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"How good were Wellington's light infantry really?" Topic

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Personal logo 4th Cuirassier Supporting Member of TMP27 Sep 2020 11:56 a.m. PST

Ok, so the Light Division is a hallowed unit of light infantry. But were they, objectively, any better than your common-or-garden French l้g่re unit?

Arguments that they were:

1/ The higher incidence of officer casualties at Waterloo among the heavy cavalry units that opposed light units suggests they were good at picking off high-value targets.

2/ They wrote a lot of memoirs.

3/ Er…

4/ That's it.

Arguments that they weren't:

A/ Really good ideas were widely copied. The idea of having a whole regiment equipped with rifles and dressed in green, or a whole division of light troops, wasn't one of those ideas.

B/ The 95th routed at Waterloo.

C/ Elsewhere British light troops accomplished nothing French light didn't also accomplish.

D/ What did Sir John Moore or the Shorncliffe instructors know about light infantry tactics anyway?

When I ask myself what evidence there is that the hallowed Light Division was genuinely any more proficient than its continental adversaries, I come up a bit empty. Which would you rather have in your army, the 52nd or the Young Guard?

What does the massive think?

arthur181527 Sep 2020 1:54 p.m. PST

Your point A, whilst true in the short term during the Napoleonic Wars, is not true in the longer term, as all armies eventually adopted rifled weapons during the 19th century and most ended up in the 20th century in a version of green – or greenish camouflage patterned – clothing for combat!

C: Did French legere units help accomplish a string of victories against the British in Portugal and Spain? I seem to have missed those…

On D, Franz de Rottenburg, a Prussian who had entered British service in 1795, helped establish Hompesch's Light Infantry, which later became the 5/60th Foot, a rifle battalion, and wrote a series of manuals which became the basis for the training of the rifle and light infantry regiments under Sir John Moore.
The 'Shorncliffe Method' of training was largely devised by Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth MacKenzie of the 52nd, who had previously trained the light troops of the 90th Foot under Thomas Graham.
Many senior British officers, including Moore, had served in the American War and experienced an adoption of light infantry tactics in the field.

Personal logo deadhead Supporting Member of TMP27 Sep 2020 2:02 p.m. PST

A/. is fascinating. At Waterloo not too many of the redcoat Light infantry battns carried anything but the standard infantry musket.

Whilst the Green Coated Rifle units proved perfectly capable of fighting like infantry in a square against cavalry or holding a line, unless in the sand pit. Even without a "bayonet" on a long firearm.

Despite the claimed advantages (and the reverse) of smooth bore vs rifled musketry.

B/. is overstating it. Like DoW said "as long as they come back", which they did and very quickly so.

2/. above is the best point of all. These days, just raise a flag and be sure to have a photographer as you do so, be it Suribachi or Hue. Be literate and publish your recollections back then…..

British Light Infantry were a select group of highly trained infantry, chosen for intelligence, initiative and skirmishing talent. An expensive luxury, totally allowed for a relatively small British volunteer army,…compared with the French Levee en Masse.

But, at Waterloo, stuck in line with rest, were they any more effective? You can be much better, but still no more effective after all.

Blimey. What a profound question this could prove.

Durham Tiger27 Sep 2020 2:40 p.m. PST

'B/ The 95th routed at Waterloo.'

Like that Ney fellow. Routed 5 times to get yet another horse…

It's not a 'route' if a skirmisher retreats to a 'Line', it's common sense.


Personal logo Artilleryman Supporting Member of TMP27 Sep 2020 2:59 p.m. PST

I might add that by the time of the rise of the British light infantry, the French Leger regiments seemed to be going into decline. It is often reported and the historical accounts seem to support it, that they were used in the same way as the ordinary line regiments. More elan and morale probably, but no special tactical use. At the end of the Empire regular skirmishing was the province of the voltigeur companies in both Ligne and Leger though sending the relatively untrained fusiliers forward in open order was still an oft used tactic (e.g. Quatre Bras).

As far as the British lights were concerned, it was not only their skill set that put them apart but they were, as has been said, highly motivated and well trained. They proved themselves time and again as independent operators, as skirmishers and in close order. After all, was not Colborne's 52nd Foot one of the units that delivered the coup de grace to La Garde at Waterloo?

Handlebarbleep27 Sep 2020 4:10 p.m. PST

@4th Cuirassier

You make some good points about reputations, yet reputations butter no parsnips.

Waterloo is rather a special case as it was 'hard pounding' indeed. Barnard is candid that rather more disappeared and returned than he would have liked. However, that little piece of Belgium destroyed far larger reputations than those (Emperors, Immortals, Marshals of France etc).

Personally, I tend not to hold with the invicible elite school, from either side. We tend to overestimate the qualititive over the quantitive. When it rains the elite get wet too. To use the sporting analogy, a great football team can be a man down and still win. Even the greatest though would likely struggle when a second man goes off.

It's also true that morale and hence effectiveness can ebb and flow. Just because you used to be great doesn't mean you're lousy now, but you still not be as good as you were.

Nine pound round27 Sep 2020 4:27 p.m. PST

The Light Division- as opposed to the light infantry more generally- did signally distinguish itself in some major actions (esp Fuentes d'Onoro and Bussaco) and a host of minor ones, such as the Coa. I think a case could be made (and is made, by Oman among others) that it was an outstanding organization. Certainly it had a host of good brigadiers- Kempt, Colborne, Beckwith- and the fact that it was often chosen for tough missions like Badajoz suggests it was a good unit.

Nine pound round27 Sep 2020 5:07 p.m. PST

I should add, it's important to distinguish between the Light Division, and the troops from that division which fought at Waterloo. By 1814, the battalions that made up the division (43rd, 52nd, 2+ battalions of the 95th, two battalions of Portuguese cacadores and a pair of Portuguese line battalions added in 1813) had several years' continual hard service as a unit behind them, and a habitual acquaintance with their staff, supporting arms and services (especially the artillery).

After the peace, the division was scattered, some units going to America to fight at New Orleans, others going elsewhere. It never reassembled as a unit, although many of its constituent units fought at Waterloo- although not the 43rd, and none of the Portuguese, who constituted almost half of the division. So it's hard to infer a lot about the Light Division from Waterloo.

robert piepenbrink Supporting Member of TMP27 Sep 2020 5:46 p.m. PST

Fully agree with Nine Pound Round.

In addition, I think I could make a decent case that rifled weapons, less conspicuous coats, thinner lines, reduced corporal punishment and an emphasis on lower-level initiative have been pretty widely adopted.

Also, though it seems to have escaped your attention, the Light Division was a division, not a French or even a British style regiment, and it wasn't used for the same things, which also makes comparison difficult. Find me the French using a legere regiment to screen an army advance or retreat and we can make a direct comparison.

The Light Division in the Peninsula with its usual supports gave Wellington a reliable maneuvering element in support of an army which did not itself maneuver rapidly. For what it was doing, I think even the "Gentlemen's Sons" of the 1st Division would have admitted it was the best the Peninsular Army had.

dibble27 Sep 2020 8:01 p.m. PST

Mark Urban's rather ordinary tome is to blame for the about 100 Riflemen? 'running to the woods' quote. Anyone who has studied the 95th will know that if there are enemy cavalry swarming the battlefield and they are deployed and in danger of being caught in open order, they should if possible, seek shelter. Which it seems, some did.

A good read of the 4 books of Rifle Green in the Peninsula, and Rifle Green at Waterloo, by George Caldwell and Robert Cooper, are way above the Urban pulp. And the latest, Riflemen: The History of the 5th Battalion, 60th (Royal American) Regiment – 1797-1818. By Robert Griffith are the must-reads.

Personal logo 4th Cuirassier Supporting Member of TMP28 Sep 2020 1:31 a.m. PST

The French practice, in 1805 to 1809 certainly, was typically for an infantry division to comprise one light and three or four line regiments. This structure, where your light troops were integrated into divisions, was notably different from Wellington's practice in Spain. There, he had a whole concentrated light division but other divisions had just the handful of integral light companies belonging to the individual battalions.

Hence I wonder why he didn't reinstate the idea of a light division for 1815, and why nobody else did at any other time, either. His light units were distributed along lines more like those of the French.

The distribution of light troops in other armies also resembles the French example more than the British. You'd expect this in the armies of countries the French had occupied or invented. It's less clear why 40% of an 1815 Prussian brigade (= division in other parlance) was light unless it was in imitation of French practice. Likewise Russian divisions came to comprise four musketeer and two jager regiments.

We don't, I think, assume French grenadiers to have been any better than those of other armies because Oudinot occasionally converged them into a division. So I wonder whether the Light Division was especially proficient – or whether it appeared so because it was a dense concentration of better-than-average infantry, who happened to be light?

Nine pound round28 Sep 2020 5:31 a.m. PST

Well, the Light Division got used for a lot of what we would today call "covering force" missions – advance and rear guards- and it was no doubt helpful that any unit in the organization could fight in close or open order, as the situation demanded. Lots of armies organized "advanced guards" for those kinds of missions, but the LD was unusual in staying together for so long, and becoming so proficient in the role.

It's often the case in such a unit that the whole is more than the sum of its parts, and Wellington may not have thought he had a leader and a proficient staff capable of forming a new light division as Crawford did. Wellington was notoriously mistrustful of his subordinates, and although Alten had the LD after Crawford's death, Wellington may not have thought he could pull it together again without the core of veterans. There were some troops from the LD there, but I suspect Wellington had less confidence even in the British troops at Waterloo, since so many of them had come not from the Peninsula, but from the unsuccessful Bergen-op-Zoom Expedition.

But there are lots of oddities in that army. Why the corps organization, for example? Dynastic reasons?

robert piepenbrink Supporting Member of TMP28 Sep 2020 6:46 a.m. PST

4th, try to focus. The quality of the component units is not the same thing as the quality of the division, which is not the same thing as the wisdom or otherwise of having such a division--and whether or not something was copied is not the sole measure of its wisdom where it was used. You're bouncing from one to the other. That said:

When it comes to rifle-armed battalions in subdued colors, the French are the outliers. See Austrian jaegers and Prussian jeager and schutzen units.

The Light Division with its usual attachments looks very like Prussian Advance Guards of 1806 or Austrian Advance Guards clear through the Napoleonic Wars. The Lutzowers of 1813-14 are perhaps a half or two-thirds scale Light Division. Note that it's mostly associated with long-service professional armies. Draft a bunch of middle-class kids, and you do things differently. The 1813-15 Prussians look more like French because that's the optimum way to use armies of draftees--not necessarily because skirmishers organic to a battalion are superior to or even as good as specialist long-service battalions.

Wellington's Army of 1815 was an "infamous" work in progress. I'm not sure it tells us much about how he would have organized troops given time and a free hand. Conversely, he was lavish in his praise of his Penninsular Army, which "could go anywhere and do anything."

If you give the French a benefit in column maneuver and attacks and the British a benefit in fire discipline--surely not uncommon--you HAVE made French grenadiers better, and also British formed light infantry.

And when did your estimation of the Light Division components shift? In your original post, they were no better than French "units" if as good. In your 1:31 post, they're "better than average infantry who happened to be light." One of the other, please.

Nine pound round28 Sep 2020 8:48 a.m. PST

Ah, now THERE'S an interesting question- what would the "objective end-state" for the Army of the Low Countries have been?

42flanker28 Sep 2020 9:20 a.m. PST

"better than average infantry who happened to be light."

Doesn't that beg the question of why they were 'better than average'? Might that not be precisely because they were the Light Division, instilled with the qualities and skills outlined in previous posts, which were then honed over five years service in the Peninsula and to some extent, as far as the British battalions were concerned, perpetuated through regimental esprit de corps?

As various posters have suggested, circumstances had changed somewhat by June 1815, not least that the Light Division had been broken up, but folklore allowing, the 52nd nonetheless showed themselves considerably better than average on the 18th.

Personal logo 4th Cuirassier Supporting Member of TMP28 Sep 2020 9:54 a.m. PST

@ Robert

No, light infantry were better than line infantry generally in most armies. They either took or they attracted the pick of the recruit pool (hussar regiments, same thing). By 1815 line and light did largely the same jobs though. If you group all your better units together, whether these are light infantry or grenadiers or line, you've got a better-than-average formation of that size.

If your average unit is of A/B quality where a quarter are A and three-quarters are B, you can swap all the As out of four units. You'll then have one formation that's AAAA and three that are BBBB. Let's say they're opposed by four formations that are still configured as ABBB. There's not much to choose between ABBB and BBBB, but AAAA versus ABBB is waaaay better, and is going to look great. It's a crack unit suddenly.

But all you've done is concentrate your better material. You haven't made more of it, nor are your As and Bs any better than the other side's As and Bs.

This must have been, in the abstract at least, a consideration when forming guards units. The rationale for guards is that stripping line units of their best men to form them makes your army better, on balance, than it would be if you left them where they were, and instead had higher-quality line units and no guards. Of course there are other reasons you'd do this – having a personal bodyguard / powerbase, a reliable reserve, baubles – and William Slim for one would strongly disagree that it was a good idea. But on balance, the advantage of converged grenadiers, guards units and light divisions was that you concentrated your better troops.

So – what if that was the only advantage? If so, it is a complete explanation for why the Light Division was successful. Individually, maybe its units weren't any more proficient than similar French units. They could even have been less proficient. It's just the concentration that makes them look better.


robert piepenbrink Supporting Member of TMP28 Sep 2020 11:20 a.m. PST

Once again, 4th, you're starting multiple hares. In you're OP, you suggest grading the division as individual battalions, and that they're not particularly good. Now you're talking about the advisability of concentrating better soldiers, and seem to be bouncing back and forth between superior human material and superior units--which, again, are not necessarily the same thing.

As for the virtue of concentration, I'd say it IS a virtue, if not carried to excess. A lot of any army is unlikely to be engaged in serious combat, certainly at the decisive point. Napoleon could and did get extra assault troops by stripping elite companies from garrison units, and adding a single battalion of lights to each of his divisions would not have given Wellington a unit he could trust for advance and rear-guard work.

And of course you HAVE made more "better material" to the extent certain units have superior training, discipline and traditions. The quality of a unit is not solely a matter of the quality of the recruit intake.

As a rule of thumb, I'd say you've carried matters too far individually if a good soldier can reasonably expect transfer to some other unit. For units, it depends on the skill of the commanders. Wellington and Frederick were all very good at ensuring that elite battalions saw more than their share of action. Napoleon was not, I think, so good at that. The Guard tended to be unnecessary in the Glory Years and inadequate in 1813-15, and French Peninsular units were being stripped of superior officers and NCO's for Guard units in garrison elsewhere.

But we were talking about Wellington's Army, were we not? And in particular "The first in the field and the last out of it! The bloody, fighting 95th!" Do you really think Britain's performance would have been improved by sending two thirds of them to garrison units somewhere?

Personal logo 4th Cuirassier Supporting Member of TMP28 Sep 2020 11:39 a.m. PST

In you're OP, you suggest grading the division as individual battalions,

Where did I do that?

robert piepenbrink Supporting Member of TMP28 Sep 2020 1:23 p.m. PST

1 where you talk about light "units" at Waterloo, evidently meaning battalions.
B where you talk about the 1/95th routing.
And in your next to last sentence when you compare the 52nd--not the Light Division--to the Young Guard.
A, of course, does both, when you flip back and forth from traits unique to the Rifles to the whole concept of a light division.

Throughout this thread you hop back and forth between discussing individual soldiers, battalion-size units and division-size units--whether it was wise to concentrate good soldiers in particular battalions, whether it was wise to concentrate good battalions in larger formations and whether the individual battalions of the Light Division were superior to their French counterparts or whether the Light Division as a whole was a superior unit, and if so to what.

Please settle for yourself what question you're really asking.

42flanker28 Sep 2020 3:32 p.m. PST

Ironically, at regimental level it has generally been the case in the British army that most senior officer had little enthusiasm for their best men being hived off to form elite units, or with the best recruits in their area being creamed off by so-called elite regiments, be it the Foot Guards or the Parachute regiment.

Ideally, each regiment in its own eyes formed its own elite.

robert piepenbrink Supporting Member of TMP28 Sep 2020 3:55 p.m. PST

42nd, I think that's true pretty much everywhere--though there's a little blurring of the borders when letting some of your soldiers join elite units is a way of getting rid of troublemakers. Peter Young discusses it when he talks about raising commando forces in WWII. But what is good for the regiment is not always what's good for the army as a whole--and a good soldier for some purposes and units is not always a good soldier for others.

I continue to think the danger point is when it becomes so common that a soldier starts to think in terms of transferring to a more congenial unit instead of improving the one he's in.

Personal logo 4th Cuirassier Supporting Member of TMP28 Sep 2020 4:33 p.m. PST

A wilfully obtuse misreading Robert.

If you can give an example of a French Light Division, to which divisional-level comparison can be made, we can all do so. However, as there was no such formation, and as continental approximations thereof never met Wellington's light troops in battle, the record of the component units are all we have to go on.

I would have thought that so far within the realms of the blindingly obvious that it shouldn't need spelling out, given what the entire thread is about.

Nine pound round28 Sep 2020 4:38 p.m. PST

Were men selected or chosen for the battalions in the light division in any unusual way? I understand the 43rd, 52nd, and the rifles were trained together at Shorncliffe, but weren't they essentially just units that already had a corporate existence, and were chosen for special training? Were replacements provided through some special system, or through the mechanisms that supplied men to other British battalions (direct enlistment, transfer from the militia, in lieu of a criminal sentence, etc)?

BTW, I think the impact of enlistment from the militia is underrated as a source of strong recruits. It was one of the unique advantages the British Army of that era enjoyed.

Cerdic28 Sep 2020 11:54 p.m. PST

I have read that the 95th received a large draft of recruits from the militia at Shorncliffe. After beginning training, a good number were found to be 'unsuitable' and sent back…

42flanker29 Sep 2020 2:38 a.m. PST

"there's a little blurring of the borders when letting some of your soldiers join elite units is a way of getting rid of troublemakers."

@robert piepenbrink. Well, yes, indeed that stands to reason. 'Best men' would not include trouble makers and square pegs, and it seems that at first, during the AWI, regiments might well send men they wished to be rid of to the 'flank battalions' who for all their efficacy in the field did contain their share of notorious marauders and pillages, even officers who cheerfully took the war to the enemy population.

von Winterfeldt29 Sep 2020 3:09 a.m. PST

I found the article by Arthur Harman : They decide not, nor are they chiefly relied upon in battle : British Rifles and Light Infantry in the Peninsular War pp. 265
A history of the Peninsular War
Volume 9 – Modern Studies

very informative and helpful

robert piepenbrink Supporting Member of TMP29 Sep 2020 4:00 a.m. PST

4th, the point that there was no French equivalent of the Light Division has been made repeatedly--even by you. And it's part of the problem of evaluation. You use the absence of equivalent formations in other armies as evidence that it was a bad idea. But of course there were equivalents--just not French. At a lower level, most of the major power armies had equivalents of the rifle battalions, and all of them had designated light infantry battalions which might be compared to the 45th and 52nd.

So we're left with "what really is your question?" Are you asking how good the individual soldiers were, how good the battalions were or whether the formation of the Light Division was an error on Wellington's part?

42nd, keep in mind that the line between good soldier and troublemaker is continually blurred. The bright, eager junior officer who always has some improvement for his superior to make is another candidate for transfer. I'm working on the Queen's Rangers from the AWI right now. Many if not most of the post-Rogers officers are from British regular units, advanced at least one grade. The Queen's Rangers were an excellent unit--interestingly, one of their historians calls them the Light Division of the AWI British army--but I feel quite sure that in many cases the commanders of British line regiments were glad to see the last of some overeager young subaltern.

Murvihill29 Sep 2020 5:51 a.m. PST

Some of the French Guard divisions were entirely made up of light troops, at least in theory (voltiguers in 1813). As far as in general I think it was a case of line troops being trained to function as lights than light troops being made worse. By the end of the Napoleonic wars even all-line battalions like the Prussians and Austrians could send a considerable part of their formations out to skirmish.
Regarding the comment that later in the 19th everyone adopted rifles, not just lights that was due to the invention of the Minie ball, not because rifles were so great before that. With Napoleonic rifles you exchanged speed for accuracy and speed was thought more important for all but a few. The Minie ball allowed rifles to be reloaded as quickly as muskets.

42flanker29 Sep 2020 6:24 a.m. PST

"the line between good soldier and troublemaker is continually blurred"

@robert piepenbrink

The key difference, in terms of my original point, is whether the CO felt his unit was diminished by the diverting of better quality men to elite or ad hoc specialist units. If he was glad to see a man go, any unappreciated qualities that might then be prove of value to the receiving unit would not matter.

robert piepenbrink Supporting Member of TMP29 Sep 2020 7:12 a.m. PST

Perfectly true, 42nd. I was suggesting that in certain cases, good and even "elite" units could be formed without diminishing the quality of the losing units--and sometimes with the hearty cooperation of the losing commander. The trick seems to be that the gaining unit is a different type, requiring different skills and attitudes.

The other way to form an elite painlessly is through better procedures--having a similar troop intake, but taking greater pains with training and discipline. I have seen comment to the effect that the better US divisions in WWII went to some lengths to see that replacements were suitably trained by the division before they were integrated into their new units, and that good units with numerous replacements were careful about retraining the entire battalion. I myself was once assigned to an Air National Guard unit which had an NCO permanently assigned to screen transfers from the regulars and see that the ones we didn't want went elsewhere. We were never above 90% of TO&E, but it was one of the best units I ever served with: every airman could be relied on. I met one more as good--"elites" in the more traditional sense--but I never met a better.

42flanker29 Sep 2020 8:59 a.m. PST

Ah, I see your point. A different perspective from that of my father who was fed up the Scots Guards taking their pick of the brigade district.

Nine pound round29 Sep 2020 3:03 p.m. PST

One small distinction- but an important one- the Light Division was not formed out of flank companies taken from other units (like, say, Oudinot's Grenadiers de la Reserve), but of preexisting units, formed and raised like any others, who attained a high level of unit (and divisional) proficiency.

robert piepenbrink Supporting Member of TMP29 Sep 2020 3:13 p.m. PST

Thanks, 42nd. Mind you, I think your father was often right--especially today, when effectively all infantry are Napoleonic Riflemen--camouflaged, armed with precision weapons, expected to operate in small groups and show initiative. But John Masters describes it as still being valid in the run-up to WWII, with Greenjacket units cultivating a very different mindset from line units.

And I think it's still true in some of the odder nooks and crannies. There are good staff and especially good intel types who just aren't what the 101st Abn Div is looking for, and the other way around.

But getting back to the Peninsula, I suspect Wellington's rifle units in particular contained a number of perfectly good soldiers (for those units) who would not have been what the Guards or even the 88th Foot were looking for. The 45th and 52nd I believe got much the same troop intake as a "line" unit, but represented a more modern discipline and a more rigorous training. So neither one represented the sort of drain on the rest of the army that Napoleon's scooping up superior soldiers into analogous Guard units did.

dibble30 Sep 2020 10:50 a.m. PST

typo?…43rd. Let's not forget the 51st, 71st, 85th, and the 90th. Don't get me wrong, It's a list not the Division makeup.

robert piepenbrink Supporting Member of TMP30 Sep 2020 1:45 p.m. PST

Typo. But I wasn't vouching for the discipline and training of all British units with "light" in the title--only for the Shorncliffe units with their subsequent years of Peninsular experience.

Titles are usually easier come by than training, discipline and equipment

ReallySameSeneffeAsBefore30 Sep 2020 2:13 p.m. PST

This is a really interetsing thread on a subject where my knowledge is sketchy. Re the Rifle units being a different type of recruit to the range of folks found in other units- I'm not sure. Wasn't the 95th's disciplinary record pretty good? Not sure about the 5/60th.

Personal logo SHaT1984 Supporting Member of TMP30 Sep 2020 3:49 p.m. PST

OK, I wasn't coming here but it seems…

The Shorncliffe Brigade was indeed superior to nearly all other trained British troops. Their morale, extensive shooting exercises and field operations marked them for greatness. They also cost a lot.

However, without experience they were not elite. But they got there.

On the point of the 'Division', this seems to me to be a distraction. While talked about and envied at the time (and villified by later authors), it was an administrative formation as much as anything else.

Yes, they 'filled the line' on occasions, simply it seems to me by virtue of no-one else likely to fill it. However they were equally 'distributed' when the need and opportunities arose for their expertise to be put into effect.

≠ d ≠

robert piepenbrink Supporting Member of TMP30 Sep 2020 6:24 p.m. PST

ReallySame, the Rifles were notoriously easy to recruit for. They had to put limits on militia joining the 95th. If that didn't result in a higher standard of recruits, someone should have shot the recruiting sergeants. On discipline--well, really you need to be picky about the kind of offense. If a unit deployed ahead of the main body and under minimal supervision doesn't do a disproportionate share of the looting, you'd start to wonder about their initiative.

dibble01 Oct 2020 5:21 a.m. PST

Oh, sorry! I forgot the 68th from 1808… :)

But I wasn't vouching for the discipline and training of all British units with "light" in the title

I didn't say you did…:)

dibble01 Oct 2020 11:55 a.m. PST

I posted this about the 60th…


…Which is linked in this post on this site.

TMP link

ReallySameSeneffeAsBefore02 Oct 2020 10:32 a.m. PST

Thanks Robert P- I see what you mean.

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