"[Fr] Were there greater anomalies in 'power' than this?" Topic

I could have just asked:- "Why wasn't Louis Davout considered Napoleons best?"

Asked and answered to some extent.
My researching the details of campaign, and the great battle of 1805, Austerlitz, shed some very obvious, though never discussed, power imbalances.

Here a Marshal of incredible education, experience and grand 'coup d'œil' had command of, ONE Division!

True enough, his Corps was on the march, but most of it never arrived on the day. So he was left with Friants Division alone.

Of course it shouldn't be thought that all he did was push [his own] men about. He effectively took over command of the French right wing from Soult/ Legrand- both supporting and shepherding the latters men as they were driven at length from the Goldbach defiles but remained an homogenous force to return to the fight later in the combat.

Just as he would do for the next two calendar years, he marshalled (sic) all the troops in the vicinity and stood when necessary beside the commanders beneath him.

Contrast this with a year later and his march on Auerstadt, again a progressive build up of forces in contact with a surprisingly large enemy body.

This time however he would have his corps at hand, again at the end of a 'march' though not quite the same length, but more strenuous terrain in similar weather conditions/ hardship.

Unlike the Gascons- he did not become petulant at being left out of a 'Bulletin'; did not ride off hundreds of kilometres after being 'insulted'; did not engage in duels or petty quarrels with his peers, but managed all his military and administrative affairs with equanimity and poise whether facing a minor challenge or a major surprise like that of Auerstadt.

I mentioned a small affair of politics in my thread [1805] Men of Honour TMP link when supplies had been 'stolen' from his Corps by another Marshal, and the subsequent response.

To my mind I see nothing that makes any of the other 'obvious heroes' of Napoleons any better than the less boasting and more resolute and steady Davout. Equally I believe he could probably have done a better job than Soult in the latter stages of the Spanish effort, but that is too contentious to quantify here.

Were I to wind back the clock, I would have chosen Mal Davouts III Corps 1806 at Auerstadt to model instead of the IV at Austerlitz.

So in recognition of the efforts made in 1805, I am newly creating the 'avant-garde' under the Marshal due to the close cooperation of the two Corps.

Regards
davew

I believe he could probably have done a better job than Soult in the latter stages of the Spanish effort

I'd go further and say he could have done a better job than any other Marshal on any occasion.

He and Wellington were the only two tactically undefeated commanders of the era.

No question in my mind – the "Iron Marshal" was the best of the Marshals – demanded a lot of his men, took good care of his men, and his adversaries called him "The Beast" for good reason; he certainly spared the pants off the Prussians, and I agree that he would have done much better in Spain than Soult

I always liked the fact that he didn't spend a lot of time dong self promotion and social preening but spent all his spare time with his family

My "imaginary" French force for 1813 is commanded by Marshal Davout, the best of all the rest!

Jim

Who is this person or organization who does not regard him as Napoleon's best? I always thought of him as such, and that was very much the consensus of the wargamers who brought me into the hobby 50 years ago.

Davout is my favorite and IMHO the best. I think he would have beaten Napoleon.

I think Massena is better as a general, if only because he actually won his own campaign; Davout was always a bridesmaid, never a bride.

@4th Cuirassier
>>I'd go further and say he could have done a better job than any other Marshal on any occasion.

Thanks for the comment.
Possibly true- and I haven't really studied the end of the 'Spanish affair' for a long time; I realise Soult was competent and did very well to a major extent denying Wellington entry for some time. But always facing the attrition of manpower and supplies into a 'soft' region of France it was inevitable.

Certainly that defensive campaign is of greater interest to me than the 'expansionist' portion.

I believe Wellington holds the score for more 'own' executions of pillagers and deserters, as N. tapped Davouts shoulder after a couple of 'examples' over extreme violence against civilians [need to find the quote].

@dandan
>>I think Massena is better as a general

Perhaps you are right, however his 'negatives' are a fair contra against his skills. That is what shows Davout as a resolute human being, with very few 'failings' or cultural 'desires' shall we say, or greed. Massena would have been well-borne on Wall Street these days I imagine.

~d

NOBODY was allowed to out shine Napoleon! So there there is a reason "Davout was always a bridesmaid, never a bride."

Yeah, again I'd say that's a relic of envy and prejudice of history; not helped by N. own tales of woe as he looked back on opportunities lost (probably insomnia too) from the South Atlantic.

'Modernists' and doubters love to psychoanalyse and apply factors that just weren't apparent at the time. Time and again he reigned in Murat who, like Flashman &c allowed his ego to get the better of, or replace, sound judgement.

Davout had the last cough, he at least lived longer.

Here a Marshal of incredible education, experience and grand 'coup d'œil' had command of, ONE Division!

True enough, his Corps was on the march, but most of it never arrived on the day. So he was left with Friants Division alone.

And that is why he was assigned the most difficult mission of the day-to fight an economy of force mission on the French right flank outnumbered four to one which allowed Napoleon to mass Soult's corps against the weakened allied center for the decisive attack.

One of Davout's divisions, Caffarelli, was attached to Lannes' V Corps. Gudin's division was at Pressburg. At Austerlitz, Davout commanded Friant's and Bourcier's divisions, an infantry brigade plus one regiment from Legrand's division of IV Corps, and most of Soult's corps cavalry.

What this showed was the flexibility of the French corps system in that units could be attached/detached to and from different corps in the French order of battle without losing any efficiency or combat power.

Unlike a number of other marshals, Davout was never AFAIK accused of the kind of organised looting that did so much to turn local opinion against France. This alone probably goes a long way to explain his relative success in keeping his formations efficient; if you don't plan to rob the locals, you have to organise proper supply instead, which Davout did.

Davout wasn't the only marshal who didn't loot. Serurier, Bessieres, Suchet, and Berthier had clean hands.

It comes down to strength of character to keep the troops under your command in strict discipline.

Augereau stopped looting after he became a marshal.

His troops called him 'The Just.'

NOBODY was allowed to out shine Napoleon!

I would suggest that is an inaccurate depiction of Napoleon's character.

It is difficult to access the quality of Davout, did he ever command independently serval corps d'armée and does show his quality in the operational art of war?

Though Eugene is technically no Marshal, I would vote for him instead of Davout in that case.

So in what way was he Boney's best, his best corps commander? I always have difficulties with best – one of the top notch – yes, but then what about Lannes – who played an outstanding role in 1806 and 1807???

Perhaps, Brechtel, you could share with us notable instances of His Imperial Majesty's care for ensuring subordinates got full public credit for their contributions?

Eugene was a Viceroy and a Prince so would not be a marshal in the first place-there was no overriding need for Eugene to be one. He already had the consummate rank.

Davout won battles on his own-Auerstadt, Eckmuhl, and Mohilhev, and his famous defense of Hamburg is textbook on how to defend a fortress city.

And his performance at Austerlitz is usually overlooked. His defense of the French right flank against odds of four to one is simply superb.

And he was never defeated. There are few commanders in any age who could claim that.

Davout's always commanded the best trained and equipped corps in the Grande Armee. And he commanded large corps, as large as the Grande Armee at Austerlitz in 1805, in both 1809 and 1812, and it was Davout's organization of intelligence gathering and his far-flung cavalry operations that detected the Austrian build-up before they invaded Bavaria.

Davout was both an excellent tactician and strategist and his administrative ability far outshone his fellow marshals-Suchet came closest in Spain.

And it was Davout that created the Armee du Nord and got it ready for field service in 1815.

"Massena, Davout, and Suchet were the masters [among the marshals], capable of independent missions. So, to a lesser degree, were St Cyr, Soult, and-for a while-Macdonald. Lannes, had he lived, might have ranked with their best."-John Elting, Swords Around a Throne, 155.

Perhaps, Brechtel, you could share with us notable instances of His Imperial Majesty's care for ensuring subordinates got full public credit for their contributions?

Davout received both praise and full credit, in writing, from Napoleon for Auerstadt, as an example.

If you're interested, I would suggest going through Napoleon's Correspondence and the Bulletins for citations.

Napoleon to Davout, 16 October 1806:

"I compliment you with my whole heart on your fine conduct. I regret the brave men you have lost; but they died on the field of honor. Express my satisfaction to your entire army corps and to your generals. They have acquired forever rights to my esteem and my remembrance. Send me your news, and allow your army corps to rest for a few minutes at Naumburg."

Additionally, Davout and the III Corps were given the honor of being the first French units to enter and parade in Berlin.

From Denis Parquin's memoirs, 55:

"We spent the morning of the 25th near the gates of Berlin, so as to allow Marshal Davout's corps the honor of entering the city first; a distinction due to it on account of its splendid behavior at the battle of Auerstadt."

Napoleon to Murat, 15 October 1806:

'…Marshal Davout has had a superb fight; alone he defeated 60,000 Prussians…"

Berthier to Davout, 23 October 1806:

"Announce to your army corps that the Emperor in making them the first to enter Berlin is giving them proof of his satisfaction for the fine conduct they exhibited at the battle of Jena."

Davout and his III Corps entered Berlin at 1000 on 25 October 1806.

You mean like the 22nd Bulletin of the 1806 Campaign, 29 October 1806?
"While there was no stinting in the praise offered Marshal Davout and his soldiers in the aftermath of the French victory at Jena (14 October 1806), there was to be no official acknowledgement that while Napoleon personally led some 90,000 French troops to victory at Jena against about half that number of Prussians, Marshal Davout's 27,000 men had defeated almost twice their number of Prussians near the town of Auerstadt. It was recorded in the annals of the Grande Armee as a single victory at Jena under the command of Napoleon and thus it was reported in the bulletin…"

link

Makes me want to go to Paris and throw myself off the Pont d'Auerstadt.

Davout didn't 'command' all those troops that hour by hour built up his own command force.
Neither did detached corps have anything to do with 'his' command.
Again hypothetical stretches of military theorem that somehow "they all knew what they were doing" is just sheer bull***, when against a plan of hold/ pin/ singular assault, they actually knew very little of what was going on before them.

WHAT I was actually asking is where else a Marshal only had a brigade, then a Division in hand.
Not particuarly his perosnality traits and the immoral publicity values carried by others.

Davout was certainly in command of the troops listed. He had operational control over them on the battlefield, and Bourcier's dragoon division was attache to III Corps.

The Bulletins were never intended as history, which is why I didn't quote from any of them. The material that I have used is from the Corresondence for the Jena campaign. That material is not from the bulletins.

WHAT I was actually asking is where else a Marshal only had a brigade, then a Division in hand.

Has not the question been answered? And Davout's command at Austerlitz was more than a single division, as shown above:

One of Davout's divisions, Caffarelli, was attached to Lannes' V Corps. Gudin's division was at Pressburg. At Austerlitz, Davout commanded Friant's and Bourcier's divisions, an infantry brigade plus one regiment from Legrand's division of IV Corps, and most of Soult's corps cavalry.

What this showed was the flexibility of the French corps system in that units could be attached/detached to and from different corps in the French order of battle without losing any efficiency or combat power.

For a reference, see the Esposito/Elting Atlas, Map 55.

You mean like the 22nd Bulletin of the 1806 Campaign, 29 October 1806?

You didn't refer to the Bulletin itself but to a secondary source that makes a point of…what exactly?

And Napoleon did make Davout Duke of Auerstadt just as he would make him Prince of Echmuhl for another battle he fought and won on his own.