Came across this old posting from the Talonsoft discussion forum and thought it might be of historical gaming interest.
And yes, the poster is *that* Hamilton-Williams.
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Posted by David C Hamilton-Williams on October 29, 1997 at 08:58:52.
Once again, congratulations to Talonsoft for producing the PTW patch, and untangling this mess left by their ex-employee. I sent in the following, to be included on the CD, but he forgot that as well. So, with Talonsoft's permission, I am including it here so that it will help you get the feel of the game. I also want to apologise for the typos in my other letter.
Effect of the Crops on the Troops at Quatre Bras & Ligny
Many historians' to-date have failed to take into account the effect that the crops in the Low Countries at Ligny and Quatre Bras, had on the troop actions, and ultimately the plans of the military commanders on June 16th 1815. The growing crops that were due to be harvested during 1815 in the above areas were of two distinct types, grown throughout the Netherlands, rye and corn, both of which, in 1815, grew to a height of 6-7 feet. It should be noted too, that the Netherlands, like England, had passed laws enclosing the field boundaries with hedges or bocage. This was difficult to penetrate, being more than 100 years growth usually. Not only did these crop commodities provide the staple diet for the populace and provide a national export, but also the huge stalk provided straw for winter animal feed, roof thatching, and mattress filling. It was also used as a paper substitute. When the latter three items became extinct, hybridisation was used to reduce the size to its present height to reduce labour costs. Napoleonic troops were therefore confined to travelling along the roads in this campaign for several reasons. From the movement perspective, politically it was not good PR to trample down your allies' crops, especially when you rely upon that good will for your food supplies, material assistance, and the billeting of your troops. Secondly, it was impossible for Allied or French troops to spread themselves out across the fields on either side of these roads, as had been used in other theatres of operations in previous campaigns, due to the impediment of the hedgerows and crops. The French, also, were loath to trample the crops, for more practical reasons. They were adept at using their troops to gather in the local corn and rye. Then, using their mobile mills and ovens, turning the same into several days' bread, thus 'living off the land' in the true sense of the word. The hundreds of letters obtained by Capt. William Siborne told of the crops and hedges causing horrendous delays and roadblocks, obstructing Wellington's armies travelling to the battlefield. Indeed some never made it, and were ordered to fall back from Braine-le Comte and Nivelles to the Waterloo position on the morning of the 17th June.
Tactically, it was not prudent to move at more than a snails pace through these crops during the battle as neither side knew what lay on the other side; similar to the experiences of soldiers in the jungles of NAM. There could be a battery of cannon within 10 – 800 yards that would open up on you with canister when you stepped out of the crop. There might be a regiment of cavalry awaiting your appearance to charge down and cut you to pieces before you could form square. Further, local vision was so reduced that you could not see the supporting battalions of your own brigade also in the crop. After several hundred yards orientation was also lost. A couple of the scores of eyewitness accounts will illustrate the situation
"The rye in the field was so high, that to see anything beyond our own ranks [28th foot] was almost impossible. The Enemy, even, in attacking our squares, were obliged to make a daring person desperately ride forward to plant a flag [lance], as a mark [for the artillery to aim at], at the very point of our bayonets." Major Llewellyn, 28th Foot, March 1837 (1).
Again, Lieutenant Pattison of the 33rd foot, whose regiment had reached a high rocky outcrop recalled:
"The ground through which we had to advance was much undulated, and in full crop of rye, which in that rich and luxuriant country grows excessively high, and on this account obstructed observation. As we advanced, the leading company of our regiment reached a prominent part of the field and observed the French cavalry advancing to the charge. Orders were then given to form square to receive the enemy. The enemy perceiving we were prepared for them, instead of advancing, made a movement to the left, broke in upon the open columns of the 69th Regiment which, being on a low part of the field, had not [through the rye] observed them. The havoc that took place was great, and one of their Colours…was carried off… having reached the rising ground, and formed square [we] placed as a beacon in the presence of the enemy. Immediately a park of artillery was opened at point blank distance upon our column [brigade]. The destruction consequent upon this was fearful." (2).
The French too, were as incommoded by the visual obstruction of the crops as the allies. Ney, instead of marching with all haste at mid-day, had to feel his way carefully towards the cross-roads, due to the bravery of the small 2nd Netherlands Division of General Perponcher, in covering the Quatre Bras front. Perponcher, feigning to be stronger than he actually was, and using the terrain – crops, woods and buildings – to delay the French advance. In effect, they bought the time needed for Picton's division to arrive. General Foy, no coward, stressed to Ney that he thought that the position was a ‘Peninsula one'. He believed that Wellington had concealed his troops in the woods and in the corn and rye to blow the French away, if they marched straight for the cross-roads. Indeed, it is probable, that had Wellington's troops been at Quatre Bras – as Wellington had expected – that is exactly what he would have done. Without the crops and the woods, Ney would have seen the Netherlands weakness and taken the cross-roads immediately with his available infantry divisions and his 4,000 cavalry. Although on Napoleon's maps the situation seemed crystal clear, maps do not show six-foot high crops.
At Ligny, of course, the situation was different. The Prussians were in a static position. Their main dispositions could be observed by Napoleon from a Windmill. Likewise, the Prussian high command could observe Napoleon's dispositions from the high ground in their rear. However, there also the French troops, advancing on Ligny, were brought up abruptly when coming out of the crops to find either the fordable, marshy Ligny brook at their feet, defended by Prussian light troops and riflemen, and the more difficult Ligny stream. These had not been observed, due to the crops from the windmill. General Comte Flahault, Napoleon's ADC, wrote later;
" From Napoleon's observatory in the mill at Fleurus, the Prussian positions did not appear nearly as strong as they really were. The Emperor could not form an exact idea of the depth of the hollows [due to the corn]. The ravine, through which the Ligny stream flowed, was quite hidden from view. Before him lay what appeared to be merely a vast plain covered with corn, slightly depressed to its centre and rising in a gentle slope to the extreme horizon – a landscape of the true Beauce type." (3).
Notes:
(1) Waterloo Letters. Gen. H.T. Siborne, London 1891, No.149, p.348.
(2) Ibid. No. 142, pp.334-335.
(3) The First Napoleon: Some Unpublished Documents from the Bowood Papers, edited by The Earl of Kerry, London 1925. P.121.
Note: Flahault married the Daughter of Admiral, Viscount Keith RN whose descendants lived in England, where Flahault lived and whose papers are archived. A colourful character, Napoleon III appointed him to organise the funeral and return of Napoleon's body from St. Helena. Flahault had a lifelong love affair with Queen Hortense, Napoleon's step daughter, with whom he had had an illegitimate son, created Duc de Morny by Napoleon III. Comte de Flahault de la Billiarderie, was also appointed to the commission appointed to edit Napoleon's massive official correspondence. He was an illegitimate son of Talleyrand, whom he loathed for his rejection and treatment of his mother. His descendant Major- General Billiarderie, commanded the British troops under General Norman Schwarzkopf Jr., in the Gulf War.
David C Hamilton-Williams.