"The fate of the 17 Tigers on Sicily" Topic

"The fate of the 17 Tigers on Sicily was reported by Major Gierga, commander of Panzer-Abteilung 215, in the following report to the Generalinspekteur der Panzertruppen dated 28 August 1943:

On orders from the division, at the start of July, I transferred the 17Tigers from the Abteilung to Panzer-Regiment Hermann Goering.

" Before the transfer, I proposed to the commander, Oberstleutnant Urban, as well as the division supply and technical officers, to give them a complete Werkstatt-Zug that was already entrusted with repair of Tigers along with elements of the Bergezug in exchange for one of their Werkstatt-Zuege. Successful recovery and repair of the new Tigers would be questionable without this exchange. The proposal was rejected by Panzer-Division "Hermann Goering" with the excuse that an exchange was out of the question; instead, only transfers from my Abteilung were to occur. I reported this to my division commander. After telephone calls between General Rodt and General von Senger, I was ordered to give up the 10 special mechanics, all of the special tools, all replacement parts, as well as the portal crane along with the 17 Tigers…"
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Amicalement
Armand

That's actually sad. What a waste of resources.

Beautifully highlights the importance of logistics, the technologically impressive the fighting unit the more it will depend on logistical support.

"Amateurs study tactics … professionals study Logistics." …

Beautifully highlights the importance of logistics…

"Amateurs study tactics … professionals study Logistics."

It does indeed highlight the importance of logistics.

But it also highlights the importance of standardization.

The Panzer-Grenadiere interfered with the employment of the Tiger-Kompanie … so that several Tigers became bogged in the mud. The Tigers became separated from our own infantry, so they were cut off, making recovery or repair impossible.

It was not just logistics. Not a question of having in-adequate supply. Also a question of those placed in command over the Tigers having no idea of how to deploy them.

Of the remaining seven Tigers, three more were lost by 20 July …. The excess Tiger crews were employed as infantry at the Gerbini airfield despite the strongest arguments from the Tiger-Kompanie commander.

… a large portion of the Tigers could have been repaired and saved … if they had been guarded by adequate infantry support. In no way were the Werkstatt and the recovery service of Panzer-Regiment "Hermann Goering" up to this task. In addition, during the retreat the portal crane, so important for repairing Tigers, was blown up by the Werkstatt-Kompanie.

Tiger crews were hand-picked from the best of the Panzerwaffe. The Tiger battalions required a disproportionate level of care and attention, but when applied well they were arguably the most capable battlefield units of the period, creating tactical impacts far beyond any other battalion-sized units.

Here we see a command infrastructure who had no idea what tool was provided to them, had no concept of how to apply that tool for the extreme tactical results it could achieve, and had no concern about preserving that rare and expensive tool for future applications.

Should we blame the command of the HG Division and the Regiment(s) in whose laps the Tigers were dumped? Yeah, maybe. But if I look at how US Army divisional and regimental commanders mis-used the GHQ tank battalions, and the Tank Destroyer companies and battalions, I see similar patterns across the board.

Craft a fine-tuned and rare tool, hand it to someone who has been selected for self-reliance and decisiveness, but who has no training or experience in using the wonderful tool you have created, and if you expect anything more than disappointing results you are just being a fool.

-Mark
(aka: Mk 1)

But it also highlights the importance of standardization.

Yes and the Germans had a problem with that as well …

In the US Army official history (Green Books) it tells a story of a lone Tiger which had gotten separated from its unit. The crew, seeing seventeen dust clouds heading for it and assuming it was a whole company of US tanks, abandoned the Tiger and fled into the hills. It was indeed a whole US tank company, but a company of M3 Stuarts!

I imagine the story the Tiger crew told to their superiors (and the one that made it into that official report) was probably a bit different!

I've seen complaints about mishandling from Tiger crews before. Thing is, without the complete tactical picture their complaints can't be fairly evaluated. Kind of easy to complain you don't have support, but the person you are complaining to has a dozen others demanding support as well and all think their demand is the most important.

I read the same Scott … The Tiger crew, it appears, just saw 17 clouds of dust coming their way. Without being able to accurately ID the 17 M3 Stuarts. Plus depending on how close the M3s were could the Tiger have been able to kill them all before they could close the range? And get close enough to actually do some damage to the Tiger.

Thing is, without the complete tactical picture their complaints can't be fairly evaluated.

Yes, you probably don't know all about the "bigger" picture of what is going on around/near you.

And support of any type is generally not infinite. You may only have so much FA, CAS, etc. in direct support of your Bn.

Gee … if you buy in to all the Hollywood Hype, especially around the Wargame Table, these 17 Tigers should have accounted for at least 70-80 Shermans, possibly more. Of course in Real Life things were a bit different … Cheers!

Indeed …

(smile)

Amicalement
Armand

If only that lone Tiger had googled and gone to
wwiiequipment.com/pencalc

75mm needs to be within 800m of the flank to kill a Tiger!

And even just getting there can be dicey …