"Are there any examples of actual infantry melee?" Topic

So probably most of us have played rules which include the concept of melee, where opposing troops come to physical grips.

Clearly this did happen in some specific and limited circumstances. Cavalry versus infantry – lots of these documented. Cavalry versus cavalry – ditto.

When it comes to infantry versus infantry, however, I am struggling a bit. I can think of examples of infantry-on-infantry melee in or around buildings, where one lot of infantry was holding the building or structure, and the opposition attacked the bridge, chateau or whatever by escalade. There are also plenty of examples of melee over fortifications, whether formal as in a fortress or improvised as in the Grand Redoubt.

Those make sense because if one side is hunkered down behind a parapet, then in practical terms, they can't engage each other by fire alone. The objective is physically fixed to the ground and the defender becomes exposed if he gives it up, so the attacker unavoidably has to seize a specific piece of ground; he has to move onto the defender's hex as it were. He can't blast away at range and make the defender fall back into a different hex.

Where I'm struggling is to recall many examples of infantry versus infantry melee in the open. One side's defending, the other's attacking, and the defender neither runs away nor does the attacking side grind to a halt under fire. As a result, a hand-to-hand melee develops.

I can't think of any examples of this happening in real battles. I can think of occasions when maybe a broken force was caught by a formed one and roughed up even more, accounting for the bayonet wounds that did occur. But actual hand to hand fighting bringing this about….nope, not remembering any.

Did this ever happen?

Just to muddy the waters a bit Frank Chadwick has made the point that the very small numbers of bayonet wounded soldiers in hospitals may indicate that melee were happening but not generally survivable, rather than indicating infrequent clashes of bayonets. Andrew Uffindell in his book Napoleon's Immortals describes how Imperial Guard infantry would be committed in peloton sized units to carry out close assaults on buildings and defended spaces. The rationale being that veterans knew it was less costly to close quickly and scare the opponents away.

I suppose it depends on what you mean by melee, this url provided info on infantry tactics and melee.
link
The basic tactic was to weaken the enemy first with musket fire and then close, hoping the other guy will run away. Borodino has a lot of infantry assaults and counter-assaults, but its possible it was guys charging and the other guy running away, followed by then forming up and charging back. Saying that, there was a lot of actual melee in built-up areas where musket fire could not get the job done. I expect that was the job of the grenadiers.

Dupont met and broke the Russian Guard infantry at Friedland 'with the bayonet.'

I would submit that relatively few bayonet wounds were to be found in hospital because a wound in the torso, especially the upper torso, would be fatal because the triangular bayonet wound would cause a sucking chest wound which in that period could not be adequately treated.

Bayonet wounds in the lower torso would cause myriad problems and would undoubtedly also be fatal.

Again muddying the waters, the French column of attack was actually two half-columns each on a single platoon frontage orientated thus (front of column facing up the page):
F3 F2
F4 F1
V G
Whilst this facilitated deployment into line (F4 and V to the left and F1 and G to the right) it also served to allow the column to split into two columns maneuvering to left and right, respectively, after breaking through an enemy line, presumably anticipating that the enemy formation would not always have withdrawn having come to close quarters.
Kind regards
Allan

The Füsilier battalion of the Brandenburgisches Infanterie-Regiment on 16th October 1813, which formed part of the 8th brigade commanded by General-Lieutenant v. Hünerbein.

In the afternoon it joined the general attack of this brigade on a French battery, which was supported by three battalions in column. (Although all the reports use the word "Quarree" (square), this probably just refers to the shape of the formation.)

The battery was taken, but with heavy losses. Major v. Krosigk, the battalion's beloved and lion-hearted commander, was killed when he attacked one of the supporting French battalions on his own, without waiting for his men. Hechel, a private in this battalion, reports:

We saw this and rushed after him. When we reached the column, it had closed its ranks again, but the enemies were trembling all over their bodies. I had pressed forward and stood just in front of their bayonets, but had to rest for a moment first. Then Unteroffizier Böttcher and I turned our muskets, first to beat aside their charged bayonets with our butts and then always "swash, swash" into the faces of the Frenchmen. Our comrades followed our example, and until the present day I cannot understand why the enemies stood so densely packed and didn't defend themselves. They let themselves be slain without resistance, or crawled with their heads under the dead. But then we would beat them on their loins, and even though they begged "Pardon, Kamerad!" [quarter, comrade!] our cruel answer was "Nixs Pardon!" [literally "nothing quarter" – imitating the rudimentary German of the French], until the whole column had been wiped out.

Now we went on onto the second column. When we were in the midst the best work, a French doctor jumped out to run away, but my comrade Busch, son of a school teacher, who stood at my side, leaped after him and stabbed his bayonet into his side so that he fell. When Busch draw back his musket, the bayonet was stuck. He shouted "Alas, now I don't have a musket!" because the doctor, who died immediately, was lying on the side where the bayonet stuck." I said: "There are enough muskets lying around here, just take another one!" He did it, and we bravely continued to strike around.

Still there was one French column in the distance. Sent from it, a French officer came towards us, waving a white handkerchief. It was an infuriated day. We did not give and did not seek quarter. So we did not take notice of this sign of peace and answered with bullets. The officer fell, his column fled. Many found refuge in the nearby forest, but we did not leave his life to anyone whom we could reach. Finally, the night fell.

I have always had the impression that melees were not common. Firefights began, and st some point one side simply disengaged by running away, falling back etc. as a result of actual or anticipated losses. I think there may have been more running away than the participants might later have acknowledged.

In some rules, like Neil Thomas, you can only melee opposing units if the attacking unit outnumbers them, reflecting the reluctance of troops to go hand to hand against the odds and common sense.

In my home rules, infantry vs infantry melees only occur when there is an advantage over the defender, i.e. Greater numbers, attack from the rear or enfilade, etc.

I am no expert, but this makes sense to me. Since I play battles as part of campaigns, I look to win while preserving my forces in any case, looking to win objectives without getting many killed by close in fighting unless the risk is worth it.

In most rules Melee is point blank volley fire. A lot of night attacks were done with the bayonet only.

>>When it comes to infantry versus infantry, however, I am struggling a bit.

Even Austerlitz contained enough anecdotal run-em-over type situations, can't be that hard.
Diversions aside, I haven't counted or compiled- I just know that rules that outlaw the concept completely are wrong!
[I don't deny that 'close' didn't always mean IN contact etc..]

In game terms, depending on the unit scale, I have always imagine melee to involve firing muskets, using the bayonet, fists, whatever. But not just bayonets. I do think it is a rarer occurrence than it is in current rules.

I can think of several examples from the ACW of troops fighting hand to hand with bayonets but included firing and even throwing rocks. But it is rare. I think it is most likely one of the units will break before it comes to blows. I agree that a lot of melees happened when one side or the other has a defensive position to take or defend.

At Sorauren: Drummer Richard Bentinck of the 23rd Royal Welch Fusiliers:

" Bentinck, our ancient veteran, added considerably to his experience of battle sights in these sharp engagements near Pampeluna."

We Had a sharp engagement outside the town and they stood very hard and they came to the charge of bayonet. The charge of the Welch Fusiliers was needed several times and though they killed many, they had many killed too.

"The bayonet as is well known, leaves more dead than wounded (unlike the bullet), for the breast of the combatant is the part chiefly aimed at and at arm's length is too near to miss the aim. The French rushed to meet them in one charge, with such strength and fury as to break through their lines.
His Drummer's uniform once more failed to protect Bentinck from hostile weapons and having before let in upon him both bomb and shell and bullet, completed the round with a taste of steel. A black looking Frenchman who had skewered a Fusilier as he burst through their line, and jerked him off his bayonet dead, next lunged the weapon at Bentinck, but receiving at the moment a blow to the skull from the butt end of a musket, he fell senseless, his bayonet passing through Bentinck's thigh instead of his body."

When we came to the prisoners there was great rejoicing and shaking of hand for they was the same number on the button as us. They were also the 23rd Regiment

(Hmm! The 23rd de Ligne/Legere were part of Ney's III Corps and fought at Lutzen etc)

"Disliking much to have 4d per day taken from his pay for being in hospital, Bentinck limped by the side of his comrades all day, with his shoe full of blood, and both trousers and stocking glued to his leg so fast with it that he had to soften them with water to get them off when evening came. He then went to the doctor and got some plaster and bandages on the wound, and as they rested for some days after this, it soon healed"

From: Pages 104-105. The Very Thing (The memoirs of Drummer Richard Bentinck 'aka Bentick' Royal Welch Fusiliers) By Jonathan Crook

@Oliver Schmidt. I am pretty sure, that Major v. Krosigk would have told another story of that fight – but he cant, because he is dead.

That is the problem with memoires of soldiers. (Or films like Band of Brothers, who are build on memoires.) The enemy is stupid. Because every soldier, who had a non stupid enemy, cant tell the story, because he is dead.

Because every soldier, who had a non stupid enemy, cant tell the story, because he is dead.

very true, however we can perhaps trust those considered as experts, such as Ardant du Picq. While not to do with infantry melee and instead concerning cavalry contacting each other, this comment may give peoples an idea of the difficulty of actually engaging in melee.

"Expert on cavalry, Ardant du Picq, stated in his "Battle Studies" (with some exaggeration, just to make the point) that 49 of 50 one side hesitated, disordered and fled before contact was made. Approx. 75 % of the time this will happen at a distance, before they can see each other's eyes."

There is a similar observation by Thiébault, Manuel général du service des états-majors généraux et divisionnaires, 1813, p. 420 f.:

Il existe un fait qui , selon moi, est propre à faire bien évaluer ce que l'on peut attendre en général d'un corps de cavalerie , et combien de bons officiers de cavalerie sont précieux : sur cent hommes pris au hasard , il n'y en a en général que vingt-cinq ou trente qui , maitres de leurs chevaux (1), maniant bien leurs armes électrisés , par les circonstances, ayant pris leur parti sur les chances de la guerre , et animés de l'ardeur des braves , chargent franchement, et ne s'amusent pas à parer, mais ne sont occupés qu'à frapper ; ces hommes sont ceux qui décident les affaires. Après eux, on trouve à-peu-près dans un nombre égal une seconde classe d'hommes qui, lorsqu'ils le peuvent sans risque , donnent de même quelques coups de sabre ; mais qui , avant tout, cherchent à parer ceux qui les menacent : enfin le restant, embarrassés d'eux et de leurs chevaux, et toujours disposés à la retraite , ne songe qu'à son salut, est à peine en état de parer quelques coups, et ne guette que le moment d'échapper à tous les risques que leur foiblesse leur exagère.

(1) L'embarras qu'un mauvais cavalier éprouve à conduire son cheval, ou l'effet qu'un mauvais cheval fait sur celui qui le monte, paralysent le zèle et le courage de beaucoup de cavaliers.

In his "Gesta Danorum" (4.3.7-9), Saxo Grammaticus makes a similar statement.

And an – in my eyes very good – characterisation of the typical bayonet attack here (in German only, sorry):

demi-brigade.org/quistorp.htm

When does it become a wargame mélée? When one side is coming to 4m with loaded muskets and you don't?

The interesting thing about the Pte Heschel account that Oliver Schmidt posted first is that indicates a bayonet fight not happening.

In his "Gesta Danorum" (4.3.7-9), Saxo Grammaticus makes a similar statement.

The Bajonettangriffe (Bayonette attack) section is rather good. This is the accounts which states when the enemy was defeated by bayonets, it was actually the threat of the bayonets which caused then to retreat. The comments about fire fight casualties are interesting, losing 1/3 of a battalion was not sufficient to cause the battalion to be withdrawn. If correct this means a battalion can lose a lot of troops before they become vulnerable, which could explain the high casualties numbers from some of the assaults, especially those at Leipzig or Aspern-Essling. I know at jena-auerstedt some Prussians battalions were under fire for 2 hours, which affected their morale significantly so they withdraw in the face of inferior French forces. It also explains why the Austrians spend 2-3 hours at Marengo before they started pushing the French back.

These days I am using rules with a game-turn scale of 1 hour and in some cases 2 hours, so this is not an issue. But if I was still using my trusty old WRG rules, i would be spending a lot of game turns just spinning dice before any results would occur.

@ Whirlwind

And it's also about cavalry melee in general rather than an account of a specific butt and bayonet fight.

At the Battle of Teugen-Hausen in 1809 we know from Austrian Regimental histories, officer service records, and troop controls that many men were wounded in a melee in the woods between both towns. One officer received 6 sabre wounds and a bayonet wounded and a few French officers were captured unwounded, which suggest a very confusing back and forth fighting for the woods where many were cut off and surrounded. Maybe not exactly open ground, but still a melee none the less. Many service records include the regimental surgeons explanation of the wounds received, which gives us great insight into how these men received their wounds at a certain battle and how it affected their service later on.

The Hungarian grenadier charge in the thunderstorm at Znaim is said to have driven the French back at bayonet point, the heavy storm having rendered muskets useless. But again, did the French break before actual contact?

Cheers,
John

My impression of reading it a melee was mostly at the point one side decided it was at a disadvantage and turns to run, the other side gets a boost it won so charges causing them.

@ John

But again, did the French break before actual contact?

Well, that's my question essentially. Were the wounds recorded caused by face to face, hand to hand fighting with muskets butts and bayonets, or were they more consistent with one side running before any such encounter took place?

I once read, I forget where, a description of ancient era battles that suggested the majority of the casualties occurred after one side broke. Two walls of shields weren't going to make a lot of impression on each other, neither side was going to open its line to create a lot of individual duels, so there'd be a lot of pushing and shoving until one side ran away. At that point they'd be pursued and attacked from behind.

If this model is true, went the argument, you'd expect most of the casualties to have been wounded in the back (we don't know this). You'd also expect a great disparity in casualties, which would be similar and small until the break, and then totally one-sided; and accounts do support this.

I am not sure why this would have changed. If this was still what happened then there would indeed be melee-type wounds but whether they occurred in duels or whether they were as the above model seems less clear.

4th Cuirassier,

Here is a list of wounds of 57e Ligne 1e Voltigeurs S. Lieut. Charles Basset: Received seven saber cuts to the 1.) left cheek 2.) lower lip 3.) right shoulder 4.) right hip 5.) right thigh
6.) left shin 7.) left leg. All wounds to the front of the body. However, I know I have read many secondary sources citing the fact that very few times two infantry units stood their ground and fought a long hand-to-hand melee.

According to the Austrian regimental histories, the 57e Ligne crested the hill and advance into the woods to be met in a confusing melee and thrown back. Fighting in the woods likely lends itself to being surprised and fighting with the bayonet or sword.

It seems very possible that most of the melees occurred during fighting in villages, sieges, prepared positions, wooded areas, and entrenchments. When taking a look at the Battle of Heilsberg, the ratio of bayonet wounds to gunshot wounds is very high compared to other battles due to the 12e Legere and 3e Ligne attacking the Russian Redoubts late at night and endured confusing close-quarter fighting.

I think this makes sense also Marbot. Units encounter each other unexpectedly over broken ground, woods or congested areas and hand to hand happens by default. Or maybe during assaults on prepared positions, where the attacking troops did not always see the men they were charging

I am sure there are a number of examples of courageous charges and open ground melees between equal forces. But I agree with the OP that this just did not happen very often. Human nature takes over.

Someone wrote:-

For the same reasons that archers in the HYW felt the need to dig pits, deploy behind ditches and hedges, or within and behind a field of sharpened stakes… alone the longbow was never enough. I'm not aware of a single battle involving the English that was not settled one way or another by a melee.

I see no reason that such issues have ever changed over the centuries since, or before.
In order to 'win' there has to be a 'loss', or a domination of ground or area- whether by actual fisticuffs or preponderance of intimidation.

Few battles end with a sedate walking off the field like a *** game.

Before praising the likes of <<There is a similar observation by Thiébault>> one should take into account his 'politics' and his ability. Neither live up to the praise he receives, as a writer anyway. Much like Jomini, he was an academic abstract in military events.

Why you ask?
-HE failed to command or control even when personally monitoring a critical tactical advance into unknown territory (unknown in that presence of enemy, not the ground per se);
-HE neither commanded nor ensured adequate scouts before his main body advanced;
-Because he failed in that, the first battalion of 14eme de Ligne was the first French unit to break at Austerlitz, under the Emperors gaze by telescope, somewhere between 0845 and 0915 from memory.

Would you trust someone with higher council if they were unable to undertake basic practical tactical considerations?
Both his early career and afterward, despite his grievous wounding from Russian cannister, wasn't a solicitous affair and he had no fairy godmother, despite his close association with Berthier and Junot.

On wounds, the most wounded General Oudinot had something like 8:1 close combat wounds of the 33? he received.
regards d

It seems very possible that most of the melees occurred during fighting in villages, sieges, prepared positions, wooded areas, and entrenchments. When taking a look at the Battle of Heilsberg, the ratio of bayonet wounds to gunshot wounds is very high compared to other battles due to the 12e Legere and 3e Ligne attacking the Russian Redoubts late at night and endured confusing close-quarter fighting.

I tend to think this is correct, out in the open it was about musket fire, but in difficult terrain you had no choice but to get into hand-to-hand fighting.

To bring it back to the table top, the reason for asking is that in the rules I use, there is a significant psych-out / chicken factor in play.

The thinking really is to reproduce the canonical type of encounter where one volley at close range typically sends the attacker back, unless the defender gets a bit unnerved and breaks first. Neither is necessarily badly hit, they are just a bit unhinged and will normally rally quite fast unless pursued.

So the attacker advances; the defender nominates a range at which he fires his volley. To do so, he has to pass a morale test. If he fails it, he runs before firing or contact. If he passes it, he gets to fire, and the attacker then has to pass a test. If he fails, he comes to a stop or he flees.

In either case the key input to the stand / run away test is the range at which the volley is fired or received: the closer the worse, for both sides, because it was so unnerving. Actual casualties inflicted by it are a factor too, but a de minimis one, usually. It's the pucker factor that matters.

If each side behaves as most did historically, i.e. by reserving fire, you get the correct result: no contact. If one side is in hard cover, you also get the correct result, because the defender stands fast and the attacker has to push forward.

The only way you get a melee is if both sides pass the test. This is an unusual occurrence, but it can happen if, for example, a line opens fire at 200 yards' range. The line stands because it's happy to be doing something, and the attacker presses on because most of the fire is missing. You then get the type of ahistorical melee I raised in the OP.

I'm wondering if the above needs to be tweaked so that on open ground no melee can take place at all. They do seem to have been vanishingly rare.

I also wonder a bit why you'd bother issuing ammunition if melee was a better way of routing the enemy. I suspect that if your men have a firearm you'd rather stand the enemy off with those, even if's only 20 yards, and use fire sooner than your last-resort bayonet.

The single volley which causes enemy to route immediately occurred against attackers in the most part. The sources state the troops were most vulnerable when they first came under fire and when charging (the German source mentioned earlier indicated if you stayed still and fired back men got use to being under fire, they became insensitive after the initial period of being under fire until casualties were greater than 33%).

The period troops were under fire before they were charged could be as great as two hours. I have no idea if this was common, but it occurred at Marengo and Jena. This could be a controlled withdraw, or uncontrolled. I expect if the commander was good enough he would know when the men were about to withdraw, irrespective of orders.

I suspect some melee would occur, so removing the possibility may not be wise.

My guess was the British reverse slope tactic was depending on the vulnerability of charging troops. As long as they could take out the first line in a volley, the guys to the rear may decide discretion was the better part of valour.

This was why it was important to destroy the defending troops ability to conduct an effective volley, but as the British were behind a slope and had sufficient skirmishers to keep the French skirmishers back, this was not possible and charging such troops was probably unwise.

This is my guess, but the Prussians did not use this tactic because they lacked the ability to keep French skimrishers back. If the skirmisher got to the crest of such a hill and using is as cover fired at the lines of troops below, this would of had a bad effect. The Prussians in 1806 were under skirmish fire for up to 2 hours, being unable to effectively respond, which it was claimed destroyed their confidence and was the cause of their withdraw in the face of an inferior force.

>>If each side behaves as most did historically

That is the point.
It appears that a significantly large proportion of the gaming world has little knowledge, or skill with, "historical" at all, and are simply driven by the rules.

They have zero to little knowledge of why those rules are stated the way they are, and slavishly follow the writers/ promoters/ adherents interpretations 'as if' they were somehow realism. In parts maybe, but overall, nah…

Bluff and bluster are great in scenario games- as a successful planner/umpire I can get away with overt deception by reducing the 'helicopter' view and knowledge in a game, while allowing the rules to be used at the tactical level to address the events that unfold.

I'd note that those who delight in aggressive competition style conflicts, are rarely those who enjoy scenario driven/ derived games in which they don't actually hold ALL their ususal cards.
~d

@4th Cuirassier,

Looking at that mechanism, the only thing that I would query is with having the defender nominating the range that the volley would be fired at: I would make that an outcome of your reaction check, so a positive reaction check would make the volley be fired at close range (or even that the defenders held fire and the attackers pulled back at the defenders smart uniforms/manly bearing/loaded muskets); a negative reaction would have the decisive volley fired at a range unlikely/impossible to stop the attackers.

Incidentally, I remember discussing this with McLaddie a few years back. There is a case (not clear cut) that a small number of bayonet fights did occur even in the open, but the numbers involved would be small, i.e. only a few of the officers and soldiers would be involved in the action, so rules which calculate the entire strength of a unit as being involved don't reflect this.

I think there is a strong case for making the effect of that long period of fire that pfmodel refers to a situational modifier to the resolution of the attack.

We had a rule mechanism, but over time:- when one wanted to impress the enemy, they declared they were AT, or intending to go inside the 200mm maximum range of musketry; one then took a morale test for 'Advancing on enemy' that if passed, allowed you to do so in good order and morale.
A fail at that point caused one to stop dead cold at 200mm but still in temporary disorder. However, this now gave the initiative somewhat to the enemy, who could if they wished issue fire or respond in any way. The advancing unit did not get to fire that turn.

If a well placed cavalry unit was to charge on them, well, they had to pass a significantly harder morale check if indeed they were even able to say, form square.

Such a mechanism forces players to adhere to the rules of linearity, having close supports, not haring off bns all over, and a constant regard to formation 'adhesion' to both command space and control.

Not knowing the BP rules at all well, having barely played them, one day my 'perfect' assault on an enemy came to nought- though I'd placed two battalions nearly side by side and overlapped te fellow by masses, no only ONE could attack him according to the rules. The second unit becoming a mere single pip of a die addition. Why bother with tactics?
d

The clash at Maida (04 July 1806) between British and French forces provides well sourced descriptions of action between infantry units at very close range (tens of yards). The French advanced boldly enough deployed in line and received close range musketry before breaking and retreating upon the British line beginning a counter-advance. Many of the French losses are recorded as being bayonetted in the back having been caught by the fleeter attackers. It was certainly a melee, but may have been typical of the most common form of close combat.

I've just been re-examining Goetz 'Austerlitz; for some other details and found at least 5 eyewitness commentaries on physical injuries caused by h-h in a couple of hours period fighting across the plateau.
Would you like me to enumerate (will take longer to do than just reading…)
d

@SHaT1984,

I have had a quick flick through, can't see what things you mean. I can only find one unambiguous reference, and that is in Castle's book rather than Goetz', quoting Thiebault.

I can't recall the source but I remember reading an infantry officer comment that his men were more afraid of bayonet and blade than being shot.
I haven't read much evidence that hand-to-hand fighting in the open was common. When it did happen I suspect it was very un-Hollywood like.

One example of a genuine melee comes from the Katzbach, where two Prussian battalions caught a French battalion in square; the Othegraven's Prussian battalion lost about 190 men, captured about 170 French, and killed a shitton of them.

"We now doubled our pace, lowered our muskets, and attacked the middle square of French grenadiers with fixed bayonets amid terrifying cries of "Hurrah." The square stood like a wall. We came within two paces. For a moment our people stood across from the French so that both sides could see each other. We officers shouted: "Drauf, drauf! [On them, on them!]" and now the soldiers reversed their muskets and drove into the French with the butt of their muskets. Because we stood in line, the square was quickly encircled on the left and right and thus attacked from all sides with the bayonet and the musket-butt. No one thought of giving quarter; after ten minutes the entire square was shattered and transformed into a pyramid. Some 150 unscathed and lightly wounded found themselves among heaps of
dead and wounded; they were sent back as prisoners. "

Interesting, where does the account come from dandan?

It's in Droysen's biography of Yorck; I found it in Leggiere's history of the fall campaign and that's the citation, worth following up on.

Thanks dandan, definitely one worth pursuing.

Major v. Othegraven commanded the 2nd battalion of the Brandenburgisches Infanterie-Regiment [IR 12, formed in summer 1813 from reserve battalions].

Their brigade (8th brigade, Borcke, only 6 battalions this day) attacked a French battery on a smooth hill named Kreuzberg, north of Bellwitzhof. This battery was covered by one battalion in column ("Bataillonsmasse") on its right and two, also in columns, on its left. The one on the right retreated, Othegraven advanced (still in line) towards the other two. Getting closer, one of these two battalions also retreated and the battery, threatend by the advance of the rest of the brigade, drove away as well. Thus only one French battalion remained.

Two skirmisher platoons of the Prussian batallion which were leading the attack, were too weak and stopped 15 to 20 paces in front of the French battalion, waiting for the rest to join up. This might have encouraged the French to hold their ground. Insults were exchanged from both sides. When the rest of Othegraven's battalion arrived, they swung around the front and flanks of the French battalion, which was still in column. Only a few shots were fired by the French infantry (it was heavily raining this day), and a melee ensued, lasting less than 15 minutes, with losses on both sides.

The Prussian losses [including those inflicted from canister by the French battery] were 3 officers and 188 men dead or wounded out of 12 officers and 690 men in the morning. 7 French officers and 165 men who were still alive (thus including those wounded) were taken prisoners. The regimental history (Mueller 1896, pp. 55-57) doesn't include any info about the initial strength of the French battalion and the number of dead and runaways. The regimetal history mentions "a mountain of dead and wounded".

It would be interesting to find a report about this melee from the French side.

Really interesting example!

Better go read this long thread -5pp, especially p3.
theminiaturespage.com/boards/msg.mv?id=273911&page=3

I was interested to read the account of Prussian infantry 'charging' a square. I tend to assume that firing would have been the best tactic, as the square would be restricted in the volume of fire it could return.

Any comments or further examples greatly appreciated.

@Keef44

The 26th was a rainy day on the Katzbach, so many French and Prussian muskets were out of commission.

@dandan noodles

Thanks – sorry for the delayed response. So without the rain a firefight would have been the usual thing?