"RPG-2s vs. Helicopters" Topic

Did the Viet Cong or NVA ever fire their RPG-2s at helicopters in flight the way that the Somalians later did with RPG-7s, Black Hawk Down style?

I think so. I have read about this in memoirs.

Helicopters are very vulnerable when landing/taking off and while hitting one with an RPG would not be easy – it is definitely possible.

Even small arms could damage a helicopter sufficiently to cause a crash.

Yes, we lost a lot of helos to enemy fire. A shockingly high number.

Some of those were to RPGs, which are surprisingly effective vs. low-flying helos, and/or those taking off, landing, or sitting on the ground, loading/unloading troops.

My older cousin was a helicopter pilot in Vietnam and he was shot down 7…yes 7 times. And his worst injury was a cut on his knee.
He explained that every time the chopper got shot down he was coming in for a landing with troops and usually just splatted down into a rice paddy from low altitude.
His fellow pilots used to argue if he was lucky or unlucky.

Any landing you walk away from is a good landing.

Yes many helicopters were shot down in Vietnam, and some by RPGs. And yes generally helicopters are pretty fragile to most SA fires of all types including RPGs.

The list of aircraft of all types lost in SE Asia during the war was huge IMO … link

E.g. :
US ARMY rotary-wing
5,195+ [number does not include USAF, USMC and US Navy, or ARVN, etc. See the link]

Bell 205 —1 lost (Air America)
AH-1G —270 lost
BELL— 1 lost

CH-21C —14 lost
CH-34 —2 lost
CH-37B —1 lost
CH-37C —1 lost

CH-47A —83 lost
CH-47B —20 lost
CH-47C —29 lost
CH-54A —9 lost
H-13D —3 lost
H-37A —2 lost
OH-13S —147 lost
OH-23G —93 lost
OH-6A —842 lost
UH-1 —60 lost
UH-1A —1 lost
UH-1B —357 lost
UH-1C —365 lost
UH-1D —886 lost
UH-1E —90 lost
UH-1F —18 lost
UH-1H —1,313 lost
UH-34D —176 lost

mghFond,
Was your cousin one of those 18 year old Warrant Officers that the Army made helicopter pilots? They had a great reputation.

Choppers have the advantage of flying low and able to autogyro to a fairly safe landing. However, if you lose your tail rotor you are luckey to survive from any altitide.

RPG's have a self-destruct at 900m so if you are 900m from a point you could salvo fire a number of them for an airburst effect. They've done this in the mid-east.

The VN version of the RPG-2 was called the B-40. A friend of mine was a Marine tanker in VN and he said the RPG-2 was fairly ineffective against an M-48A3 tank. The RPG-7 was a killer.

Downed helos in VN: YouTube link

Wolfhag

There were times when the RPG round would go in one side of the open cargo area and out the other. Not sure how many times, but I have read of it happening.

The RPG-2 was much less accurate than the RPG-7.

An excellent source of info is Gordon Rottman"s Osprey title on RPGs. In Special Forces in Vietnam, he was on the target side and fired them.

Tom

Yes, US Helicopter pilots had a great well deserved reputation in Vietnam. There are some in our local Military Officers Assoc. Sadly we just lost one to ALS. He not only flew in Vietnam but Iraq. RIP Chief !

Choppers have the advantage of flying low and able to autogyro to a fairly safe landing.

Yes flying contour, NOE, using terrain masking. Like anything on the battlefield staying behind cover, not making yourself a target certainly will increase your survivability. Being in 101, '80-'83 I spent a lot of time as a cargo/rappelling in UH1s[then UH60s, as well CH-47s, and a few OH-58s. Being Rifle Plt Ldr then Bn Air Ops Officer[S3Air].

Flying contour at tree top level with the doors wide open[which was SOP] then when the bird reached a field flying just above the crops/ground, at speed. You were looking at the sky and then now you are looking at the trees on both sides. Then pop up back to free top level. Quite a rush !

I have heard stories too about RPGs flying thru the open doors and not do any damage. Albeit that didn't happen all the time, obviously. The VC/NVA spent a lot of time learning how to shoot down rotary wing aircraft with small arms, including RPGs. Whether an RPG-2 or RPG-7 hits a helicopter there is pretty good chance that bird is going down.

Part of the reason for the high US helicopter losses was the use of forced entry ops. A Hot LZ can be like LCMs landing at Normandy in WWII. You can suppress the LZ with CAS, FA[if within range], and have gunships in the front and along side the Lift Ships. But many times it was not enough. And birds make a lot of noise no matter what.

The "best" tactic was not to land where the enemy was, and
maybe with short LZ prep with CAS, etc. Before inserting on the LZ. But again at times the birds were still "ambushed" on the way or when landing on the LZ.

And extracting from a Hot LZ/PZ can be just as challenging. Requiring some supporting fires from gunships, CAS, etc., but that too can be hard to do. Being careful not to hit your own troops. The VC/NVA use a tactic called "hugging the belt". Staying close to the US, ARVN, etc., troops, so to cause them to limit their fire support for fear of killing our own troops.

And yes if a helicopter losses power it, and is at a high enough altitude. The pilot can take the blade out of gear and can autorotate to generally land safely. As noted any landing you walk away from … is a "good" landing.

We took these lessons learn seriously even in the '80s and beyond. What we learned is if you don't have to do a forced entry operation … you don't. Those high losses are unacceptable and unnecessary. As well as we attempt to avoid collateral damage. So that limits supporting fires, from CAS, etc. E.g. the UBL raid i.e. small and stealthy.

And bottom line again a helicopter is a bit fragile. So if it hit by most anything,, e.g. heavy small arms fire, an RPG, mortar rounds, etc. you may go down. So you have to modify your tactics and techniques. E.g. flying contour, NOE, avoid forced entry ops, etc.

The whole doctrine of airmobile operations was a little ambitious and based on the false premise that the NLF/PAVN were ill equipped guerillas who would be easily defeated.

By 1968-69 that lie was exposed. The A-Shau valley operations [among others] incurred enormous fixed wing and rotary wing losses – far out of step with any possible gains. I once saw a website setting out these losses but cannot find it now. Substantial AAA was dug in on the hillsides and able to fire DOWN on US aircraft flying thru the valley. It's also quite far from the US base areas, which means a lot of time is spent flying to and from the operations zone over high mountains and weather is seldom reliable.

When Abrams took over from Westmoreland, there was a change in emphasis away from airmobile and towards armour according to David Hackworth in About Face. I'm not sure if this is born out by other sources but he has it that under Westmoreland the war was run by the Airborne and after Abrams it was more about the Armor. It makes sense on many levels that this would happen.

The more modern helicopters have much improved 'survivability'. The inherent fragility of Hueys is quite startling. There is one parked outside a museum near where I live and it's shocking how small and how unprotected it is.

The heyday of air mobility like that of Paratroops seems to be over. It remains a useful option for sure but it will never be seen again on the scale of the 1960s.

The heyday of air mobility like that of Paratroops seems to be over. It remains a useful option for sure but it will never be seen again on the scale of the 1960s.

Both important and very useful options. But I doubt we'll ever see Mass Tactical Drops like in WWII. But drops were made in Korea, even one large drop in Vietnam and GW II. The same goes for large Air Assault Insertions … But still the training and capabilities are very viable.

If there's still a place for horse mounted cavalry on occasion then paratroop drops and airmobile operations will still have their uses long into the future, just not on the massive scale of the past. Same can be said for amphibious operations. I'm sure we've seen their peak but the skills and hard won lessons would best be retained.

Amphibious operations, parachute drops and air assault insertions in most[not all!] situations are Forced Entry ops. We have learned the hard way to avoid those if not totally dismiss them. I'll admit I am biased as having been awarded both US ARMY Parachute and Air Assault wings and graduating from USMC Basic Amph Training in my youth. Regardless forced entry ops generally are considered a thing of the past. E.g. watch the first 5 mins of SPR …

It would be great to maintain large forces capable of such operations. Having the option keeps potential enemies guessing and they can have influence above their numbers. Had I control of the US defence budget, I'd spend less on nukes and more on conventional forces. The UK has a more extreme imbalance as it's been cutting conventional forces to the bone while planning to replace Trident.

During the 1960s, helicopters were the new toys and huge investments were made in the hope they could be game changers. Much was achieved. Tactics were developed and honed but ultimately it's too costly a way to fight battles.

Still worth keeping the resources, skills and tactics in the armoury. Best not to write anything off too early.

We currently have :

3 USMC Divs trained for both amphib and air assault ops

US ARMY :

1 Abn Div(82d), 1 Abn Bde (173d), 1 Ranger Rgt (75th) – All Paratroops

1 Air Assault Div (101)

1 Mtn Div (10th) Air Assault trained

Plus Spec Op units in all branches – parachute qualified +