"Were the British really “The best army in the world”?" Topic

I don't know about the cuisine…I've had excellent meals in London, especially in a little restaurant across the street from Harrod's… :-)

Regarding British officers of the War of the Revolution…

'Their officers were gentlemen, always ready to set an example in danger, despising cowardice as the deadliest of sins, but too often careless of their men's health and comfort and too solicitous of their own. Through 1776 Carleton and Phillips had hammered at this insouciance; 1777 would be filled with Burgoyne's and Phillips' orders against their misuse of the army's few horses and vehicles for the transport of personal baggage. Gentleman Johnny set them an example of concern for the common soldier, but a poor one indeed in his insistence on campaigning in style-with thirty cart loads of baggage, including an extensive supply of potables (and, reputedly, an extra baggage in the shapely form of the wife of one of his commissaries)-while urging his officers to restrict themselves to '…soldier's tents, and…a knapsack.' Some of his ensigns and lieutenants were only sixteen and seventeen years of age-a '…set of ungovernable young men…' who often upset the decorum of regimental messes, but died unflinchingly.'-John Elting, Saratoga, 20.

From John Elting's Saratoga, 20:

'The Royal Artillery was a world of its own. Most of its officers (unlike those of the infantry and cavalry) were graduates of the Royal Military Academy at Woolwich [founded in 1741 and based on the French military technical schools-the best in Europe]; a fair proportion of them had been promoted out of the ranks and would rise to field or general officer grade. Its enlisted men were far above average-'…the tallest, strongest, handsomest men in the world…looked as [if] they had been picked out of an army…have great ambition.' Phillips, who had an international reputation as an artillery officers, had trained them meticulously in the handling of every type of cannon and ammunition in Canada. He would employ his guns by 'brigade' instead of parceling them out by two's to each infantry regiment since this gave him better control of their fire. Burgoyne had three companies of Royal Artillery and the equivalent of a fourth, plus a company of Hesse Hanau artillery..'

Well, I have to say that Spring in his "With Zeal and Bayonets Only" makes a very convincing series of arguments for the British being excellent, altho his purpose is not to prove them "the best".

If nothing else, John, you have to qualify your question as "the best in the Western World" as frankly there may be asian armies that were far superior in some way, but i wouldn't know since I'm unschooled in the [locally] famous campaigns of estaban garcia in the hinterlands of Brazil or Phnohm Pehn aka "the Sun Tzu" of SE Asia [I made these up, of course].

BUT, I will present a couple of quotes since Brechtel198 is doing so.

Spring's thesis is "I hope to show in the course of this work, the King's troops won the vast majority of their battlefield engagements in American because they tailored their conventional tactical methods intelligently to local conditions. – very much as they had done in similar circumstances during the French and Indian War".

He goes on to say that "the aim of this work is to gain a picture of how British forces in America performed at the operational and especially the tactical level."

In the opening paragraphs of the book, he says:
"In the first three quarters of the 18th C., great Britain successfuly waged war against a variety of enemies that included the great powers France and Spain, and the insurgent Jamaican Maroons and Jacobite rebels. Supported by the Royal Navy, British troops engaged in what would today be styled conventional, guerrilla, amphibeous, and counterinsurgency warfare in theaters as diverse as the plains of flanders, Germany, Iberia, and India; the Scottish Highlands, the North American wilderness, and the jungles of the caribbean."

Did the British have perfect performance, no, and that wasn't the OP either. Every army has problems, and the squad things Platoon is jacked up, and platoon thinks Company is jacked up, and Company things Battalion is jacked up, and Battalion thinks Brigade is jacked up, and Brigade thinks Division is jacked up, and Division thinks Corps is jacked up, and Corps things Theater is jacked up, and Theater things Army is jacked up, and Army thinks Washington is jacked up, and…the jack stops there.
:)

So, I think Spring makes a good case for a versatile adaptation and battlefield performance and past successes. based upon the performance and opinions of the Hessians, I think Frederick and any other European power – including the Russians – would have done much worse in North America.

My honest opinion is that if the political approach had been handled correctly, America would be a dominion like Canada. But isn't there a movie called "The Madness of King George"?

In any event, Spring's book is an excellent one, altho I'm sure some disagree with him.

All this to say, I'm willing to bite – The British had the best – overall – Army in the world by 1783, even if they didn't win the war, and might not win on the plains of Central Europe.

I'm even willing to add that I doubt – given a fair fight on a good battlefield – that Washington's Army could have beaten an equal number of Brits, altho he may have fought them to a draw if they screwed up a couple of things and some of the angrier continental units with a grudge showed up.

Well, I have to say that Spring in his "With Zeal and Bayonets Only" makes a very convincing series of arguments for the British being excellent, altho his purpose is not to prove them "the best".

If nothing else, John, you have to qualify your question as "the best in the Western World" as frankly there may be asian armies that were far superior in some way, but i wouldn't know since I'm unschooled in the [locally] famous campaigns of estaban garcia in the hinterlands of Brazil or Phnohm Pehn aka "the Sun Tzu" of SE Asia [I made these up, of course.

BUT, I will present a couple of facts since Brechtel198 is doing so.

Spring's thesis is "I hope to show in the course of this work, the King's troops won the vast majority of their battlefield engagements in American because they tailored their conventional tactical methods intelligently to local conditions. – very much as they had done in similar circumstances during the French and Indian War".

He goes on to say that "the aim of this work is to gain a picture of how British forces in America performed at the operational and especially the tactical level."

In the opening paragraphs of the book, he says:
"In the first three quarters of the 18th C., great Britain successfuly waged war against a variety of enemies that included the great powers France and Spain, and the insurgent Jamaican Maroons and Jacobite rebels. Supported by the Royal Navy, British troops engaged in what would today be styled conventional, guerrilla, ampphibeous, and counterinsurgency warfare in theaters as diverse as the plains of flanders, Germany, Iberia, and India; the Scottish Highlands, the North American wilderness, and the jungles of the caribbean."

Did the British have perfect performance, no, and that wasn't the OP either. Every army has problems, and the squad things Platoon is jack up, and platoon thinks Company is jacked up, and Company things Battalion is jacked up, and Battalion thinks Brigade is jacked up, and Brigade thinks Division is jacked up, and Division thinks Corps is jacked up, and Corps things Theater is jacked up, and Theater things Army is jacked up, and Army thinks Washington is jacked up, and…the jack stops there.
:)

So, I think Spring makes a good case for a versatile adaptation and battlefield performance and past successes. based upon the performance and opinions of the Hessians, I think Frederick and any other European power – including the Russians – would have done much worse in North America.

My honest opinion is that if the political approach had been handled correctly, America would be a dominion like Canada. But isn't there a movie called "The Madness of King George"?

In any event, Spring's book is an excellent one, altho I'm sure some disagree with him.

All this to say, I'm willing to bite – The British had the best – overall – Army in the world by 1783, even if they didn't win the war, and might not win on the plains of Central Europe.

Go back to what I originally was asking.
"People said" that the British army was the best in the world. I read it in many books. No. I'm not going to list them. It was an established "fact". Almost axiomatic.
Was it true? Or was it feel-good designed to make our eventual hard won victory seem more inspiring.
I may have refined what I originally meant a bit.

Spring's book is excellent and he makes his case very well and convincing.

I completely agree that both the Prussians and Russians would not have adapted to fighting in North America very well at all. And after the Seven Years War the Prussians were definitely not the best army in Europe.

It should also be noted that the French began a long reform period after the Seven Years War because they had performed so poorly. The Minister of War, the Duc de Choiseul pushed the reforms and the French military education system was the best in Europe, including Great Britain. All of the military schools in Europe were based on the French model.

Rochambeau's expeditionary force was excellent in training, leadership, and material. The artillery they brought with them was from the new Gribeauval System.

From all accounts, and based on performance, the British army was the best in the world during the period, and Washington modeled what would become the excellent Continental Army on the British model.

What is really a shame is that no battle honors have ever been granted the British regiments who served long in North America. That slight is not excusable.

The curious mix of starchy conformity and unconventionlity that resides in the British character- to varying degrees in the component nations- seems to find a particularly intense expression in the military sphere.

Spring's thesis highlights the British army's capacity to adapt and improvise. There was a certain permability in army structures of the C18th that allowed room not only to forward-looking professionals who came to the fore in wartime but also unconventional individuals whose qualities enabled British forces to adapt to the peculiar circumstances of colonial campaigns and recover from unpromising opening moves to notable succcess in the field, (whatever strategic failure, political obstacles, or inefficient systems, may have hindered ultimate victory).

There was a reference somewhere above to British officers being over-solicitous of their own health, while neglecting that of their men.

There are enough quotations from officers describing the scanty campaign equipage and weeks spent in rough bivouacs, with a mixture of grim relish and satisfaction, for that to be something of a caricature. John Peebles of the 42nd described the frustration fo trying to keep his men clean and sober, and to prevent the more rapacious scallywags in cantonment from preying on friendly locals.

And what is usually overlooked when discussing the British Army of the War of the Revolution is that North America was not the 'friendliest' terrain in which to campaign and fight.

It is surprising that the British didn't win and that the Americans did, given the parameters and circumstances.

It's surprising that the Americans didn't win in Vietnam. They had all the same "advantages".
I pointed out either here or on another thread, that SPI had an AWI board game. The Americans had to win 3 "significant" victories. It was a long time ago, but I think the Patriots had to win a battle that eliminated 5 strength points. Something like that. It didn't matter how many victories the British had. They had to prevent the American game victory conditions. This represented political reality.
I think that the Trenton campaign, along with the Saratoga campaign would qualify for 2. Would the American resilience in the Philadelphia campaign count as 1/2?
It took the French intervention to gain the third, at Yorktown. French/American failures at Savannah and Newport didn't count. The count still stood at 2.

Here is the thing. Adams is frequently taken out of context with his remark that the Patriot side had one third support of the population, the Loyalists had another third, and the "just leave me alone" population the other third. Maybe.
But what about the British population?
In the Vietnam war, the battle for "hearts and minds" really had to do with Americans. The British lost the battle for "hearts and minds" on the home front too.

So, when I asked in my OP, months ago, if the British were the finest army in the world. Well, darn good. The French were pretty good too. And I agree that the Prussians, Austrians and Russians would have been in over their heads. Plus, they would have lost the propaganda and political war.

I have never agreed with any historical comparisons with the War of the Revolution and the war in Vietnam.

That comparison was forwarded by authors at the time who knew little of both wars.

Well, I'm sorry but I can't summarize all of Spring's book, nor can I quote him at any greater length which would eventually violate copywright.

All I can say is that he does actually quote original sources and evaluate them against other sources and other fact cross-checking and such.

At the end of the day, one has to find his argument believable or not. I'm not an expert in the field but I am in the Army, I am a staff officer, and if he isn't presenting an honest overview then he's an amazing liar.

His thesis echoes what the US Army strives to do today, which is be able to bring effective combat strength to bear under all sorts of conditions, including night, snow, heat, with and without naval support, with and without supply lines, etc. the British did it all here at one point or another, fighting with both conventional methods [of the time], and adapting tactics and supply structures to partisan, frontier and population control.

That they didn't win has more to do with circumstances out of Army control than anything else, IMHO. I believe that IF it could have been won by the Army, they would have. But at the end of the day, the colonies were inhabited by people who were ready to break away, and only a very careful diplomatic program could have succeeded. The King and his minions took a high-handed approach and it blew up in their faces.

The American War of Independence was lost on the Plains of Abraham. Discuss

Stanley, nice summary. And a good analysis. Thank you!