"Sherman vs. Panther" Topic

This and the PIAT thread make me wonder if any rules out there use the idea of the cumulative effect of tanks getting hit.

By this I mean that the traditional type of rules gives the firing gun one factor and the target another; usually, if the former value exceeds the latter, the target can be destroyed. If not, the tank continues on its merry way.

This is easy and intuitive but not at all historic. The vehicle fired on doesn't know what's hitting it. The Tiger's crew does not know that the clangs on the side are from a 6-pdr-size weapon which needn't be feared because it can't penetrate if more than 500 metres away. They just know there are repeated clangs from something that can see and hit them and at some point something's going to come through the armour. And they're going to bug out.

It occurs to me it would be sensible to model the cumulative effects of all this rather than that of individual rounds. Anything hit by a PaK 44 is going to be wrecked almost without fail but a Panther repeatedly hit by PIATs or indeed 75mm is surely going to back off at some point even if not penetrated.

Do any rules do this or does it involve too much book-keeping? You'd have to tally all hits on all vehicles / units I suppose…

4th Cuirassier,
That's a great question. Here's my answer.

Historically, when a tank was penetrated and not blown up the crew generally knew that in 5-10 seconds another round would penetrate so they'd bail right away. Partially penetrating rounds (penetration = armor or 5mm < armor) can cause spalling which can kill/wound crews, destroy equipment or hot shards of steel break open a shell case and ignite the propellant. Even if it has no real effect it would disrupt the crew for a short period of time. In that case, a morale check might be appropriate. Tanks with brittle armor suffered more damage because there was more spalling.

You could have cumulative effects on tracks and suspension too.
Supposedly, German crews were under orders to stay in the tank until it caught fire.

The rules I'm using you need to continue to fire at a target until you can visually see a result like a fire or explosion or fire machine guns at the crew bailing out.

I use rules that determine the level of damage. Spalling damage can WIA crew (Morale Check), KO the radio or gun, disrupt the crew, or cause a fire so there would be some cumulative effects.

I also have a Critical Hit rule and one that under ideal circumstances the shooter can target a weak spot. With a Critical Hit, no target is 100% safe. The hit location is determined with a D20. The Precision Aim rule allows the shooter to modify the D20 roll +/-4 to target a weak spot (50% of the armor value) or get a Critical Hit. So against a Panther, he can target the Shot Trap. Critical Hits include hitting the turret ring, cupola, coax mg, bow mg, etc. that will have less armor.

So even if rounds are bouncing off there is a 5% chance of a hit rolling on the Critical Hit Chart that can result in real damage. That can force a player to withdraw from non-penetrating hits.

I don't tally the number of hits on a vehicle. Tracking internal damage is not a big deal because it happens only a couple of times in a game. If your gun is KO you'll try to get off the battlefield.

I recall one game where a Tiger I took 9 hits from T-34/85's but the player was firing from just over the effective penetration range and it only took suspension damage.

Wolfhag

My home-baked rules require a crew to make a morale check when taking a non-penetrating hit IF there was some chance that the hit might have penetrated.

An interesting comment from a US tanker found in Isaac White's book (discussed previously on this thread) suggests another possible reason behind German dislike of WP. The American tanker suggested that rapid German withdrawal when targeted by WP rounds, was the result of their association with WP as target marking rounds for an imminent artillery barrage or tactical air strike.

The rabbit hole, as usual, is deep.

B

People need to remember the Sherman was a pre-war design and better than the German Panzer III pre-war design too.

My understanding is that M4 Sherman was designed in 1940, which hardly makes it a pre-war design. That said, it is actually quite impressive compared to pretty much every tank that saw combat service in 1939-1940. That said, tank designs (and anti-tank weapons) evolved at quite a speed, so compared to latest German, British and Soviets designs in service by summer 1944 Sherman does not stand out all that much. But had the Germans faced it in summer 1941, it would have probably been almost as big surprise as T-34.

US also had a pre-war medium tank (M2) produced in limited numbers, but this tank did not see combat service in WWII. It was not particularly impressive design, other than for the number of machineguns mounted.

The M4 Sherman tank design was an adaptation of the previous M3 Grant interim design (itself based upon the preceding M2), adapting a fully rotating 75mm main gun turret and new superstructure upon the existing M3 chassis, suspension and powertrain. The prototype, designated T6, was mocked up in wood in May 1941; the first cast hull test model was delivered to Aberdeen Proving Ground in Sep 1941. The T6 was accepted and standardized as the M4 in October 1941. The official pilot model (IIUC) was built by Lime Locomotive Works in February 1942, designated as M4A1, with manufacture commencing in early 1942. The M4 first saw action at Alamein in October 1942.

B

Here's some info I ran last night, while looking for info on 76mm guns on Shermans in Europe, post Normandy invasion.

Turns out the first ones started being delivered in July of 1944, and by the end of the war, apparently 76mm tanks were as numerous as the 75mm ones.

I would be interested in reading how these were allocated to various units, and in what ratios, from July '44 to the end of the war, but especially thru Dec. '44/Jan. '45, e.g. 1 – 2 per company, etc., or if they were grouped together in sections/platoons, or units. I think we had a discussion about this here on TMP a while back, but don't know where that article is, or what it was titled.

The articles sheds some light on the Sherman vs. German tanks issue, leveling the "playing field" a bit in the latter's favor, RE the discussions here thus far, e.g. target acquisition and firing first. As mentioned below, it appears many tanks, and/or other units on the defensive frequently get off the first shot(s) in a skirmish/battle.

As noted previously, it does seem that the German armored units did a lot better on the defensive than on the attack vs. the allies, which given the latter's overwhelming superiority in numbers and power, is not too surprising.

link

"In late Summer 1944, after breaking out of the bocage and moving into open country, U.S. tank units that engaged German defensive positions at longer ranges sometimes took 50% casualties before spotting where the fire was coming from.[75] The average combat range noted by the Americans for tank versus tank action was 800 to 900 meters (870 to 980 yd). Sherman crews also had concerns about firing from longer ranges, as the Sherman's high-flash powder made their shots easier to spot. This, and the U.S. Army's usual offensive tactical situation, often contributed to losses suffered by the U.S. Army in Europe.[76]".

Apparently, German gunpowder was much better, being relatively smokeless, making where the shots were coming from difficult for the Allied tank crews to determine.

Hi Thresher,
If you are interested in the 76mm, go to my "21 Jul 2021 8:28 a.m. PST" post on page one of this thread and click the link for a very good study on the performance of the 76mm in the ETO.Or, if you have already checked that document out, ignore this.

The large amount of propellant smoke upon discharge and often large dust clouds raised due to lack of a muzzle brake (until near the end of the war) were problems for the 76mm Sherman. I have read reports that an observer outside the tank would often be used to spot fall of shot in a long range engagement.

There was a reason why German tanks with high-velocity guns all had muzzle brakes, as did the Firefly and other 17-pounder weapons.

B

Courtesy of Steve Wilcox on TMP back in 2012 -

US Armored divisions, data from beginning of month:

Percent 76mm
October 1944 21.9%
November 1944 18.6%
December 1944 33.1%
January 1945 27.3%

Data from US Armored Divisions: The European Theater of Operations 1944-45 in the ETO 1944-45 by Steven J. Zaloga.

US 12th Army Group separate tank battalions, data from beginning of month:

Percent 76mm
October 1944 6.8%
November 1944 20.4%
December 1944 25.2%
January 1945 27.1%

Data from US Tank and Tank Destroyer Battalions in the ETO 1944-45 by Steven J. Zaloga.

- – -

Go here – TMP link – There is a lot more info in the thread "Proportions of Various Shermans in Late War US Tank Companies"

B

Thanks for the reading and armor rule suggestions guys. I will have to check them out.

@ wolfhag

Interesting and I agree with the principle that a critical hit could disable a tank. I am more thinking though about the situation where a crew just gets spooked by all the AP pinging on the outside of the tank, or the WP or whatever, and gets out of Dodge while the going is good even though the tank has not actually yet been compromised. Anecdotally this does seem to have happened.

It's similar to the accumulation-of-damage effects you get in naval wargames, except that rather than damage being accumulated, it's the crew's resolve that's being depleted.

I've not played a tank-on-tank game in years but when last I did, it was usually tank charges and duels against opposing ranks of them. Many that I have seen at conventions feature tanks lined up wheel-to-wheel blazing at each other. I would be more engaged by games that incentivise tanks to behave as they more usually did – utilising cover and terrain, trying to flank spaces the enemy may be concealed, exploring what lies around corners on foot, and yes, running away if they've had enough of all the incoming fire, whether it's AT rifles, PIATs, WP, AP, or whatever.

4th Cuirassier,
From accounts I've read, it was not unusual for tanks to relocate after a non-penetrating hit. But then again, they can't really be sure of what comes next or a round hitting a weak spot or even who is shooting at them.

Smokeless powder:
General Marshall's post-war report remarked on one clear advantage that the German Army was privileged to exploit again and again throughout the war:

"The German ammunition was charged with smokeless, flashless powder which in both night and day fighting helped the enemy tremendously in concealing his fire positions."

IIRC the MG42 firing was very hard to detect over 200 yards.

My experience is that conventions are not the place to experience what real combat looked like, except my game of course <grin>. They are normally about the models and visuals.

I use only 6mm and 10mm models with 1" = 25m for tank battles. Bigger models throw it out of scale too much but to each his own.

I try to set up a scenario where the defender can't effectively cover more than 50% of the table but has hidden deployment. This gives space to maneuver and the defender must use his mobile forces as a tactical reserve to send to where the main attack is.

Rounds can unexpectedly ricochet. There is an account of German JagTiger 128mm ricocheting off a Sherman's turret where the radio aerial is mounted and a Sherman having two Panther rounds ricochet off the transmission bolts on the hull front.

I also have a rule that when a non-open top vehicle (tank and assault gun) is engaged/shooting they have a blind spot in their situational awareness outside their front 60-degree arc. This gives opponents a better chance to maneuver on them.

That's interesting about the WP psychological effects.

Wolfhag

Turns out the first ones started being delivered in July of 1944, and by the end of the war, apparently 76mm tanks were as numerous as the 75mm ones.

IIRC, I think they actually showed up in England in May, but with the invasion imminent they weren't issued because commanders wanted their crews to get some training on them first. So they don't go to France until July so the crews could work up with them first.

Those would have been the M4A!s with 76mm that Belton Cooper mentioned. (He was in 2nd AD)

Thanks for the replies, info, and links.

I really appreciate it.

Is there any info on 76mm gun ratios in US amored units available from July – October?

Is there any info on 76mm gun ratios in US amored units available from July – October?

US Armored divisions, data from beginning of month:

Percent 76mm
June 1944 0%
July 1944 0%
August 1944 10.2%
September 1944 17.9%
October 1944 21.9%

Data from US Armored Divisions: The European Theater of Operations 1944-45 by Steven J. Zaloga, page 30.

US 12th Army Group separate tank battalions, data from beginning of month:

Percent 76mm
June 1944 0%
July 1944 0%
August 1944 0%
September 1944 15.3%
October 1944 6.8%

Data from US Tank and Tank Destroyer Battalions in the ETO 1944-45 by Steven J. Zaloga, page 30.

The original question on the other linked thread was : "around Oct-Dec 1944", thus the date range used there.

Hi Thresher 01,
Finally had a chance to retrieve a couple of my copy of
"Armored Thunderbolt – The U.S. Army Sherman in World War II" (Steven Zaloga). Recommend that you get a copy of this book, as Zaloga's appendices are much more extensive and detailed (like coverage of 15 armored divisions that served in the ETO) than I am prepared to copy here.

US ARMORED DIVISION SHERMAN TANK STRENGTH – ETO 1944-45
(75mm / 76mm)
Unit – - JUN44 – - JUL44 – - AUG44 – - SEP44 – - OCT44
2nd AD – 219/0 – - 210/0 – - 171/45- – 153/68 – -156/65
3rd AD – 204/0 – - 201/0 – - 184/50- – 159/65 – -115/60
4th AD – - – - – - – - – - – 160/0 – - 137/18 – -108/13
5th AD – - – - – - – - – - – 166/0 – - 136/19 – -125/15
6th AD – - – - – - – - – - – 156/0 – - 153/0 – - 153/0
7th AD – - – - – - – - – - – - – - – - 94/12 – - 62/49

US 12th A.G. SEPARATE TANK BN SHERMAN STRENGTH – ETO 1944-45
(75mm / 76mm)
Type – - JUN44 – - JUL44 – - AUG44 – - SEP44 – - OCT44
75mm – - 245 – - – 370 – - – 650 – - – 527 – - – 508
76mm – - 0 – - – - 0 – - – - 0 – - – - 95 – - – -37

Interesting sidelight – Zaloga's overall figures for comparative 75mm/76mm tank numbers in the US 12th Arny Group indicate that the 76mm gun tanks did not achieve numerical parity with the 75mm gun tanks until May 1945.

Percentage of 76mm tanks in 12AG -
Oct44 – 15.8
Nov44 – 27.3
Dec44 – 30.1
Jan45 – 26.4
Feb45 – 30.2
Mar45 – 32.4
Apr45 – 41.1
May45 – 52.3

Hope this helps .

B

This is TMP at its best.

What a great message thread. Fascinating.

I have a notion (this is a very old Irish meme…."I have a notion"…) that 2e DB were amongst (maybe the) the first units in NW Europe to field the M4A376 in combat in July/August 44.

This subject was extensively covered at AHF. From 2005:

link

As of D-Day the 753 in depot reserves included 640 M4 75mm and 113 M4 76mm. There were only 43 M4 75mm and 40 M4 76mm afloat and en route to the ETO. The first 76mm Shermans were issued, 51 each, to the 2nd and 3rd AD on 21 July, for Operation COBRA. First Army held the remaining 51 available on the continent at that time as reserves (which indicates that the 153 were probably the orignal 113 plus most of the 43 that had been afloat). Then as more shipments arrived, in August more issues were made, at least 17 each additional were issued to the 2nd and 3rd AD during the month and 36 were issued to the 2eme DB. Other units also received the 76mm, the 4th AD 10 on 19 August and 8 more on 27 August, the 5th AD 17 on 19 August and 2 more on 31 August, the 7th AD 13 on 28 August, the 70th Tk Bn 17 on 11 August, the 746th Tk Bn 14 on 11 August and 3 more on 14 August. Thus at least 256 were issued through the end of August, but with 251 on hand as of 31 August and 98 reported lost through 2 September the total issues including replacements must have been about 349.

This from 2008 2008:

link

The initial shipment to the Continent were 150 M4A1 76mm (w) in early July, most being in the beachhead by the end of the first week. Fifty each were issued to the 2nd and 3rd Armored Division for COBRA, beginning around the second week of the month. The remaining 50 were held as reserves. Thereafter, issues of the 76mm were made based upon requisitions from the army staffs. Issues tended to be in "lots" rather than by individual tanks.
There was no distinction in the TO&E between 75mm and 76mm-armed "gun tanks" so they were treated interchangeably in that sense. But since they had a different logistical footprint they did tend to be distributed in lots as they were received. First and Ninth Army apparently concentrated initial issues to the armored divisions, but in Third Army 4th and 6th AD resisted issues for some time, so most were allocated to the Separate (not "Independent") Battalions. By November though that attitude had shifted. Curiously, it was about the opposite re the M4A3E2, First and Ninth Army tended to issue them to Separate Battalions rather than to divisions, while Third Army tended to issue them to divisions.

Like many equipment upgrades, the appearance of 76mm Shermans in the separate tank battalions varied tremendously. At one extreme, the 774th Tank Battalion entered combat fully equipped with 76mm Shermans, and the 70th Tank Battalion drew 76mm Shermans on 10 August (all of which went to Company A). On 19 October 1944, the 737th Tank Battalion received a single tank with a 76mm gun, which it decided to use as an assault gun attached to Headquarters Company and shuttle among the line units as needed. The 741st Tank Battalion did not draw its first 76mm Shermans until 1 January 1945, and the 743d Tank Battalion received its first five M4A1s with 76mm guns on 2 January. It was not until February 1945 that the separate tank battalions moved to the top of the list, ahead of armored divisions, for allocation of 76mm tanks arriving in theater. The 756th Tank Battalion, for example, in January had 75mm- and 76mm-armed tanks in a ratio of 2:1, and by the end of February the proportions had reversed.

link

M4A3s with 76mm guns reached the 760th Tank Battalion in October and the 751st Tank Battalion by November 1944, and both outfits allocated five to each medium tank company. (Seventeen M24s arrived at the 751st Tank Battalion in March 1945, but the battalion in April had to turn those over to the 1st Armored Division, getting in exchange worn out M5 and M5A1 tanks. The 752d and 757th Tank battalions similarly drew M24s only to have them taken away.) The first M4A3s with 76mm gun arrived at the 752d and 757th Tank battalions by February 1945, and the 757th Battalion had enough to fully equip Company A in March, while the 752d Battalion re-armored all three medium tank companies.

This subject was extensively covered at AHF. …

I would add a mention of the source of this information. The poster on AHF in the first two links is RichTO90. At that time he was employed by the Dupuy Institute as a military history analyst. I know Rich's work from several books he has authored or co-authored, as well as from several online fora and discussions.

My reason for mentioning this is to note that the information Rich has posted into the noted threads is almost certainly his own research into primary period documents through the US National Archives. Researching primary documents in the archives is what he did for a living in those days. So his postings were generally not from secondary sources (ie: he did not generally re-post what other's had said, but rather what he had found, himself, in the documents from the period).

If he offers an opinion I would, of course, subject his writings to as much skepticism as anything anyone else might say. But when he posts historical data -- statistics, numbers, dates, quotes -- I hold his material to be of the highest credibility. About the only sourcing I would give higher credibility to is when I see an original document myself in an archive box at a US NARA facility.

Good links, mkenny.

-Mark
(aka: Mk 1)

Wow, thank you for all the replies, and excellent details on this subject. It is greatly appreciated by me, and no doubt, many others.

Very interesting about the way they were allocated, since I was thinking they would perhaps be integrated into battalions and companies in "penny packets" to back up and support the anemically armed 75mm Shermans.

Of course, from a logistical standpoint, keeping them in separate battaliong (51 Shermans for that, plus 17 more light tanks), and 17 per company makes total sense.

I was thinking they would perhaps be integrated into battalions and companies in "penny packets" to back up and support the anemically armed 75mm Shermans.

Of course, from a logistical standpoint, keeping them in separate battaliong … makes total sense.

I fear you may have read more into the information that you should.

There was, to the best of my knowledge, no theater-wide, Armored Branch wide, or Army-wide approach to issuing 76mm Shermans.

They came into the theater -- the first M4A1 76mm Shermans came to ETO prior to D-Day, but by September 1944 almost all 76mm Shermans coming into ETO were M4A3s, while almost all M4A1s went to MTO. At that point they were issued out, and the unit commanders at each level would issue them as they saw fit.

Keep in mind that references to "independent tank battalions" is generally a reference to the GHQ Tank Battlions that made up about 1/2 of the total tank battalions in ETO. These were tank battalions that did NOT belong to tank regiments in Armored Divisions. They were independent battalions that the theater general HQ assigned to duties as they saw fit. In ETO they were generally coupled to infantry divisions, as were the TD battalions. Most US Army infantry divisions on the fighting line in ETO had one tank battalion and one TD battalion attached to support them by HQ.

(As the US Army did a much better job of keeping it's formations up-to-strength than the Germans did, for most of the ETO campaign a US Infantry Division had more tanks and TDs than a German Panzer Division. German infantry divisions, of course, had no tanks.)

Each Armored Division could allocate the 76s they received as Division saw fit. In one or two divisions the Division HQ determined how they wanted them organized down to the company or platoon level, but more often division issued them to the tank regiments in the division (or even the Combat Commands), who then issued them to the tank battalions, and it was the battalion commanders who often (not always) decided whether they wanted them spread around the companies or consolidated into one company. Within the companies it was often (not always) the company commander who decided if they would be consolidated into one platoon or spread throughout the 3 platoons of the company, or even held by the company HQ section (as the 105mm Shermans were, by doctrine).

The independent tank battalions also generally each made their own decisions about how to allocate the 76s they received, and sometimes the companies within the battalion determined how the platoons would receive them.

This was also true of Sherman Jumbos (M4A3E2). These went almost exclusively to the independent tank battalions, as they were not considered mobile enough for Armored Division doctrine. But within the battalions they might be consolidated into one breakthrough company or spread among the companies, and within a company might be consolidated within one spearhead platoon, or spread among the platoons, as the respective commanders saw fit.

There was no TO&E in any FM for these specific variants. Commanders organized their units depending on their own concepts along with how many they received at any given time.

So you can see some units with the upgraded tanks all in one platoon, or all in one company, but you can also find others with them spread about one or two per platoon.

The same, BTW, was true of the M36 90mm TDs in the tank destroyer battalions. Sometimes one per platoon of M10s, sometimes one platoon of all M36s and other platoons of all M10s. It was left to the unit command to decide.

Or so I have read. Haven't been there, haven't done that myself.

-Mark
(aka: Mk 1)

There was no TO&E in any FM for these specific variants. Commanders organized their units depending on their own concepts along with how many they received at any given time.

So you can see some units with the upgraded tanks all in one platoon, or all in one company, but you can also find others with them spread about one or two per platoon.

In other words, if you are a wargamer you can organise your Shermans pretty much whatever way you want, and still claim historical precedent for it.

Apparently after certain point you can also field more or less any ratio of 75 to 76 mm Shermans and still claim historical precedent for it.

That said, how many wargames account for the reduced effectiveness of 76 mm HE round (compared to 75 mm), and the reduced ammo load capacity of the 76 mm armed Shermans? Not exactly insignificant issues historically, when the tanks would be most often engaging enemy infantry, anti-tank guns and other soft targets rather than enemy tanks.

______________________________________________________

As for the issues of tank crew morale effects in gaming, an issue brought out by 4th Cuirassier earlier on, I have some ideas, but I am wondering if this topic would be better suited to a thread on its own (especially since any morale rules for tanks should be somehow in line with infantry morale rules).

The tipping point for production came in the second quarter of 1944.

44/2
75 1224
76 1533
105 599

44/3
75 748
76 2148
105 758

44/4
75 436
76 2967
105 872

45/1
75 652
76 2305
105 1120

45/2
75 0
76 1413
105 1274

Interesting numbers, Marc – especially the ones for 105 mm versions, which were supposed to only form 10 % of the total Sherman tank strenght for US tank battalions.

Was there a shortage of them in eatly 1944 that needed to be rectified by higher production rates, or was there an intent to increase their overall numbers? Considering how much bang their rounds packed, they were probably well appreciated in infantry support duties.

Was there a shortage of them in eatly 1944 that needed to be rectified by higher production rates, or was there an intent to increase their overall numbers?

There was indeed a shortage in early 1944, in that production of the first 105mm M4 tanks only began in February of 1944, with first production deliveries in April.

The 105mm Sherman was developed as the M4E5, an effort during the second half of 1943 that was accepted for production (with changes) after testing was completed in early 1944. This was the second effort to create a 105mm Sherman, after the 105mm gun for the Sherman was redesigned due to the first effort, the M4A4E1 of 1942/43, being rejected as having an unworkable fighting compartment.

US Army Sherman tank units in Tunisia and Sicily used T30 75mm halftrack SPGs as their assault guns. Sherman units in Italy began receiving M7 "Priest" 105mm SPGs for this role, but early feedback indicated this was not well liked by the units, being too vulnerable in front line combat, and having a gun mount and sights that were not well suited for quick and precise servicing of direct-fire targets.

So Sherman units slated for ETO were all scheduled to receive new M4 or M4A3 105mm Shermans. But it took some time before production deliveries reached the level that all units were fully equipped, so many went into action without initially.

It is worth bearing in mind that typical US logistical flow was 4-6 months from factory to front line unit.

As to the production numbers it is also worth noting that the USMC also wanted 105mm Shermans, so production numbers of the M4A3 105s covers not only US Army but also Marine Corps requirements.

Given the timing of the entry into production, the Sherman 105s intercepted the "2nd Generation" Sherman hull and turret design efforts. Prototypes were build on earlier hulls (with applique armor and driver/co-driver hatch bulges), but all production 105mm Shermans (built only on the M4 and M4A3 models) had the single piece large-hatch hull fronts, and turrets with raised bustles (to clear the hull hatches when the turret was reversed), the wide gun mantlet, and a loader's hatch in the turret roof. One of the challenges identified in the prototypes was the imbalance of the turret (as the gun and its mount was heavier than the 75mm), making turret traverse more difficult on slopes. Largely as a result of this (and the search for more interior crew space) the production 105mm Shermans did not have gyrostabilizers or even power traverse for the turrets.

Considering how much bang their rounds packed, they were probably well appreciated in infantry support duties.

Indeed so. Feedback from tank units in ETO in the summer an fall of 1944 consistently include requests for more 105mm Shermans, as well as requests for power traverse for the turrets. Also often requested are more M4A3E2 "Jumbo" Shermans, which were evidently quite well liked. Most, but not all, units offered no particular appreciation of the 76mm Shermans at that time, several stating they saw no need for them, or when they appreciated them saying they did so for the accuracy rather than for their increased penetration. Most units offering feedback on the automotive aspects of Shermans expressed appreciation for the M4A3 Ford GAA motor as offering noticeably better performance. Units with M4s or M4A1s (with Wright radial engines) that received Jumbos (which were built on M4A3s) seemed impressed by the automotive performance of their Jumbos even with the heavier armor.

Or so I've read.

-Mark