"Why did France lose to Germany in 1940?" Topic

"After several months of "phoney war", the German army finally attacked France and the Low Countries on May 10, 1940. In less than a fortnight, the Wehrmacht swept through the country from the north.

The French army was one of the most powerful in the world, but it seems that it was unable to hold out – leading to France's great debacle of the 20th century, when on June 22, 1940, Marshall Philippe Pétain's government signed the armistice with Nazi Germany and started the ignominious story of French collaboration.

How did this happen? And why so quickly? FRANCE 24 spoke to historian Michaël Bourlet, a former professor of history at the Saint-Cyr Coëtquidan military academy, who deconstructed some of the myths about the egregious failure of the Battle of France…"
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Armand

Well, betraying all of your allays and stick to most reluctant allay is not the road to victory. They reap what they sew

What…??!!

Armand

This is essentially the argument that Robert Doughty made in "The Seeds of Disaster": the French high command envisioned a battle moving at the pace, and using the doctrine, of 1918.

Add to that the age and decrepitude (intellectual and/or physical) of so many of the senior military leadership, and you have a reasonably succinct explanation for it.

Because the Germans scored more points?

The new German warfare tactis and doctrines and the help of French communists.

Those dang communists!

First France and UK betrayed Czechoslovakia and even actively discouraged Romania to help Czechoslovakia, after that Little entente dissolved, then they didnt want to make alliance with USSR, then they did nothing to help Poland..We could keep counting all missed chances that could made French position stronger. And at the end all others are guilty but not France and UK

Nine pound for the win!

Lost in 1935 when they did not react to the militarization of Rheinland.
Then yes alliances, courage ( politicians), too late, doctrine, inept high command (for real war). Commies sabotage did not help but per se was not a main cause, as individually many were patriots and did not swallow easily the pact.

This article is half full of bleep.(saving sole editor time😀).
Not 5 millions for 40 million people. 3

Not well equiped for the task:

Virtually no smg, few mortars per bn.
No radios in tanks but for leaders. Same with air force.
Little military services cooperation. To call the air force use the normal telephone. Like calling your uncle in Monistrol sur Loire. Can have 30 min wait on top…or busy. Thank you call later.
No doctrine for artillery self defense nor weapons (a few carbines with a few clips to stand guard).
Not enough ATg and too small.
As I think De Gaulle said use tanks in 1000 groups of 3 and Gerry in 3 groups of 1000.
The old fashioned caste in the army, discouraged from reading, thinking by themselves, routine bound and some fascination of some for the politics of the ennemy.
1918 mental doctrine. Lack of flexible response.

Individuals courage, some units heroism no doubt.
The death toll never meant they fought well or efficiently.
In Russia I often have to correct the tendency to say the US did not fight well as they had "only" 400000" deaths, stating that maybe they were more efficient and fortunate not to bear the burnt of the early strikes.

And maybe they rolled too many 1.

Que nenni…there were 5 millions of men, not only 3, and of course not counting 1 600 000 special assigned workers mobilised in the Armament industries
with 12,5% France is among these belligerants reaching a ratio of mobilised on the "top" like Japan Germany Soviet Union Australasia…

3 millions is rather Italy reaching 3 600 000 at the very best, despite a little more inhabitants (~45 millions) than France but mobilised less than in WWI and less than France,

you are mixing the number of the men on the front from Dunkirk to Alps around 2 700 000 from memory, excluding the rest of France, with the real strenght of the whole French Army

One out of 8? Nan.

One out of 8? Nan.1.6 m mobilized on their work place.
114 div …

5 096 629 the 1st may 1940 of which 3 985 320 still in Metropolitan France, as said not counting the industrial mobilization only 670 000 civilians in september 1939 but reaching the number given of 1 600 000 in may 1940 by among others demobilizing soldiers from military units for the War industry and economy

there were 95 French Divisions more 2 Divisions of the Polish Army of France, 11 Divisions in North Africa 3 in Levant, not counting others officially raised Divisions but still embryonic
= 109 French Divisions + 2 Polish

authors books articles who used to count more than 95 Divisions to the French Army it is because they count some Fortified Sectors as "Divisions" however stricto sensu the French Army had 95 Divisions in the European theater – France Scotland Norway – in may 1940

Does any one have French oob during Munich crisis

Stuff, and things…

Blumentritt's retrospective impressions of the German 1940 campaign in France –

1. The strategic command is inferior to the German Command, which acts faster. (Daring leadership could have caused us considerable difficulties on several occasions in 1940, for example during the Meuse crossing by a strategic assault from France via Sedan towards the North into our flank, along the east bank of the Meuse. Further, when we were advancing towards the coast, by employing their operative reserves against our flank at the Aisne which grew longer and longer and during the battle of Arras.)

2. Tactics: The subordinated commanders were very skilled.

3. The armament was obsolete in comparison with ours. This was one of the main reasons for our being successful.

4. The spirit was good but we had the impression that we no longer had to deal with the highly regarded Frenchman of 1914-18. And we were consequently very much surprised ourselves by our swift advance.

5. Particular points:
(a) The infantry was good when on the defensive, but on offense the French had more impetus and were more powerful in 1914.
(b) The cavalry did not show up to a great extent.
(c) The artillery was still good but it ws not the artillery we feared in 1914-18. The guns were obsolete.
(d) The engineering troops were good.
(e) Actually there was no position warfare. The French defense on the Aisne was skillful and tenacious. They made good use of the terrain for camouflage.
(f) The colonial troops; the Moroccans again proved to be very good especially in the Argonnes. Here and there some atrocities but generally they were well-disciplined soldiers.
(g) The French officer was brave, gentlemanlike and well trained.

6. General estimate: There was no surprise in 1940. Both sides were ready for months and were watching each other. We owed our rapid advance to our modern air force and to the modern motorized tank tactics and not to our infantry divisions which were not as good as in 1914 and which were not superior to the French divisions in 1940. In my opinion this famous army was disadvantageously influenced by the ‘Maginot idea'. The French Army was brave, but it was not the army of 1914-1918.

Thanks!

Armand