"Were the British really “The best army in the world”?" Topic

Otto old an dead? LOL

re sieges. other than sitting down and winging it, successful sieges required a high degree of professional expertise with regard to advancing siege works and placing guns. Should it prove necessary to assault a breach, then raw courage and junior leadership came into play, although the co-ordination required to get troops to the right place and in the right sequence would benefit from discipline, experience, and a strong esprit de corps.

Thinking about it, in the AWI I believe all the formal sieges were from Yorktown southward and other than Charleston involved either French or Spanish troops in the attacking force. (I would count Boston as a blockade more than a siege) I stand to be corrected.

Hate auto correct. Too old or dead to influence

The Seven Years War ended in 1763. The War of the Revolution began 12 years later in 1775. That isn't almost twenty years.

And Frederick didn't die until 1786, three years after the war ended. And the Prussian officer corps retained what they believed was the traditions Frederick began and passed on to his officer corps.

The Prussian army of the 1770s and onward was not the army that Frederick inherited and fought the Seven Years War with. Casualties had been too heavy and the lessons of that war were not continued by Frederick and his successors.

Iirc Frederick was much impressed with Trenton-Princeton.

"Replying to Dn Jackson, I would argue that, especially in the 18th century and in the thinly populated colonies, the ability to hold or to seize strong positions was easily the most important quality an army could have."

To this I would argue that the ability to hold positions is the opposite of 'best' troops. After all garrison troops are usually considered 2nd rate troops at best. The British stuck all the low quality German troops on garrison duty.

"WHO SAYS open field "stand-up" fights reveal quality best?"

Why….I do!!! :-)

Points well taken. My thought process is that in order to determine who has the 'best' army, a highly subjective rating, you take out as many variables as possible. So force multipliers like fortifications, defended positions, etc. skew the results so to speak.

To my original question…did the Brits lose a field battle during the war to a European power?

Based on your list DnJackson Bemis Heights would qualify as a "stand up" fight, and it was a British defeat. I am at a loss to figure out why, other than the scale of the action, Cowpens would not also qualify as a stand up fight.

Is the French army performance at Savannah a reflection of the quality of the army generally, or is it just a reflection on the commander? The only army related weakness I see is the failure of the artillery to properly target British positions instead of the town.

I don't agree that the ability to seize and hold strong positions was the most important quality an army could have in the AWI in North America. IMO it was the ability to control large swaths of territory. When it came to the ability to seize positions, or to prevent opponents from driving them, the British regular army did OK. However without converting control of those strong positions into control of the surrounding territory the effect was to have islands of British surrounded by seas of rebels.

Brechtel going from the end of a war to the end of a war is 20 years.

@Bill "the ability to control large swaths of territory."

Wasn't that more a matter of numbers and politics, than the quality of troops per se?

Regardless of the scale of the encounter, Cowpens certainly looked like a stand-up fight to me- till the 71st took off their caps and laid their firelocks down.

Brechtel going from the end of a war to the end of a war is 20 years.

And…?

Was that the stated parameters of your posting? I believe you said 'by the time of' not what you posted above.

Let's stick with the condition of the various armies in 1775, shall we?
I do believe that is the premise of this thread.
The state of armies in 1763 is interesting, but there can be plenty of scope for improvement, or deterioration in 12 years.
The French were smarting from the results of the SYW, and determined to rebuild.
Did the British rest on their laurels and let quality slide?
I seem to recall that Frederick felt stabbed in the back by the British, and refused to allow German recruitment in the areas he controlled. Even to the extent of barring through traffic to ports.

My question is whether the British army was the best in the world. Often stated, but never proven. It's obvious they had problems.

"Did the British rest on their laurels and let quality slide?"

Government parsimony and complaceny, as with the end of every war until 1815.

The "ability to control large swaths of territory" rested in the militia. Period. As the Brits figured out and tried to create their own with the Loyalists. What won the war in the south, and created the conditions for Greene's brilliant campaigns, was the success of militia/partisan leaders like Marion and Sumter in breaking up the attempts to organize the Loyalists. The scattered "strategic hamlets" that the British established were indeed islands in a hostile sea.

Strong company-level posts proved effective most of the time (not against Pontiac!) against the Indian threat, but Patriot militia had the staying power and technology to destroy them (even a single small fieldpiece was decisive against a timber fort). The Indians did not seek to control a territory; they hit and ran. The militia meant to stay.

Ponder Machiavelli's advice in THE PRINCE concerning why colonists are far more powerful than garrisons.

There is an old saying John that Quantity has a Quality all its own. Put half the 1775 French, Prussian or Austrian Army on a battlefield against half the British Army and I'd be tempted to bet against the British. Put those same forces on a battlefield in anywhere near equal numbers and I might go the other way.

The wild card of 1775 has to be the Russians. Britain, France, Prussia and Austria had all partially demobilized after the 7YW. The Russians were just wrapping up a fairly successful war against the Ottomans.

"Based on your list DnJackson Bemis Heights would qualify as a "stand up" fight, and it was a British defeat. "

Agreed, which may mean we beast the best army in the world. Assuming they weren't beat by anyone else.

The Americans forced the surrender of two British armies during the war. The first at Saratoga and the second at Yorktown.

And at the end of the war the British were bottled up in three ports, New York, Charleston, and Savannah, and that was thanks to the Royal Navy.

The British in the south had been beaten up so badly by Greene's army that they were forced to the coast. Greene never won a battle, but he caused all three armies to withdraw afterwards because they had lost so heavily. Greene won the campaigns.

I think you exaggerated your case.

I never knew New York, Charleston and Savannah were under blockade. No movement in or out? Who was actively blockading them? Considering the reinforcements shuttled between these ports and the various operations in the West Indies I have to question how effective this blockade was certainly not as effective as the Royal Naval blockade of the French in the Napoleonic wars.

And Greene was the sole reason the British operations failed in the south? So Marion and the other partisan leaders had nothing to do with it?

I understand your admiration for American Continental regulars. I too have great admiration for them and all they did. But to denigrate the service of the Militia and volunteers doesn't help and weakens your case.

I wasn't speaking of a naval blockade. The British were bottled up on land and could not, or would not, venture out.

I haven't 'denigrated' the militia, but justly criticized them for their myriad shortcomings.

And without Greene's army, the efforts of the partisans would have been meaningless as the British army would still have been in the field. The partisans definitely helped, but they were also supported by Continental units detached to them from time to time.

There is too much mythmaking regarding the American militia. They didn't win the war, but did contribute to it. Without the Continental Army, the militia would have failed.

In the end the militia 'system' failed, as would become evident in the War of 1812. That was the last war that the US fought with a militia system in the field.

"I wasn't speaking of a naval blockade. The British were bottled up on land and could not, or would not, venture out."

Given their orders to hold these ports, there were not a lot of troops left over for field operations.

Yorktown was a French victory, pure and simple. If not, wargame the campaign with no French fleet, no French troops, and no French siege train. See how that turns out.

Agreed on your assessments of the militia. I will say that perhaps their greatest contribution was in occupying select areas to keep the population in line with the revolution, and the friction of war surrounding British posts and inflicting attrition and restriction of movement on the Crown.

Jackson's militia from Tennessee and Kentucky were pretty damned good during the War of 1812. Of course Jackson also had a core of regulars. There are all sorts of political and societal reasons why America armies looked the way they did, with a combination of militia and regulars. The most obvious is Oliver Cromwell (and then by 1812 Bonaparte). There was always a lively fear of the political threat of a standing army, and the militia was its counter. The British couldn't have conquered America in the face of militia resistance, and neither could a Continental Army had that been attempted. The money would have run out and the regulars transformed into brigands lacking any political legitimacy. Kevin is correct in a narrowly military analysis, but the larger picture has to be framed.

Thank you, doc mcb, for bringing in Cromwell and the justified fear of a standing army. The Newburgh Conspiracy and the revolt of the Pennsylvania Line should be enough to justify that fear.

Yorktown was also a French idea. Washington wanted to attack New York.

OFM, yes. The significance of GW is NOT just that he commanded the Continental Army, the first national institution. It is also that he could have been Cromwell and chose instead to be Cincinnatus.

Doc, where's the LIKE button?

One issue that hasn't been brought up is how the British fought. They used their light troops, grenadiers and guards as the shock troops, and they were obviously very good with great elan. But did that leave the line battalions as just good but not very good troops?

The British army faced different circumstances and terrain from what European armies faced. I don't know how well the Prussian army, with it's strict discipline, would have fared in North America. Maybe about the same as the Hessian units. The British army certainly adapted well to the different environment.

On the other hand the British army that fought in North America would have been outnumbered 2-3:1 if they fought the Prussians in Europe, and that wouldn't have worked out well, even if they were superior in some way. The size of the army certainly matters. Plus the British didn't have much of a cavalry force to match the Prussian or Austrian cavalry.

So maybe the British were the best European army as far as fighting in North America. But the size of the army also matters, as well as all arms, such as cavalry and artillery.

It's ironic perhaps that the United States should have ended up sharing, perhaps inheriting, the British suspicion of a standing army and went on to experience the same problems that the British army tended to suffer at the start of most major wars, that of having to 'reboot' the structure and skills built up in the course of the previous conflict

Yorktown was a French victory, pure and simple.

No, it was an allied victory. The American artillery also played a significant part in the siege and when the two redoubts, Numbers 9 and 10 were assaulted and taken, the French took one and the Americans the other.

The overall effort was combined.

BTW, I will not accept assertions from authority. Just because your favorite historian says it was so doesn't make it so.Let's see some proof, one way or other.

For some reason, you keep leaving out the part in bold.
If Homer G W Snodgrass says that "the British army was the finest army in the world", leaves it at that, and then moves on without explaining why, that's just an opinion.
If he goes on to explain why, that's another story. That is what I want to see in this thread. Reasons why. Or not.
It's difficult to deny that the Boston garrison in 1775 did not act in a disciplined manner on the retreat from Concord. It's also difficult to deny that the assault on Bunker Hill, or Breed's if you prefer, was tactically incompetent. Brave, but not well lead.
It's also difficult to deny that leaving Burgoyne in the lurch and instead swanning off to Philadelphia was strategically inept.
Plenty of other examples above.
If you are going to bring out your favorite historian and quote him as saying that the British were the finest army in the world, I would expect you to explain why he said that. He may be right, but why does he say that?
Again. Respond to what I actually say, without lifting single sentences out of context. And please refrain from attacking straw men.
If Babits or Elting say they were the finest army, why do they say it? Is it that difficult? Asking me if I have read them is a cheap shot. Apparently you have. If you have, do they say that the British army was the finest in the world? If they did, explain why. You brought them up, so it's your responsibility to quote them. If they never said that, then you are just throwing names around. The ball is in your court. Whether or not *I* read them is beside the point. You are arguing from authority, which any college Philosophy 101 course will pound into your head is invalid. Tell me what proof they offer. Don't just throw out a name.

I never brought up the idea that the British army was the best in the world. That's your bailiwick, not mine. And where did I post a quotation from any author that the British army was the best in the world? That is a strawman argument on your part, for whatever your ‘agenda' may be.

And I do have more than one favorite author for the Revolution. If you would like a list of some of the books I believe to be useful, all you have to do is ask.

Well, whaddya know?

"Every American knows..Washington led a poorly-supplied and often undisciplined fighting force against one of the greatest and best-trained professional armies in the world,

TMP link
link

If you think about it, the power projection was pretty much unprecedented, especially for the time period. More a reflection on the military overall, as opposed to just the army.

I am a bit buzz word impaired today historygamer so I am not sure what you mean.

Perhaps the question should be 'did the Americans think/believe that the British army was the best in the world?'

But If the Americans thought so, would it have made any difference?
I believe that the belief that the British were the finest army in the world was patriotic pseudo history, designed to make readers proud.

Like Benedict Arnold's reputation had to be built up so he could be compared to Lucifer, the fallen angel. Back then, history was full of morality stories. To build up Arnold, it was necessary to minimize Gates. Not that he needed much minimalisation.

Does this bring us back to Barry Bostwick?

What one army thinks of its opponents can be not only interesting but a decisive force on the battlefield. And, yes, the American opinion of the British army was built upon battlefield performance and hard-won experience fighting in North America.

I believe that the belief that the British were the finest army in the world was patriotic pseudo history, designed to make readers proud.

Sorry, but that doesn't make much sense at all. What is important was what the British opponents/enemies thought, not nonsense such as an idea of 'patriotic pseudo-history.'

Arnold's reputation was built upon battlefield performance and that began before the battles of Saratoga. Gates' problems were much deeper than any conflict with Arnold. Washington certainly understood the myriad weaknesses of Gates as a commander, which is why he recommended to Congress that Greene command the southern army, but was overruled. After the Camden disaster Congress finally listened to good sense and Washington's military judgment.

And the British army was excellent at the time, even with all of its problems. And in military operations, reputation is nearly everything.

On power projection, yes, and the Brits had done very well with that during the Seven Years War and after. The Spanish did well under Galvez, and the Yorktown campaign was an excellent French projection of power. However, projection of power is what navies DO; for an army to operate away from its naval support is much harder, and can get you, e.g., Braddock's defeat, or Saratoga. The British plan to create a Loyalist militia in the south was an attempt at power projection, that might well have succeeded absent Marion and Sumter et al.

"Like Benedict Arnold's reputation had to be built up so he could be compared to Lucifer, the fallen angel. Back then, history was full of morality stories. To build up Arnold, it was necessary to minimize Gates. Not that he needed much minimalisation."

"Arnold's reputation was built upon battlefield performance and that began before the battles of Saratoga. "

John, very good points. And yes I agree that Arnold's reputation was dramatically increased after his treason. This is especially true with regards to Saratoga.

What is important was what the British opponents/enemies thought, not nonsense such as an idea of 'patriotic pseudo-history.'

The American rebels had a clear appreciation that they were going up against an opponent that was far more powerful than they were. That recognition is clearly important in evaluating the men who decided to embark on the Revolution and on the men who fought the AWI.

To carry that argument further and say that what matters is whether Britain's opponents thought the British army was the finest in the world is what makes no sense. Understanding your opponent's abilities relative to your own is important whether your opponent has the first best army or the tenth. Understanding the consequences of defeat is important whether your opponent has the first best army or the tenth. That your opponent arguably had the best army in the world only matters after the fact, either in celebrating the magnitude of your victory or explaining away your defeat.

Further Kevin your argument presupposes that the peoples that were fighting Britain thought that Britain's army was the best in the world. The Americans whose experience on the relative qualities of armies was largely limited to what they had seen in North America might have thought this. It would be interesting to see whether contemporary evidence supports this, or whether it was another of those myths that arose in the early Republic. However did the French believe it? Did the Spanish? Certainly to them the British navy of the 7YW was the best in the world, but the army?

"in military operations, reputation is nearly everything"

After logistics, but before discipline, training, esprit de corps, experience, leadership, tactics or valid strategic objctives, say?

The initial experience the Americans had showed the British to be rather inept in Boston.
The march back to Boston from Concord nearly disintegrated. The column had to be rescued.
The American command structure at Bunker Hill was lacking, but they still managed to bloody the British badly.
The British failed to fortify the Heights in Boston for many weeks, and when Washington was able to do so first, the British having had All the time in the world, had no choice but to withdraw in the face of long-faced rabble and hillbillies.
Not very impressive for a first encounter.

Perhaps this experience was what lead Washington to make the almost disastrous deployment on Long Island. The army was outflanked and outnumbered, but not out fought.
And Howe's pursuit was certainly… leisurely.
Trenton certainly showed that the Hessians put on their breeches one leg at a time.
Saratoga proved that a competent British army could be handled, particularly if you have swarms of militia cutting off supply lines and retreat.

Washington certainly had a lot to learn, as the Philadelphia campaign showed, but he certainly never acted as if he considered the British superior.
As for Yorktown, Washington originally wanted to assault New York, until persuaded otherwise by Rochambeau. He certainly showed no fear of "the finest army in the world" there.

No. I believe that the notion that the plucky Americans took on "the finest army in the world" came later, in patriotic speeches and books. Perhaps to promote "American exceptionalism"?
The Americans, particularly Washington, believed they were up against a tough foe, and they didn't falter, because it was a job that had to be done.

Maybe the British thought they were.

"Maybe the British thought they were."

At regimental and battalion level they may well have done, but, as they saw it,that esprit de corps would only be as effective as the orders under which they were obliged to operate.

What was the American opinion?

Americans knew they were fighting "Regulars".
As for calling the British "the finest in the world", I would be curious to know when that phrase came into vogue.
You're an American, Kevin. A Marine, I believe.
Have you ever considered an opponent "the finest in the world"? I think not, and I don't think some scrawny hard bitten Continental would think so either. Yankee arrogance is famous.

This is of course my opinion, and if you can show me any evidence to the contrary, I'm open to it.

Yorktown was also a French idea. Washington wanted to attack New York.

De Grasse and the French fleet were going to be in the Chesapeake and weren't going to New York.

That was the reason that Yorktown became the objective; more properly, Cornwallis' army.

And Greene was the sole reason the British operations failed in the south? So Marion and the other partisan leaders had nothing to do with it?

Greene supported the partisans, something that Gates would not do, and sent Continental regulars to operate with Marion from time to time.

Without Greene's army, the partisans would have been nothing more than an irritant to Cornwallis. Greene's army kept the partisans in business.

Yorktown was a French victory, pure and simple. If not, wargame the campaign with no French fleet, no French troops, and no French siege train. See how that turns out.

Washington's army was larger than the French army at Yorktown. And the US siege train was almost twice the size of the French siege train.

See:

TMP link

By the way, it's called coalition warfare.

An excellent reference for the British army of the period, actually from 1715-1795, is Fit for Service: The Training of the British Army by JA Houlding.

Any ideas about which European army was the best has to be a somewhat in-depth study and a comparison with the French, Prussians, Austrians, and Russians at a minimum.

The French Army was in a period of reform from 1763-1789 which included a new field artillery system, training of staff officers, a revitalization of the navy, and new training and tactics as well as organization for the infantry.

The Prussians were in a period of slow decline that would culminate with the 'catastrophe' of 1806.

And the Austrians and Russians were in a process of stumbling, bumbling, and almost falling that left them unprepared for the consequences of the French Revolution.

This is a description of the British infantry of the War of the Revolution. It is from John Elting's The Battles of Saratoga, 20:

'British infantry was the wonder of European wars-tight, precise, hard-shooting red lines that could endure almost any punishment with a sullen courage that seemed to grow amid disaster. They were the 'King's Bad Bargains,' disciplined, yet always willing to straggle of slip past the guard if there were an abandoned cabin or potato patch to ransack. They were roaring handfuls when drunk-which with many of them was whenever opportunity offered. Cheerful under hardships, they were improvident '…it being with great difficulty you can prevail upon a common soldier to husband his provision in any exigency whatever. Even in a settled camp, a young soldier has very short fare on the fourth day after he received his provision; and on a march, in bad weather and bad roads, when the weary foot slips back at every step…it must be a very patient veteran, who has experienced much scarcity and hunger, that is not tempted to throw the whole contents of his haversack into the mire, instances of which I saw…'Damn the provisions, we shall get more at the next encampment; the General won't let his soldiers starve.'-Thomas Anbury, Ensign, 24th Foot.

The British armed forces were a very professional outift and their uniforms were amazing. That holds true for much of their history. The British do military history and uniforms very well; not so much in the cuisine department. :)