"Which defines substandard in a commanding officer?" Topic

number of battle won

Commanding what? A Platoon, an army, or something in-between?

The number of battles won or lost wouldn't even be in my top five; probably not even in my top ten qualities that an officer should possess.

I'm not that familiar with the Napoleonic period, but the AWI is a perfect example of wins and loses not being of significant importance in defining "substandard."

a corps or battalion, you pic

You could do a study into 90% of officers I served under.

Mostly as you knew they were self serving careerist who didn't care about those under their command except how their subordinates could be used to forward said officers career.

The "political" class of officers who only looked to climb to the next level of power and protecting their pensions.

I'm not even sure how we'd judge whether it was the commander who really won or lost a battle. In some cases, sure, it's obvious, but certainly not always. Commanders can be given hopeless missions, for example. Or they can win because the enemy was given a hopeless mission.

Despite the old saying that "defeat is an orphan," a big defeat usually has several people to blame. Yamamoto created a terrible plan for Midway, and then Nagumo botched it up even more. So… which US commander gets credit for winning that battle?

How he does (or does not) care for his troops, train them and use them. McClellan did 1 and 2, but 3 was where it mattered. Davout did all 3. Little Mac was loved, Davout was respected.

There is a good Youtube series on Napoleon's Marshals, good place to start

Interestingly the level of command is important. Many excellent troop commanders have failed at company and battalion level, while a poor junior commander may blossom into a superb divisional leader.

This could have been a brilliant discussion, with so many responses, if only we had a clearer question posed.

Clearly the intention later proved to be at a commanding general officer level. But how much more interesting if it had looked at a lower tactical level…and not just Napoleonic Era also

There are many, many ways to be substandard. Top of my list is the officer who keeps giving (and changing) orders faster than they can be executed. Right behind him is the fellow who simply orders the impossible and then can't understand why it wasn't done: he gave you a lawful order, after all. ("Sergeant, construct a hot-air balloon out of bricks and mortar, and use it to seize that hilltop.")

But if you're looking for a commander rating system--all of them involve a very large element of guesswork. And, interestingly, they all assume the better general is more likely to do just what his superior ordered, which is seldom the case in real-life superior commanders. I wouldn't use a command rating die roll. There might perhaps be a die roll for receiving and executing orders for distant commanders in a campaign game, but not on a tabletop. How far from the boss can you get on a horse & musket battlefield?

I have heard that one of the marks of a good commander is one who can make a decision. If it's the wrong or the right one it's not very important. That can be worked on later. So a substandard commander would be one who can't make a decision or give orders in a timely fashion.

Inari

That was certainly the emphasis when I went through ROTC.
What was it Patton said? Something along the lines of a good decision today is better than the perfect one next week.

>>What was it Patton said?

Perfect example, whats changed since…. bully, racist, mysoginest, all you want in a commander…

Excellent point, 1984--at least in that it establishes that bullying, racism and misogamy are not in themselves the mark of a substandard commanding officer. A good commanding officer gives clear, timely executable orders which will achieve his mission. None of that makes him a nice guy. His moral and political qualities are not relevant to his job as C.O.

If you want a possibly related subset, take a look at great movie producers. Many--arguably most--of the true greats were bad moral examples, and some of them were much worse. I don't think either position requires the actual cultivation of vice--though a certain amount of ruthlessness is probably inevitable--but the supply of nice people is limited, power increases temptations, and there are a whole raft of character flaws which don't detract from being a good C. O.

It is easier to research what makes a good commander, and look for deviations from that ideal.

Mountains of ink have been spilled on effective leadership, but in essence it is mission first, people always. So commanders who don't look after, organise, train or inspire their troops, and don't have a clue about what they are trying to achieve or how to do it, are going to be quite poor.

Good commanding officers understand what it is to command. They should be strict, take good care of the troops in their charge, train hard, enforce discipline, and be able to punish when necessary.

They should also be tactically sound, understand logistics, and exercise good leadership on and off the battlefield. And they should set a good example to their subordinates.

Interestingly, sometimes good commanders if promoted to the next level, do not do well. Two examples in the Grande Armee are Dupont and Oudinot. Dupont was an excellent infantry division commander, but failed as a corps commander on an independent mission. Oudinot was a good infantry commander, but did not understand how to coordinate his artillery with his infantry and was way out of his depth as an independent commander in 1813.

The question is obviously directed to the span of a wargame table. A limited area, a limited number of commands and a limited number of command conditions.

Many of the things that make a great commander have been done before the battle begins.

Norman Schwarzkopf, the commander of Desert Storm was asked how he identified good battalion and platoon commanders. Schwarzkopf said he would ask the officer to tell him about his command. He generally got two responses. One was to describe the general readiness of the entire battalion or platoon. The other saw the officer talk about individuals in his command and what they did for the command. Schwarzkopf believed the latter officers were generally the better, effective leaders. That kind of thing was all off the battlefield.

Only a few command traits actually 'show up' during the battle [on the table top] in comparison. Most games are about making decisions. Marmont and Longstreet, for instance, both said that all a corps commander does during a battle is give the original orders, watch and decide when to commit the reserve, and perhaps play fire brigade and when to retreat . Napoleon spent most of his time kicking a Prussian drum around during Jena, giving very few orders during that time. The same is true at Austerlitz.

The off-the-battlefield preparation/leadership has a profound effect on how troops perform for a leader. So, troop performance reflects on how good a commander is. Davout's corps is a good example.

The dynamics between commanders and subordinates also have an impact on how good a commander is and can be on the battlefield. Sickles' behavior at Gettysburg is a good example. It had a profound effect on Meade's decisions and later 'reputation.' Meade's early relationships with fellow corps commanders had an effect as well as his lack of preparation, having only been in the CinC position for a couple of days.

So, Troop performance and subordinate behaviors are just as indicative of 'good' commanders as are any battlefield decisions, or win and loss records. You decide what you want to portray on the table top and how.

Since I'm pretty sure Joe has visions of a commander rating system of the sort which plagues so many higher-level wargames, I'd like to point out that Bernadotte at Jena-Auerstadt and d'Erlon at Quatre Bras-Ligny did exactly what the usual commander ratings expect the BEST rated subordinate commanders to do--respond immediately and obediently to the last orders given. This is also true of most of the 1806 Prussian generals who largely spend their time responding to obsolete orders rather than displaying any pesky initiative. I'd think about that before I inserted a command rating system into a game.

>>I'd like to point out that

Not a discussion that I'd want to enter into, since its so subjective as usual… but you're pointing out two abject failures as approval; to address a changed strategic position , instead of using the 'Genereals' common sense that was available at the time to impact in a decisive way and produce a far better/different outcome.

The 'freedon vs constriction' of rules is to address the 'god-like' vision of gamers, and their automatons who follow every order instantly.

I'd like to point out that Bernadotte at Jena-Auerstadt and d'Erlon at Quatre Bras-Ligny did exactly what the usual commander ratings expect the BEST rated subordinate commanders to do--respond immediately and obediently to the last orders given.

Ah, Robert, neither commander's actions were perceived that way by Napoleon and other French commanders at the time, nor by later historians.

This is also true of most of the 1806 Prussian generals who largely spend their time responding to obsolete orders rather than displaying any pesky initiative.

Not really, for a variety of reasons. Hohenlohe was ordered not to engage, but did. More than one commander at Auerstedt was ordered to engage, but didn't.

@ McLaddie

Napoleon spent most of his time kicking a Prussian drum around during Jena, giving very few orders during that time. The same is true at Austerlitz.

Wellington in contrast rode miles at Waterloo. He was everywhere he needed to be, when he needed to be, all day long.

I almost wonder if there's a way to program that into commander rules.

As for the French, McLaddie, that was my point. The almost inevitable use of a "commander rating" is to get the highest-rated subordinates to be the ones most likely to obey last orders given, and promptly. You'd think after 30 years of this, the dime would drop.

Prussians. I'm fresh off Arnold, and he seems to be full of commanders obeying last orders given. The orders not obeyed are largely coming from people not in their chain of command.

If you want the actual confusion of battle with misinterpretation of orders and the exercise of initiative there is simply no substitute for using live wargamers. Those silly "command rating" charts don't help a bit.

Wellington in contrast rode miles at Waterloo. He was everywhere he needed to be, when he needed to be, all day long.

4th Cuirassier:

Yes, that was Wellington's command style. It was more a statement about the army's quality in command than anything. With small and a growing army, 1808-1812, it worked better. He was stuck with a real variety of officers, some competent and some not. In 1813-14, when the British army was far more experienced and bigger, that was less his practice. The Waterloo army was such a mixed bag, he was micro-managing all day long.

Prussians. I'm fresh off Arnold, and he seems to be full of commanders obeying last orders given. The orders not obeyed are largely coming from people not in their chain of command.

Robert:

True, but that was more a matter of the confused Command structure at the top rather than, as you say, individual commanders. There is an example of the system being the issue rather than individual commander's incompetence. Howsomever… it did 'allow' for some significant disobeying of direct commands by the Prussian commanders too.

If you want the actual confusion of battle with misinterpretation of orders and the exercise of initiative there is simply no substitute for using live wargamers. Those silly "command rating" charts don't help a bit.

I agree that multiple players are closer to the mark as far as leadership is concerned. And I certainly agree with most command ratings, playing the money game, where this commander has more 'coin' than another are completely off.

The biggest problem is that the 'confusion' of battle is never really studied as a statistical or localized issue, so any of 'confusion's frequency or types induced into a game has little or no relation to 'real' battle.