"Provisional Rifle Corps: Morgan's Sharpshooters" Topic

Morgan's Riflemen or Morgan's Rifles, previously Morgan's Sharpshooters, and the one named Provisional Rifle Corps, were an elite light infantry unit commanded by General Daniel Morgan in the United States Revolutionary War, which served a vital role executing his tasks because it was equipped with what was then the cutting-edge rifle instead of muskets, allowing superior accuracy at an up to ten times the distance of the typical troops of the day.

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Wasn't the Saratoga campaign kind of their high water mark? I'm not sure I'd list them as elite so much as they had a special skill set. I don't recall them really having an impact on any other battle of the war either. The estimated range in the attached article seems to greatly exaggerate their weapon's range as well.

At any given large battle, the Crown had just as many – if not more – rifles on the field in more disciplined units, than the American forces.

Rifle armed units also needed to be backed up by musket armed troops, since they could reload faster than the rifles and could also mount bayonets which rifles could not.
Rifles could be driven off by hostile bayonet armed troops.

Here is my interpretation of Morgan's Brigade at Saratoga. They maybe more uniformed than they actually were. Probably did not have a flag. But I like them anyway. The photo shows the riflemen up front, with Dearborn's Light Infantry with bayonets behind them. The riflemen are Perry metals and the light infantry are Perry plastic figures.

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Very nice.

Lovely figures. IIRC, from Eric's books, the riflemen were a composite unit made up from VA, PA, and MD.

The same was true of Dearborn's men. They were picked men from different units. I get why you want to use the Light kit figures – I sometimes do it too. But the men in Dearborn's unit were returned to their parent unit after, and likely had no special uniform. But, I get it. ;-)

Wasn't the Saratoga campaign kind of their high water mark? I'm not sure I'd list them as elite so much as they had a special skill set. I don't recall them really having an impact on any other battle of the war either.

Define 'elite' for a military unit. Isn't at least part of that definition having 'a special skill set?'

And Morgan's rifle corps was brigaded with Dearborn's Light Infantry, which was a hand-picked provision unit drawn from the infantry units with the Northern Army.

Elite, huh? Hardly.

"Perhaps the greatest tactical disappointment of the battle was the failure of Morgan's Corps to act as intended – that is, as a single, cohesive, body. This is not surprising, since it's two battalions were newly formed, served together for less than one week, and had no combined arms training. Instead, the riflemen were scattered soon after the battle started because the light infantry was unable to arrive in time to support, resulting in the rifle battalion being placed out of commission for some time……But the unintended result was that Morgan's riflemen had to rely solely on the natural landscape for their defense rather than the bayonet-armed light infantry.

"Although Washington ordered that men serving in the rifle battalion be "none but such as are known to be perfectly skilled in the use of these guns, and who are known to be active and orderly in their behavior," their actual prowess in the use of rifles is questionable. Most were drafted from musket-armed regiments and had to transition to army-issued rifles that were not their own. Given that the rifle battalion numbered about 400 officers and soldiers and were engaged for most of the battle, one might expect that they should have been capable of shooting down every British soldier in the field that day."

The Saratoga Campaign – Uncovering an Embattled Landscape – (Chapter by Eric Schnitzer, Saratoga Battlefield Historian) -pages 53-54.

I'm pretty sure this discussion has occurred here before.

Obviously with some time and training, the rifles and lights did better at the second battle, fighting as a combined armed unit. Dearborn's lights were returned to their parent regiments after the campaign. I can't recall any subsequent battle were Continental (key word there) rifles contributed in any meaningful way. At the battle of Monmouth, they wandered off and never got into the battle, in part due to confusing orders.

In fact Dearborn went off to cover the American left at the outset, out of concern for what Fraser's wing was doing.

Morgan's batallion charged right into the Freeman's Farm clearing, unsupported and was quickly flanked and routed by light infantry, Indians and several companies of the 24th Foot.

It took hours for them to reform and Morgan initially despaired that his command was lost.

Excellent coverage of this in Luzader's Saratoga book, also.

It's been said here on several occasions that the British almost always had more rifles on the field than the Americans. They salted them in with the Light Infantry. And the LI had bayonets.
Hessian Grenadiers often backed up the Jaegers.
Why? Because it took too long to reload a rifle, and since they didn't take bayonets, they needed to be protected by troops that did. After they fire and miss, they were vulnerable.

Despite the standard American mythology of the rifles cutting down stupid British marching in straight lines, Morgan's Rifles were a one trick pony. When backed up, they did well. When not…

We seem to be moving from the point where historians overvalue the importance of rifles in the AWI to the point where they undervalue them. Rifle use in the Continentals was not limited to just a few designated rifle regiments. The Continental army was scrambling for long arms to arm its troops into 1778. Troops who came to the army with rifles, either personal weapons or those issued by the colonies, continued to carry them for some time, and additional rifles were obtained by the army. Rifles were one of the long arms Steuben listed as could be found within a single Continental company.

When the war moved south it was moving into an area where rifle culture was common. Rifles could be found along side muskets and fowling pieces in most militia units from the interior. It wasn't just limited to specialized rifle armed units like Campbell's. There were also rifles being used by Loyalist units.

I have no idea whether an effort was made when organizing Morgan's command in 1777 to assign men familiar with rifles. Morgan's command does seem to have earned a favorable reputation even before it was sent to join the Northern Army. As for "one trick pony" the disappearance of Morgan's rifles after Monmouth probably owed more to how Washington wanted his army to fight.

Elite, huh? Hardly.

You still didn't give a workable definition of elite…

Not my job, as I didn't label them as that originally. Ask the OP, as it was in his blog that said that, not me.

Like so much during this period, rifle use and units came and went during this war. The original rifle units outside of Boston in 1775 are not the same units found later – if at all. Washington wasn't much of a fan of those unit.

I'm not aware of any of the states issuing rifles, but then again, I don't claim to know it all either. Maybe. Rifles were rare, expensive, and not great for much of the needed service.

The British issued rifles to some of the men in their light companies but there isn't any record that I am aware of that describes their use in the field.

There was a large Jager unit on the field at Birmingham Hill, but I can't find much account of their activity there – Ewald aside.

Morgan's own regiment – the 11th VA, has no found history, so far, of ever being issued hunting shirts – though they were issued uniforms. Note too that in the the BG scenario book for Freeman's Farm, the author does not list them as a skirmish unit. Again, it is not clear how they fought – as true skirmishers, open order, extended order, etc. I am told by the re-enactment unit, that for early war, the rifle company of the 1st VA was issued regimental coats, not frocks.

There is so much we don't know. Personally, I find it hard to gauge the use and success of rifles in this war.

Not my job, as I didn't label them as that originally.

Nice dodge. 🤦‍♂️

You did state that they weren't an elite unit, merely that they had 'a special skill set.' You should back that statement up, and you haven't done that.

Regarding Morgan's Provisional Rifle Corps and Dearborn's Light Infantry Battalion, the following material should suffice:

'The morning of September 18, the Americans dispatched heavy reconnaissance parties consisting of the highly experienced and capable Virginia and Pennsylvania riflemen and an accompanying light infantry battalion under the respective commands of Colonel Daniel Morgan and recently promoted Lieutenant Colonel Henry Dearborn, two officers who were veterans of Arnold's expedition to Quebec…' (Douglas Cubbison, Burgoyne and the Saratoga Campaign, 108).

'[Morgan] raised a body of sharpshooters drawn from various Virginia, Maryland, and Pennsylvania units. These men formed the famous corps that marched to the Northern Department, where he and his men distinguished themselves.' (John Luzader, Saratoga, xxvi-xxvii).

'In 1777, Washington formed a provisional Corps of Riflemen, under Col. Daniel Morgan, with picked marksmen detached from Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Maryland Continental regiments. They were sent to deal with the Indians who had been raiding in the Hudson Valley…Working in close cooperation with the American light infantry, Morgan employed his riflemen with great effectiveness as sharpshooters in the battles around Saratoga.' (John Elting, American Army Life, 23-24).

'Almost simultaneously…came a general order regularizing the status of Morgan's Corps. That unit, which was an independent organization composed of men detached from several Virginia and Pennsylvania regiments, had been sent by Washington to provide the Northern Department with a light infantry capability. Gates enlarged the Corps on September 11 by the organization of a battalion of light infantry under the command of Major Henry Dearborn of the 3d New Hampshire…'Colonel Morgan's Corps not being attached to any brigade or division of the army, he is to make returns and reports to headquarters only; from whence alone he is to receive orders.'' (Luzader, Saratoga, 260).

In Campaign to Saratoga by Don Troiani and Eric Schnitzer, it is noted on page 163, 'Morgan's Corps of picked men…'

'On 6 August Major Henry Dearborn noted 'it is in Genrl. Orders for a company of light infantry to be formed from each Continental Regiment immediately;'on the 19th he recorded, 'I am appointed to the command of 300 light infantry who are draughted from several regiments in the Northern Army & to act in conjunction with Col Morgan's Corps of Riflemen.' These light infantry units were being formed throughout the Continental Army, obviously on Washington's orders. They were to be picked soldiers-young, active, reliable, brave, and good shots. Their weapons were the musket and bayonet; possible they also carried tomahawks. Their mission was the same as that of the British light infantry-skirmishing, raiding, advance guard and outpost work. In this campaign they would also form a fast-moving yet solid battalion behind which Morgan's riflemen could rally if caught at a disadvantage by British infantry. (Morgan seems to have called them 'the bayonets.') They became one of the Northern Army's two elite units.'

'Morgan's Corps of Riflemen was the other. Like the Light Infantry it was a temporary organization, formed only in June, but already blooded in New Jersey maneuvering. Its core seems to have been Morgan's 11th Virginia Regiment, filled up with whole companies or individual soldiers from Maryland and Pennsylvania Continental regiments. In fact, there may have been more Pennsylvanians than Virginians in its ranks, but Morgan mixed them up thoroughly. Most, if not all, of its personnel were from frontier districts and had experience in Indian warfare; all were good marksmen with their long Pennsylvania rifles…There is no indication that they had any special drill or training, but Morgan's driving personal leadership kept them under control in almost any situation…He joined the Northern Army on 30 August with 331 effective rank and file and 36 sick-Dearborn said '400 Riflemen.' (John Elting, The Battles of Saratoga, 26).

Dearborn's quotations in the above two paragraphs are from his Revolutionary War Journals which are a valuable resource.

The comment above that both of these units were considered elite, as they were hand-picked, is definitive.

Ok. How would YOU define "elite"?

"The comment above that both of these units were considered elite, as they were hand-picked, is definitive."

Hahahaha. Good one. Actually, it only proves they were picked men, not elite – the best of the best does not mean elite, especially considering what they had to draw from. I grant you, elite can be hard to define, as in one battle a unit may perform well, while at another not so well (see history of the Maryland line).

My opinion – an elite unit is one that performs consistently at an above average level. Morgan's battalions were ad hoc, which be definition would not allow consistent behavior. They performed poorly in the first battle, yet you want to make them elite. Your game, go ahead. Not backed up by history. Next battle they did better, then were broken up. So elite they were disbanded? You don't see that behavior in the British army.

The Grenadiers consistently performed above average. The Guards consistently performed above average. The Lights consistently performed above average. The 33rd and 23rd consistently performed above average. The rifles? No evidence other than one battle. Dearborn? Temporary unit, disbanded after several weeks. Same for Maxwell during Brandywine.

You quoted lots of stuff above, but none of it really supports the assertion they were elite, just gives background on the units. No offense, but I'll take Eric's analysis over yours. Disclaimer – I know Eric, often correspond with him.

So there were entire battalions of hand picked men at Monmouth. How did they fair? Ambushed some rushing troops and then skedaddled. Probably smart to do so. Of course creating temporary units of hand picked men sounds good, but deprives the parent unit of perhaps its best troops for a temporary feel good moment at best.

I am guessing you are a rifle-lover and view them as super-duper troops. Not uncommon in the gaming world.

This is as good a definition as any for a military unit:

"superior in quality, rank, skill, etc."

A handpicked military unit would fall under that definition of 'elite.'

Next battle they did better, then were broken up. So elite they were disbanded? You don't see that behavior in the British army.

Ferguson's Rifles? A rather unique unit. They were also composed of "picked men" from other units. That practice may not have been very popular with the Colonel of the unit they came from. So politically, the unit itself may have been on shaky ground. Nobody wants to have their "best marksmen" stripped away, after the LI and Grenadiers have been taken. I suspect that taking Dearborn's and Morgan's men from other regiments was also not very popular with the original commanders. And Ferguson's unit was broken up right after the Philadelphia campaign, the men returned to their original units. The high expense of their fragile rifles probably contributed also.
You accept the flank companies being taken away. You have already made allowance for that. But yet another "send me your best men!" demand… I've often wondered if those sent away were indeed "the best men".

I am guessing you are a rifle-lover and view them as super-duper troops.

No. Sorry, but that is an inaccurate and rather a presumptuous statement based on your own bias and historical ignorance.

>'The morning of September 18, the Americans dispatched heavy reconnaissance parties consisting of the highly experienced and capable Virginia and Pennsylvania riflemen and an accompanying light infantry battalion under the respective commands of Colonel Daniel Morgan and recently promoted Lieutenant Colonel Henry Dearborn, two officers who were veterans of Arnold's expedition to Quebec…' (Douglas Cubbison, Burgoyne and the Saratoga Campaign, 108).

"highly experienced and capable…" Maybe. They were newly organized and had little experience of the terrain and area. In fact, they had hardly scouted the area north of Bemis Heights. Apart from identifying the British camp at Sword's House and taking a few foragers prisoners, they returned to the main camp. On the day of the battle they were not aware of the British presence until they ran into them at the farm clearing.

No doubt there were veteran troops in the unit, but that doesn't necessarily translate into being all that capable given what we now know about the battalion (per Luzader, Schnitzer).

They performed much better during the October battle, probably because Morgan had better control of his formation and Dearborn's and Arnold's direct supervision.

This topic remains an issue for those of us who game AWI or are students of the period--the Rebels in particular put together ad hoc light infantry and rifle units (like Maxwell's brigade at Brandywine) and then disbanded them soon thereafter. There are also the battalions of "picked men" at Monmouth.

The fact is, Morgan's battalion on September 19 was fairly newly assembled, contained men with little experience handling rifles and definitely was not all that well led during the initial phases of the battle. And few, if any of the men, were from the area and did not "know the terrain" as is often asserted.

The British, OTOH, had John Freeman serving as an officer on Burgoyne's staff as a member of Jessup's Loyalist regiment. He new the roads and trails.

As for Ferguson's company, he was wounded at Brandywine and "out of the picture" afterward when decisions were made to disband his company.

Wasn't Morgan wandering around the Freeman's farm battlefield blowing his turkey call, trying to reassemble his "elite" riflemen? He had no idea where Dearborn was either. And where was the actual commander of the rifles if Morgan was supposed to be in charge of both battalions? LoL

Honestly, Brechtel, I'm not sure what your point is, as you haven't provided any evidence of these ad hoc formations being elite. Perhaps remove the plank from your own eye first.

My earlier point was that I am not sure what formations these different rifle units used on the field. Skirmish? Open order? Extended order?

I have the same questions about the Jagers. Did they receive some sort of military training? Did they practice specific maneuvers prior to battles? At Birmingham Hill, were they just a mass of 400-some skirmishers milling around the flank, or were they in some sort of formation?

Excuse me while I go off and stumble over my historical ignorance now. LoL

What I'm taking away from this discussion is that ad hoc formations of "picked men" were not all that elite.
"An Army of One"?

Picked men were viewed as the best. But, what does that mean? The office I work in picked the best of the worst people who applied for a job here some years ago. So that makes that employee a "picked" person. They performed miserably at their job. No one was surprised. What are you picking from?

I get the idea of picked men. But I think you have to look at how they performed, and by definition, it is an ad hoc formation that won't leave a long record of accomplishments to judge them by.

Was Ferguson's rifles an elite unit? I dunno. In my game I'd rate them as first line skirmishers, not elite. IIRC, many of the men were new to the service (new being relative). They fought well at Brandywine, were then folded into one of the Light Battalions, then disbanded. Hard to judge that unit as elite. They had a unique weapon. Does that make them elite? You can adjust your firing game mechanism without making them elite. You certainly wouldn't do that for Morgan's rifles base on their performance.

Even a bad unit can perform very well once. Do you rank them elite for that game? How about a good unit performing poorly in a particular battle? Isn't that what morale rolls are for? Ah, the dreaded snake eyes – the bane of my gaming existence.

What was the record of the rifles and lights before Saratoga? After? Didn't the Americans have to reinvent their army every year up to about 1778?

It's a unique period of a revolutionary army facing a professional force. It makes for some interesting match-ups. I tend to err on the side of letting the dice decide such things.

I would rate Morgan's rifles higher in the second battle than the first. Same for Dearborn. Elite for both? On what grounds, as it certainly wasn't based on training, longevity, record, etc. Honestly, I am not sure I'd ever rate any American unit as elite, for all the reasons listed above.

The 1st Maryland and the Delaware Regiment were certainly elite units in the southern army, and the Continental Corps of Light Infantry were also elite units.

The Hessian jagers were certainly elite troops.

The Guards consistently performed above average.

They were decisively beaten and took heavy losses at Guilford Courthouse.

The British light infantry ran at the Hollow Way and at Germantown.

I would rate Morgan's rifles higher in the second battle than the first. Same for Dearborn. Elite for both? On what grounds, as it certainly wasn't based on training, longevity, record, etc. Honestly, I am not sure I'd ever rate any American unit as elite, for all the reasons listed above.

Certainly leadership, ON THE DAY, mattered highly. Better die rolls?
As for the Maryland and Delaware units Kevin mentioned, again it was leadership from their beginning.
The Continental Light Infantry had time to coalesce. They were not ad hoc, suddenly thrown together.
A good friend of mine, a retired Marine officer, once told me that the first thing to do to make a unit "elite" is to tell them that they're elite. After you've convinced them (he was at Parris Island), the rest is a lot easier.

Morgan at Freeman's Farm, and Morgan at Cowpens is almost night and day. Having a predictable idiot for an opponent certainly helped at the latter.

The British light infantry ran at the Hollow Way…

Well, they SHOULD HAVE! Only idiots would have stayed.
By the way, they rallied. And so did everyone who ran at Germantown.
I would consider rallying a good determinant of a quality unit. Morgan's front line militia at Cowpens rallied and came back. I wouldn't go so far as to call them "elite", but perhaps "reliable" is a better description.

+1 to John the OFM

"The 1st Maryland and the Delaware Regiment were certainly elite units in the southern army,"

IIRC, the Delaware line was eventually whittled down to company strength. Never a big unit, first line in GB.

"… and the Continental Corps of Light Infantry were also elite units."

They performed well at Stony Point. The storming of the Yorktown redoubt was a mission against a handful of men. One has to wonder why those advanced redoubt were so under-manned.

"They (Guards) were decisively beaten and took heavy losses at Guilford Courthouse."

IIRC, they carved their way through two lines of enemy – after a grueling march, not eating much at all – fighting in disorder through the woods. Got to the third line unsupported, ran, rallied and went back again. I think. Please provide an example of an American unit that ever did that?

"The 1st Maryland and the Delaware Regiment were certainly elite units in the southern army,"

Didn't the 1st MD run at GCH? I believe the entire MD brigade did. Also, didn't they run at one of the later southern battles? Eutaw Springs?

"The British light infantry ran at the Hollow Way and at Germantown."

Got out of a horrible jam, reformed, fought well.

I'm looking for consistency. You could make a good point for the MD brigade, though as we know, it was not the same year to year. That was what all American units suffered from, undermining their chances to improve over time. The Brits, not so much since the reinforced their existing regiments. Kind of like what the south did during the ACW, as opposed to the north who let their excellent units get burned out.

Didn't the 1st MD run at GCH? I believe the entire MD brigade did. Also, didn't they run at one of the later southern battles? Eutaw Springs?

The 1st Maryland defeated the 2d Battalion of Guards. The 2d Maryland, which was a new and untried unit, was broken by the 2d Battalion of Guards.

The 1st Maryland performed excellently at Eutaw Springs, but had trouble at Hobkirk's Hill, for which Greene blamed their commanding officer.

The Delaware survivors of Camden, at which the Maryland Division commanded by Baron de Kalb, performed superbly, amounted to two companies which were commanded by Kirkwood and Jacquett. Kirkwood's company served alongside Washington's cavalry while Jacquett was assigned to the 1st Maryland.

If you are actually interested I would highly recommend The Delaware Continentals by Christopher Ward.

And after Valley Forge and beyond, most Continental regiments were as good, or better, than corresponding British and German regiments. The only problem was that there were not enough of them for various reasons, not the least of which was the more 'attractive' service in the militia and state lines.

And I think you made the original point I was trying to make – that while on the one hand you have a unit like the 1st MD with a long, and consistent history of above average performance, but on the other you have Morgan's rifles that can really only point to one good day. You can make a good argument that the 1st MD deserves such a rating of elite, but you can't the rifles as the record just isn't there to justify that.

What was the life span of the specific unit called "Morgan's Rifles"?
When was it formed?
How long did it last?

I'd have to look what he had at Whitemarsh. Not sure if was the same unit, or his own 11th VA Regt.

From the passage cited above:

" Most were drafted from musket-armed regiments "

These drafted men would have to be returned to their parent regiments at some point.

Morgan's Rifle Corps was formed as a provisional unit on 13 June 1777.

It served with the main army after returning to it in mid-November 1777 and spent the winter with the main army at Valley Forge.

The Rifle Corps slowly shrank in strength because of losses, expired enlistments, and some returning to their original regiments. They had no more than 170 in the ranks when they reached Whitemarsh when returning from the Northern Army.

Morgan went on furlough in January 1778. He left the Rifle Corps for good after Monmouth and returned to command the 11th and 15th Virginia Regiments.

'I am forwarding…Colonel Morgan's corps of riflemen, amounting to about 500. These are all chosen men, selected from the Army at large, well acquainted with the use of rifles, and with that mode of fighting which is necessary to make them a good counterpoise to the Indian.'-Washington to Gates

The saga of the Marylanders is a great example of how even good units can eventually be worn down and then not perform well in the clinch (Hobkirk's Hill).

Leadership plays a role, as noted at Freeman's Farm--the Rebel side didn't seem to have much of a leadership presence above the battalion for most of that battle. That has caused problems for me as I try to put together a scenario for that one--Arnold in command? Not exactly. He wasn't even on the field for the battle. Learned and Poor? What did they do? We know more about what the battalion commanders got up to.

Remember, at the end of the day, we are playing with Toy Soldiers.

Speaking of toy soldiers, did anyone else notice that one in the picture looks like Kenny Rogers? 😆

By the time Morgan's troops made it back to the main army, there were only around 100 of them.

Hard to say how "good" they would have been as the engagement at White Marsh really wasn't much of a battle.

I can't speak for anyone else, but this was the portion on the linked page I was responding to:

"Perfect for Rebels and Patriots, Morgan's Riflemen or Morgan's Rifles, previously Morgan's Sharpshooters, and the one named Provisional Rifle Corps, were an elite light infantry unit commanded by General Daniel Morgan in the United States Revolutionary War, which served a vital role executing his tasks because it was equipped with what was then the cutting-edge rifle instead of muskets, allowing superior accuracy at an up to ten times the distance of the typical troops of the day."

The are some real whoppers in there. A musket could throw a ball out to 300 yards. Is the author suggesting that a rifle could put one out to 3,000 yards? I could go on with other things in that passage, but I think we've wasted enough electrons on this topic.

Ouch. Well, we know this is one of the problems we all run into--especially with the AWI for some reason, and particularly where riflemen are concerned.

I think a major problem is how the rifle has been romanticized as a symbol of "democratic" (small "d") ideals.
The old myth about hiding behind trees while the stupid aristocratic British marched in lines dressed in scarlet. Heck, you can even see that in the televised Game of Thrones, where Ygritte is (Wildling democratic ideals ("We do not kneel!")) sneering at Westerosi soldiers marching in lines. You know nothing, Jon Snow.

So we have the story of Timothy Murphy halting the British at Saratoga with one shot, killing a British general ("That gallant man must die!") with his trusty squirrel gun. Was it called Betsy? Funny thing is that story didn't come into being until 70 years after the battle. Just like the Betsy Ross flag, etc.

So we have the rifle. A good weapon, in good hands. But it's slow to reload, and will not carry a bayonet. So the riflemen need to be protected. It's definitely not an offensive weapon, for all of those reasons.
But it fits into Jacksonian democratic doctrine. If I were a 22 year old grad student looking into when the "hiding behind trees while the British…" myth originated, I would tie it into Jacksonian politics. Of course I would be going into my research with pre-conceived conclusions, but that's nothing new, is it? Neither in academia, nor on TMP.

Note. I'm talking about the myth of the rifle. Not about militia. I'm standing firm there.

Oh, let's never stray too far from the OP.
I think they're very nicely painted. Too often on TMP, particularly on the AWI board, we all tend to wander off.

Note. I'm talking about the myth of the rifle. Not about militia…

Those two myths tend to go hand-in-hand…😉

We know where each other stands on this. I'm right and you're wrong.
Or is it the other way around?

Take your pick…🤷‍♂️

A musket might be able to throw a ball out to 300 yards, but it would likely be tactically meaningless. I tend to believe under battlefield circumstances Col. Hanger was an optimist. Even well under 100 yards the typical soldier armed with a musket was unlikely to hit an individual target. That wasn't the point though. Muskets were supposed to be used by troops in mass firing at other troops formed up in mass with the idea being that a certain number of rounds could be fired off before the mass target could close.

A rifle in the hands of a trained rifleman has a much better chance of hitting an individual or massed target than a musket does. A body of riflemen engaged in a firefight with a body of muskets at 100 yards or more, even with their slower rate of fire, could expect to inflict far greater casualties than it suffered. This all works great so long as the rifleman's opponent is willing to engage in skirmish warfare…or so long as the opponent is willing to stay in a massed formation and remain motionless in the face of rifle fire. When the British adjusted their tactics, opening up formations so it was harder to score hits at a distance and closing more quickly rather than engaging in firefights, the advantages of the rifle were reduced. Over time riflemen would have developed a tactical solutions to these issues, but aside from Morgan the commitment in the Continental army was not there. That still would have left the other problem that riflemen in the AWI faced: Having a greater effective range does not mean as much when visibility is reduced to within the effective range of muskets.