"Top Allied Mistakes In Europe During WWII" Topic

"Now, decades after World War 2 ended, it is easy for us to look back and point out where the commanders made the wrong decision because we now know both sides of the story.

But then it was the task of the intelligence services and a lot of estimated guesses to figure out what the other side would do, so it is easy to look back and say "this was a mistake."

However, we did it anyway and are looking back on the European theater and see which mistakes the Allies made…."

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Armand

I have never been too sure that unconditional surrender was such a bad idea. FDR announcing it without any consultation with his allies was a bit unwise, OK. But it might have helped allay Soviet fears of the Allies making a separate peace. Helped only, as the USSR/Stalin was still notoriously distrustful of the West.

In the end the unconditional bit was quietly dropped to allow Japan to surrender, but keep the Emperor.

The Russians wouldn't have settled for anything less than unconditional surrender. They were doing the bulk of the fighting anyway.
Would Hitler have negotiated? Doubtful.

Exactly.

The only snag was either anti-Hitler side not trusting the other to keep their word.

Stalin's paranoia that the Allies and a post-death of Hitler's Germany could then join to turn on him. (Not that daft)

The Allies fear that Stalin might suspect just that and draw back from invading Germany. (Perfectly reasonable). Stop at USSR borders.

The Allies' fear that the USSR could (for the second time let us remember) reach a very favourable deal with Nazi Germany, that handed over everything that we later called as behind the Iron Curtain, in exchange for avoiding another million or so Soviet dead at the war's end. (Much evidence that it was considered)

Thank God for Oppenheimer and Manhattan. He was not become death the destroyer etc, he was the preserver of worlds, not the destroyer (well so far anyway, up to 2021). The A bomb was a miracle in its timing and Little Boy and Fat Man showed a glimpse of Armageddon, that would never have been apparent unless seen.

Another great link for discussion, that might have been lost to the "Four Hour Rule"

I hope others destroy my argument (seriously) or at least contribute. There are far too many visitors, who then add nothing, to judge by the stats.

Stalin was same or worst than Hitler… he has been pushed to his own boundaries…not with the Germans of course… with good diplomacy (and Atomic Bombs menace).

East Europe would be recovered much better and fast…

Armand

East Europe got there in the end. Pre Covid, I could enjoy a beer in Prague, Warsaw or Budapest (I wish right now).

But, to do it, it took Ronald Reagan and Gorbachev (I will not hear a word against him, thoroughly nice guy. I once had dinner with him. OK, he was three tables away and it was in a smart hotel in Corfu…a very smart hotel. I was the first person to recognise him and stand as he and his retinue marched in. Every one of his rather well built escort reached into their suit jackets (for their credit cards?) as I did so. But they saw me standing to attention, out of respect.

They did not blow me away. My wife told me to sit down and I said I would actually rather not (but in much stronger language). I got a momentary smile from him, which I value to this day.

I see that the old chestnut of the US Navy not instantly instituting coastal conveys made the list. This totally ignores the fact that the Navy didn't have the ships, the planes, or the personnel to do it immediately. Nor did the Air Corps. For much of the first year, the anti-Uboat air patrols depended on the Civil Air Patrol – old men and teenagers in private planes!

Then there was the political problem – both the shipping companies and the maritime unions were against it. So were the politicians in the seaboard cities – look how long it took to get the blackout enacted and enforced.

It wasn't the Unconditional surrender but the US State Department's

Morgenthau Plan was a proposal to eliminate Germany's ability to wage war following World War II by eliminating its arms industry and removing or destroying other key industries basic to military strength. This included the removal or destruction of all industrial plants and equipment in the Ruhr. It was first proposed by United States Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau Jr. in a 1944 memorandum entitled Suggested Post-Surrender Program for Germany.[1]

While the Morgenthau Plan had some influence until July 10, 1947 (adoption of JCS 1779) on Allied planning for the occupation of Germany, it was not adopted. US occupation policies aimed at "industrial disarmament",[2] but contained a number of deliberate "loopholes", limiting any action to short-term military measures and preventing large-scale destruction of mines and industrial plants, giving wide-ranging discretion to the military governor and Morgenthau's opponents at the War Department.[3][4] An investigation by Herbert Hoover concluded the plan would result in up to 25 million Germans starving to death.[5] From 1947, US policies aimed at restoring a "stable and productive Germany" and were soon followed by the Marshall Plan.[3][6]

When the Morgenthau Plan was published by the US press in September 1944 it was immediately seized upon by the German government, and used as part of propaganda efforts in the final seven months of the war in Europe which aimed to convince Germans to fight on.[7

Allied mistakes in Europe: 1) Invading Italy "the Soft Underbelly" was extremely costly and a badly managed campaign; 2) Failure to close the Falaise Pocket prolonged the war for months; 3) Entering the Huertgen Forest.

I'm sure there were many more, but these stand out in my mind right away.

Guaranteeing the independence of Poland? Not guaranteeing the independence of Czechoslovakia?

Invading Italy.

Somewhere, I remember reading one of his contemporaries said something of Churchill, along the lines of "When Winston is right, he's really great, like nobody else in the world, etc, but when he is wrong, my God."

I am gonna go agnostic here on the unconditional surrender but, and say, I don't know that it mattered. I think Hitler meant what he said when he said "world power of complete defeat." I don't think we painted him into that corner: he did it to himself.

Thanks!.

Armand

Some very good examples there !

How could have successfully attacked Germany in 1939? It took them four weeks to mobilse their army. They did not have a single organised armoured division, their air force was a shambles, most of their heavy artillery was in storage. The forces they had would not have been sufficient for any long term offensive and the British managed to deploy a measly 4 division by October 1939. The Germans could have just sat in their trenches and bunkers, which although not as strong as the Maginot lines, would have worked more than adequately against the shambles that would have been a full scale French offensive in 1939.

Which is why I question the decision to "guarantee" the independence of Poland!

Until the Soviet-Nazi Non Aggression Treaty it was a reasonable bluff. Overnight Poland did not stand a chance. The idea that the German General Staff would have responded to a Western Invasion by overthrowing Hitler is surely a myth created by them post war. Another is of course that the Westwall was manned solely by "old men and boys". How many times have we heard that assurance?

I do like William Ulsterman's analysis above (from Liam Waterfordman)

Until the Soviet-Nazi Non Aggression Treaty it was a reasonable bluff

It was not a 'bluff'. It was a promise that was kept.

That puzzles me. The "guarantee" of Polish Independence did lead to a declaration of war but very, very, little practical aid. OK, winning WWII did not hurt, but just delivered them into the Soviet Bloc. Supplies dropped to the Warsaw rising, lots of diplomacy at various inter Allied conferences…not much else

Polish independence owed more to the Afghan resistance Mujahedeen, Ronald Reagan and Star Wars, Gorbachev and Perestroika, Gdansk shipyard workers and a (very conservative) Polish Pope than anything the Allies did in the 1940s.

That puzzles me. The "guarantee" of Polish Independence did lead to a declaration of war but very, very, little practical aid.

If you read the original guarantee you will find it was delivered in full. That a nation state called 'Poland' would be preserved. I looked at a 1946 map and sure enough there was one country named 'Poland'

That's a pretty casuistic reading.

That's a pretty casuistic reading.

Is it? Any attempt to portray it as a trick where the Poles were fooled into thinking it was more than it was is nonsense. Poland was well aware of the terms of the agreement. It was never said that The UK and France would offer immediate military assistance by invading Germany. It was accepted that if an invasion happened there was little practical help that could prevent a German victory. Thus the promise to restore an independent Poland at some point in the future. That bit was delivered in full.

Poland was not independent after WWII: it was controlled completely by the Soviet Union. An independent Poland would never have accepted the conditions the Soviet Union forced on it, such as annexation of the eastern part of the country and the wholesale deportation of its citizens. The Poles didn't make a Soviet Marshal their Defense Minister: Josef Stalin did.

I would have to read the original agreement in detail but I do notice that, above

"it was delivered in full. That a nation state called 'Poland' would be preserved" (which Nazi Germany would never allow). That was delivered I agree.

The continued existence of a state called Poland is very different from guaranteeing its independence. There was a Polish Govt post WWII, there was a Polish army, it did have its national boundaries (however changed). But there was one big snag of course, total control by the USSR.

Poland was not independent after WWII: it was controlled completely by the Soviet Union. An independent Poland would never have accepted the conditions the Soviet Union forced on it, such as annexation of the eastern part of the country and the wholesale deportation of its citizens

Pre-WW2 Poland was far from being a 'democracy'. It had a number of wars with its neighbours and taken territory from them by force of arms. Turns out they were obliged to give up those gains post WW2. What goes around comes around. Poland also took part in the division of Czechoslovakia so spare me the moral lessons. Also I have yet to see a single Pole even contemplate giving back the German territory they were given after WW2. Double-standards writ large.
The UK gave a specific guarantee about the continued existence of Poland in the case of a German invasion. Be sure to check and see it was a specific to a German invasion and no other nation. It was aimed at German aggression and nothing else. The UK had no obligation of any kind to protect Poland from The USSR. That is real-world politics made by real-world politicians. That Poland was unable to protect itself from a nation it had gone out of its way to attack after WW 1 is a lesson in how not to pi*s off all the big boys at once. You have to take sides rather than aggravate both of your powerful neighbours

I did. Here's the language of the August agreement between Britain and Poland, formalized by their respective representatives (the British Foreign Secretary and the Polish Ambassador). Note that it is directed not against Germany, but "any action by a European Power:"

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The use of the term "contracting party" is indicative that this is meant to be a specific agreement between the two governments, as binding in terms of international law as any other treaty between two powers.

Poland being a "democracy" is neither here nor there; it was an independent power, and Britain was pledged to do what it could to maintain that status against any European power- a category that is not defined in the treaty, but clearly includes the USSR.

It is the 'Secret protocols' that mention Germany by name. In the case of action by any other nation the agreement only stated they would 'consult together on measures to be taken in common'.

The problem of Poland in 1939 was that in May of that year there had been a series of discussions between the Polish Chief of Staff, Karprzycki and the French GHQ – Gamelin. No official and binding agreement or plan was ever recorded but there were vague understandings reached. One of these was the Polish claim that Gamelin had undertaken to launch an offensive into Germany 16 days after the start of any war. The Polish claim is that this meant a full scale offensive into the heart of Germany by at least an army group. The French claim is that this meant a few divisions probing the German border whilst the French army organised itself after full mobilisation. As a result WWII began on the allied side without any clear plan and wildly different expectations about what commitments had been made. The key error was that in terms of the Polish military it encouraged wishful thinking – they partially mobilised and deployed well forward in a cordon defence of their borders, relying upon a massive French attack into Germany in 16 days. The error was compounded by the late jittery British demand (supported by the French) that the Poles not fully mobilise their army. Therefore Poland went to war with a strong diplomatic position (Two of the great powers guaranteeing their sovereignty) which was undermined by wishful thinking, in terms of their belief that the French could meaningfully attack Germany in 16 days AND compromised by the British insistence that the Polish military not be in position, ready for the starter's gun, on 1st September 1939. And this was from the politicians of Britain and France who had insisted that they had put to good use the time gained by the Munich settlement to rearm and plan the next confrontation with Germany – It is one of the most dire warnings of history.

It was a trip-wire and nothing more. It was the declaration Of War on September 3rd that was the real meat of the agreement.

Guaranteeing Polish independence was not the mistake. The mistake was not instituting immediate measures to put the armed forces into a position to enforce that guarantee. That Britain did not do this raises the question of what the goal of the agreement was. Did the Chamberlain government still naively assume that an empty threat of war would restrain Hitler? Or was Chamberlain trying to restrain Poland and France?

Sorry but I cannot overlook what Chamberlain said in March of 1939 when Germany took over Bohemia and Moravia.

It has been suggested that this occupation of Czecho-Slovakia was the direct consequence of the visit which I paid to Germany last autumn, and that, since the result of these events has been to tear up the settlement that was arrived at at Munich, that proves that the whole circumstances of those visits were wrong. It is said that, as this was the personal policy of the Prime Minister, the blame for the fate of Czecho-Slovakia must rest upon his shoulders. That is an entirely unwarrantable conclusion The facts as they are to-day cannot change the facts as they were last September. If I was right then, I am still right now….

After all, the first and the most immediate object of my visit was achieved. The peace of Europe was saved; and, if it had not been for those visits, hundreds of thousands of families would to-day have been in mourning for the flower of Europe's best manhood.

More ominously for the future Chamberlain went on to say that if he had not given in to Hitler, then nothing Britain, France or Russia could have done would have saved Czechoslovakia, and if the allies had ultimately prevailed, Czechoslovakia could not have been reconstituted with its Versailles boundaries. (Really?) This reads like the script for Britain's foreign policy in the days leading up to the German invasion.

mkenny really? Or is that what it looks like to us today? If so, it was most a incompetently strung trip wire that led to…nothing much bad happening for Germany until 1942. It was supposed to be the lynch pin of a mighty deterrent that would constrain Germany and prevent a war from happening at all. It was really quite a dismal failure as it did not deter a German attack and placed the allies in a vulnerable position that they could have avoided with some small efforts in the areas of planning and preparation.

If so, it was most a incompetently strung trip wire that led to…nothing much bad happening for Germany until 1942. It was supposed to be the lynch pin of a mighty deterrent that would constrain Germany and prevent a war from happening at all. It was really quite a dismal failure as it did not deter a German attack and placed the allies in a vulnerable position that they could have avoided with some small efforts in the areas of planning and preparation.

Incompetent? It was the start of the downfall of the Nazi regime. A line was drawn and the consequences of crossing it made plain. Hitler ignored the warning and in 1945 every last vestige of his empire was wiped from the planet. You can if you wish quibble about the the how why or when but in September 1939 The UK decided to make a stand and entered into a conflict that cost her dear. The price the UK paid was immense and yet you quibble because you think you could have done it better.
Oh and by the way 'bad things' started happening to Germany in the summer of 1940. That is when Hitler's dreams came crashing to a halt at the English Channel. That failure of his armed forces led directly to his second mistake to invade Russia.

Chamberlain made every effort to prevent a War. He believed that by selling out Czechoslovakia he could achieve a greater good. It was considered a price worth paying. He believed Hitler when he said when it was his last demand. When he realised Hitler had lied and that he was going to try the same trick on Poland then he saw the light and increased defence preparations. He also resolved not to cede an inch in the future and gave the Polish guarantee. No more Mr Nice Guy. Hitler thought Chamberlain would back down and Hitler was proved wrong. The fatal mistake was made by Hitler not Chamberlain.

Chamberlain believed selling out the Czechs was a price worth paying because Britain wasn't paying it. But moving on:

On March 31, 1939 Chamberlain made an "unequivocable guarantee" to the Poland. Within hours pro-government newspapers were announcing the guarantee did not extend to Danzig and the Polish Corridor. Other news sources as well as members of Parliament challenged Chamberlain on this point, at which point the government repeated statements repudiating the news reports about Danzig and the Polish Corridor. Yet at the same time on April 3 Chamberlain wrote privately "what we are concerned about is not boundaries of states but attacks on their independence. And it is we who will judge whether this independence is threatened or not."

The accounts I've read indicate that behind the scenes the British were trying to convince the Poles to make concessions to Hitler which would include returning Danzig to German sovereignty. These continued even after the Nazi-Soviet pact was signed. Also some have argued that one reason Britain didn't prepare for immediate intervention was that the knowledge that Poland would have to bear the weight of the war for the first few weeks might make the Poles more flexible.

As for Hitler thinking Chamberlain would back down again, there were certainly mixed messages, including a British proposal that would include a withdrawal of the guarantees to Poland.

To clarify I am not putting the blame solely on Chamberlain or Britain. There is plenty of blame to go around, including the U.S. decision to return to "isolationism" after WW1. Standing up to Hitler came with a cost. Until the seriousness of the threat was clearly demonstrated it was always possible to think that cost was too great.

mkenny – the whole point of Chamberlain's policy (and that of Daladier) was to deter Germany from going to war in the first place. That required a meaningful rearmament and a degree of co-operation with the French and Polish military, which just never happened. It isn't just me that thinks it was a disaster – there were plenty of others at the time – Winston Churchill being the most vocal. The bad things that happened to Germany were dwarfed by the bad things they were able to inflict upon Europe precisely because of the failure of Britain and France in 1939. Bill N is quite right – up until the last minute Britain was still trying to come up with a deal that would appease Hitler. More importantly when the British started to fight the war against Germany they were hopeless under Chamberlain's leadership – They were caught out in Norway, played a bit part in Belgium and France and the much vaunted bomber command upon which the bulk of the re-armanent dollars were spent, only dropped leaflets. All of which speaks to just how flawed the British approach under Chamberlain was. There would have been no problem if the time bought at Munich in 1938 was used to re-arm and organise in a way that was meaningful – but it was squandered. It is also something of a jump to say that German failure at the Battle of Britain led to the invasion of Russia – if we are gong to start playing that game then we may as well go back to 1919 and failure of the Versailles Peace Treaty and say that it was the cause of all of the problems in the first place. Which I note some lazy historians do.

Also some have argued that one reason Britain didn't prepare for immediate intervention was that the knowledge that Poland would have to bear the weight of the war for the first few weeks might make the Poles more flexible.

Yep them there Brits is always willing to fight to the last Pole/Frenchman/Aussie etc. Perfidious Albion and all that.
The conspiracy theory of WW2 falls apart when you have to explain why, at its very lowest point in the summer of 1940, the UK did not simply withdraw behind its Navy and let Europe fall. The UK chose to continue the war even when victory seemed impossible. Bottom line is Britain gave a very specific guarantee to Poland and it made sure it delivered on it.

There would have been no problem if the time bought at Munich in 1938 was used to re-arm and organise in a way that was meaningful – but it was squandered

Remind me who brought back Conscription in The UK?

That is YOUR bottom line. It isn't THE bottom line. When the German army crossed the border into Poland on September 1 there should have done so against a fully mobilized and deployed Polish army, while on the western front there should have been fully mobilized French and British armed forces prepared to immediately act. That there was not was the result of Chamberlain playing the appeasement card right up to September 1.

The "in the summer of 1940" argument does not hold water. In May of 1940 the British Empire went under new management. Churchill had a better understanding of what was at stake. If it was strictly up to him Churchill would probably have taken a different interpretation of Britain's undertaking to Poland than Chamberlain did in 1945. However in 1938-39 Britain was the Senior Partner among the allies. By 1945 the British Empire was third chair.

The "in the summer of 1940" argument does not hold water. In May of 1940 the British Empire went under new management. Churchill had a better understanding of what was at stake

Rubbish. The implication that if Chamberlain was still in charge that the UK would have made a deal with Germany is absurd. Chamberlain made it clear that he was in a war and that he was in it to win. He even said he knew it would bankrupt the UK but it did not matter as long as she won. I think you have been reading too much Churchill.

That is YOUR bottom line. It isn't THE bottom line.

It is 'the' bottom line if it is being claimed the UK lied/cheated/deceived The Poles as to the nature of the agreement. The UK made a promise to the Poles and they delivered on that promise. That is an undeniable fact.
All the cudda, shudda, wudda stuff is mere distraction.

we may as well go back to 1919 and failure of the Versailles Peace Treaty and say that it was the cause of all of the problems in the first place.

Well, it certainly was a major contributor to the problem. The terms of that treaty certainly made Hitler's demands seem at least partially justified, including the demand for the return of Danzig (most of which's residents, I have read, favored the idea).

"It is 'the' bottom line if it is being claimed the UK lied/cheated/deceived The Poles as to the nature of the agreement. The UK made a promise to the Poles and they delivered on that promise. That is an undeniable fact…"

Same with the Polish in England who bled for them when the war was finished…

Armand

Same with the Polish in England who bled for them when the war was finished…

Now there is a first, a post not a direct result of a Google search.

Not a first… you have to follow more deeply Ultramodern my friend… (smile)

Armand