is a 6.

The Germans designated the Panther a medium tank because it had a 75mm gun, not by the weight like other countries. Again, comparing a pre-war Sherman medium tank design to a heavy tank design after the war started is not exactly a fair comparison. But war isn't fair and you need to improvise and use your strengths against your opponents weaknesses in battle. The Allies did that pretty well and later models of the Sherman made them almost equal.

Interesting conversation.

Wolfhag

@Wolfhag – Not necessarily unplayable, personally I am past that "ASL" level of detail in a miniatures game, I'd rather so that on the PC.

As an added note on the book, I was not aware that our sights did not have the zoom capabilities of the German optics. Although it is not surprising that the German optics were good! A few comments about how they had a hard time sighting the German vehicles at longer ranges.

@ushcha and @Miflander66.
The Sherwood Foresters were an infantry regiment (my dad was in the regiment from 1939, until he transferred to Royal Engineers )
The regiment using Sherman's were the Sherwood Rangers Yeomanry and the incident, where Shermans of that regiment caused a Tiger crew to evacuate, is described in "Brothers in Arms" by James Holland. The Sherman crew reckoned they fired 10 rounds in about 30 seconds, so not quite 25 rounds a minute, but still pretty impressive.

In the short distance from Fontenay Le Pesnel to Rauray (2.5 km) no less than 4 Tigers were encountered and knocked out.

"If they were able to attack as planned in an inverted "Vee" the Sherman's would not have been able to out maneuver them so easily and the German take advantage of their longer range. "

Sure.

In the German counterattack at Brieux in summer 44 the Tigers led out the Panthers of KG Wunsche behind a Nebelwerfer barrage. Both squadrons of defending Churchill were wiped out, despite the huge AT screen on the other side of the Orne. In his memoir, John Foley recounted how they got three shots off at 50 yards off at a Tiger which all bounced off, before the Tiger blew a hole right through his tank from one end to the other.

The Grimbosq bridgehead was Aug 6-7-8 1944 and on those dates SS 102 was fighting in the Vire area. Very unlikely to be any significant Tiger support at Grimbosq except on Aug 6-7th. 107 RAC did not have 2 Squadrons 'wiped out' but they did have form a composite squadron from the surviving tanks of A and C Squadrons. B squadron was badly hit on August 8th and by then SS 101 were having their own nightmare at Cintheaux.

Brieux. (Almost looks like FOW!) Crew losses must have been appalling.
link

Crew losses must have been appalling.

Going by the average then c 20 KIA. It was more or less the same for all tanks of all nations. Stories of Allied tanks busting into flames and the entire crew burned to death at the mere mention of a Tiger in the area should not be relied upon. If you want a comparison then during EPSOM 12th SS lost 32 tanks & 15 KIA in the 2 days 26/27th June.

True enough. Unless a hit exploded ammunition, a crew compartment or engine bay fire could take a minute to take hold… enough time for survivors to bale.

With a Turret / Crew compartment penetration… maybe 1 – 3 killed outright. But. of course, there may be critical injuries… and MG fire.

Allies tended to pump rounds into a hit tank until 'obviously' dead or baled.
Germans with 88s or High Velocity 75s…not so sure… and usually more targets needing attention.

'Losses' is often a 'grey ares' for stats… German losses were often due to abandonment / demolition. Allied… some vehicles repairable and recovered.

The field of dead Churchills is chilling as pic taken in 1947, so tanks not worth recovery. Article says of 22 'losses' , 5 recovered… so pretty devastating firepower.

Worth remembering that the figure of 1 KIA (and 1.5 WIA) per tank loss is a statistical average covering a broad range of loss causations. See Coox & Naisawald for their somewhat deeper statistical dive into the casualty issue.

If you are not already familiar with this document (freely available on the web) – Analysis of 75 mm Sherman Tank Casualties Suffered Between 6th June and 10th July 1944: Report No. 12 offers some insights from the British PoV on the nature of Sherman tank losses in Normandy. Average number of penetrating hits per kill – 1.63; percentage of brewed-up tanks – 85 pct (IIRC).

What is unclear to me is whether the Germans persisted in hitting a target tank until it burnt, or whether the Shermans at that particular point in time were prone to burning (ammunition stowage in the sponsons versus floor; excessive ammo loads).

Complicated detective story.

FWIW

B

Worth remembering that the figure of 1 KIA (and 1.5 WIA) per tank loss is a statistical average covering a broad range of loss causations. See Coox & Naisawald for their somewhat deeper statistical dive into the casualty issue.

Which means that for every tank where the whole crew were killed there were 4 knocked out tanks where no one was killed.
Coox & Naisawald compiled their paper years after the war and their definition of a tank casualty appears to be partially based on War Diary/AAR mentions of tank losses rather than the actual number of tanks stricken from the Units. Both these numbers are tanks that became casualties rather than total losses and thus are not an accurate accounting of tanks that were total losses. After years of looking for the sources for the '75mm Sherman casualties' I am fairly confident that was an examination of Sherman hulks in the tank graveyard (tanks written off as scrap) at Bray 2.5km NNW of Rots and not a survey of all types of casualty.

Coox & Naisawald specifically defined the term "tank loss" as it related to their study. They did NOT confine their study to "tanks stricken off" and were very clear about that.

Their study was published in 1951. I would hardly consider that to have been "years after the war", considering the time required to gather, analyze and compile so much relevant data from so many sources.

B

Coox & Naisawald specifically defined the term "tank loss" as it related to their study. They did NOT confine their study to "tanks stricken off" and were very clear about that

But lots of people are not 'clear about that' and the method used to calculate (i.e 'guess') tank casualties was very unscientific. It is not a very good report for the real tank losses/casualties. For that you should use the 1945 study of Commonwealth tank losses which has a bewildering level of detail as to loss of both tank and crew.

Their study was published in 1951. I would hardly consider that to have been "years after the war", considering the time required to gather, analyze and compile so much relevant data from so many sources.

I contacted Naisawald about this report in January 2008 long before it was published online. He explained to me what the report was to be used for and the way they went about it. I am very well informed on this matter.

"….. the method used to calculate (i.e 'guess') tank casualties was very unscientific.)

The introductory acknowledgments include -
> The Historical Section, Canadian Army Headquarters, Ottawa Canada
> Army Operational Research Group, London, England.
> British Joint Services Mission, Army Staff, Washington DC

Quoting from the document cover -
"Comments and criticism of its contents are invited. These should be addressed to -

THE DIRECTOR
OPERATIONS RESEARCH OFFICE
FT. LESLEY J. McNAIR
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

Let me know how you make out.

B

I can only say that I thought this topic had been flogged to death, but this has been a fascinating thread. I only hope it keeps going because I have learnt so much. (I am still more knowledgeable about 1815…even then only about one Sunday for about 12 hours, but I have learnt so much here).

I am on my 15th 1/72 French Sherman. One I sent to a chap in France, a descendent of a crew member, the other M4A2 is in 1/35. My wife is pleased that we do not have 13 Shermans. All I am missing now is a bog standard M4, but they were very scarce in 2eme DB.

We all grew up with the idea of "Ronsons" and "Tommy Cookers". Then the idea that every tank should have been a Firefly instead. Then that Tigers and Panthers were what everyone should go to war in.

This has repeated much recent thought, but some how condensed it all superbly

The introductory acknowledgments include -……….

The old tired argument from authority

Please note what I actually said before further venting.

Here it is again:

It is not a very good report for the real tank losses/casualties.

That is anyone wanting the actual number of destroyed tanks needs to look elsewhere. Coox and Naisawald is a good primer and if you would like to see how it could be done I recommend this book:

link

What you should do is take the author's 'raw data' and then form your own conclusions. Be careful not to conflate the 'facts' in a book with the authors conclusions.

Moving on… one thing that strikes me on reading first hand accounts in Normandy is how often one side would inflict heavy casualties on the other. The next day the situation might be reversed.

The next day the situation might be reversed.

Yes, ambushing and getting off the first shot is of utmost importance, especially if you wait until the enemy gets close enough for a 90%+ chance to hit. In a prepared assault you can have a good prep barrage and artillery dedicated to screening your flanks. That can really help the Allies and take away the range advantage the Germans had.

From accounts I've read it was all too often the Allies led with their Sherman's without adequate support and recon. This can result in an ambush with most of the Company wiped out in minutes.

Once you hit a target any other targets nearby or +/-100m are "ranged in" and engaging the next one will have a 90%+ chance to hit without needing a ranging shot. This is what made the Germans so dangerous because they were normally defending. That means they would have different landmarks pre-measured for range increasing their first round hit. Under ideal conditions they could knock out 3-5 tanks in one minute. The use of flashless and smokeless powder made them harder to spot when concealed too.

Responding to an ambush situation is where the Sherman really shines. The commander controlled turret traverse and vane sight allow him to get a shot off before the German can reload and shoot again and be pretty accurate out to 600m, a somewhat normal engagement range in NWE. With a WP round loaded the German tanks can't get off a second shot and is screened allowing the Sherman's to maneuver out of the LOS. This works against tanks, infantry and anti-tank guns.

In our group we had a player that preferred the Sherman 75 and another the Russians. For NWE scenarios when attacking he loaded the Sherman's with a mixture of canister, HE and WP. He figured there was no point in bouncing AP rounds when something else may be more effective or using AP against anti-tank guns or infantry.

He was ready for infantry, anti-tank guns and armor. Canister suppresses anti-tank guns and strips away their concealment. It can also can kill an exposed tank commander and infantry. The draw back is the range is fairly short. WP is effective against anti-tank guns and infantry and also screens them. WP against tanks forces them to button up and has a slight chance of starting a fire or forcing them to relocate. HE can be effective against infantry and anti-tank guns and sometimes tanks.

The Americans were big proponents of Recon by Fire when advancing and attacking. This can give the Sherman another advantage and force the Germans to expose themselves preventing an ambush. While HE fire on the move may not be very accurate when firing into a treeline a miss high results in an air burst. An HE round hitting short can ricochet and create an air burst over the target. Both of these are effective against infantry, exposed crews, and anti-tank guns.

Many times Sherman crews would go into action overloaded with HE rounds and fire them off as quickly as possibly on the move or at a short halt for Recon by Fire suppression. If they knew how to use a stabilizer it was that much more effective.

We're still experimenting with Recon by Fire rules to make them playable but it is another advantage Sherman's had that is rarely reflected in games. Also, using Recon by Fire with machine guns would identify concealed pillboxes and tanks because of the multiple tracer ricochets. The Sherman bow machine gun was useful for this because it used tracers to aim as it had no gun sight.

The Russian player knows he had to close to 800m or less to penetrate Tigers and Panthers with his T-34/85. He'd move at high speed into and out of the LOS splitting his forces and angling his armor for a better chance of a miss and increased armor protection and ricochet chance.

He'd have his gun already pointed at a target and acquired ready to fire (Tracking Fire rule). When the German tank fired and missed he knew he had 6-8 seconds before it could reload and shoot again. He'd give a Halt Fire order taking 3 seconds to halt and 1-3 seconds to shoot (Snap Shot) and then "Shoot & Scoot" moving out immediately after firing before the German could shoot at him at the halt. Over 800m he'd normally fire HE because a near miss forces the German to button up or kill the TC.

After games where the Germans lost commanders like this the German players soon learned to button up as soon as the Russians started shooting giving the Russians another slight timing and Situational Awareness advantage.

Hopefully, you can see how interesting it is to play the Allies with Sherman's. If done right and taking advantage of all of their features they are not cannon fodder like many other games, and don't forget that .50cal HMG either.

Wolfhag

The canonical type of rule set I grew up with typical involved rolling to see if you hit and then resolving the effect of each hit. Unless you immobilised the target there was no real memory built in, i.e. no cumulative effects ever accrued. It was always one shot, one outcome, forget, next shot.

I'm wondering if there's a way to adopt what naval gamers do, which is to assign ships total hit points of some kind and critical locations. Successive hits shoot them away with either permanent or temporary effect. Lose all your hit points, even temporarily, and you lose your tank for the balance of the game.

If you assigned a Tiger an arbitrary hit points total of 100, you might also assign a round of 75mm WP 25 points. A 17-pounder hit might be worth 150 points. You don't then need the 17-pounder to eliminate the Tiger; four WP hits in rapid succession use up all its hit points, and the tank's eliminated by abandonment.

It would call for a bit of record-keeping, so of doubtful practicality for higher-level games. But if you have only 3 or 4 per side, then keeping track of who's still on fire – or otherwise still feeling the effects of the previous turn's fire – becomes manageable. You can perhaps then force results like crews baling or retreating, because they've just had eight HE hits in 20 seconds, and although their tank's intact, their nerves are not.