"Malaya: The Myth of Hearts and Minds" Topic
4 Posts
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Tango01 | 11 Jul 2020 9:34 p.m. PST |
"At a RAND Symposium on counter-insurgency held in April 1962, Brigadier-General David Powell-Jones cautioned allies that ‘too much in the way of generalities should not be deduced from the Malayan campaign' (Symposium, p. 24). His remarks were echoed by another participant Colonel John White who ‘stressed the relative simplicity of the problem there…thanks largely to the background of British rule and organisation, a loyal police force and the established policy that self-government would be granted as a soon as possible' (Symposium, p. 61). These observations were repeated by a US Army Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Bohannan who offered: ‘that the relative simplicity of controlling and influencing the Malayan population was atypical and to be explained by the fortunate circumstance that the British were able to count on the loyalty of the civilian as well as military government' (Symposium, p. 74). These views were prevalent amongst contemporary observers. No less a luminary than the American historian Bernard Fall warned that making comparisons with Malaya was ‘dangerous delusion' (Komer, p. 78). Indeed, a feature of this symposium, which attracted some publicity, was a mood of almost apologetic embarrassment on the part of the British. It was recognised by participants that the Malayan Emergency had been ‘simple' (an often used word) and could not be fairly compared to more intractable insurgencies faced by allies. The British themselves entirely discounted the French counter-insurgency experience in Indochina (offered by a Lieutenant-Colonel David Galula, who would later become a sort of counter-insurgency god), which may at face value have offered lessons, appreciating with wisdom that the situation in Malaya was particular and unique and required its own answers. The ‘Emergency', in passing, was coined to guarantee insurance payments by Lloyds, showing at least where British hearts and minds were focused…" Main page link Amicalement Armand
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Garryowen | 13 Jul 2020 6:29 a.m. PST |
It is my understanding that the Communists in Malaya had no safe havens like Laos and Cambodia. They also had no powerful Communist country like China adjacent to their base from which they could get a steady stream of military supplies and armament. Those differences also make Malaya and Vietnam like apples and oranges. Tom |
Legion 4 | 13 Jul 2020 7:19 a.m. PST |
That is very true and a critical difference … |
jdginaz | 13 Jul 2020 2:48 p.m. PST |
They were also an unpopular ethic minority. |
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