"Waterloo Betrayed: The Secret Treachery That Defeated" Topic

…Napoleon

"Discover why Napoleon really lost the Waterloo Campaign Napoleon was betrayed during 1815 There is no doubt of this. The Traitors admitted as much, and the Allied powers documented their acts. In the immediate aftermath of Napoleon's defeat at Waterloo, many French considered treason as the primary cause. But over the next 100 years, a conventional narrative of the campaign coalesced, and acts like Bourmont's defection were downplayed and sanitized to the point of meriting barely a mention in many histories. Since the early 20th century, while the details have improved, the same basic story arc has remained unchanged. At most, treason may have contributed to fragility which some claim manifested at the close of June 18th, 1815. Waterloo Betrayed: The Secret Treachery that Defeated Napoleon presents a new narrative that demonstrates that Napoleon was massively betrayed during the Waterloo campaign and only this treason prevented a decisive victory. The 1815 Campaign in Belgium was not four days long, nor did it begin on June 15th. French military operations began on June 5th, and the planning even earlier. With a detailed analysis that starts at the beginning of the campaign, and focusing heavily on the most thorough collection of French military correspondence ever assembled in a single work, the book demonstrates: • Napoleon's concentration orders were rewritten without authorization, sabotaging his plans, and forcing him to delay the campaign a full day. • Traitors, enabled by the rewritten orders and campaign delays, tipped off the Prussians, allowing them to concentrate 12 hours earlier. This alone enabled the Prussians to give battle at Ligny. • Napoleon went to his death never having learned the actual dispositions of his left wing on June 15th or June 16th – information that was actively withheld. • Napoleon did issue recall orders to Grouchy on June 17th. • Napoleon never said that the battle of Waterloo would be "as easy as breakfast," the most often quoted statement from the campaign, frequently used to justify poor analysis. The book includes over 270 pages of Appendices that provide extensive source citations, including over 100 pieces of correspondence, each in their original French and English translation. Waterloo Betrayed provides the answers to the campaign's most enduring mysteries."

Main page

link

Wonder to know if any of our fellow members have read this book

If the answer is yes… comments please?

thanks in advance.

Armand

The bloke 'Stephen Beckett' posted his rhetoric on here about a year ago. Another Nappy fawner.

I've read it at the request of the author a few years back. That being the case, I don't believe that it would be correct to comment on it one way or another.

If I remember rightly, the author raises a lot of questions which, without the manuscripts/letters that may answer them being available, make it hard to say yes or no to what he claims.

But really, why do people feel they have to insult the author by calling him 'Another Nappy fawner'? What is it with such people? Is it because he raises some questions on what might (or might not) have actually happened? Are the same sad people really scared that the reputation of the glorious British winning the Battle of Waterloo (all on their own, of course, LOL) might not be as accurate as they want to believe?

The author, I believe raises questions but, as I say, I think there may be some manuscripts that could answer them but no one has been allowed to look at them. But it is a book (Waterloo Betrayed) worth reading. However, saying that, as far I am aware, there's been nothing new or recent from the author, in terms of updates etc, so it might just be another 'could of' suggestion, rather than a definite did suggestion.

Still, the mystery and magic and attraction of Waterloo goes on!

We all know that Sharpe won the battle all by himself, with just a little help from sgt Harper. Napoleon was doomed from the moment Sharpe enlisted! I've read the book so it must be true!

Obviously nothing at all to do with Wellington's Allied Army and Blucher's Prussians.

Sharpe also stop the advance of Ney wing at Quatre Brass… alone with one shot!… (smile)

How Napoleon could win against him?… (smile)

Thanks!

Armand

What would Elting say to this?

This was the fellow member who said that Soult maybe was a traitor with his job in 1815?.

Armand

Stephen Beckett has published a lot of hitherto unpublished documents on the 1815 campaign:

mapleflowerhouse.com

"Waterloo Betrayed" was already popped up by Tango01 before:

TMP link

If I remember rightly, the book does not say the allied victory had nothing to do with the British or Prussians. Obviously, some people who may not have actually read it, still feel they have the right to make comments about it. I suggest they read it first before offering silly, childish posts.

The author has just asked some questions which have not yet been answered. He has not attempted to play down the British involvement or the Prussians, who I believe were there. LOL

@Brechtel198 of course it would be appropriate to comment – let it fly. Include comments on my latest work. I am sure you are very thankful for all the hundreds of new orders from 1815 I found.

Does anyone know what happened to Vandamme's collection of 1815 documents, those not claimed in the 1830s?

I have a pretty good idea… did you even know they were missing?

Has anyone read Baudus' first draft of his Waterloo notes and knows the difference between what he originally thought and what Houssaye eventually received?

I do.

Poor Bourmont, tortured soul, just waiting to be relieved… or active liar pretending to do his duty until the very end? The answer lies in the last letter he sent to Gérard that he signed as a general. Seen that? I have.

Waterloo Betrayed is obsolete, a fact I have never hidden from. The research continues, and I am pretty sure that what my team does in an average year dwarfs what 99.9% of others do in their lifetime. Which explains why it was me that found Napoleon's dictated June 10 orders, and the new registries, and all the other primary source materials that have dramatically changed the conventional history of the campaign in Belgium in 1815.

All of the 1850 era mythology about separating both armies, defeating in detail, and practically everything about June 16 that has become baked in as fact is actually _c_r_a_p_. Hint, d'Erlon could never have pulled off the maneuver so often suggested of him…

If you want to challenge me, DO IT, but share your identity. Share your credentials. Make a claim, and back it up.

I've never shied from doing that, including publicly changing key conclusions of Waterloo Betrayed because I actually found materials.

I am very proud that Andrew Roberts listed my latest work as a book of the year in the London Times review of Books, and I love what Bowden has said about the books and that they are a source for his upcoming work in a future year – including access to my additional findings. And I can't wait for the new publisher to share all the research I have been doing but am too busy to present.

Yet I can't help but notice a familiar name on this thread that always takes a shot and slithers away.

Read Hussey's appendices in Volume 2 of his work – a magnificent aggregation of obsolete secondary sources. Sad how someone can spend a lifetime, and still be so wrong.

@Gazzola, I have massively updated my materials including publishing 5 more books with the material for several more.

mapleflowerhouse.com check it out before it is taken down and the effort is migrated to publisher.

This is a very sad sequence of messages.

Firstly the whole issue has been flogged to death on this forum (as shown by Oliver Schmidt).

Secondly the Waterloo Betrayed book is actually very well researched, with massive detail and references (if folk have actually read it).

Thirdly, the author, at the time of publication was prepared to address criticism from folk such as me, who said that the Soult treason idea, however strong the circumstantial evidence, was simply stretching credulity. Soult could have been on the grassy knoll as "badge-man" in 1963 in Dallas, but it is unlikely. He did address my doubts on TMP.

But fourthly, how many historians then admit they got it wrong? You will see above his admission about "obsolete". That deserves massive respect. His interpretation of the facts I doubted at the time, indeed will always do so, but his presentation of the raw data is quite extraordinary.

Agree!.

Armand

So basically, what is being revealed is the number of 'traitors' that were active against Napoleon in 1815, but that he was aware of them anyway.

I think anyone would expect those with Royalist sympathies to work against Napoleon, in whatever way they could, so nothing new there, expect perhaps the number who did so and the details which have remained unknown, perhaps until now or soon?

So the Waterloo Betrayed book is obsolete. Right, interesting. But good news that Bowden might be bringing something out and that Stephen's latest research updates might be getting published. Possibly two interesting titles to keep an eye out for, I would say, so something positive for the future, hopefully. LOL

Just watched the video on Mapleflower House Publishing link provided by Stephen. It suggests 'traitors' provided the allies with Napoleon's plans well before the 16th June.

Not sure what to make of it really, since it seems to also suggest that, whatever happened, there would still have been two battles fought on the 16th anyway. Had the Prussians not been informed, they may not have been as many concentrated for the action at Ligny as actually ended up with?

This seems a bit of a what-if suggestion but interesting anyway?

@deadhead – I withdrew my accusation of Soult because I discovered the reason for the change of orders of June 12, the root cause being that Soult remained in Avesnes rather than continuing to Laon, and the discovery of the June 10 order of concentration – both the draft and final copy, dictated to Bertrand. (latest work contrasts the difference between draft and final copy – dramatic!)

Curiously, 2 scholars have told me that my latest work has shifted their opinion from Soult incompetence to Soult treason. I believe most associate treason with a dramatic act – such as serving for a foreign power, selling secrets, etc. However, there has been much debate in the United States, since Treason is listed in the constitution as a crime that shall result in death, of the "aid and comfort" clause. Specifically, "acts which tend and are designed to defeat, obstruct, or weaken our own arms" meets this standard, and has been held as sufficient for treason in British courts as well. Basically, if you are a military commander, and you don't do your best, and your motivations are found to be sympathy with the enemy, you are a traitor.

Believing Soult betrayed Napoleon/France is not outlandish.

With the full timeline now known, and with my prior research on Soult's motivations and actions during 1815 and beyond, they believe Soult purposely acted in a obstructionist manner, both on June 11/12, and on June 15 (which led to d'Erlon's lack of progress.) The fact that certain letters to d'Erlon did not make the Grouchy registry, and that my discoveries *proved* that Soult actively hid critical materials during his lifetime despite numerous requests for them was sufficient to swing their minds. Very clear case of how opposing views can stretch credulity for either side. This is the story of Soult – one of Napoleon's most brilliant Marshals who was given independent command, or opportunistic idiot, or both.

I believe that is possible Soult undermined the effort – but *I* believe it is more probable that the new materials demonstrate Soult utterly failed, and that this was unspeakable. One need look no farther than what happened to Grouchy – documented in much detail in WB. Waterloo enhanced Soult's political career as well. Soult betrayed, he failed, maybe both, but what really matters to our study is that he buried as much of the truth as he could. Remember, the title was "Waterloo Betrayed" as a play on words, whatever Soult did, he betrayed the history of Waterloo and led many generations to believe myth in order to protect his reputation.

(in WB, I state that Soult was responsible for Gérard's delays as well – this was my worst mistake in WB as the correspondence existed, I just didn't have it. Gérard's delayed march was Gérard's mistake as I document in the latest work. Having Bourmont in the Army was Napoleon's grave error.)

Either way, the history of the campaign is fundamentally changed – all the books written before 2018 are simply wrong on the aspects of French planning and operations. What I failed to comprehend is that I was touching religion for so many.

@Gazzola – the politics and traitors of 1815 were well known in France. It was Allied and Bourbon policy to suppress this – Waterloo was Napoleon's defeat, and all the ills of France came from him. By 1850s, French Republicans wrote histories, often very good, but continued this soft policy. Those that worshiped Napoleon continued to bang the drum, but the target was now Grouchy. Napoleon knew information poured out of Paris, and he leveraged that as well. In fact, his plan was somewhat predicated on the overwhelming amount of news such that when he struck, he would win the race of his actual departure and achieve surprise. Soult remaining in Avesnes cost the French 12 hours, and the traitors that tipped off the Prussians gained them 12 hours. In a campaign where 4 hours could have tipped the scales on numerous occasions, this is pretty big deal.

Any discussion of history that isn't a dry recollection of events involves what-ifs… without the what-if, there is no drama or significance because there is nothing at stake.

Had the French advanced on June 14, the Nivelles-Namur road is seized. Had the French advanced on June 15 and the Prussians were not tipped off, the Nivelles-Namur road is seized. Wellington and Blücher do not meet, the communications are horribly disrupted, and the likelihood of the early battles is very low. This was Napoleon's plan, and then a rapid march on Brussels.

About half of WB is obsolete – but the background on Soult and the political portions is still solid. I did not reproduce that much in the latest work because WB exists. The goal of WB was to rock the tree and uncover new materials – worked beyond my wildest dream. My loudest detractors have never found or produced anything of note… a fact I will remind them of yearly. The crow is served, cold.

Bowden has my materials and is getting more.

Thanks!.

Armand

So only half of WB is obsolete. That's a relief! LOL

Looking forward to what becomes disclosed in future publications.

At the moment, I am still sticking with Soult being too slow and not up to the job. And you can understand why he might have wanted that kept hidden.

Can we still suspect Ney of being a traitor because he ordered the troops back that were marching towards Ligny under Napoleon's orders. Perhaps he was executed before he could reveal anything? LOL

But great to see the glorious defeat still being discussed and debated and probably always will be.

As far as Ney, quote the document that orders d'Erlon to the Ligny battlefield – I think that answers the question of Ney's fidelity.

Here, I'll go first:

" "

As an FYI, the team is hot on the trail of some Gourgaud sources, and will be looking at new materials and talking to descendants later this month. There is one particular piece that could provide great illumination to June 16.

What is frustrating is that Gourgaud gave critical materials away, original artifacts, to friends. For example, Gourgaud gives 11 pages of Napoleon's dictations in exile, along with an original maps from campaigns, including one of northern France and Belgium, to his friend John Jackson of Hamburg. John dies and they flow to his brother James, and they are then found in a Scott & O'Shaughnessy sale on Wednesday, June 6….. 1917. And the trail runs cold…

Stephen

Keep it going mate. The more we learn the more we know. And for anyone moaning about it or what you are doing, ignore them. It won't change the result, sadly, as far as I'm concerned but every new piece of info adds to our collective knowledge.

Just stated to read the book. An interesting take on the difference between Napoleon's orders of June 10th and the orders issued by Soult.

In addition Stephen Beckett does show why General Monthyon was not made Chief of Staff; now both Archie Becke and Kevin Kiley have suggested this officer for the role.

Having half the book as Appendices is excellent since we have a lot of extra material to consider.

I'm really disappointed at the lack of an Index.

Overall, I'm actually looking forward to finishing this book.

138SquadronRAF

So Soult was good for the job, was he? I wonder how that turned out? LOL

Gazzola,

I did not say that he was good at as a Chief of Staff.

He'd never been Chief of Staff, even if he was one of the few Marshals of the Empire who was capable of independent command without careful direction.

Now great uncle Archie (Becke) suggested him to command the left wind of the Army of the North and Davout to take the right with Monthyon as CoS. I'm not sure about Davout. Mainly because Napoleon had left Davout in Hamburg for 1813-1814. So why would he employ the Iron Marshal in the field in the 100 Days? Evidence why Monthyon was not employed is, to me, interesting.

Putting Soult in command of the left wing would probably been my choice were I Napoleon in 1815.

As to my final opinion, I will finish the book before sending out the jury.

138SquadronRAF

It is always better to read a book before offering any criticism about the title.

I was a bit stunned when Stephen posted the book was obsolete but happy that changed to only half of it obsolete. I'm looking forward to seeing what he comes up with in future.

In terms of the Waterloo campaign, in hindsight, we can say everyone on both sides made mistakes. In this case I would say the French made more mistakes and some commanders were unable to carry out their tasks as hoped. But such is history. You win a battle and you're a genius, you lose it and it a case of what happened there then? LOL

Mistakes, surely.

Let us face it, the whole campaign possibly hinged on getting Blucher out from under his horse, all in one piece.

Without him would there have been a rally at Wavre, without him a march to La Belle Alliance, without that prospect any intention of the DoW to fight south of Brussels? There are plenty more possible counterfactuals eg d'Erlon's appearance at either battle on 16th, or a mistimed Union Brigade charge, but, for me, everything hinged on those few seconds.

deadhead

I guess every plan is a gamble, no matter who makes them. But all plans depend on the gamble and expectation (or perhaps hope) that tasks given to people will be undertaken and at the time required. But there is always the human factor, which tends to affect any planning.

Well said….

Armand

I guess every plan is a gamble, no matter who makes them.

Best summed up as "Kein Operationsplan reicht mit einiger Sicherheit über das erste Zusammentreffen mit der feindlichen Hauptmacht hinaus."

Or to give the full quote in English;

"The tactical result of an engagement forms the base for new strategic decisions because victory or defeat in a battle changes the situation to such a degree that no human acumen is able to see beyond the first battle. In this sense one should understand Napoleon's saying: "I have never had a plan of operations." Therefore no plan of operations extends with any certainty beyond the first contact with the main hostile force."
Helmuth von Moltke the Elder

Er right, a longer more wordy version of what I said before, every plan is a gamble. Some you win, some you lose.

Monthion lacked respect by many.

The concept of Wing commanders is overblown – this materialized on June 16… but even then, it was never imagined or intended to be significant. Napoleon would be in command when present, and would be present for any significant action. The battles of June 16 were a complete surprise, but even then he was going to personally supervise securing the right prior to the march on Brussels.

Had Davout acted as major-general, and had been sent on that mission to the frontier, then possibly he would have met Napoleon on the road to Laon, per Napoleon's orders, and things would have gone splendidly. There is debate of whether Napoleon's orders to Soult were vague, I do not believe so as I found the same language throughout Napoleon's correspondence, and the phrasing seems quite clear. Regardless, what cannot be debated is that remaining in Avesnes was wrong… yet, no record of Napoleon criticizing this or complaining about the campaign's delay. I believe this is because in exile, his thesis was that the concentration was brilliant. Not only was it simple and far from brilliant, it was a disaster of execution. Amazing how much propaganda and myth flows from all sides for these two weeks in 1815.

It is now factually known that Soult suppressed key materials from 1815. It has long been known he raided the archives when he came back to prominence under Louis-Philippe, and this has been confirmed. The performance of the French staff in 1815 was bad.

But…

As we find more materials and take a deeper look at what happened, it is now very clear that Soult did not replace Berthier. Soult was assigned the role of major-general, but Bertrand replaced Berthier. Bertrand shared the carriage, the travels, the talks, took the final concentration dictations and organized the dispatches. Bertrand rode with Napoleon the morning/afternoon of June 17. We have the orders Soult dictated after Ligny – none of which were of strategic importance compared to organizing the pursuit.

Napoleon's plan was up the gut, occupy Brussels. He did not take the allies very seriously – and this was not a mistake, as they performed horribly, as the Prussian analysis throughout the 19th century demonstrates. If the French launch on June 14, as intended, the Nivelles-Namur road is easily seized, and Napoleon dines in Brussels on June 16.

(all the combatants were tenacious – my criticism is reserved for the allied dispositions and French operations)

Napoleon wasn't even concerned about traitors revealing his plans – rumors spread from Paris daily, but Napoleon would be significantly faster than the truth. And he was!

But Napoleon had split his own command infrastructure – Soult zigged, Bertrand zagged, and the French army is delayed. Bourmont positions all the men on the frontier to the Charleroi road, and leaves the road to Namur open for his baggage and officers (this is conjecture, but we have the letter Bourmont wrote to Gérard on June 14 that delineates the efforts for the repairs of the Charleroi road – from a private collection discovered only in last couple years.) The Prussians are tipped off, and their army appears at Ligny.

It isn't quite as dramatic as the Waterloo Legend that is so popular, but the 1815 campaign failed because of boring stuff well before combat.

The new books make the operational study from Waterloo Betrayed obsolete. Of course, they also make all the Waterloo Campaign books obsolete – hopefully some new ones will emerge that start to reference the new materials. The political/Soult analysis from WB is still very valid, and one anecdote is that while I have changed my view on Soult's behavior/motivation from 1815, I have had others, credential, very well studied, actually say they believe the new research supports a view of Soult's malfeasance. A lot of my WB case was circumstantial, now there are some facts.

But the facts I see are just Napoleon greatly underestimating Berthier's role – not just as administrator, but as companion. Napoleon himself said 1 bad general is better than 2 good ones – yet in 1815, he employed 2 men, each arguably some of the best at what they did, and his very simple concentration maneuver (new books explores just how simple this "great" concentration was – hint, it wasn't great) was screwed up.

I have a copy of Becke's first Waterloo account that was a part of an anthology of military writings, and it has his hand written notes correcting his own text. He of course later would write a much more detailed analysis of the campaign, a very good one. I have Stoffel's unpublished Waterloo manuscript, and may transcribe/publish that – but – a big effort for questionable return. It is actually a much more interesting artifact of writing a book in the 19th century. Stoffel highlights the concentration screwups, but his text is focused on Grouchy – he has a very advanced defense of Grouchy which is impressive for the time he wrote it.

Like I said, some plans work and others don't. And even the best of plans can fail if those given certain tasks fail to achieve them. That's when you need a plan B and I don't think Napoleon had time to think up a plan B. Waterloo was all or nothing.

@Gazzola – I believe Napoleon formulated his plan B on the march, June 16. Pin the Prussians, envelop them. This has captured so much imagination that many even claim it was Napoleon's plan all along – to separate and defeat in detail. There is nothing that supports this, there is much primary hardcopy that refutes it, and it wasn't in Napoleon's control – he could do nothing if the armies withdrew… which he expected.

What has been generally missed by historians who speak of d'Erlon's failure to complete the above was that by this time, early afternoon on June 16, Napoleon was ignorant of the dispositions of his left. This plan was not executable.

While one can criticize Ney's conduct in the battle of the 16th, both he and d'Erlon were slow by design. d'Erlon had been repeatedly ordered to observe the west – that was his urgency – not marching north, and certainly not coming to Ligny. Only hindsight creates the urgency to take advantage of the opportunities we are now aware of.

Too many French historians wrote histories based on what they wished had happened, rather than rooted in what these individuals knew at those moments.

June 16th was Soult's failure. He knew, Napoleon didn't. That is damning, and this has been demonstrated by the surviving documents.

In fact, while my latest work does change the conclusion that Soult was working against Napoleon, I have had several tell me that due to the thoroughness of the latest work, they have changed from ridiculing WB to now believing Soult was working against Napoleon – betraying him.

I now believe that Soult and Napoleon failed, and Bertrand and Soult did their best to keep this from history.

I agree that Boney couldn't forsee what the Allies could do, he wished for an early battle, most likely against the Prussians because they were most likely to concentrate first – but that doesn't necessarily mean that they would give battle.

He was – in my view – surprised where they did concentrate and in what way they deployed, all showing that their main concept was to be in a position to be able to keep in touch and supporting distance to Wellington's army.

But in the end it suited him to give battle quite early. In case the Allies would have played a bit Trachenberg plan, so Prussians retreating to the East and Wellington to the west, and then just try to beat in detail one of those persuing French forces not under Napoleon, the worse the situation for Boney would getting, it would be a bit like in 1813 – marching back and forth from Dresden to Leipzig.

Yes, the whole campaign from the perspective of Napoleon is nothing else than a big cover up – as he was unfit for command any longer – but this cannot be admitted, Bernard Coppens hinted this already in his mensongers.

VW saying Napoleon was unfit for command just shows how low some people will go to knock Napoleon. A silly and purely vindictive comment, considering he had been in exile for some time beforehand. And we must not forget that after he strolled his way back to Paris and the Throne, he had little time to get his army ready and make plans to defend France from the invading allies. With these factors in mind, I think he did pretty well. His overall aim did not work out, due to various factors, but he still managed to beat the Prussians on their own, so I guess he must have been 'fit' enough then! LOL

I agree Stephen, that Napoleon failed, which is why Waterloo is and always will be an allied victory and one that ended the Napoleonic era. However, I still believe that Grouchy failing to complete the task given and keep the Prussians away from Waterloo was a major, if not the main factor, in the final result. That is not to say that the allied line would have definitely broke had the Prussians not arrived when they did, but Wellington may well have ordered a retreat in order to fight another day. And if Soult was either working against Napoleon or just slow and not up to his task, then it is no wonder whatever Napoleon planned to happen, did not.