"What if... No French Fleet at Yorktown?" Topic

Years ago, before being seduced by the siren song of miniatures (facings, flags, helmets…), I played a few strategic AWI board games.
One, I think it was S&T or SPI American Revolution, had the Americans win when they got 3 "strategic" victories over the British. It's hazy.

Trenton was probably one. Saratoga definitely another.
Yorktown indisputably the third.

But suppose the Yankee player rolls badly on the French Intervention table? (Franklin's diplomacy fails.)
Note the Yanks would have already had Trenton and Saratoga in the bag before the French came on board.
What would be the result?
From the beginning, the French were happy to supply guns, gunpowder, and other needs. Thank you, Hortalez et cie!
The intent being of course to keep the Yanks annoying the traditional enemy who had just whipped France badly all over the world in the Seven Years War.

So. No French army at Savannah (failure) or Newport or New York. No French army to march from New York to Yorktown.
No French fleet to trap Cornwallis and bring more army.
BUT, the French continue to send supplies, in convoys protected by a French fleet.

What happens?
Cornwallis successfully escapes. But in the process he tacitly admits that the whole Southern strategy was a failure. A tragic failure. He abandons the South and Loyalist cause to Greene who loses all his battles but conquers the South, with few British garrisons remaining.
What effect does that have on the War?
I submit that a war weary British people, and Parliament, seeing no way out of a hopeless conflict, may have well contacted Congress to "discuss a few things".
Peace may have come later, but at the price of Washington NOT being the hero, just another General. Would the ambitious Gates, with the laurels of Saratoga been the dictator?

I think that the French contributed to a quicker end to the war, but an American victory would have come later, but with more bitter results.

As for the French, this would have been cheaper in the long run. It would still have weakened Britain, but possibly not with the ruinous bankruptcy that lead to the French Revolution.
Perhaps.

No wrong answers here. Idle speculation. Lafayette would still have been the equivalent of hippies picking sugar cane for Fidel.

No 28mm Lauzun's Legion Hussars to fight the British Legion! Now, THAT would have been tragic.

From what I've read, the French were more than a little upset at how much the Americans got out of the Treaty, but that's another subject for another thread.

OFM, I don't know enough about this topic to add to it but I just wanted to say that it's nice to see you posting again. I look forward to reading more of your posts and to learn more about the French fleet at Yorktown.

The long term results for both America and Europe are interesting to speculate.
No French Revolution? No Napoleon? No Washington but Gates as President for Life?
America confined to the Appalachian ridge?

I think independence would have eventually come, but at what price?

The French fleet was the instrument that trapped Cornwallis at Yorktown, preventing his escape.

Why does Cornwallis go to New York rather than return to Charleston? He would have been able to be his own boss rather than being second fiddle in NY.
He could have launched a new campaign in the South.
A related question is if France did not enter the war, does Spain. If not then Mobile and Pensacola along with Baton Rouge are not captured. Nor are all of the British loyalist troops lost in the invasion of Central America are not lost.

So the third Strategic victory will still have to be at Charleston or New York.

He was recalled to New York by his boss, wasn't he?
How does he go to Charleston?

Maybe he could have marched North to … Gettysburg.

But perhaps he was ordered to stay put at Yorktown because of fear of the French army or fleet.

I think the French cut the war short by a year or two. Clever, brazen supplies and financing, diplomatic bluster and denials…

Surely, Cornwallis could neither have abandoned the south (any more than he had) or sailed to Charleston without Clinton's permission.

He did not need to escape from Yorktown, since he wasn't trapped (under this scenario) was he? So the first question would be, did he have any more useful work to to do in Virginia; cutting off the Rebel lines of communication andt disrupting supply lines to the Carolinas. The Crown forces there despite Rawdon's victory at Hobkirk's Hill were unable to operate any distance from Charleston. Clinton as C-in-C would have to decide what to do.

Clinton was already sick of the whole sorry affair, having never wanted the job in the first place, and could only focus on holding New York. Cornwallis, possibly suffering from depression after the death of his wife, had been driving himself extremely hard for eighteen months and might also have been approaching the end of his tether.

Given the unlikely injection of new ideas or new vigour into the Crown's strategy, and with the American capacity to fall only to rise again, it does seem like the conflict would have slipped into stalemate.

Gates was out of the running following Camden or some alternate universe equivalent.

I think the real danger for the US was the loss of central civilian government over a longer war. Picture instead of a small but disciplined Continental Army subordinate to Congreess ready to take over when the British evacuated their coastal enclaves, a power shift to Marion, Sumter, Pickens and Allen. (For the middle colonies, I couldn't even provide a name.) I don't think democracy and constitutional civilian rule would have been altogether lost. They had deep roots in the English-speaking world by 1776. But starting from a much lower baseline, a working federal government would have been much harder to establish, and our politics much closer to the post-colonial norm in Africa or Latin America.

There goes that OFM again…

Eric

Given the scenario posited by OFM, then O think independence would have been iffy at best. With no French intervention then there would have been no withdrawal of British troops from North America. Those additional troops would have allowed for more effective offensive action in the colonies. Imagine Cornwallis' army two or three times it's actual strength. The Americans were equally sick of the war by now, worthless currency, mutinies in the army, etc. I think something along the lines of dominion status might have happened.

Now, had everything happened as it did historically except the French fleet, for whatever reason, couldn't trap Cornwallis, then I think OFM is very close. Washington would still have forced Cornwallis out of Virginia and back to New York. The war would drag on for another year or so, but Washington would still rise to the Presidency as the man who orchestrated eventual victory.

I recently read "In The Hurricane's Eye" by Nathaniel Patrick and in the book he explains why the French and British fleets headed north from the Caribbean to northern waters annually during hurricane season. Its an interesting read about the impact of the naval strategies in the hemisphere and its impact on the War of Independence.

OFM, your scenario was no French forces in the America's. No problem sailing to Charleston or Savannah.
Stick to the premise if you are really wanting a discussion. What about the Spanish angle? You ignored it.

Rudy.
Cornwallis was ordered to evacuate and sail to New York.
He had no choice but to obey.

sigh…

American finances were in trouble too. Might there have been some sort of compromise peace which would have had to be resolved later? Quite possibly while Britain is embroiled in another French war.
Frankly I wonder what would have happened had he fallen out of the boat while crossing the Delaware. "Sit down that man, you'll upset the boat!"

Shot at Kips Bay; Princeton; Brandywine Creek?
(Monongahela; Fort Necessity?)

"For a ha'porth of tar…"

My "what if" has been If instead of moving into Virginia after Guilford Courthouse Cornwallis returned to South Carolina. In Charleston were the replacements for the regiments under his command. All of his regiments were have been rebuilt to nearly full strength. Imagine how Greene's campaign could have gone with Cornwallis field in back to fighting strength.

Good question – if the Brits had been able to evacuate under their own terms and move Cornwallis' intact army to New York, one possible scenario is parts of the colonies becoming independent while other parts stayed as British North America – as noted, it was not exactly like the Americans had much in the way of stable finances and it was not just the British public who were getting tired of war

I'd love to think it would be a complete British victory.

However, I think in reality it would come down to a negotiated settlement, with some sort of limited self rule (with no taxation by central government).

Glad to have the OFM back…

"one possible scenario is parts of the colonies becoming independent while other parts stayed as British North America" – which is what happened anyway. Except the dividing lines would have been different.

Also, Americans view their government as inevitable. But it was actually a wild experiment, and with different leaders it could easily have collapsed.

I do think that in spite of all this the ace card the Americans held throughout the war were each colonies Militia. Not only could they provide a reinforcement to the Continental army, but they provided a training ground for future officers and soldiers. They maintain control of each colony and supported the rebel government as well as crushed most loyalist uprisings. Lastly, they nibbled away at British supply lines and were a constant drain on their manpower.

Yes.
The militia are often disparaged for not doing well what wasn't really their job.
I would NOT expect them to stand in line and duke it out with Grenadiers. Or the 33rd.
But then you don't really want to strip the 1st Maryland out of the main army to go around pacifying the Loyalists and protecting the farmers, do you? Don't elite and well trained regulars have better things to do?
Both militia and Continentals were vital cogs, but in different ways.

Yes, well said.

And it must be said that Patriot militia did a much better job at … err … oppressing the neighbors, than did Tory militia.
Too many British independent commanders (Burgoyne, Cornwallis…) failed, expecting Loyalist support that the Patriot militia did a very good job suppressing.

The Continentals referred to the militia as 'Longfaces' for their overall attitude when being called to active service.

And they were a hindrance to Continental recruiting as their pay was better than the Continentals and their active service periods were short.

Under some commanders they did very well, such as John Stark, Morgan, and Stevens, but overall they harmed the overall war effort as it was the Continentals who defeated the British, not the militia. And it was the Continentals who took the most casualties.

Regarding the French, without their assistance, the US would not have won.

Regarding the French.
Obviously this thread is about ACTIVE French participation, militarily and naval.
French logistic and monetary assistance was of course vital from the beginning. As I said from the beginning of this thread.
The Patriot cause already had two "strategic victories", as they would be called in strategic board games. The Trenton Princeton campaign and the Saratoga campaign. Both, along with the Germantown "beaten but keeps getting up" attitude contributed to the French jumping in actively.
But all of the above showed Patriot resilience.
IN MY OPINION, the Patriots could have won the war if the French continued their not so covert logistical and financial support. (Thank you Hortalez et cie!)
It would have taken longer.

Kevin. This is my OPINION. Since it never happened, I cannot prove it. Since it never happened, you cannot disprove it.

As for the militia.
As I qualified above, we are, or should be, talking about two different tools here. Hammer and screw driver.
The militia did not win the war all by themselves. I am not claiming that. Neither is Will.
The Continentals did not win the war all by themselves. I hope you're not claiming that.

John Adams called the American Revolution the entirety, including the War AND the politics.

You keep referring to "Longfaces". Where were the Continentals when Marion, Sumter and Pickens were subduing the Tory back country?
Who was suppressing Tory activity during Burgoyne's campaign?

Let's take the army before Boston. At what point did they magically become "Continentals" instead of mere militia?

"… but overall they harmed the overall war effort as it was the Continentals who defeated the British, not the militia. And it was the Continentals who took the most casualties. "

Not sure about this statement of yours. Looking objectively without the militia I am not sure the Continental line could have done it alone. I think I there are numerous examples where militia contributed greatly to the ultimate victory. To start the first year of the American Revolution saw a militia army contain a British Army in Boston and eventually saw the British withdraw.

The new Jersey militia contributed greatly to the Victory at Trenton. Without them that victory is doubtful. The constant raids and harassment wore out the members of Rall's brigade and exhausted them. A reading of Hessian first person accounts or correspondence between Rall and Grant make this crystal clear.

The Saratoga campaign also saw militia contributed to the Victory. Aside from Bennington, Brown's operations around Lake Champlain and Ticonderoga sealed off the British supply lines to Canada and prevented reinforcements to the main army. At the 19 September the two Connecticut militia battalions in Poor's brigade went onto the battlefield and held their own. Lastly the overwhelming numbers that turned out helped to surround and cut off the British retreat.

How about the two Springfield New Jersey raids?

I could go on but you get the point. This is all in addition to preventing loyalist uprising and maintaining Rebel control of the government's of the 13 colonies. No easy task.

I really see no point in Cornwallis returning to Charleston, even if he were falling back on strength.
The whole premise of the Southern campaign in the first place was to garner Loyalist support and to bring back Crown rule.
None of that happened before, and was even less likely a second time.
Equal credit to the Regular army under Greene and the MILITIA under various squabbling commanders.

With no French fleet or army to hinder him, he did the right thing uniting with Philips and Arnold.
Maybe Virginia was riper for reconquest?
Or move north to trap Washington?

Comments on the effectiveness of the militia:

‘They come in you cannot tell how; go out you cannot see when; act you cannot tell where; consume your provisions; exhaust your stores; and leave you at last in a critical moment.'-George Washington.

‘'Men just dragged from the tender scenes of domestic life; unaccustomed to the din of Arms; totally unacquainted with every kind of military skill, which being followed by a want of confidence in themselves, when opposed to troops regularly trained, disciplined, and appointed, superior in knowledge, and superior in Arms, makes them timid, and ready to fly from their own shadows.'-George Washington, 24 September 1776.

‘No militia will ever acquire the habits necessary to resist a regular force…The firmness requisite for the real business of fighting is only to be attained by a constant course of discipline and service. I have never yet been witness to a single instance that can justify a different opinion, and it is most earnestly to be wished that the liberties of America may no longer be trusted, in any material degree, to so precarious a dependence.'-George Washington, 15 September 1780.

‘I would not have had a swamp in the view of the militia on any consideration; they would have made for it, and nothing could have detained them from it. And as to covering my wings, I knew my adversary, and was perfectly sure I should have nothing but downright fighting. As to retreat, it was the very thing I wished to cut off all hope of. I would have thanked Tarleton had he surrounded me with his cavalry. It would have been better than placing my own men in the rear to shoot down those who broke from the ranks. When men are forced to fight, they will sell their lives dearly…Had I crossed the river, one half of the militia would immediately have abandoned me.'-Daniel Morgan-remarking on the militia of his command at Cowpens, January 1781.

‘The North Carolina militia…abandoned us…Many were missing, as is always the case with militia after battle; but they generally are to be found safe at their own fireside.'-LtCol Henry Lee remarking on the battle of Guilford Courthouse, 15 March 1781.

‘Regular troops alone are equal to the exigencies of modern war, as well as for defense as offense, and whenever a substitute is attempted it must prove illusory and ruinous.'-George Washington, 15 September 1780.
‘When the perfect order and discipline which are essential to regular troops and contemplated, and with what ease and precision they execute the difficult maneuvers indispensable to the success of offensive or defensive operations, the conviction cannot be resisted that such troops will always have a decided advantage over the more numerous forces composed of uninstructed militia or undisciplined recruits.'-Alexander Hamilton.

As Ronald Reagan said, "Well, there you go again, Kevin."
What your Wall O'Text basically says is that the militia had no point being in the line of battle. I kind of said that myself, above.
You did not refute what I put forth as the main use of militia, which is to control the countryside and keep down the stories. In this they were very successful.

You quote Washington having no use for them. Yet who was it who exhausted the Hessian Garrison at Trenton before Washington showed up to basically mop up an exhausted brigade?
Who was it who basically made it impossible for the British army to keep garrisons supplied in New Jersey after Princeton? Washington went into winter quarters after Princeton. That was the militia's job.
After 1st Trenton, didn't a large portion of the vaunted Continentals elect you let their enlistments expire January 31? Even Glover's Marbleheaders went home, since privateering paid better.

Morgan at Cowpens. He basically gave the militia permission to run away. In fact, he even ORDERED them to. "OK, boys. Give me two fires, then skedaddle back over there where I want you to regroup…"
I kind of think that what you quoted was after the fact, trying to embellish his great stratagem. Maybe, maybe not. But he was a proud man, easily slighted. Like most Great Men of the period.

But, let's look at an action where the militia was integrated with the Continentals and did quite well. Eutaw Springs.
From Ward. Greene's first line was militia. They were charged by Legion infantry armed with bayonets and drive them oFor, firing many volleys. Legion cavalry charged them in the rear and were also driven off. "Longfaces", indeed.
And, ahem, who fell out to plunder the British camp and get drunk? Militia AND CONTINENTALS. Snatching defeat from the jaws of victory. I wonder how Greene had any hair left, poor man.

When did a unit magically become Continentals? The army surrounding Boston were "taken on the establishment" as Continentals, but did that suddenly make them good troops? Perhaps the disdain they felt towards the rowdy backwoodsmen was more the disgust gentlemen feel towards hillbillies.
Good troops fight well. Bad troops … suck.

Russel Weigley, in "The American Way of War", has an interesting thesis. It's about the differences between the Regular Army and the "militia" throughout American history. He even has an interesting take on "a well regulated militia". Well, the yeomen of Concord, Lexington and Bunker Hill were certainly well regulated.

There has always been the fear of a Standing Army, an old English tradition dating back hundreds of years. That's why there is no "Royal Army" in Britain. And for over two hundred years the Army has to be justified through a yearly Mutiny Act.

In America, this fear of a Standing Army was certainly justified by the Newburgh Conspiracy. In perhaps his finest contribution to American democracy, George Washington suppressed by the force of his character, a planned coup by some officers of the Continental Army. Needless to say, one of the leaders of this conspiracy was that splendid soldier Horatio Gates.

Back to Weigley. I do tend to digress.
He traces the duality, even the dichotomy between the Regular Army and the Militia, throughout our military history.
There were of course the militia refusing to cross borders in the War of 1812.
But the "militia", state raised units controlled by politicians, really became prevalent in the Mexican American War and Civil War.
Quick. Don't look it up! What proportion of the Union Army were US Regulars? And in the Confederate army, were there ANY "Regulars"?

And in the Spanish American War and World War One, the Regulars were a vanishingly small proportion of the Army. Luckily we got this figured out by the time World War Two came along.

Weigley passed away before he could finish this work.

Kevin, interesting collection of quotes.

But nothing you copied and write disproved what I wrote. Nothing there challenges the examples I gave you.

Pardon my post beginning with Ronald Reagan. I called away before I could undo the damage wrought by both Spell-check and Autocorrect.
Just one example, "stories" should of course be "Tories".
For "oFor", read "off". I have no idea what happened there.
Carry on.

The bottom line in the discussion of the contributions of the Continentals and militia what is overwhelmingly evident is that without the Continental Army, the US would have lost. Much of the much-vaunted value of the militia is legend and myth. The militia could never have won the war on their own, but the Continental Army was crucial to the victory in the end. The support of the French was vital to defeat the British. No other American army has either undergone such hardships over a long period of time nor has one ever won as much. The militia hurt the Continental Army not only by its lack of performance when required on the battlefield, but by preventing by its existence the ability of Washington to build the army that he wanted to meet the British on anything like even terms.

From The Book of the Continental Soldier by Harold Peterson:

‘Even so the new Continental Army did not spring into being overnight. The volunteer regiments enlisted at Boston were of different sizes, ranging from 500 to 1,000 men each. Terms of enlistment varied, though most ran until the end of the year. Discipline was lax…Worst of all, there was no overall plan for an army, no table of organization. All these situations had to be corrected as speedily as possible in the face of an enemy and while appealing to the patriotism of the men for further enlistments.'

‘The Continental Army increased in size as additional regiments were authorized, the artillery and rifle regiments became a corps and a brigade, respectively, and cavalry, light infantry, and artificer regiments joined the force along with special mixed units called legions. The one factor that remained constant was the Continental Line's inadequacy by itself. It was never large enough to conduct a campaign on its own. The various states organized and outfitted the regular infantry regiments according to a quota system, but they also maintained troops of their own, the so-called state lines, and there were in addition the local militia organizations that could be called out for a short period to meet an emergency in their special vicinity. Almost all major actions and campaigns were fought with a combination of the three types of units, and the American Revolutionary War soldier might be a member of any one. Possibly during his career he might have served for one enlistment or another in all three, from the elite Continental Line to the irregular and often unreliable militia…'

‘Under von Steuben's guidance the Revolutionary War soldier became a first-class fighting man in the best European tradition. Contrary to popular tradition, he did not hide behind trees and stone walls to pot at enemy formations. With exceptions such as Kings Mountain and various routs, he met the British Army on its own terms in open fields and drawn up in a line of battle. He learned to make savage bayonet charges, and in such famous attacks as Stony Point and the assault on the redoubts at Yorktown, he charged with an unloaded weapon, relying solely on cold steel. By the end of the war the Continental was no longer just the citizen with a gun. He was a hardened campaigner. He knew his weapons and his drill. He could face the enemy under any and all circumstances. He knew how to throw up fortifications and how to obtain shelter. His independent spirit remained but he knew the military hierarchy and how to recognize it by insignia-and he knew the deference due it. He was, in short, the master of all the miscellaneous hardware and gear of military life, the basic tools of the Revolution.'

From The Continental Army by Robert Wright:

‘This day giving commencement to the new army, which, in every point of view is entirely Continental…His Excellency hopes that the importance of the great Cause we are engaged in, will be deeply impressed upon every man's mind, and wishes it to be considered, that an army without order, regularity, and discipline is not better than a commissioned mob.'-George Washington, General Orders 1 January 1776.

‘To go into an enumeration of all the evils we have experienced in this late great change of the Army…would greatly exceed the bounds of a letter…I shall with all due deference, take the freedom to give it as my opinion, that if the Congress have any reason to believe, there will be occasion for troops another year…they would save money, and have infinitely better troops if they were [to enlist men] for and during the war…The trouble and perplexity of disbanding one army and raising another at the same instant, and in such a critical situation as the last was, is…such as no man, who has experienced it once, will ever undergo again.'-George Washington, letter to Congress, 9 February 1776.

‘No dependence could be in a militia or other troops than those enlisted and embodied for a longer period than our regulations heretofore have prescribed. I am persuaded, and as fully convinced, as I am of any one fact that has happened, that our liberties must of necessity be greatly hazarded, if not entirely lost, if their defense is left to any but a permanent standing army, I mean one to exist during the war.'-George Washington to the President of the Congress, 2 September 1776, after the defeat at Long Island.

‘No militia will ever acquire the habits necessary to resist a regular force. Even those nearest the seat of war are only valuable as light troops to be scattered in the woods and plague rather than do serious injury to the enemy. The firmness requisite for the real business of fighting is only to be attained by a constant course of discipline and service.'-George Washington, 15 September 1780.

From American Army Life by John Elting:

‘In addition to the Continental Army, the various states had their own land forces, which consisted of state regulars and militia…The regulars, often confusingly termed the ‘State Line,' were enlisted for from one to three years of service. Usually in uniform, they were employed for garrisons, seacoast defense, frontier operations, and the preservation of law and order; in emergencies, they might be attached to Continental forces. The militia, consisting of able-bodied citizens of military age, was often called up for varying periods of service, but seldom more than three months.'

‘Regarding themselves as sovereign and independent, the states usually gave their own regulars and militia higher pay than they did their Continental regiments. This naturally made it more difficult to secure recruits for the Continentals-why endure three years of hardship and danger when you could earn far more for a shorter period, under much easier discipline, near your home?'

‘On active service, the militia (or ‘Long Faces' as the Continentals called them) often were more of a hindrance than a help. Washington described them as ‘badly officered and under no government. They come in you cannot tell how, go, you cannot tell when, and act you cannot tell where, consume your provisions, exhaust your stores, and leave you at last in a critical moment.' Maj Gen Nathanael Greene compared them to the ‘locusts of Egypt' because they wasted the countryside without performing any useful duty. In battle they usually broke and ran as soon as things got dangerous.'

‘The militia had to be used in large numbers, because of the weakness of the Continental Army. In states like New Jersey that were fought over repeatedly, militiamen acquired appreciable military skills and were very effective in harrying British foraging parties and detachments. They were also useful in suppressing Tory activities, and militiamen formed the guerilla bands of Francis Marion and other partisan leaders in the Carolinas. In the end, the militia was very certain that only its own skill and courage had won the war.'

‘The Revolutionary War created its own military traditions, perpetuated in myth, art, and even serious history. The most pervasive of these was that all free-born Americans would spontaneously rise in arms to meet and crush any foreign invasion…In cold fact, there was no large-scale rallying during the Revolution, but the myth endured.

Again, a most interesting wall of text. But did you answer my post?

Possibly the most decisive battle of the war was King's Mountain. A crown army destroyed and not a single continental in sight. How about Bennington? Or the action around Fort Ticonderoga and Lake Champlain which cut off Burgoyne's supplies and possible reinforcements. How about the first year of the War around Boston?

I am not saying the militia won the war alone. But to say they did not contribute or were less then useless is just wrong. French aid was crucial (as was Spanish aid and the neutrality of other European countries). The Continentals were important to have a regular army. But the militia was crucial for so many other reasons.

Kevin.
All you are doing is refuting things I never said.
Are you going to draft all the militia into the Continental Army? Where do you see the individual States having the political will to allow that? Given the widespread fear and contempt for a Standing Army, how is that possible?
Then, who will get the crops in and perform other vital civilian duties if the militia are all off campaigning with the Continentals?

Where did I say that the war could have been won without the Continentals? Never, yet you seem determined to refute what I never said.

If the militia are incapable of standing in line, explain Eutaw Springs? It was the Continentals who let Greene down in that battle by looting the British camp and getting falling down drunk.

Without French army and fleet, BUT with plenty of material aid, IN MY OPINION, the war could have dragged on until the British got sick of it. The possibility of a POTENTIAL revanchist French intervention was always there.
A political settlement, along which lines I'm not going to speculate was possible. Our real life Yorktown led to a political settlement. The British still had 2/3 of the army in America left.

Let's not forget that the French motivation was entirely to get back at Britain for the Seven Years War. Few Frenchmen were excited by love of Liberty, with the exception of Lafayette. Maybe a few others.

At the negotiations for the Treaty of Paris, France actively sought to limit the growth of the United States, by confining is to East of the Appalachian ridge, and south of the Ohio.
Jay instead negotiated directly with Lord Shelburne, leading to the addition of the Northwest, and pushing the borders all the way to the Mississippi. This "exceedingly generous" settlement shows just how sick Britain was of the War.
France was not pleased. Her intent was to split off a permanently weakened America, and not to create a state that would and could grow strong.

I read all that in a book I borrowed years ago. Alas, my library cannot be measured in acres, unlike some people.
But the WIKIPEDIA article says much the same thing. Wikipedia is handy, and it jibes with what I read IN A BOOK.
link
I would never use Wikipedia as a reference of course, but its notes can point us in the right direction.

Let's not forget that the French motivation was entirely to get back at Britain for the Seven Years War.

And that makes a difference to the positive outcome…how?

Few Frenchmen were excited by love of Liberty, with the exception of Lafayette. Maybe a few others.

Lafayette is over-exaggerated as a historical figure-witness his 'performance' during the French Revolution and after.

According to Fouche, Napoleon's some-time Minister of Police and former Revolutionary terrorist, Lafayette was an 'old imbecile one can use like a…ladder which one throws down after one has used it.'-Henry Lachouque, The Last Days of Napoleon's Empire, 53.

'The Lafayette in American schoolbooks is mostly an imaginary creature'-John Elting, Swords Around a Throne, 733, note 23.

Lafayette went over to the allies in August 1792 and was imprisoned by the Austrians. Napoleon got him released in 1797 and awarded him a generous pension. Lafayette was not grateful for either favor.

In 1815, Lafayette led the 'chorus' of Paris politicians in the Chambers against Napoleon after Waterloo. Lafayette is characterized as 'that strange blend of liberalism, hauteur obtuseness, ambition, and frustration' and was guided by Fouche in his imperial denunciations.-John Elting, Swords, 658-659.

Too much myth and legend about Lafayette and not many facts.

I would never use Wikipedia as a reference of course, but its notes can point us in the right direction.

Correct on both counts.

But nothing you copied and write disproved what I wrote. Nothing there challenges the examples I gave you.

It wasn't meant as a 'challenge' merely information on the overall worth of the American militia.

And you have offered no sources to your opinions. That might be helpful to the discussion.

Oh, The Road to Guilford Courthouse offers plenty of examples of the Patriot militia harassing Loyalists and keeping them down. You get no argument from me about Sumter. He was a horse's ass but he did his bit.
Ketchum's Saratoga shows the militia smothering Burgoyne's supply lines.

I've always likened Lafayette to hippies going to Cuba to cut sugar cane for Fidel.

The now age-old 'discussion' of Continentals vs militia is going to continue no matter who says what to whom.

The following is offered because the subjects were brought up in this thread.

And the bottom line is twofold: First, without the Continental Army the militia could not have won the war no matter how many times they harassed the British and Loyalists. The militia certainly did not stop the British recruiting Loyalist units, such as the Queen's Rangers and others who served well and ably against the 'rebels.'

And it should be noted that the war in the South was too many times a private fight to settle old scores, witness the executions of prisoners at Kings Mountain.

Further, when Greene was commander in the South, he did send Continental units to support and operate with the guerilla bands. Lee's Legion operated with Marion from time to time and even Maryland Continental infantry was sent in detachments to support the guerillas.

The following will be addressed here and in follow-on postings as these were the subject brought up:

The following information is taken from The Battles of Saratoga by John Elting:

Action at Hubbardton:

While the Americans were not ‘successful' here, the Continentals fought stoutly, with the exception of the 2d New Hampshire. The Americans were surprised while ‘cooking breakfast' around 0500. The British, under Fraser, achieved ‘a complete, open-mouthed surprise.' The 2d New Hampshire ran, but the other two regiments, Warner's and Francis' 11th Massachusetts formed line of battle. After hard fighting, Francis was killed and his regiment ‘took to the woods' and Warner ordered his small regiment to ‘scatter and meet me in Manchester.' The British scooped up 70 prisoners after the shooting was over, including Col Nathan Hale.-32.

Still, Francis' and Warner's stand against a superior British force was described as ‘hard-knuckled.'-71.

Battle of Bennington:

‘New Hampshire rallied grimly, John Langdon, Speaker of its General Court, pledging his personal fortune to raise a brigade of 1,500 men. John Stark accepted its command-on the condition that he would be a New Hampshire brigadier general commanding New Hampshire state troops. His reputation brought a flood of volunteers; in less than a week his ranks were full, by 30 July he had them organized. These were no raw militia: Many had served with Stark in 1775 and 1776; most of the officers were veterans. The brigade's discipline might be informal but it was effective. Like Stark's New Hampshire regiments at Bunker's Hill, these would hold together and follow orders under platoon and artillery fire.'-42.

It should also be noted that Stark was supported at Bennington by Warner's Continental Regiment as well as 200 of Herrick's Vermont Rangers.

An interesting note about John Stark, 50. He undoubtedly demanded obedience from his subordinates, any good commander does. But he didn't demonstrate ‘cheerful and willing obedience to orders' to commanders, such as Horatio Gates, that he did not respect.

‘In his anxiety to concentrate every possible man at Bemis Heights, Gates called in Lincoln and Stark. Lincoln, then at Skenesborough, was agreeable. Leaving Seth Warner and some militia in the Manchester area, with patrols out between Fort Ann and Fort Edward, he countermarched with approximately 700 men, but he would have far to come. Stark was not agreeable. Gates and Lincoln both wrestled with him, employing all methods from sweet reason to stern admonition. Stark apparently gave in. Some 600 to 800 of his brigade arrived at Bemis Heights on or about the 12th; Stark himself appeared late on the 15th. On the morning of the 18th his brigade's two months of service were up. Had Stark urged them to stay, it is likely that most of them would have, but Stark made no apparent effort. With Burgoyne only a few miles away, they fell in and marched for home again. It is sadly possible that John Stark was enjoying the expression on Horatio Gates' face.'

‘Undoubtedly Stark did it our of sheer cussedness, but there may well have been a modicum of hard sense in his actions. Gates' decision to call in Lincoln had removed the threat to Burgoyne's left rear that Schuyler had so carefully created. At the same time, Gates already had as many troops packed into the Bemis Heights position as he and his rudimentary staff could handle. New Hampshire was raising another brigade for Stark, and he would take it where his fighting instincts told him it was needed.'-50

Battle of Freeman's Farm:

‘Freeman's Farm – the first battle of Saratoga – was a standup fight between regular troops. The American formations may have been a little looser, the individual American's aim a little more accurate, but there was little basic difference between the two armies. The Connecticut militia fought ranked, like Continentals, and stoutly too. If the Americans had more riflemen, the British had artillery. English officers would reflect that only the self-sacrificing courage of their gun crews had saved the British Line. A few believed the Americans were ‘in general drunk,' but to many more ‘…it was a dear bought victory if I can give it that name' and ‘The courage and obstinacy with which the Americans fought were the astonishment of everyone…'-55.

The two Connecticut militia regiments were in BrigGen Poor's brigade along with five Continental infantry regiments-three from New Hampshire and two from New York.

BrigGen Learned's brigade had four Continental infantry regiments, three from Massachusetts and the 1st Canadian Regiment.

Morgan's Rifle Corps and Henry Dearborn's Light Infantry were both Continental units.

The following information is taken from Eutaw Springs: The Final Battle of the American Revolution's Southern Campaign by Robert Dunkerly and Irene Boland:

Regarding the confusion caused by the Continentals overrunning the British camp, it isn't as simple as stating that they stopped their advance to loot the camp.

‘This is the point at which the looting of the British camp becomes a factor in the battle. While it clearly did occur, the extent of the looting seems to have been exaggerated by many histories of the battle. It was probably not as widespread, or as decisive an event, as commonly thought. The evidence suggests that pillaging alone was not responsible for the breakdown in Greene's ranks.'-70.

‘Moreover no British account makes note of the looting, indicating that it was either unseen or not felt important enough to recount. Stewart attributed the American retreat to his ability to rally the broken regiments, Sheridan's stubborn defense of the house, and Majoribanks timely counterattack.'-72.

‘This the only evidence that exists for the plundering of the camp comes from the accounts of Otho Williams, who led the Maryland troops through the British camp and witnessed the looting firsthand, and Samuel Hammond. It is thus likely to remain unknown whether the looting was widespread and to what extent it hindered the Continental advance. Williams felt convinced that it upset his attack on the house and garden. For two centuries of historians, his account has been the primary source for the incident, and the incident has been the primary culprit in the American failure to crush Stewart.'-72.

It is also interesting to note that the militia was not involved in the looting because they were not at that point on the field. After their engagement with the British line, the Continentals passed through them to continue the attack, for all intents and purposes conducting a passage of lines. The militia were not in the attack when it hit the British camp.

The Continental had also had key officers, such as the Virginia brigade commander, LtCol Richard Campbell mortally wounded, and LtCol John Eager Howard, the commander of the 1st Maryland Regiment, wounded along with his brigade commander, Col Otho Williams. This undoubtedly helped disrupt the American attack as did moving formed troops through the British encampment, which was an obstacle in itself.

The casualties incurred by the Americans tell the story: The South Carolina militia had an approximate strength of 820 and incurred 53 casualties. The North Carolina militia had an approximate strength of 253 and incurred 37 casualties.

The Continental infantry was as follows: Maryland Brigade, 400 with 113 casualties; Virginia Brigade 350 with 53 casualties; North Carolina Brigade 350 with 154 casualties; The Delaware Regiment 70 with 10 casualties; Lee's Legion infantry 60 with 17 casualties.

The militia infantry had a strength of approximately 1073 and incurred 90 casualties, less than ten percent. The Continentals had a strength of 1230 with 347 casualties, more than 28 percent. The numbers tell the story of the fighting and who was more heavily engaged.
Casualties include killed, wounded, captured, and missing.

It is usually a truism that when Continentals and militia were engaged in the same action, the Continentals bore the brunt of the action and incurred the greater majority of the casualties.

That isn't exactly an accurate assessment for Guilford Courthouse where Greene had over 1,000 missing, the greater majority of them militia. That was because the North Carolina militia in the first line didn't all fire the three rounds a piece asked for by Greene, and when they broke they just kept running, some of them all the way home, and were not rallied even though they had veteran Continental units on either flank as well as being supported by Continental artillery in the center of the line.

Regarding Eutaw Springs, my source is Ward. I guess this boils down to "My book is better than your book!" 😄