"The British 'Patton'?" Topic

Assuming that Patton was the best commander of armor that the Americans had, who was the British equivalent? Who was the best armor commander in the British or Commonwealth armies?

Pip Roberts, commander of British 11th Armoured Division, a unit always at the front of any operation.

They were active in Operations in Normandy in
Epsom
Goodwood
Bluecoat

Then Market Garden
Battle of The Bulge as well (yep, Brits were in that as well)
And through Germany to Kiel.

B

It depends what level of command you are talking about. Patton was a Corps/Army commander, so I guess the nearest equivalent would be O'Connor. It was just a shame he was captured in 1941 and had lost his edge by late 1944.

O'Connor's edge was that in 1941, he was reading the Italians' mail thanks to Ultra.

By 1944, as a subsidiary commander, he had no such advantage. Without it, his performance was on a par with that of his equally uninformed peers.

Well, who would you suggest? Pip Roberts may have been great, but he ran a division, not an army.

Both McCreery and Horrocks ended up commanding BAOR after the war, so presumably someone thought highly of them.

None, the british mechanized doctrine was not based in mobility as it was in the US army.

For the "best armor commander" at army level I'll say Monty. There was not a British equivalent to Patton as the armies were very different. But Monty understood very well how the British army operated so he used the armor units to the best of their capabilities within the British doctrine.

For a corps or army commander then I would say either Auchinlek or Slim.

For a forward thinking armour strategist,,,Percy Hobart.

I'd agree none, or Slim. No British commander was outstanding except Slim. His campaign wasn't armour-intensive, so he's not a Patton equivalent, but nor was anyone else.

Horrocks' special talents or his striking armoured victories have not come to my attention, but someone had to command BAOR.

Mark Urban's book about 5RTR makes it clear that command positions in tank units in 1944 were directed towards career officers who'd indicated that they intended to stay in post-hostilities, and who wanted this on their CV / resumé before they ended. These roles were not given to the best candidates or the most deserving, but to the neediest.

Can I just add to those above who have said none?

British Armour doctrine was different anyway. But it got the job done against the elite of the German Army in 1944.

Plus Patton, Monty and Slim appeared on the scene as CiCs when they had overwhelming equipment in quality and quantity, numbers and support, plus air supremacy. The art of being a really great supremo is to turn up just when the tide is turning anyway. Even then they all struggled, whether Kasserine, early Alamein or Imphal/Kohima. They were still facing a very capable enemy.

All our UK statues are to late war generals who had massive lend-lease supply, better than their enemy's and in vastly greater numbers. Nothing wrong with that, we still only give knighthoods if our football (your soccer) team wins the penalty shoot outs…but how I hope my cynicism is proved wrong. Nothing succeeds like success.

The start point that Patton was the best US general doesn't seem a given to me. Best by what measure?

Yes. That is classic, and correctly used "Begging the Question".

Major General John Shirley Wood actually commanded an armored division (the US 4th Armored Division). Not sure why Patten gets credit for his efforts.

Peruse Patton's career before reaching any verdicts ….

Start from WW1, go to the pre-war Louisiana maneuvers, to his take-over of II Corps in Tunisia, then Sicily (where IMO, Patton's "hand slap" scandal quite probably cost him the Overlord job that Eisenhower ultimately was politically forced to fill with Bradley (Eisenhower and Patton were very close friends from the earliest days of their army careers).

B

Pip Roberts, IIRC, was responsible for capturing Antwerp by "coup de main". That alone qualifies him IMO for due consideration.

O'Connor also, for his exploits in Libya. I tend to discount his less noteworthy experience in Normandy. For one thing, he had been out of the "sharp end" of the game for three years and a lot had changed. Secondly, Montgomery was IMO rather a micro-manager and not greatly inclined to permit his subordinate commanders to "shine too brightly" …

Strictly my opinion, of course.

B

Doing well despite the odds or at a time of adversity still goes to Auchenlek and Wavell taking out an Italian force of near ten times their size and doing so on the attack.

Additionally, Slim needs to be studied for his fighting withdrawal from Burma alone. I would in no way say that Slim had any advantage in terms of equipment of logistics for the advance into Burma of '44 and '45. Slim was briliant for recognizing problem solvers and for giving them his backing. name any other army that uitilied the jute industry to supply cargo parachutes because they couldn't get their hands on any? Name any other war front that came up with an engineer unit that specialized in bitumen as a road surface just to maintain their shaky logistics.

Taking Antwerp was no use since they never took the entrance that would have opened it up for shipping. A lot of allied commanders were only good because of massive weapons, logistics and air support. I tend to give creedance to those who did everything on a shoestring or self help program.

Even then they all struggled, whether Kasserine, early Alamein or Imphal/Kohima.

No matter what one may think of General Patton it was Major General Lloyd Fredendall (my vote for the worst US General in WW II) who commanded II Corps at Kasserine. Eisenhower finally had enough of Fredendall after that battle and replaced him with General Patton.

Auchinleck is a good call. He was poor at picking subordinates but I don't think he was ever defeated.

It seems unfair to discount a general just because he used all the advantages of numbers, logistics, etc. that were given him, or because he was never forced to improvise these things.

Many generals had these advantages and still failed, or did less well than they might have done.

Mention was made, above, that British armor doctrine differed from US armor doctrine -- I'd like to see more about that!

Two US commanders who are always overlooked are Krueger anad Eichelberger. The US 6th and 8th army commanders under Macarthur in the Pacific. Both did some incredible advances at low casulties usually on fairly tight budgets of men and material compared to Europe or the US navy drive across the north paciifc. Something to think about.

I wonder sometimes if it wasn't one of the great historical missed oppportunities, J.F.C. Fuller. His involvement with Mosley and the BUF made him radioactive, but he was a serious and accomplished soldier, and the vision of mechanized warfare that he outlined in the 1920s and 1930s was more prescient than almost anyone else. Trythall's biography makes it seem like Ironside, at least, thought him a serious candidate for a serious staff job which would presumably have positioned him for further promotion when he decided to retire after being offered an insulting assignment. I wonder what kind of service he might've given if he had swallowed his pride and gone to India for four years.

John, Midlander, Bill said best US armor commander, which is rather different from "best US general," and he did say "assuming." I will stipulate that no two generals fight exactly the same enemy under exactly the same conditions, which makes this whole argument more an expression of opinions than an attempt to unearth an indisputable fact.

That said, me for O'Connor. Yes, he had advantages in North Africa. But he also made excellent use of limited resources, and tailored his maneuvers to the training and weapons he had, rather than complaining about what he didn't have. I don't think any British general in 1944 had Patton's opportunities: the geography was against them. But a number of others in North Africa might have done better than they did.

And I always give O'Connor bonus points for his later observation on not securing the Antwerp approaches--"Napoleon would have thought of them. O'Connor didn't." You can read a ton of military memoirs and not find another general admitting a mistake.

For my money Slim easily wins this contest. Both when retreating and advancing he understood mobility.

If we're doing "what if" Nine Pound Round, think also of Hobart, who created and trained the Western Desert Force, then spent much of the war as a private in the Home Guard.

Have to agree with Hobart.
He set the stage and trained the units in the desert and then was replaced just before their big wins bore the fruit of his training.

When they did their advance,,,he was a lance corporal in the Home Guard by the way.

I still think Slims use of armour, air and logistics was brilliant.

Should this make it into an actual poll, would it be possible to simply name it "Best WWII British Commonwealth armoured commander", and skip all the unnecessary references to Patton that simply seem to derail the topic?

A successful commander, if to become a legend as such, is best served if he (and one day it will be she too) has the most kit, the best kit, the best supply and replacements, the best intelligence, air supremacy (not superiority), the best trained subordinates,(this from the the infantryman down to as low as the ADC staff officer).

Talent, overwhelming arrogance (or should that be self confidence and determination) and luck count as well. An opposition past its best does not hurt either.

Timing is everything. Take over, just as the tide is turning, and no-one will pull down your statue in years to come.

4th Cuirassier makes the point about the value of Ultra to O'Connor in 1941.

One distinguished Air historian I have had the pleasure of working with (an American, I should add, and maintained by the USAF) considers that much of Patton's famed elan in 1944 (such as refusing to get hungup about the safety of his flanks in the breakout, for example) was also a privilege conferred by Ultra.

I refuse to take part in a squabble concerning Patton. His style and reputation were known to all after Sicily, and this allegedly made him a valuable decoy as part of Fortitude to keep the Germans guessing as to Allied intentions until July 1944.

But equally, if Patton's Army and Corps were such beneficiaries of Ultra once he had actually landed, the same is true of Dempsey and his band. Surely the point is that, if we're looking primarily at Normandy, the Overlord strategy was set (by Monty and Ike) and the roles apportioned according the respective qualities of the Allied armies.

"…roles apportioned according the respective qualities of the Allied armies."

Actually, I think they were apportioned according to the Rules of Allyship with England or Britain, the first of which is "British forces get the position nearest the Channel, or such alternate evacuation port as the Royal Navy may dictate."

But there is a difference in attitude. I started putting together pictures of WWII officers for the wargame room--no lower than battalion command, no higher than corps. I've got Patton next to an M-3 Stuart, Creighton Abrams in his Sherman, Rommel next to a Pzkw IV for 1940 and in his command track for the desert, Wittman with his Tiger and deGaulle next to a Somua. Still can't find a single picture of Jock Campbell, Strafer Gott or O'Connor next to a British tank. They commanded armoured forces, but they didn't see themselves as tankers is my guess.

To endorse Robert's logic by turning it around, the US also got the Western half of Normandy (with Cherbourg and ultimately other Atlantic ports) to enable a direct buildup from home).

But whatever: the Overlord plan saw the Eastern half of the Allied area as the anvil and the Western half as the launchpad for the encircling hammer.

I sense that the longstanding accusation that that the British Army in Normandy and afterwards was slow. sluggish and overcautious is being being laid to rest, although instances can doubtless still be found to make this case. I hope that those who make it can also acknowledge that it was also capable of rapid and bold advance when opportunity beckoned. The Great Swan which moved the front north from the Seine to the Low Countries within days resembles the US breakout and encirclement in that both strikingly outpaced a broken enemy struggling to reestablish a defence in unfamiliar ground.

Not only the great swan.
People forget the drive on Rangoon. That would be more than the equal to it and with far more problems present of supply and infrastructure limitations.

The position of the Allied Armies in Normandy simply reflected the fact that the US troops were mainly in the western part of the UK.

robert piepenbrink, re evacuation, bit of a d**k comment, no?

Also, it was Horrocks not O'Connor who made the \Napoleon remark regarding the approaches to Antwerp…

Another one (albeit not British) who remains one of the great what-ifs: Joseph Stilwell, whom Marshall regarded as the best operational-level commander in the US Army, and an early designee for the command of Torch.

Stilwell was unfortunately sent to China, a place he probably understood more thoroughly than any other contemporary senior American officer. That was doubly unfortunate, for he was utterly unsuited to the diplomatic role he had to play, and his experiences in Burma early in the war (combined with a personality that was already notoriously prickly) gave him the reputation of being a raging Anglophobe. After he exhausted his capital with an ally who was never going to make a decisive contribution to the war effort, he was relieved and eventually sent at MacArthur's request to take over 10th Army on Okinawa after Buckner was killed.

There's no doubt that he owed his entire career to Marshall, whose judgment of men was outstanding but not infallible. He twice had to prevent a more senior officer from firing Stilwell during their tenure at Ft Benning, and had Marshall not been appointed Chief of Staff in 1939, Stilwell would undoubtedly have ended his career as a colonel- he was, IIRC, one of the first nominees for promotion that Marshall submitted.

He was notoriously impatient, sarcastic, and blunt to and frequently past the point of rudeness. The Chindits hated him, and he drove Merrill's Marauders past the pint of destruction. None of these things are necessarily inconsistent with real military talent, though, and I wonder how he would've done in command of a sizable force in a different theater, particularly Italy or Northeastern Europe.

With the possible exception of Fredendall, Lucas, Clarke, Eisenhower, Mashall, Bradley, Hodges and Patton, Vinegar Joe Stilwell was the worst US General.

Best were Simpson, Collins, Taylor, Harmon, Truscott and Gavin.

Strange that there were very capable divisional and corps commanders in the US Army, but quality really dropped off in the higher echelons…..

"With the possible exception of Fredendall, Lucas, Clarke, Eisenhower, Mashall, Bradley, Hodges and Patton, Vinegar Joe Stilwell was the worst US General."

It's a miracle we survived WW2.

B

I would agree with Goblin – none due to doctrine.

Patton was closer to German or later Soviet commanders in terms of aggressiveness and emphasis on exploiting breakthroughs. Other allies generals were far more methodical and whilst great on breakthrough had less emphasis on offensive manoeuvre.

My $0.02 USD

I'd love to know what this mysterious British 'armoured doctrine' was, and how it was different from the US one – at Corps and Army level at any rate.

By 1944 all the Allied corps were mixed infantry and armoured divisions, and more analagous to the Russian combined arms armies than Tank Armies or Panzer Corps. More suited to the short distances and congested terrain of Western Europe of course.

Anyway, apropos the discussion above, if I had to pick a good Corps/Army commander, then Slim would be up there, but although he was indeed a master of combined arms ops in the jungle, it wasn't an armour heavy campaign. otoh by 1944 combined arms was the name of the game anyway.

With the possible exception of Fredendall, Lucas, Clarke, Eisenhower, Mashall, Bradley, Hodges and Patton, Vinegar Joe Stilwell was the worst US General.

Sounds like someone is upset that Eisenhower pulled the Ninth Army back from Montgomery denying the latter his fantasy of a race into Berlin.

To get back to the main point, I don't see "The British Patton" and "The best British armor commander" as the same thing. Once he got out of Africa Patton was an army commander more than an armor commander.

Sounds like someone is upset that Eisenhower pulled the Ninth Army back from Montgomery denying the latter his fantasy of a race into Berlin
Monty did not hold it against Eisenhower so when Hodges messed up and Bradley lost control during The Bulge he took charge of their Armies and sorted it all out for Ike

Martin wrote – "I'd love to know what this mysterious British 'armoured doctrine' was …"

Criticism of British armored doctrine can be found in the writings of Michael Carver and Jonathan Fennell regarding the North African campaign. The gist is that the British Army at that time actually had two armored forces, the RAC and the RTR, each with its own particular fighting doctrine. The RAC, offspring of the old school cavalry brotherhood and imbued with the teachings of Fuller and Liddell-Hart, viewed itself as an independent operator and tended to disregard the need for coordination with the infantry and artillery arms. On the other hand, the RTR and its slow tanks was unable to operate jointly with the armored divisions and tended to remain tethered to the infantry.

But I suspect that, by mid-1944, a lot of changes in fighting doctrine had taken place.

B

Speaking of Patton … some interesting and great sayings from him. I do like all of them. Admittedly I am biased …

link

Blutarski, your RAC/RTR distinction is intriguing but leave me asking more questions. Can you explain …?

The RAC was only created in 1939, on the eve of war. It created a new umbrella organisation for the RTR and those cavalry regiments already converted to armour or slated for this. The RTR had been the development forum for armoured doctrine between the wars, something which the 'new' tankies took time to appreciate and absorb. The fact the donkey-wallopers and vulgar mechanicals each rather looked down on the other didn't help, but they had got there by mid-War. But it is not the case that the RTR maintained a separate development or training function after the RAC's creation.

However, the distinction between Cruiser and Infantry tanks, with their differing designs and doctrines, did not reflect the RTR or Cav background of a regiment by about 1941; as more cavalry converted to tanks. Look at the Orbats in the Desert War. RTR regiments were used indifferently as both Cruiser and Infantry tank units.

Meanwhile numbers of newly-numbered RAC regiments were being formed from Infantry Battalions. It is true that to say these provided most of the 'I' tank units along with many of the RTR regiments – the North Irish Horse were the only Churchill-equipped Cav unit that comes to my mind.

Forgive me if I've missed your point.

BTW, in a less divisive spirit, the joshing between Can and R.Tankies probably continues to this day. I recall gunnery training at the RAC Centre in the 1980s, for which our group was instructed by a RTR Staff Sgt and a SCoH from the Life Guards. When indicating the former, the latter would refer to 'People's Cavalry'.

If you understand what an SCoH is, you've probably been able to get your head around the British Army …

If you understand what an SCoH is, you've probably been able to get your head around the British Army

In the household cavalry (to which corps Life Guards belong to), CoH stands for Corporal of Horse, and SCM stands for Squadron Corporal Major (not to be confused with SMC which stands for Sten Machine Carbine).

That said, being a Johnny Foreigner, I must admit that SCoH does not ring any bells. Logically it could stand for Staff Corporal of Horse, but does such a rank actually exist?

Hi laretrenue,
I consider myself more of a reader of the North African campaign in general than a highly focused student of the early British army of WW2; so it is very possible that I may have gotten details of organizational terminology a bit wrong. What I passed along in terms of doctrinal problems with British armor came from my readings of the books on the North African campaign by Michael Carver and Jonathan Fennell. It was Carver (IIRC) who commented about the lack of attention paid to combined arms cooperation on the part of those armored cruiser tank formations in the Libyan campaign. The commentary implied that it was the converted cavalry formations that most displayed this trait.

One implication of this lack of armor/infantry cooperation was that, without the close cooperative support of armor, the infantry formations tended to lose the power of offensive movement and evolved into the role of stationary defensive garrisons of selected tactical features(ref the Gazala "boxes").

Another argument made was that the power of British field artillery (the 25-lbr regiments at least) suffered as a consequence of elements often being committed to the anti-tank role as a result of the inadequacies of the 2-pounder in that role.

FWIW.

I'd be interested to learn more on this issue, as well as an explanation of the term "SCoH".

B

Griefbringer and Blutarski,

Thanks for replies.

I go along with all the points made in Blutarski's three paragraphs above, and I don't think anyone will challenge the argument that the British Army was slow to adopt combined arms cooperation. Still, I'm not sure that responsibility for the inadequacy of the 2pdr and the consequent redeployment of the 25pdr can be laid at the door of the armoured arm.

Carver is worth reading, and he had grounds for his opinions, having been in the Royal Tank Corps (as the RTR was called before the formation of the RAC) before the War and lived through the learning curve of British armour in the Desert and NW Europe. Mind you, he wasn't short of opinions. I met him once, and he was happy to share them.

As for SCoH, I'm afraid I'm guilty of carelessly garbling the detail. Johnny Foreigner or not, Griefbringer is quite correct, and checking this, I was dealing with a SCM. Just shows how arcane these things can be …

"I'm not sure that responsibility for the inadequacy of the 2pdr and the consequent redeployment of the 25pdr can be laid at the door of the armoured arm."

Sorry about that. I did not intend to imply that the diversion of 25-pounders to the anti-tank role to compensate for the inadequacies of the 2-pounder should be laid at the feet of British armor.

B

As for SCoH, I'm afraid I'm guilty of carelessly garbling the detail … checking this, I was dealing with a SCM.

And I was hoping that I might learn yet another interesting NCO rank… oh well.

That said, if the Household Cavalry find it appropriate to refer to RTR as "People's Cavalry", are they then in return called "Snobs' Horses" or something equally flattering?

I did not intend to imply that the diversion of 25-pounders to the anti-tank role to compensate for the inadequacies of the 2-pounder should be laid at the feet of British armor.

RAC certainly had their own issues with the 2 pdr gun mounted on their tanks – not just to do with the armour penetration (which was actually pretty good by pre-war standards), but also the lack of HE rounds.

I don't think the RAC never tried to mount a 25 pdr gun on a tank turret, instead settling on various other turret mounted howitzers to provide HE and smoke support. Australians on the other hand managed to stick 25 pdr in the turret of one of their cruiser tank prototypes.