"Napoleon's Marshals." Topic

The only 'myth-generating' here is the 'support' and defense of Bernadotte and his reprehensible actions on 14 October 1806.

in case, just let's have a look at the map, even an Esposito map would do, and this work is certainly not anti Nabulieone – look at the position of Prince de Ponte Corvo's corps, initially he was east of Davout's, an approach via Donburg to reach Apolda makes perfect sense. Swopping with Davout – well no – Davout has already secured the important defile of Kösen.

The crossing at Dornburg moreover has the benefit that soldiers of the 1st corps could interfere directly on the Jena battle field as well.

In case Bernadotte would have stacked up behind Davout – his objective – Apolda – would be more difficult to reach and then he would be out of bounds to interfere at the Jena battle at the afternoon.

Nabulieone was right to stress that 1st corps should cross at Dornburg there this was much more beneficial for all (assuming he faces the Prussian main army) – a look at a map will all show this more evidently than constructed myths – end of story from my side about this topic, scourge of repetition otherwise.

Excuses, excuses. Nothing but for Bernadotte.

Why, then, if Bernadotte was correct in his actions didn't he engage the Prussians on the 14th?

The only excuses I see Kevin are those that were offered up by Napoleon in his October 1806 indictment, and that his apologists have been happy to repeat since.

The truth is that Napoleon was embarrassed. Napoleon planned for a battle against the main Prussian army, and his plan called for Davout and Bernadotte to operate against the Prussian flank and rear or rear. However he had misread the Prussians, and instead fought an action against a wing of the Prussian army while Davout alone fought against the main Prussian army. Napoleon could not deny what Davout had accomplished. However by recharacterizing the orders he had issued, Napoleon could absolve himself from blame for Davout having to fight the main Prussian army alone.

1. Contrary to your claim "still in Naumburg" does not mean the same thing as "not already in Dornburg".

2. The postscript in Davout's order in the English translation at least says "may" not "shall". Especially since the orders were being routed through Davout, if Napoleon had intended to alter Bernadotte's orders, he should have used definitive rather than permissive language.

3. Even if Bernadotte had reversed course and followed Davout, his first troops would have been arriving on the field sometime after Morand, or at the end of the battle.

Finally and frequently forgotten, at the end of the day Bernadotte's troops were in Apolda. If Bernadotte had advanced with Davout, Apolda was supposed to be their destination. It is just that by the time he got there on the afternoon of October 14 French forces reaching Apolda no longer mattered.

Also to clarify, this isn't a defense of what Bernadotte did. It is a defense against Napoleon's patently false charges against Bernadotte.

I chip in once more despite my pledge, an often ignored order.

Au bivouac sur les hauteurs d'Iéna [13 Octobre 1806], à dix heures du soir.
Le maréchal Bernadotte avait reçu l'ordre de se rendre à Dornburg. Il est très nécessaire qu'Il y soit rendu. Mais si cependant il se trouvait à Naumburg, ce serait une raison de plus de se mettre en route pour exécuter les dispositions suivantes, qui est [sic] de vous rendre à Apolda avec tout votre corps d'armée pour tomber sur les derrières de l'ennemi, si l'on se bat, comme tout porte à le penser. D'Apolda, vous vous porterez partout où se trouvera le feu. L'ennemi a laissé voir aujourd'hui une nombreuse armée, la gauche appuyée à une lieue de Iéna et la droite à Weymar. Par votre mouvement vous tomberez droit sur ses derrières. Vous entendrez probablement la canonnade qui vous portera à activer votre marche, mais vous aurez soin de marcher toujours en ordre de manière à pouvoir recevoir des charges de cavalerie. Vous suivrez, pour faire cette manœuvre, la route qui vous conviendra, mais l'important est de prendre part au combat. Si le maréchal Bernadotte se trouvait avec vous, vous pourriez marcher ensemble. Mais l'Empereur espère qu'il sera dans la positon a indiquée à Dornburg. Lorsque vous serez à portée d'être entendu d'Iéna, vous tirerez quelques coups de canon, ce qui sera le signal si nous ne sommes pas forcés de commencer plus tôt.
p. 230
Girod de l'Ain, Gabriel : Bernadotte, Chef de guerre et Chef d'État, Paris 1968

and yes Bill N is right it says may – and not shall nor must – sometimes wrongly translated for the convenience of myth making.

also did Nabulieone ignore this report of Davout? Who clearly indicates that he had enemy units in front of him, and didn't Davout capture a whole Prussian pontoon train as well, all this should provide some hints that something was in front of him.

Le Maréchal Davout au Major Général

Naumburg, 13 octobre 1806.

J'ai l'honneur de rendre compte à V. A. que dès hier ma cavalerie légère poussa des reconnaissances sur Iéna ; après passé le pont, elles rencontrèrent l'ennemi à pue de distance sur la rive gauche de Saale. La division de dragons aux ordres du général Sahuc poussa également des partis sur ce point et rencontra aussi l'ennemi.
La première de ces reconnaissances a eu lieu hier à 6 heures du soir ; la seconde à 9 heures de soir : aujourd'hui une nouvelle reconnaissance faite à 10 heures du matin, prouverait que l'ennemi occupe toujours Iéna et qu'il rallie ses forces à Eckartsberg. Je vous envoie la copie de cette reconnaissance ; le rapports confirment. On a entendue le canon hier soir depuis 4 heures jusqu'à 5 heures et demie ; aujourd'hui on l'entend ; il va assez fort sur notre gauche depuis une heure après-midi : il y a de la fusillade.
J'envoie des partis sur Eckartsberg par Freyburg que j'occupe en force et par Kösen.
Toute l'armée est à Naumburg. La division de dragons occupe Pforta et Flemmingen.

Foucart, Jena, p. 592

The truth is that Napoleon was embarrassed.

Embarassed for what? Winning? The 'truth' is that Bernadotte failed to support Davout, which was in the orders for 14 October, and that he was already late to be in his assigned position in Dornburg.

And he failed to engage the Prussians which was undoubtedly why he was in trouble with Napoleon. The only person 'embarrassed' here was Bernadotte.

I'm late to the party here, but with all these fusillades pro and con regarding Bernadotte, I have just one question.
What was in it for him to abandon Davout? How would it benefit him?

If Davout lost it would denigrate Davout in his eyes and he probably envied Davout for his efficiency and the manner in which his corps performed continuously.

Or, Bernadotte was just a marplot with a mean streak and an immense ego.

There have been a few questions following shortly after my posts on this thread. Some have been addressed by Bill N and von Winterfeld and I will draw up a timeline of events soon.

Titeux was a royalist and it greatly influences his work. His material on both Bernadotte and Dupont is nothing but excuses for the myriad errors both committed in command and leadership and was influenced by his royalist viewpoints.
He champions them because they both failed Napoleon and the troops they commanded and led.

Titeux was published in 1903 which in the middle of the Third French republic (1870-1940). I don't see that Royalist of Bonapartist sentiments were of concern in that period.

When I was younger I followed the theory that Bernadotte had abandoned Davout but the more I see about this the more I consider that Bernadotte took the best course of action available.

In the last 30 years there has been a revolution in access to historical documents over the internet. In the past you would have to take the opinion of a small number of authors who had access to these documents. Now we can get to electronic copies of the documents and think and make up our own minds.

Not being engaged at all on 14 October was the best course of action for Bernadotte?

Bernadotte was ordered to Apolda on the 14th with the intention of turning the flank of the Prussians before Jena that Napoleon presumed was the whole Prussian army. No Prussians were found about Apolda for Bernadotte to engage. (Prussian scouts had been found near Dornburg on the 13th).
If we consider the hypothetical of Bernadotte taking the Kosen route to Apolda then it is unlikely that 1st corps would have actually engaged the Prussians at Auerstadt given that there was only one road and that was a defile so all Bernadotte would have been able to do was to follow Davout and provide support (a possible benefit). However in doing this he would have left the Dornburg to Apolda road unguarded.

Bernadotte had already failed to obey 'the letter of the orders' in that he had failed to be in Dornburg on time. He was at Naumburg when he received a copy of Napoleon's orders, not Dornburg. He used that part of the order to get away from Davout and because of that Davout was left on his own and Bernadotte would not get into action at all on 14 October.

Bernadotte had his corps marching on Dornburg when he received Napoleon's order of 15:00 so he halted the march of his corps to await any new orders. At this point the rear of 1st corps had not passed through Naumburg but some elements were well on their way. The overnight order (22:00 13th October from Jena) was only received at 03:00 on the 14th (same order as Davout). Note the wording "vous pourrriez marcher ensemble." If you know French then you will know that this is the conditional form so this translates to "you MAY march together".

That's what the orders actually stated in the postscript by Berthier.

In the letter of the 23rd October from Napoleon to Bernadotte with his criticism he states "vous deviez marcher" (imperfect past), "you should have marched". That is at variance with the orders.

Excuses, excuses. Nothing but for Bernadotte.

Well I can concede excuses for Napoleon for not having an accurate understanding of the Prussian position especially the forces about Ekartsburg, I can excuse Berthier's order using the term "pourriez", I can excuse Murat for dispersing his cavalry towards Leipzig and then recalling Sahuc from Davout and marching them down the Dornburg road.
Inaccurate information, friction and mistakes are all part of war.

Why, then, if Bernadotte was correct in his actions didn't he engage the Prussians on the 14th?

I repeat:
Bernadotte was ordered to Apolda on the 14th with the intention of turning the flank of the Prussians before Jena that Napoleon presumed was the whole Prussian army. No Prussians were found about Apolda for Bernadotte to engage. (Prussian scouts had been found near Dornburg on the 13th).

If we consider the hypothetical of Bernadotte taking the Kosen route to Apolda then it is unlikely that 1st corps would have actually engaged the Prussians at Auerstadt given that there was only one road and that was a defile so all Bernadotte would have been able to do was to follow Davout and provide support (a possible benefit). However in doing this he would have left the Dornburg to Apolda road unguarded.

I suggest reading Titeux and find out how well researched his work was – using archives and private diaries, I prefer an author like this who stays transparent.

And again Bernadotte had no other choice than to march to Apolda – via Dornburg, Soult was quite pleased seeing him there.

5e Bulletin de la Grande Armée
Iéna, 15 octobre 1806.
(…) Le maréchal Davout reçut l'ordre de déboucher par Naumburg, pour défendre les défiles de Kösen, si l'ennemi voulait marcher sur Naumburg, ou pour se rendre à Apolda pour le prendre à dos, s'il restait dans la position où il était.
Le corps du maréchal prince de Ponte-Corvo fut destiné à déboucher de Dornburg pour tomber sur les derrières de l'ennemi, soit qu'il se portât en force sur Naumburg, soit qu'il se portât sur Iéna.(…)
those statements exactly mirror the state of knowledge of both Napoleon and Bernadotte at the 15th.

Soult at the 15.th of October – just did think that Bernadotte was on the right spot
Le Maréchal Soult au Major Général.
Du bivouac en arrière de Ulrichshalben, 15 octobre 1806, 2 heures du matin.
(…)
Je suis parfaitement lié par la droite avec les troupes de m. le maréchal Bernadotte qui sont campées à Unter – Ober – Rossla, par la gauche aussi par des partis avec les troupes qui one été portées sur Weimar.
Une forte colonne ennemie s'était dirigée immédiatement après la bataille sur Rossla où elle comptait passer l'Ilm, mais ayant aperçu la tête de la colonne de M. le maréchal Bernadotte, elle revint sur Ulrichshalben où je l'ai poursuivie.
(…)
Foucart, Iéna, p. 643

just in case, it does no harm to reflect on hitherto accepted wisdom – Bernadotte bashing, the traitor, as an article by Garry Wills : Maucune's Division at Salamanca in Helion's Glory is Fleeting – shows.

Bernadotte was ordered to Apolda on the 14th with the intention of turning the flank of the Prussians before Jena that Napoleon presumed was the whole Prussian army. No Prussians were found about Apolda for Bernadotte to engage. (Prussian scouts had been found near Dornburg on the 13th).

Could you post the order sending Bernadotte to Apolda on the 14th?

Holtzendorf was in and around Dornburg on 13 October. He actually was engaged at Jena on the 14th. Soult engaged him and drove him off.

Bernadotte reached Dornburg around 1100 on the 14th and Apolda about 1600. Apparently he sent a dispatch to Berthier on his arrival at Apolda claiming that his being in Apolda 'had saved Davout.

Hohenlohe had been defeated by about 1430 and Brunswick's army was being pursued by the victorious III corps at 1630.

At 1600, Beaumont's cavalry division, the I Corps cavalry and Rivaud's infantry division (I Corps) were in and around Apolda. Drouet's infantry division (I Corps) was between Dornburg and Apolda, and Sahuc's dragoon division (Cavalry Reserve) and Dupont's infantry division (I Corps) was in Dornburg. Bernadotte hadn't even concentrated his corps as of 1600.

Bernadotte was certainly not moving 'franc etrier' to his supposed objective. His orders to Dornburg were 'overcome by events' as he had not occupied Dornburg according to his orders.

From Napoleon's Finest-Davout and his 3d Corps: Combat Journal of Operations 1805-1807, Translated and Annotated by Scott Bowden, 54:

'…[Napoleon] therefore ordered Marshal Davout to move towards Apolda, so that his corps could fall upon the rear of that army. He left the choice of the road up to the Marshal, as long as he took part in the battle. His serene highness the Major General of the Grande Armee [Berthier] added: 'If Marshal Bernadotte (Prince of Ponte Corvo) is with you, you can march together, but the Emperor hopes that Bernadotte will already be in his assigned position at Dorbburg.''

'Marshal Davout distributed the orders to all his generals, who left immediately to carry them out; then Davout sent an aide to see Bernadotte, commander of the 1st Corps, who had indeed arrived in Naumburg during the night.* The Marshal gave him written notice of the orders he had just received from His Majesty, and asked him to declare what he was going to do. Bernadotte told Davout that he would not move towards Apolda with the 3d Corps, but would instead march for Camburg [and from there on to Dornburg].

* 'Davout sent Captain de Trobriand to Marshal Bernadotte. Bernadotte admitted receiving the order at four-thirty in his report to the Emperor.'

Well done Kevin!….

Armand

Thanks. It appears that if Bernadotte had actually received an order to advance to Apolda and there isn't been any evidence to support that idea), he refused to obey it and went to Dornburg instead.

'…but the Emperor hopes that Bernadotte will already be in his assigned position at Dorbburg.'

Curious…if Berthier had meant to write that, why not simply use the present tense…ie 'The Emperor hopes that he *is* at his assigned position at Dornburg'. Or simply slip in the word 'deja'…which seems to be missing from the original French?

And why complicate things by using the future tense – '…qu'il sera…'? Of course, you can use the future tense to form a future perfect for something you expect to be already done – but my school-level French doesn't see one there. Where's the past-participle-thingy my teacher used to bang on about?

I swear the French do this just to confuse us.

Could you post the order sending Bernadotte to Apolda on the 14th?

Holtzendorf was in and around Dornburg on 13 October. He actually was engaged at Jena on the 14th. Soult engaged him and drove him off.

Bernadotte reached Dornburg around 1100 on the 14th and Apolda about 1600. Apparently he sent a dispatch to Berthier on his arrival at Apolda claiming that his being in Apolda 'had saved Davout.

Hohenlohe had been defeated by about 1430 and Brunswick's army was being pursued by the victorious III corps at 1630.

At 1600, Beaumont's cavalry division, the I Corps cavalry and Rivaud's infantry division (I Corps) were in and around Apolda. Drouet's infantry division (I Corps) was between Dornburg and Apolda, and Sahuc's dragoon division (Cavalry Reserve) and Dupont's infantry division (I Corps) was in Dornburg. Bernadotte hadn't even concentrated his corps as of 1600.

Bernadotte was certainly not moving 'franc etrier' to his supposed objective. His orders to Dornburg were 'overcome by events' as he had not occupied Dornburg according to his orders.

Brechtel, you ask a good question about orders for Bernadotte. Thank you as it encourages me to investigate this in more detail.

I have not found any reference to a written order for Bernadotte to march on Apolda on the 14th but there is mention of marching for Weimar (Bernadotte report at 18:00 on the 13th). The order to Davout issued at 22:00 on the 13th does mention Apolda so perhaps Bernadotte has interpreted this order as equally applicable to 1 Corps regardless of marching together with 3 Corps. There is no evidence of criticism of Bernadotte marching to Apolda after the event.

It is strange that Berthier has not issued any direct orders to Bernadotte apart from a "copy to Bernadotte" note attached to an order to Davout. There were some direct orders to Dupont to follow the other divisions of 1st Corps from Berthier which is rather surprising as I would have expected Dupont to be under the direct orders of Bernadotte.

I think it is important to consider that Napoleon and Bernadotte met at Gera towards the end of the morning of the 13th (Reichel). There are no notes from this meeting unfortunately. The strategic axis of advance for 1st Corps was probably discussed based on the order of 9:00 on the 13th issued to Murat. Foucart (V1 p 579). Titeux (p81) indicates that there was a direct order for 1st Corps to march on Dornburg.

Bernadotte refers to a letter brought by an officer for Davout and Murat. He responds by his letter of the 13th at 18:00 where he states that Murat and his forces will move off for Camburg and Dornburg (despite the fatigue of his troops) and by dawn on the 14th be ready to move on Weimar or everywhere else. To move on Weimar implies moving through Apolda. This order is not to be found in the register of the Major General (Berthier) but is believed to have been written at 11:30 at Kostritz.

While en-route to Dornburg he receives the order written one and a half leagues before Jena at 15:00. This order was to Davout with the same order for Bernadotte. This order includes the line "if there is no attack (by the Prussians) at Jena you will receive tonight dispositions (orders) for tomorrow. On receiving this order Bernadotte halts the march of his corps.

Bernadotte reports the halting of his corps at 20:00 at Naumburg (Bernadotte's location, the corps is spread on the road about Naumburg) Foucart V1 P605.
So here we see Bernadotte reacting to orders received, it is unfortunate that he decided to halt in reaction to the 15:00 order on the 13th but believed that was the necessary action.

At 22:00 on the 13th the order to Davout is written and despatched. This can be found in Foucart V1 P669 and a slightly longer version in Reichel P329. This order is reportedly received at 03:00 by Davout at Naumburg.

After briefing his divisional commanders Davout meets Bernadotte face to face so no mention of an aide. Bernadotte himself makes a written copy of this order (in the possession of King Oscar II of Sweden) as he has not received any written order since the one of 15:00 on the 13th. It is as though Berthier has forgotten about Bernadotte.

On the 14th Dupont describes deploying to face the Camburg crossing prior to the light cavalry, the dragoons and division Drouet entering the defile down to Dornburg. When Dupont marched off (from 16:00) he left three companies of voltigeurs to guard the bridge and village of Camburg.

Dupont finally halted for the night at Apolda at 23:00.
Bernadotte reposts first at 16:00 (Titeux) and again at 21:00 (Foucart V1 P696). I see nothing about saving Davout in those reports.

So Bernadotte was delayed in arriving at Dornburg and again at Apolda. His reaction to the 15:00 order on the 13th is a significant contribution to this initial delay. The defile from the Saale to the heights above Dornburg explains the length of time taken to get to Apolda and the dispersal of his corps which Bernadotte urged on to Apolda rather than concentrating his corps on the height above Dornburg.

Well done Mike!….

Armand

And why was Bernadotte 'delayed?' Seems to me he was sluggish in obeying his orders to get to Dornburg, and that mission was 'overcome by events' when he wasn't there, but in Naumburg close to Davout.

The receipt of the 13 October order superceded any previous order to go to Dornburg because the overall situation had changed.

* 'Davout sent Captain de Trobriand to Marshal Bernadotte. Bernadotte admitted receiving the order at four-thirty in his report to the Emperor.

I am a little confused by the reference to Trobriand. If this is about the receipt of Napoleon's order to Davout at 03:00 and the personal meeting of Davout and Bernadotte. Can you point to the report timed 04:30 by Bernadotte please.

There was a claimed report by Trobriand that he had taken a request for support from Davout to Bernadotte in the afternoon of the 14th.

Trobriand's evidence is somewhat problematic. This first concern is that it was published 73 years after the event. Given the controversy about the events of the 14th I would have thought this document would have been in the public domain nearer the event.

According to Trobriand he was order to make contact with Bernadotte, leaving the field of the Auerstadt battlefield at 15:00. He claims to have met Bernadotte at 16:30 on the high ground on the left bank of the Saale with his troops at rest. Trobriand explained the situation at Auerstadt (the defeat of the Prussian army) and invited Bernadotte to support the pursuit of the Prussian army as Davout's corps was exhausted.

So this is not a mission to ask for help to win the battle. The meeting at 16:30 is suspect as Bernadotte had issued a report to Napoleon at 16:00 from Apolda.

The report did not appear in the Journal of the 3rd Corps nor in Davout's correspondence published in 1885.

Trobriand was only promoted to Captain in 1807 so why is his report attributed to Capt. Trobriand.

In his report he makes a lot of fuss about the fatigue of his horse. Hardly the sort of thing to include in a report by a Lieutenant to a Marechal de France.

Thanks. It appears that if Bernadotte had actually received an order to advance to Apolda and there isn't been any evidence to support that idea), he refused to obey it and went to Dornburg instead.

Well if he had received a direct order and refused to obey that would be serious insubordination.

I don't think he could refuse an order that does not exist.

And why was Bernadotte 'delayed?' Seems to me he was sluggish in obeying his orders to get to Dornburg, and that mission was 'overcome by events' when he wasn't there, but in Naumburg close to Davout.

Bernadotte reports some fatigue in his troops following several days of hard marching. He gets them back on the road without eating in his report at 18:00, then halts them again on receiving the order advising to expect new orders.

The march on the 14th appears to have started with Dupont who takes up a position to block any Prussian advance from Camburg. A prudent move to protect the rear of any troops entering the defile. The dragoons and Drouet's infantry then enter the defile to Dornburg.

It would appear that marching to Dornburg was a slow process firstly as it was a defile obliging columns to be limited to the road, secondly it was steep in places causing the cavalry and artillery to march carefully and slowly.

Dupont also mentions his timings for the 14th. He starts marching at 03:00 on the road between Naumburg and Dornburg. At 06:00 he is positioned half way between Naumburg and Camburg. No time given but arrived before Camburg where his division was deployed to protect against any Prussian advance. A recce was conducted to Dornburg. Following that the cavalry of 1 corps then Dragoons then division Drouet. Division Dupont only entered the defile at 16:00 and the rear of the division cleared it by 18:00.
Dupont marched on to Apolda arriving there at 23:00. This is a distance of three leagues from Dornburg covered in roughly twice the time you might expect. This tells us something about the defile from the Saale to the plains above the town.

We also need to consider the effect of the dragoon divisions about Naumburg as well as in the defile. A cavalry unit takes up a lot of road space at the best of times and it can delay troops crossing a town or seeking to enter a defile.

This will generate a lot of delay.

The receipt of the 13 October order superceded any previous order to go to Dornburg because the overall situation had changed.

This would be the order at 15:00 from the bivouac 1 and a half leagues from Jena. This informed that new orders would be issued. This order was received via Davout. Bernadotte writes a report at 20:00 that he is halting the movement of his corps, a good part of this was on the road between Naumburg and Dornburg.

On reading the order to Davout at 03:00 on the 14th Bernadotte realized that he needed to get to Dornburg ASAP.

always it is a good sign -when falling back to Trobriand – a sign that they are at wits end, despite the scourge of repetition here from and old discussion.

[q]By:Robert Ouvrard
Date: 1162071748
In Höjer Bernadotte's Biography, the author gives some remarks made by general Titeux about Trobriand affair (Trobriand report to Davout published in 1879 by Davout's daugther) :
1. The grade of Trobriand is not correctly given;
2. Bernadotte is reported to have been at 4 h 30 on the left bank of the river Saale, when he was in reality at Apolda since 4 h;
3. the numbers reported for the losts of the 3rd Corps are greatly exgerated;
4. the conversation between Trobriand and Bernadotte appears "extravagant"
Höjer adds that it seems very strange that this Trobriand report would have completely ignored by ALL Bernadotte detractors until 1879.
For Höjer, it is clear that the old general has – consciensiously or not – produced an historical fake, in order to honor the memory of "his" marshal, and be nasty with an adversary.
For the files.
Bes Regards
Robert
[/q]

This is what anybody with common sense might say :

Trobriand left at 15:30 – according to his own notes Davout at – let's say Hassenhausen, then he rides to Kösen, then to Naumburg, then to Dornburg and then – he must ride to Apolda – because at 16:30 – this is the spot where the Prince de Ponte-Corvo was (confirmed by Soult, Dupont and the Prince de Ponte-Corvo – report to the Ètat-Major himself).
I ask myself, how can he achieve this in one hour? Moreover when his

[q] quoique mon cheval fut très-fatigue [/q] :O :\

This alone shows that something was very wrong with Trobriand's statement – a hoax (in my view – yes) – indeed.

Robert pointed also out that Trobriand claims to have met Bernadotte almost at the same spot as earlier in the morning, which is again not true.

Trobriand also claims to have asked for support to pursue the beaten enemy – precisely this Bernadotte achieved – or having already achieved by being at Apolda – collecting stragglers flooding back from Echartsberg and Auerstedt.

Still of course Bernadotte could not know that Davout had encountered the Prussian main army, how could he be wiser than the military genius Napoléon, Emperor of the French, King of Italy, Mediator of the Confederation of the Rhine etc.

von Winterfeldt,

3. the numbers reported for the loss of the 3rd Corps are greatly exaggerated;

I see a new research project for myself!

Thanks for the great discussion everyone. Not my thing but enjoyable to see those more well-versed in the subject than myself.

As fascinating as the Marshals are, very many of the officers who never quite got there are even more so.

John

the numbers reported for the loss of the 3rd Corps are greatly exaggerated

'Exaggerated' from what? What are the actual numbers for Davout's losses on the 14th then?

The following information is taken from page 77 of Napoleon's Finest: Davout and his 3d Corps-Combat Journal and Operations, translated and annotated by Scott Bowden.

French (III Corps) losses (killed and wounded) at Auerstandt, 14 October 1806:

1st Division: 98 officers, 2,181 enlisted.
2d Division: 20 officers, 900 enlisted.
3d Division: 134 officers, 3,500 enlisted.
Corps Cavalry Brigade: 9 officers, 210 enlisted.

Totals: 261 officers, 6,791 enlisted.

These totals do not include the corps engineer detachment and headquarters personnel.