"Reinforcements davout's corps at austerlitz just dragoons?" Topic

Informatie gezocht over de eerste uren van het 3e korps infantrie. En zoek een lijst van het totale korps. Hartelijk dank

Looking for the first hours of the 3rd corps infantry and a whole list of the total corps – thank you

According to 'Napoleon's Finest' serving under Davout were:

2nd Division (Friant)
1st Bde (Kister)
15th Light, 2 Bns, 628 / 300
33rd Line, 2 Bns, 1,214 / 500
2nd Bde (Lochet)
48th Line, 2 Bns, 1,365 / 800
111th Line, 2 Bns, 1,440 / 700
3rd Bde (Heudelet)
108th Line, 2 Bns, 1,637 / 800
2nd coy, 2nd Foot Artillery, 4x8pdr 2x6"
˝ 1st coy, 1st Horse Artillery, 2x8pdr 1x6"
3rd Sqn 3rd Dragoons, 321 / 130

4th Dragoon Division (Bourchier)
1st Bde (Sahuc)
15th Dragoons, 3 Sqns, 227 / 90
17th Dragoons, 3 Sqns, 290 / 120
2nd Bde, (Laplanche)
18th Dragoons, 3 Sqns, 279 / 150
19th Dragoons, 3 Sqns, 266 / 160
3rd Bde (Verdičre)
25th Dragoons, 3 Sqns, 220 / 100
˝ 3rd coy, 2nd Horse Artillery, 2x8pdr 1x6"

Strengths are given as : parade states / estimated present.

Davout also had Soult's corps cavalry plus one brigade and one regiment of Legrand's division (IV Corps).

Also, as you asked about the whole Corps – one of the other 3rd Corps divions was at Austerlitz but fought under Lannes.
Do you want their OOB?

Hypothetical organisation doesn't count.
Detached corps dont count.
Residual troops dont count.

What are 'residual troops'?

And to what 'hypothetical organization' are you referring?

In the Grande Armee, attachments and detachments from one corps to another was 'standard operating procedure.' It was one of the aspects of the corps organization that made it so flexible.

What the OP/ joe requested AND MY OWN modelling is based on (hopefully have removed any non-historic comments):

Specific OB (Progressive Arrivals)- (Updated Apr21)
NB- The III Corps was marching (from Vienna environs) in inverse order, that is the Avant-garde was the 3rd Brigade, followed by the second, then the first- not including other detached corps in between. (D. Mem- The Friant division arrived at forced marches, and the Gudin division, the furthest away, could arrive at most only during the action, if, as we thought, it was to be very next.)

1- Avant-Garde -0800 approx. Davout Memoires repeating his battles reports, states that while he was marching with Heudelets ‘brigade', about 8am, an officer from the 8e Hussards* approached them to advise that the 3e de ligne was under serious attack again at Telnitz, and to hurry to their aid.
It is also stated in Davouts Memoires that the 1er Dragons had been positively placed under command of Heudelet.

*NB- The 8eHussars (Col Franceschi) had been detached from Margarons brigade to ‘watch' and screen the extreme right flank of the army in case of incursion by any other forces attempt to outflank the army. His left rested between the villages of Telnitz, where the last infantry brigade stood and Menitz that was left unmanned at all by any troops, except perhaps the 8eHu forward vedettes.

1- GBD Heudelet
15e Legere- 2 comps only – only 64 men total (*) described as "Voltigeurs".
NB- there is an illustration in H&C Aust. showing ‘lights' advancing to attack.
108e de Ligne- 1er et 2eme bons
1er Dragons (Col…)

2- Mal Davout arrived after Telnitz was cleared of Russians the first time. This may therefore indicate it was he who rode back toward Kl. Raigern(also spelled Raygern) to hurry and direct the route and balance of of GDV Friants 2nd Division.

3- Art á cheval -3 pieces- joined the dragoons position around the arrival of Friant.

4- GDV Friant (2nd Division commander) -approx 0900- intercepted en route by Davout (personally or by ADC unknown) who directed them NE to Sokolnitz at haste via the Turas plateau high road (not visible to the Allies due to constant fog and the higher ground).

5- GBD Lochet Time- tbc
48e régiment d'infanterie de ligne, 2 bataillons
111e régiment d'infanterie de ligne, 2 bataillons

6- GBD Kister Time- tbc

15e régiment d'infanterie légčre -balance of 1er et 2eme bons (12 companies?)
33e régiment d'infanterie de ligne 2 bataillon
*-*-*
tbc

Wat zijn 'resttroepen'? may be in gross-reichen? as rear guard

TBC__

Because I wasn't sure of reciting times from memory. I went back to Davouts Memoires (pub. de Mazade 1885) and found on p264 that he gives a different order for the march- the latter two brigades switched, in that Kister arrived (at Sokolnitz) first.

It should be noted explicitly that only Heudelets' brigade went to Tellnitz. The others were re-directed (as it were back on the original orders) to head to Sokolnitz.

I'm now creating a translation of the Memoires to completely cover the battle as appropriate to Davouts actions.

FWIW, dave
;-)

yes
the whole o o b the early troops

To add-
GDV Bourcier- 4th Dragon DV arrived behind Kister and deployed southward toward Tellnitz, partly covering the exit of Heudelets brigade from village- and also preventing enemy advancing from same. Their half company (peloton) of artillerie á cheval also arrived then.

Davout wrote "In the same moment of time when French were ejected from Sokolnitz, Division Friant was still separated from Division Legrand (*204); there was no time to lose. General Heudelet had rallied his men at Telnitz [after being ejected from there], and kept watch over the debouch [the exit via the Northern bridge], while General Bourcier, a little more on [our] right, by small charges made there, the purpose to limit the exit of the enemy from the village.

At this time especially the division of dragons received fire, suffering lightly from enemy mousqueterie and from artillery, because it was apparently firing too high. [Probably because of the existing dense fog AND the rising ground in front of them, and elevation differences between the two forces.]

[**Notes in para_dww].
*204- this being the legere of GBD Merle."
FWIW, dave
;-)

>>Wat zijn 'resttroepen'? may be in gross-reichen? as rear guard<<

You're funny joe.
"rear guard" – err no, the entire corps was a days march from Brunn and was ordered up _almost_ too late!

Heudelets Brigade only arrived at Kleine Raigern approximately 0200hr and dropped on the spot.

Hence why Davout issued spirits to the troops and hussled them out of Kleine Raigern between 0530 and 0600 on 2 December. It was a 10 kilometres march to the nearest (and at that time unknown) combat.

At some distance each brigade did the same. Their orders and Order of March depicted an advance on Turas to BE THE RESERVE should anything befall the army, and prevent cossack penetrations toward the enemy rear. It was to be an out of sight-out of mind surprise.

However, the TWO orders Davout received after breaking 'camp'- first to march on Turas and a second before daylight to 'swing right' and face Tellnitz-Sokolnitz boundary closer to the Goldbach.

A third intervention was Margarons officer. Duffy claims from I don't know where, that the officer reported that Sokolnitz was not being attacked, whereas Tellnitz was.
Given the 8e Hussars were specifically detailed to screen the area from Tellnitz SOUTH via Menitz, I don't understand how one could have mentioned Sokolnitz at all.

The echelons of brigades advanced via (transitting) Kleine Raigern and undertook modified orders accordingly.

Again, there was no reserve. Every man and unit of Friants Division was thrown into line of battle, or at least a supporting line (ie the most of the dragoons).

It's true they did a lot of 'facing off' the enemy for a while.

This was caused by three criteria- lack of specific visibility in the fog, and lack of support/ reserves of their own;
- primarily it was because after taking Tellnitz and occupuying open ground positions WEST of the village and Goldbach, the Allied force remained halted for almost the rest of the day, waiting for the inevitable advance that never joined them.

The rest of the Corps force-marching up from Wien were too far away to arrive anywhere.
All best joe,
dave

in the napoleonic guides draggoon facings in 1812 just as usual
,,1805????

>> guides draggoon facings
Garde??
No Garde Dragoons until 1806 (and then not even much).
You mean line dragoon regiments??
Yes, even the shorter habit didn't change colours of facings. Less those 6 regiments converted to 'lanciers' in 1811. For once things happened immediately and they were off for training and reorganisation.
d

talking in this topic dragoon are line no guard dragoon
i know about them but not my cup of tea yet?
after
i finished austerlitz huh?
just now any o. o.b. for austerlitz

with al o.ob.s

No Garde Dragoons until 1806 (and then not even much).

The new regiment joined the Grande Armee in late 1806 and half of them were still dismounted.

They were given the horses of the crack Prussian Gensd'armes cavalry regiment. Their first action was Friedland where they didn't particularly distinguish themselves.

To form them, each line dragoon regiment contributed ten men with ten years' service. The officers were chosen from the Guard and line cavalry. They 'liberated' the silver trumpets of the Spanish Garde du Corps in 1808.

Interestingly, the Grenadiers a Cheval were originally formed from troops drawn from the line dragoons.

>>just now any o. o.b. for austerlitz

The 4th Division des Dragons as given above is correct, less one regiment was retained at Gr. Raigern for security and communications.

All the Divisions des dragons organised from the Army of Ocean Coasts remained almost the same the entire campaign. It was a very effective and efficiently managed corps.

Including the design and management of the 'unmounted' extra men who formed the marching division. (Despite the ridicule and sniggers both then and now…).

Did you want more joe?
I have modelled the 3rd Division as IT WAS ATTACHED to the IVCorps d' armée the entire time. I have only one brigade more to complete the division.

Refer:-
theminiaturespage.com‌

‌"TMP link

Don't know whats happening on here but text being 'lost'?
The box contains the four regiments completed plus for convenience the 3eme Cuirassier Brigade.
cheers dave

Wilde je meer Joe?
every facngs of the chasseurs 1805?

Facing colours as per last 2 below (but ignore later style uniform as need to go with the "hussar" type style.)-

Also see:

same husar?question different uniform colors

habit a la husar is callled the early ones that is

thanks for al this info it wil be much clearer now

>>habit a la husar is callled the early ones that is

That may just be referring to 'ordinary' dress.
The only hussars likely to get a complete second uniform, that they pay for anyway, will be the officers for 'undress' or Sundays, hardly ever would you see them on a battlefield/ activer service out of hussar style.
My thoughts anyway, d

i thought this so dear shat 1984
this
korps was een dagen mars van Brúnn en werd _bijna_ te laat besteld!
crops corps raygan the 3rd came didn't came brünn?!
they must have seen some
russian troops i know the 3rd from the south not north!

SHaT1984…following up your Sep 21 post

I looked at the "Le Centenaire D'Austerlitz" by Martin, 1905

>> However, the TWO orders Davout received after breaking 'camp'- first to march on Turas and a second before daylight to 'swing right' and face Tellnitz-Sokolnitz boundary closer to the Goldbach."

– "Le Marechal Davout avait quitte Gross-Raygern, se dirigeant d'abord sur Turas, puis sur Sokolnitz"
– the order of march was "la division de dragons du general Bourcier, puis la division de Friant" Friants division is given as a different OOB than Napoleon's Finest but matches ShaT1984("la division Friant etait formee en trois brigades: la premiere (108e et les compagnies de voltigeurs du 15e legere aux ordre du general Heudelet); la deuxieme (reste du 15e leger et 33e de ligne aux ordre du general Kister); la troisieme (48e et 111e de ligne aux ordre de Lochet)"

>> A third intervention was Margarons officer. Duffy claims from I don't know where, that the officer reported that Sokolnitz was not being attacked, whereas Tellnitz was."

– Martin has "Pendant sa marche, il fut informe, par un officier du Margaron que le 3e de ligne venait d'etre contraint d'abondonner Telnitz" No mention of Sokolnitz per SHaT1984 thesis, just the risk to Telnitz

>>Every man and unit of Friants Division was thrown into line of battle, or at least a supporting line (ie the most of the dragoons).

– Martin then has "Davout se porta aussitot sur ce village et ordonna a la brigade Heudelet (108e de ligne et les compagnies de voltigeurs du 15e leger) de l'attaquer, tandis que le 1er regiment de dragons, detache de la division Klein, avait pour mission d'empecher l'ennemi de deboucher du village. Les soldats d'Heudelet, favorises par un brouillard epais, se precipiterent a la baionnette dans Telnitz…les Austro-Russes ne purent resister a l'elan des notres, qui enleverent le village vers neuf heures et demie et pousserent les fuyards jusqu'a la hauteur situee en avant, a proximite de l'etang de Satezan"

forgive the lack of proper accents, and if others know this data forgive the redundancy

Sorry joe I missed your reply… wasn't igoring your question deliberately.

crops corps raygan the 3rd came didn't came brünn?!
they must have seen some
russian troops i know the 3rd from the south not north!

1. Correct. the IIICorps (Davout) DID NOT come via Brünn. They hadn't advanced beyond Wien on this leg of the campaign. I understand N. was seriously concerned that Archduke Johann could have quick marched into his rear and LOC. So Davout Corps holding the capital AND Ney managing the Tyrol.
2. No, Davout hadn't seen any Russians since the occupation of Wien. The threat was Austrian armies in Italy (Karl) maybe and Johann, so South and West.

Fixed?
- -
@ChaosMan

Haven't heard of that title, can you give it in full please?

>> However, the TWO orders Davout received after breaking 'camp'- first to march on Turas and a second before daylight to 'swing right' and face Tellnitz-Sokolnitz boundary closer to the Goldbach."

The 'orders' to hustle were first given on 1Dec thus Turas remained the target.
Heudelet left Kl. Raygern in the dark Northward on the march to Turas. Next I understand the overnight correction came in and it ordered them toward Sokolnitz instead, and as cited by Davout official report.

NEXT was the intervention of the 'officer' from the 8eme Hussards that led to the directed hastened march of Heudelets brigade direct on Tellnitz, nearly due East of the current route.

No mention of Sokolnitz per SHaT1984 thesis, just the risk to Telnitz

No hypothesis of mine; stated as fact by Davout in TWO offical reports, one to E-MG AND another a week later (or was it more) detailled direct to Napoleon who had requsted it.

It is also Davout who states that the 1er Dragon moved off AFTER Heudelet, something along the lines of "following along behind Heudelet".

Yes except Davout wasn't actually with Heudelet at that time. The ‘attack' was solely his responsibility.

Davout appears to have been shepherding the marching troops and NOT leading and fighting. He showed very great confidence in all his Generals.

The quotations from ‘Martin' suggest to me that he is both summarising and eulogising when he says the Russians couldn't stand the French bayonet attack. And falsely claims the French took the ‘high ground' near the ponds. WHile Davout cites that the vineyards were retaken, the French were soon driven back by masses. The Russian divisional troops AND artillery deployed against them, which no skirmishers could withstand.

Well we know what happened next don't we- just as the Russian 7th Jaeger had been surprised by the assault of the 108eme and 15eme Legere; and then caused a rout/ panic amongst the reforming Grenzers who were adjacent but behind them. Who then caused a panic in a further Russian regiment behind them.

The former (108eme) were equally surprised as they stood reforming in the fog and smoke of the combat East of Tellnitz Northern bridge. A vaunted Austrian cavalry charge by their 4th Hussars that routed the regiment and caused an equal amount of panic in them, making them break out Northwest in the fog though apparently losing many prisoners though not actually pursued very far by the cavalry.

So not a very balanced summary?
cheers dave

@SHaT1984

Le Centenaire D'Austerlitz, 1805 (An XIV) – 1905
Par le Commandant Emm. Martin
J. Leroy, Editeur, Paris, 1905

I have a physical copy, don't know if it's scanned somewhere.

Davout appears to have been shepherding the marching troops and NOT leading and fighting.

Where did you find this? It was not Davout's job to 'shepherd' anyone. His job was to command his corps in combat and support his subordinates. Reading his after action reports, this is definitely not what Davout was doing. He was leading and commanding his corps in combat.

Shepherding stragglers was a staff officer's job, not a corps commanders.

Are you suggesting that Davout was not leading his corps at Austerlitz?

You are correct in stating that Davout had confidence in his subordinate commanders, but leaving them to fight the battle alone was not something Davout would have done in order to 'shepherd' the corps stragglers.

>>Where did you find this? It was not Davout's job to 'shepherd' anyone.

He wrote of what he did, and where it happened-
- he wasn't leading Heudelet, nor when he routed.
- you created 'stragglers' -I never called them that.
Men issued triple rations of brandy at 0500 with whatever breakfast they got, I'd say they were on fire, but needed to be guided as well.

If you don't like shepherding, then lets say he was "managing" the speed and directions of his separate brigades forward in a new direction.

He was there heading for Turas with Heudelet along the NE route road, not the main road North; otherwise he couldn't have been in position to have been the recipient of the 8e hussars officer who came from Tellnitz environs (the 8th who were the FAR RIGHT FLANK GUARD of the deployed defensive line).

In fact is his separate report with commendations, Davout cites about, one of his "staff officers":
Le colonel Bourke, mon premier aide de camp, marcha avec la brigade du général Heudeletet se fit distinguer par cet officier général.

No matter what theoretical 'hyper-commander' machismo gets thrown up, Davouts own words/ reports clearly that his next connection with Heudelets brigade was its 'recovery' from the rout NE out of Tellnitz and comments on joining up with the 3eme de ligne who [stood reforming on the higher ground] and likewise had been ejected beforehand.

It reads like Davout had returned to Tellnitz about 0930 and was with the 3eme to observe this before Friant / Lochets brigade had made Sokolnitz. That was a redirection also that had to have happened BEFORE he returned, and thus whereas my original thoughts were unsure, it appears clear to me that HE WAS RESPONSIBLE for directing Lochet Northeastward to Sokolnitz and he himself returned alone more or less to the West of Tellnitz.

Clearly the reduction in combat at Tellnitz had elevated the awareness of the more recent increasing combat at Sokolnitz, a much shorter distance from the current positions than Tellnitz itself and a relatively easy ride of no more than 2kms in relative safety.

Commanding is not the same as 'leading' or being in the front line. Again, Davouts strategic intelligence was greatly employed in getting troops to the fight, not in leading them in one.

I also note that there is nothing in his Memoirs that confirms the claim made by attention seekers of 'history writers' that Davout attended either the 'midnight' conference nor the morning 'breakfast' with N. While there was undoubtedly a cast of the famous and furious there, he wasn't one of them, and thus continued to rely on written and word of mouth orders from on high. In fact, Davout I believe doesn't even mention anyone [personality or Imperial ADC] from the E-MG or subsequent orders.

On Davouts Memoirs, his multiple reports all need to be read because they convey differing information. The very first contains dates but no times, only actions, and in a clinical method; whereas the personal report made to N. has much greater detail, names and some precise times included. Ditto another citation of losses and injuries throught the corps troops and others.

~d

If you fall out, you're straggling. You can keep going to catch up, but it's still straggling.

For a reference, I've used Davout's combat journal:

Napoleon's Finest: Davout and his 3d Corps Combat Journal of Operations 1805-1807.

I suggest having a look at page 6.

Commanding and leading are two different skills. The best commanders, such as Davout, were skilled at both.

Davout with Friant and Bourcier marched from Vienna via Nikolsburg.

Suggesting that Davout 'shepherded' those who fell out on the march (stragglers) denotes that Davout was not with his main body but was behind with the stragglers. He wasn't; like I said, that is a staff officer's job.

Davout to Berthier is one of his after-action reports, dated after the action with only the month-December 1805:

This states, in part, 'The division under General Bourcier took position alongside the division under Friant at Raigern on the evening of [1 December].

'Before sending them to the ground where they would fight I formed Friant's division into three brigades.'

This comment definitely shows that Davout was with Friant and Bourcier on the battlefield the night before the action and was not chasing stragglers.

Regarding III Corps' march from Vienna to Austerlitz, the following might be helpful. From John Elting's Swords Around a Throne, page 463:

'If a maneuver required 'forced' marches, the usual solution was to increase the length of the daily march, 'doubling the etapes' to cover 30 to 35 miles a day, rather than increase the rate of the march. Though bands played and drums boomed, men would sleep on their feet or tumble insensible into ditches, not to be roused by slaps with the flat of a saber. Officers picked them up, got them into wagons when they could, and kept the rest of the column moving on. Such marches, especially made in bad weather on short rations, killed and crippled as many young soldiers as a battle, but if the rest of the column reached its objective before the enemy could react…the loss was justified. Such a march was that of Friant's division of Davout's III Corps from Vienna to Austerlitz in 1805: More than 70 miles in thirty-six hours without halting. Hardly one man out of twenty was still with their eagles at the end, but the stragglers were collected by officers left along the road for that purpose, allowed a short rest, and then hustled forward again. The division closed up with remarkable speed, got part of a night's rest, and the next morning held Napoleon's right flank against odds of four to one.'

Another excellent illustration of French marches is in Heinrich von Brandt's Memoirs where he recalls the movement of the Vistula Legion from Spain to Poland for the invasion of Russia. This was not a forced march, but it illustrates how well-organized the French system was and how it was accomplished.

I agree with Brechtel here. No "shepherding" of stragglers involved, Davout was commanding the main body of troops under his command and marched with them to Sokolnitz as ordered.

I'm not sure what you mean that he was "not fighting". No, Davout did not place himself at the head of Heudelet's single reinforced regiment, he remained with his main body (4 regiments plus Bourcier's dragoon division) and assumed overall command of the French forces at Sokolnitz. He wasn't at the head of the 108e at Telnitz because he was commanding his main body at Sokolnitz.

I can see what you may be getting at – that a marshal marching to a battle might be expected to place himself with his advance guard. But in this case what had been intended as the advance guard ended up as a detachment while still en route to the battlefield.

One minor point in Brechtel's post, Raigern (Rajhrad in Czech) really can't be considered " on the battlefield" being some 10-11 km from Sokolnitz and Telnitz, but replacing "on the battlefield" with "at Raigern" and it's 100% correct.

A few other points:

1. Correct. the IIICorps (Davout) DID NOT come via Brünn. They hadn't advanced beyond Wien on this leg of the campaign. I understand N. was seriously concerned that Archduke Johann could have quick marched into his rear and LOC. So Davout Corps holding the capital AND Ney managing the Tyrol.

Not quite correct. Davout's corps had advanced beyond Wien and was not holding the capital proper, but was screening it from the north bank of the Danube. Davout's forces were pushed out to the north and east of Wien with Caffarelli's division was pushed all the way out to Pohrlitz, Friant's division on the Marchfeld outside of Wien, and Gudin at Pressburg. Caffarelli arrived at the battlefield via Brünn and was placed under Lannes' command, the other two divisions took more direct routes. Mortier's 8th corps occupied the capital with the divisions of Dupont and Gazan in Wien, and Dumonceau to the south at Neustadt. Marmont had two divisions at Graz (people often overlook Marmont). Ney with two French divisions and a Bavarian division were mopping up the various Austrian rearguard detachments in the Tyrol as you note.

2. No, Davout hadn't seen any Russians since the occupation of Wien. The threat was Austrian armies in Italy (Karl) maybe and Johann, so South and West.

I don't think Davout had seen Russians at all in the campaign to this point! In the advance down the Danube, he was opposed by Merveldt's corps. I can't think of any actions between 3rd corps and Russian troops prior to Austerlitz.

But the concern was more serious than Johann and maybe Carl – it was Carl in command of the combined forces of the Army of Tyrol (or at least the remaining 2/3 of it) and the army of Italy. Napoleon had hoped that Ney or Marmont would be able to cut off the retreating Army of Tyrol and destroy it, but Austrian rearguards held off the French advance long enough for the majority to slip away and join Carl. Only the north Tyrol corps (one of three corps in the Army of Tyrol) was cut off, scattered and mopped up.

The portions of Johann's Army of Tyrol that had managed to escape had joined Carl's Army of Italy at Marburg (Maribor) on 26 November and the combined force (commanded by Carl) were heading north (slowly of course). But yes, a more rapid march – or more patience on the part of the Russians at Olmütz – could have put Carl in position to threaten Vienna which is why Marmont and Mortier remained in position with 5 divisions to counter Carl, who was still being pursued by Massena. Davout was in the pivot position, to shift north in support of Lannes/Soult or south to support Mortier/Marmont (or even a little of both).

>>If you fall out, you're straggling. You can keep going to catch up, but it's still straggling.

Only you would construe a column of men force marching toward a battlefield as straggling.

As such it is not worth any further comment.
===========================================================

I think Brechtel and I both were reacting to your comment:

Davout appears to have been shepherding the marching troops and NOT leading and fighting.

The term 'shepherding" calls to my mind the act of rounding up straying sheep to keep them with the flock – the way a frigate might be shepherding merchant ships in convoy. In context, this would seem to refer to the men of Friant's division straggling behind during the forced march. So I get where Brechtel is coming from since I had the same reaction. Can you clarify who you feel Davout was "shepherding"? If this is in reference to Davout remaining with his main body rather than accompanying Heudelet's detachment, I would say that you have certainly used the wrong word.

As for NOT leading and fighting, again, I'm not sure what you're trying to say and what your expectations are here. My reading of the reports shows Davout making the command decision to send Heudelet to Telnitz as a detachment. Davout certainly led the fighting at Sokolnitz, as in commanded the troops involved in the action. This is effective leadership of the forces under his command, and officers are generally said to be participating in the fighting if they are present and commanding, regardless of whether or not they draw a sword or fire a pistol.

If you are defining "leading and fighting" as placing yourself in the front ranks and charging the enemy, then no, neither Davout nor any of the corps commanders did this at Austerlitz. And in general they wouldn't unless something went very very wrong. But if that's the case, I would say your definition of what constitutes leading and fighting as applied to corps commanders differs from the normal usage of these terms.

Overall, I sense you're reacting to some poorly researched history or gamer impressions/assertions, which can be all over the place, and we're missing the context for many of your comments. For example, you took issue with an assertion by [unknown source] that Davout was present at the midnight meeting. Not something I've seen asserted that I recall. Ditto the "hyper-commander machismo" comment. So the outcome is that it appears you are slamming Davout, asserting that he remained in the rear shepherding troops and didn't lead or fight at Austerlitz. At least that's the way it has come across.

Only you would construe a column of men force marching toward a battlefield as straggling.

The troops who kept to the formation were not straggling, merely those who fell out for one reason or another.

I would recommend that you take a look at the sources listed. Further, a useful definition of straggling might also help.

A straggler is one who does not remain with the formation during movement. And by any accurate military definition, those who fell out from Friant's division on the march from Vienna to Raigern were straggling as they did not keep to the formation(s).

I do hope that helps.

@ ShaT1984 – I also note that there is nothing in his Memoirs that confirms the claim made by attention seekers of 'history writers' that Davout attended either the 'midnight' conference nor the morning 'breakfast' with N.
@Carnot93 – For example, you took issue with an assertion by [unknown source] that Davout was present at the midnight meeting. Not something I've seen asserted that I recall.

Not sure of Jacques Garnier's reputation, in his "Austerlitz 2 decembre 1805", has "Le marechal lui-meme etait arrive la veille, vers dix heures du soir, au quartier general de l'Empereur d'ou il etait reparti le 2, entre 5 et 6 heures du matin, pour rejoindre ses troupes. Il retrouve la tete de colonne de Friant vers Rebeschowitz alors que celle-ci marche vers Turas et lui indique son nouvel objectif, conformement aux instructions de l'Empereur. Friant oblique donc vers la gauche pour se diriger sur Sokolnitz. A 8 heures, un officier envoye par Margaron apprend a Davout que le 3e regiment est en position delicate a Telnitz, mais que Sokolnitz n'est pas encore attaque."

The Marshal himself arrived the night before, around 10pm, at the headquarters of the Emperor, where he then departed the two, between 5 and 6am to rejoin his troops. He found the head of Friant's column near Rebeschowitz, who were marching toward Turas; and he gave them their new objective [Sokolnitz], which conformed with the Emperor's orders. Friant then shifted to the left to take them to Sokolnitz. At 8am, an officer sent by Margaron…etc.

-- Now, one thing that's off, is if you are in Rebeschowitz on your way to Turas, redirecting to Sokolnitz is a right turn/right shift, not a shift to the left

Goetz says "Friant's division, after hard marching for over 24 hours, had covered 70 km. His footsore plodded into Nikolsburg around 10pm, while Davout and his staff forged ahead, stopping just short of Brunn around 1am on 1 December.

>>@ ShaT1984 – I also note that there is nothing in his Memoirs that confirms the claim made by attention seekers of 'history writers' that Davout attended either the 'midnight' conference nor the morning 'breakfast' with N.<<

I appreciate the note; It was Segur or someone else of that ilk that made the claim.
EXACTLY NOTHING, REPEAT NOTHING in Davouts Memoirs or Reports indicates or confirms any such contact.

Whatever <<Jacques Garnier>> status is, it is uncorroborated and a single statement that now gets recited, without verification or even analysis.

As for the fantasy stories made up that to be marching you are straggling [a word that was introduced ONLY by someone who disagrees with everything]; that being 10 miles away is to be 'on the battlefield'; that cavalry is in two places 2 miles apart etc. is just such utter comtemptible garbage.

-- Now, one thing that's off, is if you are in Rebeschowitz on your way to Turas, redirecting to Sokolnitz is a right turn/right shift, not a shift to the left

And as you point out, the semantics of turning left or right, not a very mlitary way of writing.

The approach by the singular 'brigade' of Heudelet (in advance- which after all is what a designated 'avant-garde' is supposed to be doing)- to Tellnitz was directly from Kleine Raigern EAST diverting via the Southern end of the Ottmarau lake/ ponds. [To similarly arrive at the SOUTHERN END of Tellnitz village].

The few of the 1er Dragons with them had started second, but arrived before the place first (obviously cavalry can move at a higher pace than maching infantry) and probably screened it as fighting died away until the foot arrived.

We also know from reports, that it appears, by concensus, that the Generals and officers (certainly the ADCs present) dismounted before the rush into the village by the foot units.

I think of corroboration for this is that I did not read of any officers IN THIS ACTION being dismounted by horses killed and wounded benath them.

There is no written indication that Davout was with them. It is clear however he gave an order and a direction (no doubt being guided by the unknown officer of the 8eme Hussards).

- whilst the 'main' advance of Friant started, if we WERE TO BELIEVE what is written by 'Garnier' then THEY were to be found already NORTH of Kleine Raigern where the Division had rested. If so, being in accordance with the previously issued orders to make for Turas to hold/ extend EAST as required, then to change direction when at <<Rebeschowitz>>.

The TWO orders overnight (why and how these were communicated if Davout was AT HEADQUARTERS?) is confirmed, yet at or after 6am after the troops were marching.

It is only around 8am that the 108eme and 15e Legere Voltigeurs debouch into Tellnitz 'at the run'.

It is nearly 0900 that Friant AND his two brigades arrived before Sokolnitz. They had been marching toward Turas as planned, yet we are expected to believe that Davout had NOT, as his overnight changed orders, NOT communicated this to Friant.

Bewilderingly the great missive by Eltinge tc. maps show eroneously Friant Division scampering past a subdued Tellnitz at 0900- clearly and most effectively without any factual basis.

To have been turning (in circles perhaps) at "Rebeschowitz"; or "who were marching toward Turas" at such a stage, how could they have also been at Tellnitz next to the Goldbach?
Yes we know Heudelet did so, but the maps refer to Friant without exception. And yet it is a very noticeable exception!

In the reports made by Davout and Friant, we know that they debouched upon Sokolnitz from the West-NorWest, otherwise they couldn't have taken up the advanced lines of attack (were we to believe they crept up the Goldbach like Elting shows).

In doing so they had made a significant detour around the NORTH of Lake Sokolnitz which was massively larger than the Satchen ponds, yet hardly gets any mention until the break-our by the Russian 3rd Column occurs, squeezed later in the day.

I don't know where "Nikolsburg" was to correlate, and I find it dubious that Davout would be "stopping just short of Brunn" when the Grande Armées headquartes was but another 5 miles away.

And if this were true, where did the 'attended the midnight conference' come from, if he had stopped? Also I place no faith in the 'departed' at 5-6am. And by what route? Nowhere do we read of a visit from a distinguished Marshal, or was he flying through the night incognito like the headless horseman?

Davout, as a competent and seriously concerned leader of men he respected and who equally respected him AND his judgement, would have remained at Kleine Raigern ensuring they were properly rested, provisioned, fed and encouraged for the great day that lay ahead.

In fact one can contrast Davouts actions and enthusiasm with the desultory Soult who, in the words of his greatest detractor*, "we never saw all battle".
- -
Thanks-

*Thiébault.