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DrsRob31 Oct 2022 12:35 p.m. PST

The tarifs adjoining to the Imperial decree of 7 February !812 does include the Infirmiers with brown coatees, faced madder red and piped white (Goupil, table 6).
So at that point at a minimum the plan to create them was still alive, if not actually executed.

Michman31 Oct 2022 4:19 p.m. PST

"every box of correspodence relating to the French armies in Spain from 1808 through to Talavera, nothing is mentioned at Army, Corps, Division or Brigade level"
The decree militarizing the infirmiers was signed 13 April 1809. The first five companies took ~4 months to organize and deploy – hence after Talavera,
See : Imperial Decree of 13 April 1809
link
Brown & red uniform described in Article 17.

Infirmiers existed, as employees of military hospitals, since before the Consulate. I do not think they were included in regiments since 1784 or thereabouts, As far as I can tell, their work clothing was simple off-white light canvas, with smock, a bonnet and a great coat. This may indeed have been "codified in January 1810" as was claimed above.

"the ambulances were driven by the regimental artillery"
These are the regimental "caissons d'ambulance". An "ambulance" was a mobile medical facility detached for field service from a military hospital, not a vehicle. An ambulance was manned by doctors, infimiers and drivers. The smallest vehicle used by an ambulance was a "caission d'ambulance". These were *also* found at the regimental level, but without any infirmiers.

Ambulances or parts thereof were not attached to regiments, but to armies, corps, large separate bodies of troops, etc. Of the 10 companies created in 1809, the 1st served in Russia with the main Army headquarters, the 3rd with I corps, the 9th with II corps and the 10th with III corps. IV corps had an Italian ambulance company, and the Imperial Guard had their own. VIII corps had a Westphalian "Feldlazarette". I suppose that the Polish, Bavarian and Saxon corps would have had something similar. Macdonald never really formed much of a corps headquarters for the so-called X corps.

Augereau complained to Berthier on 5 August 1812 that his XI corps lacked an ambulance company and it seems Victor made the same complaint to Dumas for the IX corps on 9 August (Fabry, 11-19 août, pages 184 & 226)

Martinien records officer casualties in Spain for the 2nd, 5th, 6th, 8th ambulance companies. The 4th served in Catalonia and the 7th in Madrid. An 11th company was decreed 29 November 1811. It served in Zeeland in the Netherlands.

Are we only being told that the brown & red uniform was never fielded ?

In addition to the Bardin illustrations, Vernet-Lami thought that the red & brown uniform existed :

picture

von Winterfeldt02 Nov 2022 11:20 a.m. PST

I have to admit that I am very sceptical about those kind of prints, there in some cases they created havoc of misinformation like about the Tirailleurs du Po, or the white bearskins of the Grenadiers à Cheval trumpeters.

L. Dawson has good arguments from the archives.

von Winterfeldt02 Nov 2022 11:25 a.m. PST

@ MacLaddie

I am also one of the few who sees the Armée du Nord as a fragile force, not in the fact of bravery on the battle field, but about the distrust of officers and men who often were new to each other, or the formation of regiments from up to five units, the trickle of destertion, and not only from officers, the utter panic at the end of the battle, the ill co ordination of attacks – like the cavalry, not an army of substance – not even on par with that of 1813.

Lilian02 Nov 2022 11:45 a.m. PST

Martinien records officer casualties in Spain for the 2nd, 5th, 6th, 8th ambulance companies. The 4th served in Catalonia and the 7th in Madrid. An 11th company was decreed 29 November 1811. It served in Zeeland in the Netherlands.

Are we only being told that the brown & red uniform was never fielded ?


I think that is the matter, many people and reenactors seem to mix regimental stretcher bearers and Nurses Companies for hospitals

the 15th august 1812 in Spain 48 officers and nurses of the 6th Nurse Company were in Madrid, 199 with the Armée du Portugal and 170 from the 5th Nurse Company with Armée d'Aragon in Valencia according the archive shared here
link

von Winterfeldt02 Nov 2022 12:09 p.m. PST

@Lilian

Indeed, that what happened to me as well, now I have to re orientate.

Michman02 Nov 2022 2:03 p.m. PST

"many people and reenactors seem to mix regimental stretcher bearers and Nurses Companies"

I see. I did not know why there should be any confusion – all the decrees, regulations, manuals, etc, of the era are quite consistent and clear.

==============

About the red & brown uniform ….

It was decreed in 1809, 1811 and 1812. It was pictured in a near contemporary illustration by Vernet-Lami – not infallible, of course.

Yves Martin writes of the Vernet-Lami series :
"These plates were published in 1821 under the name Collection des uniformes 1791-1814. …. Strictly speaking it is not a primary source since they were not exactly contemporary. However, the plates provide a fairly good vision for the latter part of the Empire"

One would not expect the infirmiers' red & brown uniform to be recorded in archives for any time before mid-1809. One would not expect them to be mentioned in regimental records. In the field, the infirmiers seem to have been considered similarly to ouvriers d'administration (and listed with them in the tarifs du solde). The expenditures were approved by an assigned commissaire ordonnateur. The service de santé militaire was a separately reporting bureau dependent on the ministre de la guerre. So, the possible archival locations for records of uniform material purchases seem numerous.

And hence my question …. does Mr. Dawson believe, from his research, that the red & brown uniform was never used ?

Brechtel19808 Nov 2022 7:30 a.m. PST

Infirmiers did exist as did the use of the brown uniform.

Pierre Francois Percy who was inspector general of military hospitals and the surgeon-in-chief to the Army, finally was granted permission and the authority to organize a battalion of soldiers-infirmiers to serve in the large hospital Percy was organizing in Madrid in 1808.

The battalion was made up of limited-service personnel. The following April Napoleon ordered that ten companies of infirmiers d'hopitaux also known as soldats d'ambulance, be organized for service.

They were uniformed in brown faced with red and were armed and equipped as infantrymen. Five companies were assigned to the Grande Armee, two to Italy, and three with the armies in Spain. Two years later they were assigned a depot in Paris as well as an additional company.

One company was considered to be enough to support a corps. These companies were not highly thought of by their fellow soldiers. They were usually made up of refractaires, former employees of contractors, and limited-service personnel.

Brechtel19808 Nov 2022 7:34 a.m. PST

'…Dawson's 'reason' for the Armée du Nord's collapse flies in the face of the evidence. Regardless of the 'mythos', lack of experience etc. etc. etc., the performance of the Armée du Nord during the Waterloo campaign was not one of a 'fragile combat force.' It certainly wasn't the army of 1805-07, or even 1812, but it was hardly 'fragile.' At Waterloo, a fragile army wouldn't have fought for nine hours straight after sleeping in the rain the night before. A fragile army wouldn't have stayed fighting when the Prussians showed up on the French right flank.'

Concur. There are frequent errors in all of the books of this author that I have read and possess. All historians and authors make mistakes, but there are just too many in these volumes.

And the 'fake news' comments are not supported by any factual material. I'll rely on Rousselot, Leliepvre, Knotel father and son, and Patrice Courcelle.

MarbotsChasseurs08 Nov 2022 12:38 p.m. PST

Brechtel198,

Have you checked the controles de troups for the 1815 army? Many regiments were mixed together only a few weeks before the campaign started. Men who did not know each other were forced to fight in the same company.

The 7e Legere officers ad men from the ex 26e Legere, 16e Legere, and other officers. Each regiment worked together differently and these men had little little no time to work together before combat. They were not fragile, but this comes from the fact many had faced combat before, but these are not veterans of 1805,1806,1807, or 1809. Most are 1812 and above it not 1813.

There needs to be a mix of primary documents from the archives, memoirs, and some secondary sources.

MarbotsChasseurs08 Nov 2022 2:03 p.m. PST

This shows the 7e Legere during the organization post-1814. We have officers from the 7e Legere, 21e, and 26e for the officers and men from all over the place.

picture

Looking at the 72e Ligne in 1815, we find men from two men from the ex-72e Ligne, one man a veteran of an 11 and now an adj. sous-officier, and the other who joined in 1813. Two men are 1815 volunteers, one soldier from the 2nd Portuguese Regiment and one who entered service in 1814 with the 15e Voltigeurs of the Garde. These are only six men, but this is not uncommon for the make-up for the regiments in 1815. These regiments were expected to work together with a wide variety of soldiers who barely knew each other.

picture

Brechtel19808 Nov 2022 3:00 p.m. PST

An excellent resource for the many organizations and reorganizations of the French army, especially the infantry is JB Avril's Avantages d'une Bonne Discipline. It can be found online:

link

von Winterfeldt09 Nov 2022 12:21 a.m. PST

@Marbots Chasseurs

Indeed you have and your information is one of my reasons to come to the conclusion that the 1815 army, or at least quite a proportion was indeed a very brittle force, which was very far away from the army of 1806 / 07, even 1809. It shows in 1815 at Belle Alliance at the sheer panic and collapse of the French center and right wing, which cannot recollect for other battles. Thanks again for your research and sharing it.

Brechtel19810 Nov 2022 5:35 a.m. PST

The French Armee du Nord was one of the best that Napoleon ever commanded. And it was noted as being 'keen but brittle.'

The units performed very well at Ligny and also at Quatre Bras. And at Waterloo they fought Wellington outnumbered for hours, Lobau's corps and part of the Guard being employed on the right flank against the Prussians.

And it should be remembered that they almost won, problems notwithstanding.

I highly recommend Andrew Field's excellent work on the campaign and battles as well as the older material from Houssaye, Ropes, and Siborne's history of the campaign, for example.

Waterloo and 1815 have been beaten to death and much of the 'new' material written about it in the last ten years or so is error-ridden, unfortunately.

Lilian21 Jan 2023 3:37 p.m. PST

soon PLD's series at Pen & Sword is coming, beginning by the Light Cavalry then the Heavy Cavalry

Volume 1 Hussars & Chasseurs spring 2023
Volume 2 Carabiniers & Cuirassiers summer 2023
Volume 3 Dragons & Chevau-légers Lanciers autumn winter 2023
will follow in 2024
Volume 4 Light Infantry, National Guard-134e-156e de Ligne and Support Troops
Volume 5 Line Infantry 1806-1812
Volume 6 Line Infantry 1812-1815
Volume 7 Army of the Revolution and Marengo
Volume 8 Army of Austerlitz

Personal logo 4th Cuirassier Supporting Member of TMP21 Jan 2023 5:18 p.m. PST

the 1815 army, or at least quite a proportion was indeed a very brittle force, which was very far away from the army of 1806 / 07

That army was destroyed in Spain.

Brechtel19821 Jan 2023 6:01 p.m. PST

That army was destroyed in Spain.

A good portion of that army never went to Spain. For example, when the first French invasion army, made up of conscripts and other non-veteran units, failed, Napoleon brought into Spain a good portion of the units that served in the campaigns of 1805-1807. However, about 90,000 veterans, which included Davout's III Corps and the heavy cavalry, remained in central Europe and were the solid core of the newly formed Army of Germany for the 1809 campaign.

von Winterfeldt21 Jan 2023 11:46 p.m. PST

looking forward to them, must reads in case you are interested in archival research and not in fantasy.

Lilian30 Jan 2023 9:55 a.m. PST

After the French Army Historical Service has recently digitised to share online the Registres Matricules of some Guides companies such as both Compagnies de Guides Interprètes de l'Armée d'Angleterre & d'Allemagne merged in only one company Paul Lindsay Dawson gave us some comments about these units destined for the first one to the Invasion of Great Britain from the camps of Boulogne along the French coast

his document, is interesting on two counts. Firstly it is a duplicate of the records held by the units own Council d'Administration held in SHDDT XK 31. However, the Contrôle Nominatif lacks the wealth of detail held at unit level. We would not know from the Contrôle, the number of ex British soldiers in the unit, the reason for enlistment, or that some like Henry Jones was a former United Englishmen hiding out in Hamburg, or Francis Moffart was formerly United Irishmen, who had taken part in the 1798 invasion and had ridden over to Humberts lines with 50 Yeomanry. He was taken back to France amongst the POW with Humbert sometime later. Many of these men wrote letters to the Ministry of War explaining their motives for joining, Henry Jones explained he detested the British Government, the lack of polticial reform and no freedom of religion, and was committeed to the downfall of the British Crown. He was one of many in the unit. Rallying the disaffected Irish, Scots and English was an effective PR coupe by Bonaparte- a similar motive lay behind the Irish Legion – whose gaol for the Army at Bolougne was Ireland, with 'insurgency chouanisation' in England led by the Guides as a diversion. SHDDT GR 1M 1419 to 1422, SHDDT B11 and B12, as well as Dutch National Archives.
Secondly, the Guides Interpreters of the Army of England were wound up on 1 October 1808, and merged with the Guides Interpreters of the Army of Germany, and the Guides of Berthier to become the Compagnie d'Elite du Grand Quartier Général, and the uniform of the former Guides of Germany – illustrated by Otto of course. It seems the digitised register also includes this latter unit. Indeed no mention of this event is made.
It goes to show the importance of getting hands on with original documents. If would beleived the digitised register, one gets the impression the unit existed till the Russian campaign, and we would not be aware of the men from the counter terrorists units from the Vendée who took park, along with United Irishmen, United Englishmen and sole Scot from Edinburgh. The interplay between 'British' radical groups, the French state, and counter espionage, sabotage and 'war by other means' is fascinating and little understood.


Compagnie de Guides Interprètes de l'Armée d'Angleterre
Their nominal commander, Dupont d'Erval was born in Elbeuf region of France in 1758, by trade he manufactured broadcloth for the Army. With the outbreak of the Revolution, he abandoned his factory and his fortune and, emigrating to England, he enlisted as a volunteer in the York Rangers and received a temporary commission of major. At the dismissal of the York Rangers on 24 August 1797, the brevet of major was granted to him by Louis XVIII on 31 December 1797. Yet within two years he was back in France, by March 1799 informing the directory in considerable detail about England and her armed forces and propossing insurgency operations in Ireland. At the same time as the landings occurred in Ireland, Dupont's raiding parties would land and fire ships would be launched into Plymouth and Portsmouth to cause havoc. Dupont had surveyed the southern coast of England, and recruited to his cause the United Englishmen and their nominal leader Robert Watson who accompanued Dupont to France, along with General Humbert and Robert Fulton. Fulton, Dupont, Watson and Humbert propossed to attack England in summer 1801 using Fultons submarines: the preliminaries of the Treaty of Amiens derailed the plans, and Fulton left France. Dupont d'Erval's plans in 1799 and 1801 relied upon sending to England and Ireland, known radicals, who would act is liaison officers, and lead armed radical groups. The armed groups would bring terror in the manner of the Vendée. The idea of insurgency warfare was developed by Lazare Carnot to export terror and cause rear area havoc. In his plans, Talleyrand and General Clarke – of Irish origin, who surrounded himself with Irish emigre radcials – Dupont d'Erval found willing support. From this came the Company of Guides Interpretors of the First Consul, attached to the Cabinet Noir, which had established links with Irish radical groups which were centred in Flushing, Ghent and Hamburg. Thus unit of emigre radicals became the cadre of the Guide Interpretors of the Army of England. In concept it brought together 'the troublesome' emigre radicals into a single point. It gave Dupont dErval his own private force of insurgents. The defect of this was – as could be expected – the polticial differences between the different radical factions. By the end of 1805 the Irish and English had left, or been 'chucked out' as 'more trouble than they are worth' and was reduced from 117 officers and men to 40 guides led by two sergeants, 11 of these were couriers and guards to Marshal Brune at Saint Omer. The formation decree states the unit was to be dressed as dragoons, but Dupont d'Erval recommended the men – as they were mostly standing 1m 65 or thereabouts – be dressed as Hussars, the clothing to be taken from the stores of the light cavalry division of the Reserve Cavalry. We know the unit had dragoon saddelry at first as the kit was all private purchase as the receipts exist for dragoon saddles etc, but by the spring of 1806 the clothing of the remaining men was falling to pieces, or missing, and the unit had no horses. Unwilling to give up on the idea of raising insurgency forces, Dupont d'Erval requested Berthier and Brune to recruit disaffected Irish and English living on the north French coast and Paris to enlist. Checking the contrôle nominatif, non of course did. Dupont d'Ervals hope of fostering rebellion in England and Ireland by training his own group of insurgents was at an end. The plan to invade Ireland was not, and a Franco Austrian plan was developed over 1809-1810 in response to Walcheren, and a French plan was put into practice in 1811-1812. How the Guides were dressed is impossible to say for sure. They never left Saint Omer till summer 1808 when they headed to Versailles where they were disbanded, along with the Guides of the Army of Germany and the Guides of Berthier to become the Compagnie d'Elite du Grand Quartier Général, to act as courriers, orderliers, escorts and camp guards, a task previosuly undertaken by the 21e Dragons.

Sir Able Brush10 Feb 2023 11:16 a.m. PST

Wow – that's a lot of books. I loved his Imperial Guard ones – they take some reading though!

Lilian10 Feb 2023 2:54 p.m. PST

Trumpeters of the 12e Cuirassiers
iconography vs PLD's researches in French Regimental Archives for his Volume 2 Napoléon's Carabiniers & Cuirassiers

from Collection Vanson


Paul Lindsay Dawson : it is inexplicable as the 12e Cuirassiers had not an inch of rose broadcloth, brown and grey yes which was inherited from the 12e de Cavalerie, but not rose. No rose broadcloth in years X, XIII or XIV. The only bonnet a poil were 17 purchased for trumpeters specifically and clearly noted as black. We also note the trumpeters were armoured in 1805, but not by 1808.

Officially, based on the regiments archive this is the dress of the trumpeters of the 12e Cuirassiers

Lilian26 Feb 2023 4:47 a.m. PST

About Trumpeters in the Dragoons
We are busy with completing our forthcoming text on the Dragoons and Lancers [Volume 3]. As ever, archive documents hold many surprises for us, which often contradicts 'recieved wisdom' from acknolwedged 'experts' like Rousselot, Bucqouy, Knoetel and others. Yet, the archive documents themsevles show where these men made assumptions rather than look at the documents. On image we show a trumpeter of the 7e Dragoons reconstructed from several archive documents. The first thing we notice are the blue facings. We also know the trumpeters had white epaulettes from a document of 7 September 1807, when more of these items were purchased to replace those lost on campaign. The plume is shown by Martinet. The length of the tails may be a surprise. Short tails to dragoon habits were regulation by 1810, and a document of January 1808 speaks of the tails being 'cropped short during the last campaign'. Yet 'recieved wisdom' suggests dragoon habits had long tails till Bardin, and the 7e did not have blue facings for trumpeters. So who is right? Eye-witnesses working over 200years ago, or illustrators working 100 or more years later who did not have access to these documents?


One of the long established and cherished myths about trumpeters of the 1e Empire period, and certainly of the dragoon regiments, is that they wore reversed colours and had black sheepskin schabraques. These two myths are very easily proven to be just that. Firstly, the decree of 23 Vendemiaire AnXI removed – confirming an earlier decree of AnX- to remove from use the sheepskin schabraque from dragoons and cavalerie regiments. We know this was carried out by looking at the relevant inspection returns for these regiments. Just three regiments of dragoons out of 30 retained the sheepskin schabraque after AnXI. Therefore the idea of dragoons riding to battle at Wagram with sheepskins is wrong.
Again, inspection reports show us the reality of how trumpeters were dressed. The 2e Dragoons were reviewed in AnX. The relevant document lodged in the Archvies nationales tells us that at this point they still had the old model round portmanteaux – which we show – and had sheepskin schabraques in use – which we show. Interestingly, the sabres were noted as worn from a waistbelt and none regulation – which we show. Tellingly, documents at SHD tell us that rather than scarlet habits faced green as we expect, the trumpeters housse, portmanteaux and habit facings were blue. Archive documents tell us that the 2e were not unique and infact the majority of dragoon regiments 1802-1808 had their trumpeters with blue habits or blue facings. The 7e had scarlet habits faced blue, and the 23e wore blue habits faced crimson. This shows the importance of conducting archive research rather than simply relying on 'the same old sources', which are clearly not based on hard facts. So when did dragoons get sheepskin schabraques? Well, during the 1st Restoration is the easy answer, and by Waterloo.


Paul Lindsay Dawson
Confection Drouot
February 16th & 25th 2023

dibble28 Feb 2023 7:56 p.m. PST

Lillian. Were contemporary paintings scutinised when researching these uniforms?

Brechtel19804 Mar 2023 11:42 a.m. PST

Excellent question Paul. +1

Brechtel19804 Mar 2023 2:03 p.m. PST

Trumpeters uniforms could change from year to year depending on the commanding officers and how often they changed, and that included the color of the uniform coat and facings as well as headgear.

Personal logo 4th Cuirassier Supporting Member of TMP06 Mar 2023 11:02 a.m. PST

Dibble makes a good point. If there is a difference between the records PLD has delved into and contemporary artwork, it needs to be understood.

dibble07 Mar 2023 1:26 p.m. PST

There are many, many miniatures out there that not only depict French officers but NCO ranks too. Perhaps I should start collecting those images?

Brechtel19807 Mar 2023 4:10 p.m. PST

If there is a difference between the records PLD has delved into and contemporary artwork, it needs to be understood.

It needs to be discussed at length.

von Winterfeldt07 Mar 2023 11:53 p.m. PST

Paul Dawson is very well versed with contemporary paintings and gives us tools by his archival research to evaluate them even better.

Brechtel19808 Mar 2023 7:02 a.m. PST

And you 'know' this how?

Mark J Wilson08 Mar 2023 11:54 a.m. PST

Two thoughts, a) Just because a painting is contemporary that doesn't means it's right, it's called artistic license. b) Just because it's in the regulations doesn't mean it happened, it just means the person who wrote the regulations wanted it to happen.

dibble08 Mar 2023 1:46 p.m. PST

Mark J Wilson

Thus where that's concerned and any other means of evidence. More than one example of either eyewitness, extant example, or representation should be gathered to put the evidence on more solid ground.

I have countless examples of Miniature portraits and other works of art and I have yet to find any evidence of 'Artistic license'.

A miniature portrait was commissioned by the Officer to give to a loved-one. If an artist took any liberties, especially with Regimental distinctions, he would put his commission, reputation and means of making a living at risk.

Endorsement by word of mouth and recommendation was what "brought home the bacon" not 'artistic license'

I've even seen naïve pictures drawn of or by loved ones which depict the uniform they are wearing, accurately.

Prince of Essling09 Mar 2023 12:54 a.m. PST

Excellent point Paul. +1

dibble09 Mar 2023 2:11 a.m. PST

Five examples of Naive pictures. The first is a rather poignant trio.

Personal logo 4th Cuirassier Supporting Member of TMP09 Mar 2023 6:18 a.m. PST

I have PLD's book Napoleon's Waterloo Army: Uniforms and Equipment. I welcome the research and the inventiveness of his uniformology approach, I'm delighted to find that my Airfix French are less inaccurate than I supposed, and I'm really delighted to have discovered that the dragoons and carabiniers' coats were a better colour than I'd previously supposed. For getting into the weeds and turning over stones his work is first-class.

Where I'd take minor issue with his book is that in the odd place, it seems to me that his conclusions about the campaign and the army itself aren't always supported by his data.

For example, he observes a "lack of cadre and veterans within each regiment", he notes that most regiments were "fairly inexperienced men, having seen on average two years, nine months' active service", and he comments on the army of 1815 as "fragile and…not the army that Napoleon had commanded in previous years", noting that elements were politically suspect.

I am not really persuaded by this characterisation. He tends to evaluate as inexperienced and fragile those units that lacked personnel recruited before 1813. But quite honestly, after the disasters in Spain and Russia, I don't see where you would have found more experienced French troops than these in 1815. Both those armies got wiped out, and indeed at one point Britain had no fewer than 122,000 French prisoners of war in Britain – a force, roughly, the size of Napoleon's Borodino army.

He says:

In the 4th Regiment of Line Infantry, of the 1,312 men, only seventy-eight had served before 1813; the vast majority (92 per cent) had enlisted in 1813

Well, to me, blokes with nearly three years' active service are veterans, or they're at least pretty well-seasoned. They're certainly not callow and inexperienced. If they're 1813 veterans who fought in northern Europe, they also won most of the battles, so they should have been pretty solid.

I'd also be interested in some analysis of the extent to which the lack of pre-1812 men for the line was because by 1815, they'd all been pinched for the Guard.

The other obvious point to make about this allegedly inexperienced and politically suspect army is that to support such a claim, you really have to compare it with its adversaries, otherwise what's the point of mentioning it? I suggest that to do so rather undermines the claim. The Anglo-allied force commanded by Wellington was clearly no better, even famous regiments such as the Scots Greys being almost completely green. The Guards' numbers had been brought up to strength by an infusion of 600 militiamen, and the KGL units meanwhile had been tapped up for NCOs to ginger up the Hanoverians. Substantial cadres were unreliable, with German hussars deserting, other Germans deliberately opening fire on Wellington himself and the Duch-Belgian contingent having been on the other side 14 months earlier. The Prussian force was the worst of the three, with a heavy concentration of Landwehr, no heavy cavalry at all, no better off in the "rank and file recruited before 1813" stakes than the French, and so politically suspect that an entire Corps mutinied and had to be sent home after a few hangings.

I'd believe PLD's uniformological conclusions because he's done something nobody else has done and has the data to prove it, but as a historian and analyst of the campaign, he wouldn't be my go-to source.

Brechtel19809 Mar 2023 6:54 a.m. PST

+1 4th Cuirassier.

I have found too many errors in fact in the subject books by that author, especially in Napoleon's Last Army Waterloo by Rocco and Dawson.

Keith Rocco's artwork is outstanding and it is too bad that the text contains so many errors in fact.

Brechtel19809 Mar 2023 6:56 a.m. PST

Well done, Paul.

There are similar drawings by French personnel on the stationary that they sent home containing their letters.

Mark J Wilson10 Mar 2023 4:15 a.m. PST

@ dibble, I entirely agree that the more evidence you have the better, however you can never know what you don't know and the possibility that fancy uniforms were destroyed early in a campaign and replaced by something more serviceable and plainer cannot be ignored. Take that officer who moved ot eh light company and changed his shoulder decoration accordingly. In Ipswich I believe this, but his colleague transferred to the light company of a serving battalion before Salamanca because the light company had lost officers might not had had the chance to get his tailor to make the necessary adjustments.

dibble10 Mar 2023 3:57 p.m. PST

Mark. I understand that on rare occasions scenarios like what you have quoted may well have happened, but did those occurrences occur at the time of them sitting for an artist? It may well have happened that an unintentional 'inaccurate' depiction was made by an artist, but that would be a rather rare set of circumstances coming together don't you think?

"Take that officer who moved ot eh light company and changed his shoulder decoration accordingly"

He would still be in the uniform of his regiment Light, Battalion or Grenadier. All he has done is changed departments.

As for your second example:

"but his colleague transferred to the light company of a serving battalion before Salamanca because the light company had lost officers might not had had the chance to get his tailor to make the necessary adjustments."

I can't think of a Portrait miniaturist following armies around on campaign. There may have been one or two serving soldiers who had an artistic bent about them, but for them to capture a moment in time of what you say, is…


I have a very detailed portrait of a Colonel of the 3rd foot (Buffs)The portrait is so accurate that his shoulder-belt plate is depicted in great detail. His buttons and epaulettes should by the norms be in silver but his are in gold. So it seems, a Colonel could take liberties with his dress. But if that Colonel had been painted in profile, the belt plate not depicted, and the title of the sitter lost. Then it would not be possible to pin down that he was in the Buffs.

So are there anomalies? Oh yes! but to speculate on a single example of a picture would be foolhardy anyway.

I have hundreds of Portraits where it's impossible to pin down what regiment is depicted and I rarely stick my neck out because I so hate to intentionally add to yet more inaccurate information. But where I am on solid ground I will produce multiple examples of a certain Regiment to endorse that what had been depicted as 'correct' by historians, is/was either accurate or 'inaccurate'

Probably the worst at inaccuracies are (including the top) Auction house 'expert researchers' who are about 80% crap at denoting the Regiment depicted.

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In the past I have endorsed Paul Dawson's works even though they were a little (a bit like me) hard to understand in some areas. But where this tour-de-force is concerned, Written records would be better served with contemporary, visual 'human' examples (note the plural) too.

von Winterfeldt11 Mar 2023 12:22 a.m. PST

so we would agree to applaud the efforts of Paul Dawson to make all those archival material available to us armchair researchers so we can use those information as a tool to evaluate images.

dibble11 Mar 2023 2:45 a.m. PST

Yes! of course. If it's adequate for your references then good for you.

MarbotsChasseurs11 Mar 2023 5:25 a.m. PST

Bretchel,

I always see you bashing Paul Dawson, but how many archival documents do you have on the French army? Do you know the exact make up of each regiment from the officers to soldiers from 1814-1815? I do and the regiments are a mix match of men and experience. Almost all officer served at the Battles of 1805-1809 as Ncos or soldiers and those who were older came from national guard units with very little active service.

You can't use secondary sources to attack others. Please provide primary sources that are from the French side that show the armies experiences and organizations.

Brechtel19811 Mar 2023 5:47 a.m. PST

I'm not going to post the primary references I have in my library. I'd have to start with my collection of the old La Sabretache, 25 volumes, which are at least half from the Napoleonic period and cover letters, after action reports, etc. from the participants in the wars. That would take entirely too long, as they are books, not magazines. And they total at least 7,500 pages. My personal library contains about 1,000 volumes, again at least half on the Napoleonic period. And I have downloaded many primary sources from the internet mostly about the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic period along with period artillery manuals such as Gassendi's and Smola's.

If you are interested my email is Boulart198@yahoo.com. We can talk offline on this large subject any time you want.

And as you are undoubtedly aware many secondary sources contain much primary source material, such as Paul Britten Austin's trilogy on the Russian campaign of 1812.

I'm not 'bashing' anyone but I do have a historical problem with anyone who posts inaccurate information, among other things. I have found too many errors in fact in the subject authors books. That should be posted.

And all authors make errors in their writings and bringing that to the attention of readers is what book reviewers do.

And I disagree with your 'assessment' of secondary source material, both for the reason mentioned above and because of the credibility of valued historians who have done the research work.

MarbotsChasseurs11 Mar 2023 8:14 a.m. PST

Thank you for your response, but have you been able to review archival documents? I don't think secondary sources are bad, but as you said mistake are made and new information is found. We should not take historians word on everything without trying to at least view primary source material. However, some of my favorite secondary sources are regimental histories that provide documents directly from the SHD, but were written in the late 1800s.

However, saying the army was experienced without having the regimental rolls or Xb or Yb files isn't a fair assessment. These regiments were put together last minute with all types of men from different regiments with very little time to work together. As another poster said, many of the best men were taken for the Guard and these men if they were lucky served in 1809 campaign. I don't think the army is worthless, but it isn't the best fighting force the French have had in this time period.

Brechtel19811 Mar 2023 9:58 a.m. PST

<q?but it isn't the best fighting force the French have had in this time period.

If you are referring to the Armee du Nord, who said that it was?

Perhaps this is a strawman argument?

Definition of 'archive':

'a collection of historical documents or records providing information about a place, institution, or group of people'

von Winterfeldt11 Mar 2023 12:45 p.m. PST

well said MarbotChasseurs – just using works full of myths like Elting or Houssaye won't do any longer other then one does like to stay in the realms of myths. Secondary sources as per se are not bad, but some outlived their time for long, while others still pass the test of time.

It seems that for some very few it is trendy to bash the archival work of Dawson for no other reasons than having an axe to grind.

MarbotsChasseurs11 Mar 2023 6:06 p.m. PST

Bretchel,

You said it on Nov 22, 2022 that "The French Armee du Nord was one of the best that Napoleon ever commanded. And it was noted as being 'keen but brittle."

When I mention archival I should say do you have Xb, 2Yb, 2C, etat nomantifs, inspection reports from 1814 and 1815, service records, pension files, regimental rolls, officers correspondences. Without looking at these files from 1814-1815 and making up your own conclusions, it is hard to challenge others who have these documents. However, there is no doubt you have a massive library, I believe there is always more to be learned from new research.

Brechtel19812 Mar 2023 5:45 a.m. PST

I did say that 'one of the best'-not the best as which was what you had posted. There is a difference between the two statements. And that information is from Col Elting's work with which I agree. His sourcing in both the Atlas and Swords is excellent.

Today there is almost a manic 'quest' for 'new' material. That's fine, but too many errors in an author's book, or books, tends to negate the research done for those books. That is the case here.

Would you like the errors posted by book? It would take awhile, but I'll do it if you care to see it. It might be a good idea as it will no doubt produce many discussions. Let me know if you want it done or not.

Brechtel19812 Mar 2023 6:00 a.m. PST

After the return of the Bourbons in 1814 the French army was reduced, which it had to be as it was too large for a peacetime force. The infantry was reduced to 90 ligne and 15 legere regiments; the cavalry were established as one carabinier regiment, 12 cuirassier regiments, fifteen dragoon regiments, 6 lancer regiments, 15 chasseur a cheval regiments, and 7 hussar regiments. The artillery had 12 regiments, 8 foot and four horse, and there were three engineer regiments. Pontonniers, train troops, and artificers remained with the artillery.

The Old Guard was retained, the Young Guard disbanded. In the latter, they were sent to the line. The troops from the disbanded units were used to bring the remaining regiments up to strength.

Returning royalists, whether or not they were combat veterans or had served against France, were given commissions. The returning garrisons and prisoners of war posed different problems and the creation of the new King's Guard added about 10,000 generally worthless troops to the equation and their maintenance would have supported the equivalent of 50,000 troops in the line.

The reorganization was quite complex. First of all numbers for units were abolished, they being given a name instead and the units produced were a confusing collection of disbanded units who had no ties to the units to which they were assigned.

This was the army that Napoleon 'inherited' upon his return from Elba and Davout was given the task, as Minister of War, to get it ready for field and combat duty, which he did with his usual skill and efficiency.

Brechtel19812 Mar 2023 6:41 a.m. PST

Anyone interested in taking a look at the infantry reorganizations in 1814 after the return of the Bourbons, see JB Avril's Avantages d'une Bonne Discipline (published in 1824), 432-443. It is a detailed table of the units that were assigned to make up the 90 ligne and 15 legere regiments in 1814:

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