"Success of Stosstrupen" Topic

While being reasonably literate, I am no expert on the First World War.

The paradigm is that German Stosstrupen were successful in attack much more so than your typical British or French unit. Their doctrine was to have a short 'intense' artillery barrage, a breakthrough enabled by their weapons and tactics (and training); bypassing resistance to continue the attack and letting follow-up forces reduce those and presumably widening any breaches and putting defenders on the back foot as it were.

But why did this work? How did the Stosstrupen breakthrough when 'normal' attacks got slaughtered? Is it because they attacked in unexpected places while most attacks took weeks of prepratory bombardment which alerted defenders? Did Stosstruoen fail when the defenders were prepared? Other reasons?

Any insights friends?

I was taught that they succeeded because of their intensity. It overwhelmed their opponents in the near term.

They failed when they could not achieve that initial shock, when the follow on forces could not eliminate the by-passed pockets of resistance, and when their own advance ran out of steam. These tactics required a lot of resources at a time when Germany did not have a lot.

They were a Elite infiltration force. They were to go around strong points and take out the enemies frontline support ( mortars,Artillery, and supply. The problem was it diluted the regular formations of their motivated elements and degraded the whole armies fighting efficiency.

They attacked in small groups using infiltration tactics, fire and movement and with the integrated support of lavish quantities of heavy weapons behind a suppressive (as opposed to destructive) barrage.

It did rely on supporting formations to mop up the remaining pockets of resistance (which often didn't happen) and on there being reasonable gaps in the defences. Most armies defended in depth from 1917 onwards as otherwise they were completely destroyed by air observed artillery, trenches or not.

Making better use of terrain in small groups avoided the curtains of defensive MG fire, to a certain extent anyway.

During the Kaiserschlacht it is notable that Stosstrupp attacks failed against defences manned at the recommended density (one division per 3km), but were more successful against the thinner sections of line (with depleted divisions stretched over five or more km). It wasn't a magic ticket to victory, but a least it provided a method where infantry could fight forward using their own weapons.

All British and French divisions were trained and equipped in platoon level fire and movement tactics by 1917, unlike the Germans who reserved that for designated attack divisions, which was partly why the campaigns of 1918 were so much more mobile, along with vastly improved artillery technology and methods. Sadly there wasn't much scope for inflitration tactics in the swamps of Third Ypres in 1917.

Specialist assault units were a diverse spectrum. The most specialised units, which trained others in shock tactics, were prefaced with Sturm-. The most famous was the unit that evolved from Sturmabteilung to Sturmbataillon Rohr. Several Jäger battalions were trained up as Sturmbataillonen and by 1917 there were 15 battalion-size units and 2 companies trained by SB Rohr. It is very important to note that, even during Third Ypres, British and Dominion troops were referred to as Sturmtruppen in German official histories and related books.

As the war progressed, more and more men were sent to receive training. The process accelerated in the lead up to Operation Michael. There were multiple variations in how the training impacted non-specialist units. All infantry received some training, often at the hands of men who had been trained by a specialist unit, in aspects of Stosstaktiken. Some regiments raised specialist assault companies. Some battalions raised specialist squads, hence Stosstrupps. In general, however, the highly specialised tactics became diluted or could not be applied in full because the significant firepower and control thereof in specialist units was not available in non-specialist units. Renn writes about returning from training to his infantry regiment. During a review by the commander, Renn was dressed down because he was wearing the leather patches on his elbows and knees.

There is a lot written about 'infiltration tactics' but I would urge caution in interpreting this concept. When specialist Sturmtruppen were attached in a major battle, such as Operation Michael, they were given very specific objectives and were not involved in deep drives into the enemy rear areas. If the enemy was widely dispersed, as happened with the British Fifth Army in Operation Michael, then it was possible for attacking German troops (almost entirely not specialist Sturmtruppen) to get around the thinly spread defensive locations. Operation Mars was quite the opposite. And in Operation Friedensturm, the last of the great offensives, even specialist Sturmbataillonen could not make any headway against the French defence in depth.

Robert

Here is an example from Operation Friedensturm. It comes from Fritz Ristow's book "Sturmgrenadiere", which is adetailed account of Sturmbataillon 7 in the First World War. Elementsof the battalion took part in Operation Friedensturm, the last of theGerman Spring offensives in 1918:

Sturmbataillon 7 provided the following for the attack:
5 Sturmblocks, each with about 60 men with light Minenwerfer, light and heavy machine guns, and Granatwerfer.
Infantry Gun Battery 4.
1 reconnaissance patrol [Spähtrupp] of 1 officer, 8 men
Motorised Battery 1.

The battle was launched at 0110 hours on 15th July. The attack frontage was nearly 150 km wide, from Chateau Thierry on the Marne to Tahure in the Champagne Region. There were 2000 artillery batteries as well as 1300 medium- and heavy-Minenwerfer for the enormous preparatory barrage. The German Seventh Army provided 11 divisions in the first wave, southwest of Reims, while First and Third Armies provided 15 divisions, east of Reims. In the centre, the difficult hilly terrain of the Reims fortress, with its strong defenses, was
not attacked.

This is the experience of Sturmblock Gößler on 15th July, 1918:

'Sturmblock Gößler (1) was assigned to the 5th Grenadier Regiment of the 36th Infantry Division, which was part of General von Kathen's right Attack Group (Angriffsgruppe). After crossing the Marne, the unit from I Battalion was responsible for the task of clearing the enemy from the villages of Moulin, Paroy and Connigis on the east-facing slopes of the Surmelin Valley, so that the attack infantry could quickly advance further, unhindered.

"At 0110 hours, the German artillery fire was due to suddenly roar into life, but time seemed to stand still ; the minutes crept like snails. Now it was nearly 0100 hours: There, what was that? A series of dull artillery reports from the French side, and then the howlingnoise getting nearer, rising to a crescendo, and ending in the ear-
splitting noise of the explosions. And it was not a brief burst of fire! The firing roared continuously : the whole Marne valley, hillsides, and high ground were under the heaviest fire from all calibers! – Then finally the German artillery also started, and the Hell's concert of the artillery battle began. There was no evidence
that the French artillery was overpowered; every now and then it even seemed as if their fire was stronger than the German effort. – This fire had to be coming from the strongest force. From the slopes of the Marne Valley, the German artillery was going to combine their entire firepower on the enemy bank and, protected by this curtain of fire, the Pioneers were going to lay the pontoons across the Marne, and the first combat patrols would get across. Would this succeed?"

No, the I/5 Grenadier Regiment and the attached Sturmblock Gößler did not succeed with the crossing. They were so smashed about on the northern slope of the Marne by the enemy artillery fire that all the storm troopers' support weapons were destroyed; 15 men were killed and 18 wounded from the Sturmbattalion before they had even reached the enemy. Also their courageous leader, Leutnant Gössler, was wounded, first in the right hand, then mortally via the right shoulder joint into the right chest. Nevertheless, despite being badly knocked about, they tried. The infantry Grenadiers from Danzig, along with the small remnant of the Sturmblock tried to cross the Marne several times. But in vain! Numerous aircraft added to the wall of shrapnel from the enemy shells by dropping bombs and strafing the area with machine-gun fire. Spent and exhausted, their leaders killed, the attack column completely broke down in the hostile fire, since the pioneers could not get to the enemy bank despite their strongest efforts. The Sturmblock, which had little combat capability after loosing all its support weapons, was withdrawn and played no further part.'

Robert

Robert, Great information. I've read about storm troopers but not such detail. By the way you mention light and heavy machine guns. What were the light machine guns? I assume they didn't carry the standard heavy machine gun MG08.

Both MG08 and MG08/15s were used but for different purposes. The heavier MG08 was used to provide overhead and indirect fire for suppression and interdiction. They were also used to consolidate captured positions, providing a longer reach than the bipod-mounted MG08/15. Specialist stormtroopers also made use of captured enemy light machine guns, both the Chauchat and the Lewis gun.

Robert

As Robert says, the MG08/15 was the "light" machinegun, but captured Lewis and Chauchat were even lighter:) There is a photo in Ian Drurys "Stormtroopers" showing the mix of light and heavy MGs in a Stormtrroper company (and some granatenwerfer too iirc)

Here is a really interesting example of what happened when assault troops tried to "infiltrate" around a centre of major resistance that let the attack flow by. It comes from the same account of Sturmbataillon 7. Notice how it was the specialist stormtroopers that were sent back to deal with the problem:

'The two Sturmblocks Kuhn (2) and Stertz (3) fought shoulder to shoulder with the Württemberg Mountain Regiment on the left of adjoining IInd Guard Infantry Regiment (Franz) of the 2nd Guard Infantry Division. Their forming-up areas were also under heavy enemy counter-preparatory fire, which destroyed valuable combat capability before the assault even began. Just before the assault commenced, the German artillery brought down a barrage on the foremost French trenches. Right on schedule, the Guard infantry broke into the French position and quickly overcame the flickering resistance. On the right wing, the Füsilier Battalion (III) and Sturmblock Kuhn were faced with the Trotte forest in their combat sector. The forest was bypassed to the left, leaving it behind in order to maintain contact with the creeping barrage in the allotted combat sector. This difficult movement succeeded because the enemy offered only slight resistance. The attack flowed forward. But lying in Trotte forest, which was now behind the Fusiliers battalion, were strong enemy forces that had been holding back, and now began firing furiously in all directions. An unusually bitter fight now unfolded.

The numerous enemy machine-gun nests, skilfully camouflaged with brushwood and located in mutually supporting positions, were difficult to capture. Working closely together, the support weapons enabled slow progress, but again and again a new enemy source of fire would open up. Leutnant Kuhn was killed; the Stormblock lost nearly half of its combat capability. The regimental commander, Major Otto, now sent Stormblock Stertz, which had been subordinated to the second-wave battalion (I/2 Guard Infantry Battalion), into the Trotte forest as well. Gradually they succeeded, together with parts of the Guard Infantry (9th Company), to make safe the forest stronghold that had obstructed the advance. The fierce struggle went on for hours. Finally around midday, the enemy resistance in the Trotte forest was regarded as over when 5 officers and 200 men were captured. Leutenant Stertz quickly amalgamated both Stormblocks together and then returned in the direction of Vandières where the attack was walking forward.'

It should also be noted that the light resistance in the forward French trenches was due to the fact that French had all but vacated them before the German attack began. The points of resistance were scattered throughout the middle battle zone and, as illustrated, came into action after the German barrage had passed. The attack never reached its first major objective. Operation Friedensturm was then cancelled; the strategic initiative passed to Allies.

Also note that British and French formations were also instructed typically to follow the walking barrages closely. Both used mopping up teams to deal with German forces that were bypassed. In French these teams were known as 'nettoyeurs' – cleaners.

Robert

A bit from Renn, who was selected for stormtrooper training in 1917:

'"Service in a storm battalion" said Lamm, "will suit you better than sticking in the trenches." I didn't quite see through that. Of course, I had not the vaguest idea of what a storm battalion was.
"What is a storm battalion, actually, sir?"
"I don't quite know myself. I only know that we're to be trained as patrol and shock-troop leaders."'

He described his training:

'We had to drag machine guns and fling bombs, advance along trenches and crawl without a sound. At first that was a severe strain on me. I sweated on every occasion… Then daily it grew easier. We were on duty from morning till night, with only two or three hours of an interval at midday. I had no time for reflection and felt in good trim.'

On returning to his unit, Renn mentions the arrival of a new company commander:

"He's from Divisional Staff. An order has been issued that officers from the higher staffs have to take turns serving at the front."
"What does he look like?"
"He has a monocle and a riding-switch."
"Just what you would expect from the base."

The new commander reviews the company:

"Sergeant Renn, you are wearing puttees and leather knee-pieces. Is that allowed in the regiment, sergeant-major?"
"He came back from a storm battalion only two days ago, sir."
"That's excellent. We'll get together a whole platoon of shock-troops. But as far as I can see, the whole company is arranged in a higgledy-piggledy manner, old and young together, and giants beside dwarfs. Has nobody tried to alter that?" [Not quite as I remembered ;-). The dressing down was for the higgledy-piggledy line up, not the leather protectors]

The new commander 'was looking for something to find fault with, but did not know enough about it… "Agree with him and do as you like," laughed the subaltern.'

It was interesting to read about the lack of awareness about the stormtrooper concept. Renn does not remember his training for the higher-level tactical concepts he was taught, only the outward expressions of these – being fit enough to carry MGs, throw grenades, and crawl undetected. Subsequently, he and his stormtroop 'platoon' were used in raids. Otherwise, he spent his time with his company as usual.

Robert

Thank you gents!