"Alternative WW1 Question" Topic

It is mid-September 1914. Archduke Franz Ferdinand has been assassinated and war has broken out in Europe.

Strategic Situation: The Germans have adopted a defensive strategy in the West. With no offensive against the French with much greater effort has been committed to the Eastern Front. The Battle of Tannenberg has been even more disastrous for the Russians. The prior to hostilities two German battlecruisers have been sent to reinforce the von Spee's Pacific Squadron. The battlecruisers Goeben and Moltke are the Mediterranean, and together Austro-Hungarians have been conducting raids against the French. Using the Kiel Canal the High Seas Fleet has moved from Wilhelmshaven and has turned the Baltic into a German Lake. Neither Italy nor the Ottoman Empire have yet entered the war.

To relive pressure on their Russian allies, France has now launched a major offensive in the west and has invaded Belgium to avoid German defenses with a major thrust towards the Ruhr.

You are a member of the British cabinet. Do you favour honouring the Treaty of London (1839), ensuring Belgium neutrality and coming into the War on the side of the Germans. Or honouring the spirit of the Entente Cordiale and backing France. Alternatively, do you favour armed neutrality and attempts to broker a peace.

Bonus question, for the naval enthusiasts: Once decided on the policy, what changes to Royal Navy dispositions would you make?

The Belgium treaty wasn't going to get Britain join the Central power. Britain would have gone to war to to save Russia and limit Germany's gains. Admiral Fisher plan was to break into the Baltic and invade Germany from the coast.

The British public was not in favor of declaring war had Germany not invaded Belgium and in general viewed Russia as a historic opponent and a perpetual colonial rival throughout Asia. The public opinion on France was at best, neutral.

I have no idea what effect a French (preemptive?) invasion of Belgium would have had on British public opinion. Would the British Press and the various party leadership have taken a unified position?

Also, royal family likes and dislikes played a greater role than who invaded who. Victoria engineered the war with weddings.

Interesting question(s) + point of view, that led me personally, years ago to start (and now finalize due to lockdown) a crazy project … to rebuild the 1980 board game Guns of August in 6mm on 2 8x6ft …

link

once the club re-opens me and my mates will explore (i.e. given in just a limited game scenario) these question(s).

I cannot imagine a French invasion of Belgium unless invited in and nor can I imagine the British lifting a finger to help Russia at that time.

I think French pressure to move the Royal Navy to protect the French north coast as agreed (and as happened), together with the German fleet passing throught the Kiel Canal would have mobilised the British Navy in full and the German reaction to this could have lead to Britian being dragged into the war. Britain might have sat on the fence when it came to sending over the BEF if neither Belgium nor France were threatened with German invasion and especially if France launched their own invasion of western Germany.

There are a number of interesting 'what ifs' in 1914.

As a member of His Majesty's Admiralty, I await the government's decision, but try to anticipate and prepare for the major contingencies.

Gibraltar needs a division of 3x battlecruisers and 4x dreadnoughts. I think the older ones will suffice as a "fleet in being" (3x Invincibles, Dreadnought, and 3x Bellerophons) ready to commit to blockading French or German naval units in the Mediterranean. The German battlecruisers are a worry, but so is the huge French fleet of cruisers, and the age-old problem of keeping the French navy separated by Spain into 2 smaller parts.

Malta already has a strong force of pre-dreadnought ships (battleships, armored cruisers, DDs, a few CLs, etc.). Maybe reinforce it with more old warships and extra garrison troops just in case.

If Britain declares against France, Italy probably will too, to take Corsica, African colonies, and French battleships in the peace treaty. If Britain declares against Germany or stays neutral, Italy will try to sit out the war, as in real life.

Turkish crews are in Britain to pick up Reşadiye (HMS Erin) and Sultan Osman I (HMS Agincourt). If Britain is vacillating about whether to fight France or Germany, it may be an unacceptable diplomatic risk to steal their new capital ships. German successes against Russia guarantee Turkish participation on the German side, but there's no sense agitating the Turks against the British interests in the Suez canal.

- Ix

As interesting as the strategic question is, I can't really see France plunging itself into this situation either. There are too many downsides, and the French army has somewhat ossified itself into its war plan for Germany.

The French army plans called for extremely rapid mobilization and then hyper-aggressive invasion of Germany over the French frontier (Allez! Allez! Allez!), but the French were so committed to honoring their neighbors' neutrality that they were unready for the Schlieffen Plan, and it almost worked. I don't think they had either the logistical flexibility or the diplomatic fortitude to invade Belgium.

I do think the French army would have been across the frontier and invading Germany within days of the declaration of war. This is exactly what they thought they were doing in real life, and the high command was so focused on it that at first they refused to even *believe* the reports that the Germans were outflanking them through Belgium. The Germans were right to go West first; the French were champing at the bit to avenge 1870. France had to be defeated ASAP or Germany was in severe danger from that side.

- Ix

German battlecruisers in the Pacific are a bit of a paper tiger. When war was declared, von Spee set out for home immediately because he had no bases to operate from. Giving him battlecruisers makes his fleet too strong to confront, but also even more desperately needy of supplies. Unless Japan is committed to join the war early on the German side (to wage a second RJW…?), giving von Spee battlecruisers just makes his situation trickier without gaining any (German) strategic advantage, and weakens the HSF in the North Sea and Baltic.

- Ix

The notion of Germany opting for an Eastern strategy is sound. It focuses their and the AH armies against the weaker opponent.

Your postulated naval deployments are unsound. Trying to move any naval assets outside of the North Sea could well strand them far from friendly bases and condemn them to eventual internment. von Spee had ample assets to brutalize French possessions in the Pacific. The Russian naval assets at Vladivostok were considerable, but apart from 2 ancient cruisers, all light, defensive, vessels.

Moving the Fleet into the Baltic would have availed little. They could have offered little meaningful support to the army and the near coast of Russia was a mine strewn nightmare.

Better to sortie the High Seas Fleet past the neutral British Channel Squadron and bombard Dunkirk to rubble. The bulk of the French fleet was in the Med.

Once done, return home to refuel and reammunution. Send an open cable to the French for publication in every world newspaper. "You have 48 hours to surrender or Calais is next."

If the Brits don't intervene the French will have no choice.

Moving the Fleet into the Baltic would have availed little. They could have offered little meaningful support to the army and the near coast of Russia was a mine strewn nightmare.

I disagree somewhat. As an initial move in the opening phase of the war, moving the HSF to the Baltic accomplishes two things:

• It openly de-escalates the Anglo-German tension in the North Sea, giving credence to any German overtures for British alliance or neutrality.
  
• It gives the HSF a lot of extra assets to prevent the mine-strewn nightmare that the Russians were bound to create.

I do agree that by 1915 the HSF is of little use in the Baltic, except for specific major operations (as it was used historically in 1915-1917). The Russians began their mining operations and guerre de course immediately, and dreadnoughts and battlecruisers are little help against those, especially with the Kaiser quailing about the risk to his precious battleships and his orders confining them to harbor. The massive influx of German DDs and CLs would be a help at slowing mining and convoy raiding in the southern and western Baltic, but I suspect the historical Russian progress mining the Gulf of Finland and then the Gulf of Riga would have been repeated even with the entire HSF in the Baltic.

German bombardment of the French coast is an excellent idea, and one of the reasons Britain did not stay neutral. The Entente Cordiale specified that the British were to defend the Channel and North Sea, which is why the French navy was centered in the Mediterranean.

- Ix

The idea that France would surrender after the destruction of one or more of its coastal towns is unthinkable.

If the German Fleet moved into the North Sea then that act would have in itself decided Britain to enter the war against Germany. The German fleet would not have reached Dunkirk. The British had already pledged some years previously to defend these waters.

@Yellow Admiral

Can you supply a source re the EntCord specifying UK responsibility re closing the North Sea? From all I can gather, the EntCords with France and Russia were primarily to tidy up colonial issues, and to afford a photo op displaying a generalized anti-Central Powers solidarity. I thought the French were primarily in the Med as they deemed their top priority was bringing their troops from North Africa back to metro France.

I can find nothing in either document that even whiffs of alliance, nor stipulate RN ops in the event of anything.

@Wargamorium

True, predicting the French response was presumptious, but I can hardly envision a French government surviving a demonstrated inability to protect its territory from naval bombardment. A frantic effort would have been made to mine the channel to frustrate the Germans. The northern entrance of the channel is shallow enough to allow it. But the first British ship to founder on a hastily laid mine would be as unpredictable a factor as a bullet in Sarajevo.

Can you provide a source re the British pledge to protect the North Sea and the Channel against the Germans? To be sure, any German operations in the channel would have been highly provocative, but perhaps not necessarily incendiary.

The German fleet would have reached Dunkirk. The channel squadron alone could not have stopped it. The German trip home could, however, have been a very different matter.

The London government was dithering about what to do after France and Russia declared war. They were not under an alliance obligation. It was the German violation of Belgian neutrality that galvanized the outcome. Its hard to project British conduct where it is France, not Germany, offering the violation of Belgian sovereignty.

Oh, the tangled knots we tie,
When first we practice to ally.

Let's work through a major German effort in the East. Presumably, this is a left hook through East Prussia.

Russia would have to pull back its left flank and might possibly have to evacuate Poland. Probably that's too drastic, as they would rely on the forts on the Vistula.

I am guessing the only other strategic gain for the Germans is a drive up the Baltic coast towards St P.

Given a purely defensive posture, the Russians might have done far better than their actual disastrous handling of the first 1914 campaign. They wouldn't have to cope with attacking over large distances without rail support and the German use of the E Prussian rail network to move their armies and hit open Russian flanks.

@ HMS Exeter.

I cannot imagine HMG simply allowing the HSF to bombard the French Channel towns without the Grand Fleet sortying to demilitarize the Channel and protect British commerce. And if the GF sorties and somebody fires the first round, the HSF goes to the bottom pretty quickly.

I can't see K Billy taking that kind of a risk w his precious dreadnoughts.

Can you provide a source re the British pledge to protect the North Sea and the Channel against the Germans?

See The Anglo French Naval Convention of 1912. The Cabinet felt that this was at least morally binding as the French had moved their fleet down to the Mediterranean in accordance with this Convention. I think that this Convention was kept a secret even from the Cabinet until August 1914 but I might be wrong there – it is hard to imagine.

The Cabinet were in a quandary as to what to do and three members resigned as they believed Britain should remain neutral even if France or Belgium was invaded.

They could not decide if they were legally obliged to send the army to Belgium in the event of a German invasion and even felt that a small incursion confined to the right bank of the Meuse could be overlooked. Nor could they agree on what to do in the event of a French incursion into Belgium so they sought and received a guarantee from France that this would not happen. A similar request to Germany was not answered until a few weeks later. France dared not invade Belgium as they feared this would cause Britain to remain neutral.

The Cabinet also felt honour bound to assist on land as the French and British Staffs had been co-ordinating since 1904 and it was agreed that Britain would send 6 Divisions to take their place on the French left flank. Britain was not legally committed but felt they could not refuse as the BEF was integrated into the French plans.

Either way I still do not think that the British would have allowed the German navy to enter the North Sea without reacting and would not have allowed them near the Belgian ports never mind the French ones.

Thanks for the reference. After a quick peruse its clear I'm going to have to really delve into this. What a load of diplo-double talk.

"In the event of an unprovoked attack, we commit to deploy our forces in accordance with the established plans,…assuming we decide we want to." What a load of hooey. Its hardly surprising Churchill is waders deep in this.

This is going to require further study.

Let's start with a basic question. What happened between late June, 1914 when the Archduke was assassinated until mid-September 1914 that would make this scenario remotely possible? In the OT events moved quickly from Austria-Hungary's declaration of war on Serbia in late July to a general European war by mid-August, driven in part by Imperial Germany declaring war on Russia on August 1 and France on August 3. In this AT we have a situation of France being at war with Germany in mid-September with no explanation of how it happened. We have two major German warships being dispatched half way around the world to somewhere they had no reason to be in peacetime, German warships running rampant in the Mediterranean Sea and a fully mobilized High Seas Fleet, all without any response from the United Kingdom. How does this all happen?

This is going to require further study.

It is a fascinating subject. I read one or two books and thought I understood. Then I read 3 or 4 and this muddied the waters. 5 or 6 raised even more questions and now after reading about 25/30 books on the subject I realise I know very little and there is still a long way to go.

@Wargamorium

Any recommended reads? The eponymous book is unavailable.

That is quite a tall order. There is quite a lot of debate around the subject and some books come under heavy criticism. However some excellent books were published around the 2014 centenary such as The Sleepwalkers by Christopher Clarke, The Lost History of 1914 by Jack Beatty or July 1914 by Sean McMeekan. I also enjoyed The Lions of July by William Jannen. However my top book on the subject has to be The Russian Origins of the First World War by Sean McMeekin. There are very many more and each has its own merits and demerits.

The causes of the First World War are many and complex and I have yet to find a single volume which covers all so a lot of reading and note taking is required. Authors differ and emphases shift as scholarship advances and I find some of the modern authors to be excellent and far less accepting of the more formulaic and Anglocentric views of the past.

Thanks