"The psychology of artillery effectiveness" Topic

"After thirty years focused on small wars and smart munitions, the Army looks set to update its gun park. The potential of facing an enemy who has a lot of fire support, can contest the airspace, and could dominate the electronic spectrum, has turned back the clock to an era when cheap, dumb, un-jammable artillery dominated the battlefield. The Army is hoping to buy greater range and more explosive effect but it has also recognised the need to relearn how to use old-fashioned artillery and how to defend against it1. This article aims to show how one of the key foundations of artillery effectiveness needs to be reconsidered before the upgrade.The last time the fundamentals of artillery effectiveness were examined with real rigour and vigour was at the tail end of the Cold War, in a series of studies that ended with the development of AS90, MLRS and the Battlefield Artillery Target Engagement System. BATES was designed to let individual batteries respond quickly to unit-level calls for fire, but, when needed, multiple dispersed regiments could concentrate fire along the line of main effort. One of the benefits BATES had over the old chinagraph system was that it could do this quickly while avoiding the many problems of overkill – wasted rounds, smashed infrastructure, slowed advances and so on. This was made possible because the secret ingredient in BATES was the calculation of how many rounds of what type of fire support were needed to have the required target effect.

But what was the target effect? Most wars begin with gunners focused on the killing power of their arm, but slowly coming to realise that ‘destruction of a major portion of enemy personnel, weapons and fieldworks is generally impossible'2. By the end of each world war, gunners accepted that the main effect of fire was something psychological. But this lesson had to be relearned many times because the nature and extent of the psychological effect was unclear. Did fire gradually erode the enemy's will to resist, shock him with its ferocity or simply convince him to take cover long enough for ground troops to assault? Nobody knew, and there is still no hard answer, which is a little worrying after a century of experience using artillery to suppress. The enduring uncertainty is one reason why, despite precise munitions and a focus on ‘influence', liberated Mosul in 2017 looked a lot like liberated Caen in 1944…"
Main page
link

Amicalement
Armand

The predominantly psychological, rather than material and lethal, impact of artillery was manifested during Germany's colonial wars in Africa.

During the Herero and Nama Wars in German Southwest Africa 1904-08 (present-day Namibia), German artillery was generally ineffective at producing casualties against concealed Herero and Nama riflemen. The Hereros and Nama used smokeless powder and were experts at cover and concealment, fighting from thick thorn bushes and from boulder fighting positions, trenches, and stone fieldworks. German sources note that against concealed Herero and Nama troops the impact of artillery was "extremely negligible", "only negligible", "not especially effective" and "completely failed" ("äußerst gering", "nur gering", "ohne besondere Wirkung" and "völlig ausfiel").

However, those same German sources also note that artillery was successful in performing a crucial non-lethal role: suppression. By firing at the suspected locations of concealed troops, artillery could force Herero and Nama riflemen to keep their heads down, thus reducing the volume of fire they could deliver against German troops and allowing the Germans to advance. And the morale effects of non-lethal artillery fire could be devastating.

Here is an account by captured Nama leader Samuel Isaak, as transcribed by the Germans, of the effect of German artillery bombardment on Nama morale at the battle of Zwartfontein:

‘The artillery shot excellently, but nevertheless inflicted no casualties on us' [said Samuel Isaak].

However the morale effect of the artillery fire on the [Nama] must have been enormous. ‘In front of us and behind us,' said Samuel Isaak, ‘to the right and to the left the shells exploded, we were all completely white [with fright], such mortal fear had we and thought, oh God, oh God, how shall it end?'
(Translation by Roy Jones)

' Die Artillerie schoß vorzüglich, sügte uns aber trotzdem keine Verluste zu.' Dennoch muß die moralische Wirkung des Artilleriefeuers auf die Hottentotten sehr groß gewesen sein: ‘Vor uns und hinter uns,' sagt Samuel Isaak, ‘rechts und links krepierten die granaten, wir waren alle ganz bleich, solche [Heidenangst] hatten wir und dachten, o Gott, o Gott, wie soll das enden?' (Generalstab-Nama, Book 4, pp. 60)

One is reminded of the notable quip by a British soldier in World War I along the lines of "It was remarkable how many shells could be fired with no one being harmed but the tax payer"

Thanks!.

Amicalement
Armand

This was the concept behind the "rolling barrage" pioneered during WWI. The artillery would fire advancing waves of shells just ahead of the infantry and armor, causing shock and disruption among the defenders, who would presumably make easier prey for the attackers. Sadly, there were far too many instances where the artillery outpaced the infantry or ceased firing far too early, allowing the defenders to regroup and prepare their defenses long before the attacking forces arrived.

Interestingly, land mines are also considered psychological weapons. When I was a sapper, we emplaced minefields not to destroy the enemy, but to block their advance, turn their direction of advance, disrupt their formations, or "fix" them in a kill zone long enough for friendly overwatch forces to tear them apart with pre-plotted artillery and direct fire.

Thanks also!…

Amicalement
Armand

The post-WW1 writings of Bruchmueller are IMO a good source regarding adaptation of artillery bombardment techniques to produce maximum psychological effects. His artillery preparation plan for the great Michael Offensive of March 1918 is arguably akin in some ways to the musical score of a symphony orchestra.

B