"In hindsight, was it a mistake for Germany not to spark a" Topic

…general European war in 1904-1905?

"The logic behind such a move would have been that if Germany would have been encircled by an alliance of hostile enemy powers, then it should try to break out of this encirclement at the most pristine and opportune moment--as in, when its enemies are the weakest. This was in 1904-1905, when Russia was busy fighting Japan and also busy dealing with a revolution on the home front. In such a scenario, Germany could have had a largely free hand in a war against France (and, if necessary, Britain) in the West and then could have turned East to crush Russia once France would have been defeated. In such a scenario, of course, the only risk for Germany would have been the lack of a Haber process--which wasn't created and/or commercialized until the 1910s. So, if this alt-WWI will last more than a couple of years, Germany might have very well run out of munitions and thus been incapable of continuing this war--though I suppose that this problem could have been mitigated to some extent by Germany's ability to loot French and/or Russian munition supplies in the French and/or Russian territories that it would have occupied during this alt-WWI.

Anyway, what do you personally think about this question of mine? In hindsight, was it a mistake for Germany not to seek war in 1904-1905 when it was the strongest relative to its enemies France and (especially) Russia? Adolf Hitler was certainly a vile piece of scum, but I can't help wonder if he actually had a valid point on this specific issue."

Axis History Forum
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Armand

Why would they? And, contrary to popular belief, the Germans aren't the warmongers. It's the French.
They declared war on Prussia in 1870.
They declared war on Germany in 1914 and 1939.

Oh dear Witteridderludo, ignoring the facts. I cannot comment on the FPW, but Germany declared war on Russia in 1914 and France (supporting their ally), then declared war on Germany. Germany then declared war on France, after invading Belgium (without any declaration).
In 1939 both France & UK declared war on Germany after they invaded Poland, and to say that Germany wasn't the warmonger is just laughable if it wasn't so tragic.

You have to assume that war between Germany on the one side and France and Russia on the other was absolutely inevitable; it is only with that assumption that the choice of one time or another to wage it makes sense.

It certainly came, but I don't think it was inevitable.

The Great War came about because basically Statesmen had run out of ways to avoid conflict, and were actively seeking it.
After Waterloo, wars in Europe rarely lasted more than a year. Some even went by the name of the Six Week War.
"We better get this over with now, because the next one will be a doozy!"
Right.
And blaming it on a chemical process that hadn't been discovered yet also seems a bit odd.
If you're a "scholar" living over 100 years after the fact, it seems like a time machine will be needed to tidy up messy bits.

France was diplomatically isolated in 1905. However the German army did not possess the qualitative superiority over the French army in 1905 that they had in 1914.

In 1905 the French (and Belgians) already had well developed fortresses to oppose a German invasion. The siege artillery that the Germans used on those forts at the start of WW1 was not in production in 1905. The French were already producing and had experience in China with their quick firing 75mm guns. The Germans were just starting to produce their own quick firing field artillery. It was the experience in the Russo-Japanese War that convinced the Germans to produce enough machine guns to arm their troops at a rate of 6 machine guns per regiment.

France was hardly "isolated" in 1905. The Franco-Russian alliance had been in place for more than ten years. The Franco-British Entente Cordiale had been signed in 1904, with confidential military cooperation talks under way by 1905.

Great Britain very shortly thereafter formally joined the Franco-Russian alliance to form the Triple Entente in 1907.

If anyone is interested in understanding the (IMHO) true underlying cause of WW1, they need only examine the dramatic rise of German economic and industrial power starting from around 1880. By 1914, Germany (and the USA) had overtaken Great Britain as the premier industrial powers in the world. In 1914 for example Germany alone was producing more steel than Great Britain, France and Russia combined.

Witterridderludo is perfectly correct when he says that France, not Germany, was the warmonger, with Great Britain and Russia as willing accessories. Both had their own strong motives to dispose of Germany.

B

Thanks!.

Armand

The Franco-Russian treaty meant little in 1905 when Russia was being beaten by Japan in Asia and was dealing with revolution at home. The Entente Cordiale fell far short of a military alliance, and IIRC military discussions began during the Moroccan crisis of 1905. So I do believe Blutarski that it is fair to say that France was isolated in 1905.

Also I think it is misleading to diminish the rise of U.S. industrial power with a parenthetical. Iron and steel production is one of the factors frequently cited as proof that Germany had surpassed Britain's industrial power. As I recall by the first decade of the 20th century U.S. iron and steel production far exceeded Germany's as well as Britain's.

Also Germany declared war on France on August 3, two days after Germany declared war on Russia. Ironically Austria Hungary only declared war on Russia several days later. France declared war on Germany several hours after Germany had declared war on France.

Hi BillN,
What exactly is so special about 1905 in your mind? That Russia went through a period of political instability? The Entente Cordiale, settling Franco-British colonial disputes, had been signed in 1904. Meanwhile, the Franco-Russian alliance survived and remained in effect. The alliance, established in 1892, continued in force until 1917. 1905 = one year out of a thirty five year military relationship. Meanwhile, go here – link – to view French expenditures on defense from 1873 to 1913; France's overall military expenditures over the afore-mentioned period were greater than any other nation on the planet – greater than GB, Germany, Russia in actual monetary outlay. France was habitually out-spending Germany by 5-10 pct.

The Entente Cordiale was France's overture to GB to consider alignin with them. It is not a coincidence that the RN almost immediately thereafter (for the first time in a century) withdrew her Mediterranean Fleet to home water and the British Army suddenly commenced re-modeling itself from a colonial intervention force to a continental expeditionary force. The greatest tell-tale is to be found in the confidential and unpulicized military discussions commenced between France and GB regarding the transferring and logistically maintaining a BEF to continental France "should the need to do so arise".

It was also (IMO) hardly a coincidence that two short years later, GB put aside its differences with Russia and joined France and Russia to form the Triple Entente (a different creature altogether from the Entente Cordiale). France was not the only European state to view Germany as a potential strategic (as distinct from a simply military) threat

By 1914, GB was rapidly losing economic ground. In about 35 years she had gone from the top of the global economic heap to number three behind the USA (number 1) and German (number 2).

Re GB's economic trajectory 1870-1914, go here for a decent introductory – PDF link – You can look for other resources, but they will all tell the very same story.

Dates of formal declarations of war, as was quite well understood and accepted at the time, meant nothing. What was far more important were the military mobilization dates.

That's my take on the matter. Your mileage may, of course, vary.

B

1905 is not special in my mind. I would think that was clear from my initial post saying why I didn't think Germany would go to war with France in 1905. The OP's question is why Germany didn't spark a war in 1904-5 which is why I addressed that date. If Germany deliberately sought to initiate a war then IMO the ideal time to do so was within a couple of years before or after WW1 actually started.

As for your claim that declarations of war meant nothing, and military mobilization dates were more important, I disagree. Mobilizing first or at the same time as the opponent might, depending on the nation, confer military advantages. Mobilization though was reversible. The mobilization could be stopped and the troops sent home again. Declarations of war and invasions were irreversible commitments to go to war.

Bill,
I'm not making any claims whatsoever. I'm just relating what I have read in the history books.

A military mobilization was HUGELY complicated, expensive, time-consuming and disruptive to the nation, its economy and its population. The expense incurred by any nation undertaking a formal military mobilization was exhibiting serious intent. I cannot recall any general national mobilization that did NOT result in war. Can you?

By comparison, issuance of an official declaration of war document was a mere diplomatic documentary formality.

B

<q?I'm not making any claims whatsoever

You said "Dates of formal declarations of war, as was quite well understood and accepted at the time, meant nothing." I'm not saying your originated the claim, but you did assert it.

I cannot recall any general national mobilization that did NOT result in war. Can you?

Full mobilizations, no. I can think of some partial ones. In May 1938 the Czechs made a partial mobilization. In 1934 Italy initiated a partial mobilization and deployment of its forces to the Austrian border in response to the assassination of Dollfuss. In September of 1938 France began to mobilize in response to the Czech crisis. War didn't immediately follow on any of these.

The same thing could have happened at the outbreak of WW1. If the leaders of Austria-Hungary, Russia, Germany and France had the courage to hold off on making declarations of war while their forces mobilized, then staring at their opponents fully mobilized across the border might have caused cooler heads to prevail. That is why the declarations of war were not a formality.

I am also not picking on Germany in particular. I just don't accept an argument that lets Germany off the hook based on Russian mobilization. The declaration of war or invasion, not the process of calling troops to the colors, was the irreversible act which initiated the war.

Bill,
I assert nothing; I state what has been written in the diplomatic histories. You might find it profitable to read the historical archives of the period more closely. Of course, that's entirely up to you. I passed along my collection of books some years ago, but there is plenty on the web worth reading.

- – -

As far as the outbreak of WW1 is concerned, by far the best chance for the entire dolorous disaster to have been averted was for Russia to have confined itself to a diplomatic protest. Russia had absolutely ZERO obligation, treaty-related or otherwise, to militarily involve itself in the Serbian crisis. Instead, Sazanov (foreign minister) orchestrated a full military mobilization along both the Austro-Hungarian and German borders. This was quite a dramatic change of attitude for Russia, considering that it had sat scrupulously quiet with hands folded during the previous several chaotic years of warfare that had ravaged the Balkan region.

Go here –
link
- for a reasonably good recitation of events from 1908 to 1914.

What was the difference this time? Why did Russia suddenly decide, with no compelling justification whatsoever (yes, I repeat myself for emphasis), to militarily intervene on a massive scale? Well, Austria-Hungary was now deeply involved, and she was Russia's premier strategic target. Apparently, Sazanov was apparently unable to resist the opportunity.

Your interpretation of events is clearly at odds with mine. That's fine.

Have a nice day.

B

And on top of that, it should be mentioned that the German and Austrian general staffs were justly concerned about the consequences of the Russian "Great Program," which promised heavy investments in the strategic railways of Western Russia and the Russian Army's equipment and readiness. The whole goal was to speed up mobilization and deliver a larger force more rapidly to Russia's western borders by 1917- and to modernize key capabilities like artillery. This was not complete in 1914, but a lot of progress had been made, and the Central Powers knew the Russian mobilization would be faster than previously anticipated.

Both the German and the Austrian staffs regarded this as a a huge and growing threat, and Conrad in particular was eager to deal with Serbia before Russia got much stronger- he said in effect, prior to the 1914 crisis, "we could have done it in 1908, the odds were worse in 1913, and now it's a straight-up gamble." They made the decision to go to war in 1914 in part because they thought that the odds of fighting at a later time might be worse. The Russian declaration of general mobilization helped accelerate that process, because a faster Russian mobilization reduced the time they had to complete their own mobilization, and opened up all kinds of vulnerabilities.

One of the terrible lessons of that war is that there's a lot of danger when a nation feels like it has only a narrow window to secure itself, and the odds only worsen if they wait. Japan was in a similar situation in 1941.

Well said, indeed, Nine pound round.
The German General Staff was likewise well aware of Russian preparation and had ticked off 1917 as the strategic tipping point in the balance of power.

All being conducted courtesy large French investments.

B

Years ago, I visited a nicely preserved mountaintop manor going by the name of "Castle in the Clouds" in New Hampshire. The original owner built it just before WWI- a Bostonian of French ancestry. You could take a nice self-guided tour, and in his office, you could see copies of the Imperial Russian bonds he had sunk his fortune into prior to the war, confident that the French banks were floating a solid investment.

Sic transit gloria mundi.

Being a native Bostonian and my wife a New Hampshire Yankee, we too have visited "Castle in the Clouds" – an architecturally unique and beautifully sited mountain-top estate. I distinctly remember lusting mightily for a library of the sort found in the house. But I never paid much attention to the owner or his personal background.

Speaking of worthless loan bonds, however, take a look at what percentage of American loans made our erstwhile WW1 "allies" were defaulted upon in the late 1920's and never repaid. The amount (in real-world adjusted economic terms) is staggering and IMO probably played a role in the 1929 stock market collapse and ensuing decade long depression suffered in this country.

If you have time and inclination, there is some interesting material to be found on the JPMorgan/Rothschild financial axis and the efforts undertaken to procure huge war loans from Wall Street to the Entente powers.

B

Yes – JP Morgan and Company were basically the bankers for the allies- floating bond issues that they sold (for a fee), and that were eventually paid off by the US Government. Interestingly enough, Kuhn, Loeb, situated directly across Wall Street from Morgan, was the banker for the Central Powers. The two firms were on the opposite sides of many financial contests: in the famous contest for control over the Northern Pacific Railroad in 1901, Morgan backed one side, while Kuhn, Loeb backed the other.

I am not used to hearing the Rothschild connection per se, but of course, there was a Morgan branch in London, and it would not surprise me if multiple financial firms were involved in bond issues on that scale.

JP Morgan Jr and his wife were attacked and stabbed (although not killed) by a German sympathizer (IIRC, a German-American who sympathized with the Central Powers' cause) in their house on Long Island in 1915.

To Bill N
Go here – link

B

J P Morgan's financial and banking empire, as I understand it, was founded upon his father's connection to the "City of London" in the first half of the 19thC. Young JP was sent to London to learn the trade and developed the important connections which made the House of Morgan the premier financier of American industrial expansion in the latter part of the 19th century.

The Morgan-Rothschild connection achieved great notoriety when, very early in the war, Morgan successfully petitioned the US government for Morgan Bank to loan vast sums of US dollars to the Rothschild organization in GB to be re-loaned as war loans to the Entente governments.

Postwar, it was estimated that the amount of US war loans to the Entente nations exceeded loans to the Dual Alliance by a factor of ~1,000 to 1.

Bankers seem very fond of wars; the bigger, the better.

B

Bankers are fond of any effort that requires the mobilization of large amounts of capital, because they float the bonds and take a profit on the sale (contrary to myth, they do a bigger business setting up and selling bond issues to those who become the actual lenders than lending the money themselves). Nothing requires more money than a war; against that are the controls and disruptions it brings. On balance, I think they tend to prefer to avoid it: the idea that the interconnection of the capital markets made war impossible had a lot of proponents in the years prior to 1914.

The younger JP Morgan was a very different kind of man from his father, although no less Anglophilic. If you want to see a film portrait of him, the character of W. P. Thatcher in "Citizen Kane" is allegedly a pitch-perfect piece of mimicry of Jack Morgan. The librarian at the Thatcher Memorial Library is likewise at least a recognizable pastiche on Belle Da Costa Greene, the Morgan librarian family librarian, right down to the pince nez.

Hi Nine pound round,
The great American philosopher Frank Zappa once said – "Politics is the entertainment arm of Industry".
IMO, it is the banks and financiers who control Industry and, by inference, politics.

You sound like your connection to banking and finance goes beyond simple passing interest. Did you work in the biz? I spent five years with Royal Bank of Scotland (a modest slot in the RBS international letter of credit department) starting right after "Fred the Shred" blew up RBS with his acquisition of ABN Amro's American operations. Some really tragicomic stories there, believe me.

BTW, check out the web link I included in my above post to Bill N. Very interesting.

B

No, I never have, but I have been involved in business deals where financing is a component, so you learn how it works.

I glanced at the book: I would assume much of the sourcing is from the Imperial Russian documents published by the Soviet government after WWI. I would classify it as "the case for the prosecution," and while I can't claim to have read it, I was a bit put off to see a reference to Harry Elmer Barnes, who battered his reputation to pieces arguing a revisionist position on Pearl Harbor a few decades later. I should warn you that I tend to take the "blame to go around" view of the start of WWI, rather than a narrow assignment of responsibility to one side or the other (individuals are a different matter). I think the real tragedy arises as much from what Dubail and Zhilinsky were planning as it does from what Conrad and Moltke were up to.

One other item of interest: have the details of the "Great Program" ever been published anywhere? You occasionally see a description of its potential (the description in Norman Stone's book on the Eastern Front being one of the more interesting), but was the program ever described in its entirety? That would be interesting to see.

The book was written with access to previously secret and confidential Russian, French and British documents and correspondence that had been held secret, suppressed or falsified outright, but were later exposed.

I found it quite authoritative, convincing and compelling. Once started, I read through the first hundred or so pages in one sitting.

Well worth reading, IMO.

B

Thanks!

Armand

I am working my way through your link B. So far it is simply repeating what is already well known, but approaching it with a different bias.

Hi Bill N,
I'm frankly rather surprised that you seem to be willing to venture outside your "comfort zone". However, based upon your rather bald assertion that this book is "simply repeating what is already well known" and "approaching it with a different bias" is IMO astronomically far from the truth of the matter.

This sadly reminds me of the old story about horses, water and drinking.

B

Since you do not know me Blutarski I will move past your insults based on who you think I am and address the two key points.

Mr. Owen's work was published in the 1920s. The information may have been a relevation at the time, but that information has had decades of circulation. It should come as no surprise that someone reading it today would find the information "already well known". As for approaching it with a different bias, Mr. Owen tells us right in his Preface what his agenda is.

Hi Bill N,
What you deem to have been an "insult" was in fact a criticism. Had I intended to actually insult you, I would have been far more pointed in my language; you can positively trust me on that.

Owen was a United States Senator, who sat on the post-WW1 board on inquiry and had broad access to the original (once secret/suppressed) archival diplomatic material of the protagonist and antagonist states. The United States, of course, was an ally of the Triple Entente. You have dismissed this entire work of careful research with nothing more than a few breezy, derisive and unsubstantiated comments -
> This book was printed back in the 20's; it's old and irrelevant.
> All this material is common knowledge nowadays.
> The author was biased.

I suggest that anyone interested in judging how irrelevant, commonplace and biased this book really is, should peruse it themselves; it's only 227 pages, but IMO illuminating (the book I previously recommended ("Roots and Causes of the War" by Ewart) runs to two volumes and 1200 pages.

Read the secret codicil to the 1892 treaty that established the Franco-Russian "Double Entente", whereby ANY mobilization by Austria-Hungary, partial or otherwise) even if not directed toward Russia (sound familiar?) would require Russia to mobilize against both Austria-Hungary and Germany.

Read the exchange of secret diplomatic telegrams whereby it was agreed by France and Russia that mobilization = a state of war.

Read and consider the interesting time-line of events involving Russia, France and Germany –
30 Jul 1914 – Russia orders general mobilization.
31 Jul 1914 – Germany gives Russia 24hrs to halt its mobilization.
01 Aug 1914 – Russia fails to respond to German proposal; Russian patrols cross German border in four places. Germany orders mobilization and declares state of war with Russia @ 7:10pm.
02 Aug 1914 – French troops cross German border.
03 Aug 1914 – Germany declares a state of war with France; France declares war against Germany.
07 Aug 1914 – Russia declares a state of war with Germany.

Have a nice day, everyone.

B

In the months since our exchange Blutarski I have been attempting to locate information about French troops crossing the German border on August 2, 1914. I have been unable to find any. Do you have a good source for this.

There was the skirmish on August 2 at Joncherey but that was on the French side of the 1914 border. August 2 was the day that German forces occupied Luxembourg and also the day the ultimatum drafted by Moltke on July 26 was delivered to Belgium. It was also the day the Germans claimed that France had dropped bombs near Nuremberg.