"“And what do we mean by the Revolution? The War? ..." Topic

… That was only an effect and consequence of it." — John Adams to Thomas Jefferson, 1815

"The history of the American Revolution really begins with the French & Indian War (1754-63), without which no rebellion would have taken place when it did. We read about the French & Indian War at the end of Chapter 3. The British took over North America at the end of the war, ruling the region north of Florida and west to the Mississippi River. Take a look at the map above. Colonists wouldn't have broken from Britain if they still needed their protection from the French (green), who'd blocked western expansion in the Ohio Valley. Americans and Redcoats fought together against the French but, as the saying goes, familiarity breeds contempt, and colonial militias resented the contempt of their superiors in the British military. More importantly, some colonists didn't think that they needed the British anymore and the population inhabiting these growing, resource-rich colonies was virtually self-selected for rebellion against authority, many of its settlers having emigrated from the British Isles to seek greater freedom. They bristled under British attempts to keep them near the East Coast and quarreled over financial issues regarding taxes and trade. By 1763, it was time to dust off the Join, or Die. woodcut Ben Franklin had printed in 1754 to rally colonists on behalf of the British against the French; but, this time, they were rallying against their own rulers.

After the French & Indian War, the British tried and failed to defuse Indian conflict along the frontier by drawing a Proclamation Line down the spine of the Appalachian Range (red line above), barring settlement west of that boundary. The British were overextended financially and geographically after their win over France and they wanted to push more settlers along a north-south axis to Anglicize French Canada (make it more English) and establish a claim to Florida. The border wasn't effective in keeping settlers like Daniel Boone from going west and caused resentment among those who suspected that the British were trying to hem them in so as to better control and tax them. Fighting Indians along this frontier during Pontiac's War of 1763 galvanized settlers even more, forging unity they later employed against the British…"

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Amicalement
Armand

Interesting read.

I've always felt that calling it the American War of Independence was more accurate.

When teaching US history I always described the American Revolution as occurring from 1763-1789 with the beginning of British 'interference' with the colonies after the French and Indian War and ending with the adoption of the US Constitution.

The War of the Revolution, of course, was from 1775-1783 concluding with the Treaty of Paris.

Glad you enjoyd it John… (smile)

Amicalement
Armand

I know it is semantics Kevin, but I think it would be more accurate to say the escalation of British interference with the colonies after the F&IW. British interference would go back at least to the Navigation Acts passed by the Commonwealth.

There were a series of Navigation Acts passed by the British government since the middle of the 17th century. That's just a little early for a cause of the Revolution.

There was also one passed in the 14th century before the American colonies existed.

The War for Independence is better.
The war was closer to a civil war than a revolution anyway.

When teaching US history I always described the American Revolution as occurring from 1763-1789 with the beginning of British 'interference' with the colonies after the French and Indian War and ending with the adoption of the US Constitution.

Which is pretty much what John Adams wrote to Jefferson late in his life.

The war was closer to a civil war than a revolution anyway.

There were aspects of a civil war in the Hudson Highlands and in the South from 1780-1782, but overall it was not a civil war, but a rebellion from the mother country.

It was a civil war in particular areas, yes, and certainly also a war for independence. But it was also a revolutionary struggle. As the op notes, it was a political event occurring in millions of people's attitudes. One part of that was the military struggle. The militia FORCED poliitical involvement and mobilization. Many Americans, at least a third and maybe twice that, would have preferred to stay neutral. The militia system precluded that. Sooner or later the militia got called up, and each individual man had either to go or to refuse to go. That choice was political, and of course in 90+% of the cases was made to go fight the British.

Thanks!

Amicalement
Armand

One part of that was the military struggle. The militia FORCED poliitical involvement and mobilization. Many Americans, at least a third and maybe twice that, would have preferred to stay neutral. The militia system precluded that.

That's an overstatement. The 'political' situation sometimes, if not many times, was dependent on who was in charge in a certain area of the country. And that many times determined who was loyal to whom.

Some militia units, or groups of militiamen, would actually turn on elements of the active forces, both Continentals and militia, depending on the circumstances.

From With Zeal and With Bayonets Only: The British Army on Campaign in North America, 1775-1783 by Matthew Spring:

‘The Continental Army was the foremost obstacle to the restoration of British authority in the colonies.'-6.

‘Throughout the American War, militiamen's tendency to come and go as they pleased (often taking scarce equipment with them) caused senior rebel commanders much frustration, and their inability to stand up to British regulars in the open field contributed to a number of disastrous rebel defeats, most particularly the battle of Camden.'-15.

‘…whatever their private sympathies, a large proportion of the colonists (possible the majority) appear to have remained essentially uncommitted, taking the path of least resistance by submitting to whichever party happened to dominate locally…the loyalties of those Americans who chose to play an active part in the conflict were frequently shaped less by ideology than by prewar ethnic, political, economic, religious, and personal rivalries and were liable to change according to circumstances.'-18.

‘…Brigadier General Stevens of the Virginia militia reported to Governor Thomas Jefferson that, as parties of fugitives from the shattered rebel army made their way northward after Cornwallis's great victory at Camden, ‘the inhabitants rose in numbers, took and disarmed the chief of our men.' According the rebel colonel Otho Williams, these fugitives were betrayed by ‘many of their insidious friends, armed, and advancing to join the American army.' When these latecomers learned of the catastrophic rebel defeat, ‘they acted decidedly in concert with the victors; and, capturing some, plundering others, and maltreating all the fugitives they met, returned, exultingly, home.'

Some militia units, or groups of militiamen, would actually turn on elements of the active forces, both Continentals and militia, depending on the circumstances.

Huh? What?

Doc MCB, brilliant! Very well thought out and explained.

Always a pleasure to read your comments.

Kevin, to quote a most amusing movie line:
"Again with the negative waves Moriarty!"

‘…whatever their private sympathies, a large proportion of the colonists (possible the majority) appear to have remained essentially uncommitted, taking the path of least resistance by submitting to whichever party happened to dominate locally…the loyalties of those Americans who chose to play an active part in the conflict were frequently shaped less by ideology than by prewar ethnic, political, economic, religious, and personal rivalries and were liable to change according to circumstances.'-18.

This para that Kevin quoted actually proves my point. They may well have wanted to remain uncommitted, but once called out for service each man had either to go or refuse. That is political mobilization.

And of course any large war tended to pick up and intensify pre-existing animosities. If the Hatfields are Union, the McCoys must be Confederates.

The following paragraph, also posted above, is more indicative of the myriad problems with the American militia. And it demonstrates that they were not always supporting the US cause.

‘…Brigadier General Stevens of the Virginia militia reported to Governor Thomas Jefferson that, as parties of fugitives from the shattered rebel army made their way northward after Cornwallis's great victory at Camden, ‘the inhabitants rose in numbers, took and disarmed the chief of our men.' According the rebel colonel Otho Williams, these fugitives were betrayed by ‘many of their insidious friends, armed, and advancing to join the American army.' When these latecomers learned of the catastrophic rebel defeat, ‘they acted decidedly in concert with the victors; and, capturing some, plundering others, and maltreating all the fugitives they met, returned, exultingly, home.'

General Stevens was a militia commander and Colonel Williams a Continental regular.

Yes, I know that letter well. It is indeed the point. Individuals were often either indifferent or hostile to the patriot cause, or (more generally) simply motivated to look out for themselves and their families. It was noticed and assumed that militia in the immediate proximity of a British force would NOT turn out; each man stayed home to protect his own family. (An interesting corallary, though irrelevant here, is that on the frontier the married men would stay as Indian raids threatened, because they had to if they couldn't move their families, while the young bachelors would move to a safer region.)

Kevin, you are confusing individual militiamen (who are basically every free white man, and therefore immensely varied) with the militia SYSTEM. Which worked to enforce the state's requirements as best they could under local conditions. Think of the county court martial as a draft board. They have to fill the county's quota, but they have some discretion in WHO goes. If one examines the Augusta County Court Martial Record Book (it is the only one surviving, in the State library at Richmond) one finds things like "Widow Smith's son is exempt while his mother is taking care of an idiot she is now taking care of." The Continental Army was neither equipped nor interested in dealing with such personnel matters.

You keep insisting on a point -- that militia were often ineffective in the field -- that really nobody is arguing against. But political legitimacy, and recruiting (including catching deserters and returning them to duty), and morale, all rested heavily on state and local authority (because the Continental Congress surely didn't have any!) and the key institution in that was the militia operating through county courts martial (all captains and field officers, a permanent body and the military equivalent of the county court (all the justices of the peace) which ran the civilian government. If it helps, think of the militia as the police: armed men available to enforce laws, under the authority of local officials.

When Virginia wanted to raise 5% of its manpower for the Continental line (1780 law) the militia were formed into "divisions" of 20, each responsible for procuring one recruit. One of several alternative means was catching a deserter. If one reads the pension applications (in which a man was required to describe his service) one finds a number of instances in which the 20 men formed a posse and caught a deserter and returned him to the army. This was one of many ways the militia system operated. It would have been simply impossible for the Continental Army to find and arrest deserters, especially if they made it 10 or 20 miles away from the army's location. See all the published deserter descriptions from which we get uniform information.

Doc MCB, again many thanks for a thoughtful and well written response. Its a pleasure reading your posts.

Very interesting.
I've always been leery of newspaper deserter descriptions, unless the guy was wearing "regimentals", or there was a group similarly dressed.
I think the deserter in the purple dressing gown was either smart or dumb.

In any event, doc mcb certainly makes a good case, particularly in Virginia, for the mobilization of the "civilian". Again, part of the Revolution.

The definition of a "revolutionary" war (taking VietNam as an example) is that there are two opposing political systems each claiming authority over the SAME population. Whichever can best control the population can draw economic resources, manpower, and political legitimacy from it.

This can overlap a bit with a "civil war" in which different parts of a larger political system war against each other. King versus parliament is an example, as is the "war between the states" as we used to call it.

The American Revolutionary War was certainly the first, and to an extent also the second, if the British imperial system is the focus.

So while it was necessary, essential, to win the military struggle, in which endeavor the Continental Army was paramount, followed probably by foreign assistance, it was equally essential to win the political struggle. And in that the states and their respective militia systems were paramount.

The Continental Congress is deservedly criticized for all sorts of weaknesses and ineptitudes. Nevertheless, it kept thirteen sovereign states united enough to wage war and negotiate peace together. That is a gigantic achievement. Because the British and French and Spanish would have loved to draw individual states away into their own spheres of influence. (As a close parallel, consider the British attitude towards the Republic of Texas; the Brits LOVED having a cotton producer not part of the US with its tariffs etc.) Some of the states were small and weak and knew that they desperately needed a union, but Virginia and Pennsylvania, as examples, were quite large and strong enough to go it alone. E Pluribus Unum was an amazing achievement.

Well done excellent examples.

You keep insisting on a point -- that militia were often ineffective in the field -- that really nobody is arguing against.

I disagree. Some here, you included, keep insisting on the importance of the militia for 'political' purposes and ignore the fact that the militia was one of the main reasons why Washington could never get the Continental Army to its authorized strength.

The militia's dubious military attributes undoubtedly caused the war to last longer than it might have and its execrable conduct in the field too many times led to myth-making for its overall contribution to winning the war.

And that myth-making is still being hyped today in various publications as well as on this forum.

And the reliance on the militia had disastrous consequences in the War of 1812 and is the main reason why that was was the last one that the US put any reliance on the militia at all.

And the reference to the Vietnam War is residue from the 'historical' comparisons that arose from the 1970s and the US anti-war movement, which in itself was seditious if not treasonous and that 'movement' caused casualties for troops in the field. In short, the comparison is ludicrous and inaccurate.