"Caught off guard: why didn’t America see Pearl Harbor" Topic

…coming?

"The US knew, in the second half of 1941, that Japan was preparing for war in the western Pacific and south-east Asia. Tokyo needed to secure material for its military operations in China – principally oil, tin, bauxite and rubber. But Washington was never aware of the final details of these plans.

US strategists knew, of course, that a Japanese offensive would chiefly target Dutch and British possessions in south-east Asia, because it was there that the raw materials required to fuel Japan's imperial ambitions were located. They knew, also, that the US's military presence in the Philippines would at some point come into the crosshairs. For some time, it had been clear that Japan was war-minded. Emperor Hirohito's expansionist regime had been beating the war drum in Asia since it had entered Manchuria in 1931, and had begun military operations elsewhere in China in 1937. The world had seen the alacrity with which it had forced a humiliated France to submit to its demands in Indochina in June 1940, and had watched Japan sign the Tripartite Pact on 27 September 1940 with the European fascist aggressor nations, Germany and Italy…"
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Amicalement
Armand

Basically – they did see it coming and ignored the threat. Some kind of attack was expected and to an extent engineered.

That the attack fell on Hawaii and was so destructive [though not actually successful] was less foreseeable.

I thought that was more or less established now?

FWIW – Imperial Japan had been waging aggressive war since 1933 and was never going to be stopped by sanctions or rhetoric alone. So pushing them to make the first attack was probably essential and justifiable.

Because of the distance from Japan and because the shallow water in the harbor made ordinary torpedo attacks impossible.

Thanks!.

Amicalement
Armand

Because conventional naval wisdom, since the dawn of the age of cannons, was that shore defenses dominate ships. Defended harbors were typically successfully attacked only by means of sabotage or landing sizeable forces on un-protected shores and marching inland to make a shore-ward land attack.

And naval hierarchies are typically studied in naval history, and steeped in the conventional wisdom such study imparts.

They were fully prepared for sabotage. And they were reasonably well prepared for a battle fleet sailing into view and challenging the harbor entrance.

And then … something else happened. The Japanese didn't do what the defenses were prepared for. How could such a thing happen?

Well, it happens all the time. You are very seldom taken by surprise by issues you prepare for. It is far more often the issues you do NOT prepare for that take you by surprise. In conflict it's almost predictable -- because if your adversary wants to surprise you, they are probably going to be very deliberate in choosing an approach that you have not demonstrated that you are prepared for.

I don't know why so many people fall into so many conspiracy theories for things that are easily explained by common behavior.

-Mark
(aka: Mk 1)

The Japanese learned lessons from the Taranto raid, the US ignored them.

20/20 hindsight works like a charm! Seriously, intelligence reports are analyzed at multiple levels and are assessed for their likelihood. In this case there was failure to interpret certain indicators at multiple levels. Such is war!

I think there is a difference between seeing the possibility of Japan initiating a war with a surprise attack and foreseeing that Japan would initiate it on December 7 with an air attack on Pearl Harbor along with attacks on the Philippines, Guam and Wake, while also initiating an assault on the British in Malaysia.

It was expected the Japanese would attack at some point and that this attack would use surprise to the maximum degree possible.

Looking back, attacking Pearl Harbour was probably a mistake. We know they sank battleships when they should have prioritised fuel depots and repair facilities. But I would go further.

Had they focused their efforts on other targets that could be more useful and not made such a high profile attack that could be portrayed as 'infamous' it might have made more sense.

This has been a research area for me for years. When stationed in PH I worked at many of the sites attacked that still showed damage (1970s). There were mistakes made by the US commanders that properly resulted in their dismissal, but there were also political games being played at the national level. Coupled with deceptive testimony by some officials in the inquiries, conspiracy theories were spun up. There are some recent books that are more factual, and balanced, than what we read in the 1960s-70s. Happy to make some recommendations, if people are interested. BTW, I'm (slowly) playtesting a series of what-if scenarios for December 1941 air combat that show the Japanese were really taking a tremendous series of risks with their attacks. Some basic Allied military competence, not hindsight, would have greatly lessened the damage, and significantly hindered the territorial gains Japan made.

Also, having broken the code didn't mean they were reading everything. They weren't even intercepting everything.

The Japanese learned lessons from the Taranto raid, the US ignored them.

Quite true.

Pearl Harbor was a set up plain and simple. The fleet was moved to Pearl from the West Coast as Bait … Japan would never have attacked the West Coast. The Oil Embargo and The Bait were designed to get the US into the war before Germany beat Russia. Recall that in late 1941 the Germans were at the gates of Moscow and it looked like Russia was through. Nobody was predicting the successful Russian Winter Counter Offensive.

So Roosevelt fervently hoped that the Japs would strike the Bait. The US carriers being at Sea was no convenient coincidence it was planned … if you doubt me Google Search Halsey Battle Order #1 … line one of which states the Enterprise is operating under wartime conditions … ON NOVEMVER 28 a full ten days before The Attack. We knew.

What we didn't know was that the Army would be so useless in defending a major base. Just to prove how pitifully they were prepared they let the same thing happen in the Philippines a day AFTER PEARL HARBOR. The only reason the Japs didn't sink more battleships there is that there were none there to sink.

So Roosevelt got his attack. His Day of Infamey. His War.

Albeit the resukts were way more costly that he had probably planned. But in the event the ships were sunk at anchor and so most were eventually raised and repaired. And thousands of crew who would have perished had the battleships been sunk at Sea were spared to crew new ships coming out of the shipyards. As and added boon the Japs spared our oil reserves, machine shops, dry docks and submarine pens and facilities, i.e. they left Pearl a functioning naval base for our Carriers and Subs.

Roosevelt desperately needed a way to get us in the war. Pearl Harbor was that way. Not a conspiracy THEORY. The hard TRUTH.

Not a conspiracy THEORY. The hard TRUTH.

Not truth. Simple conspiracy theory. Well, not simple, actually -- fairly convoluted. If you want to sell your conspiracy claptrap, please try making some sense first.

Pearl Harbor was a set up plain and simple…. designed to get the US into the war before Germany beat Russia. Recall that in late 1941 the Germans were at the gates of Moscow and it looked like Russia was through. Nobody was predicting the successful Russian Winter Counter Offensive.

Yeah, right. Nobody was predicting the successful Russian Winger Counter Offensive. I'll grant that. But another thing that nobody was predicting was that Germany would declare war on the US after Japan attacked. Nobody, not the Americans, the British, not even Hitler's own staff, were expecting that.

So how exactly was the master chess player Roosevelt supposed to turn a war between the Japanese and the Americans into a way to save Russia from the Germans?

Come on, I'd love to hear that one.

Have you ever read (or listened to) Roosevelt's address to the joint session of Congress on December 8? If you have, you might notice that it does not have the word "Germany" in it anywhere. Not even a single mention of the war in Europe, of the desire to protect Russia or Britain or even to protect America by stopping the Germans. Nope, not a single word.

The only reason that Pearl Harbor brought the US into the war against Germany was because Hitler decided to declare war on the US within the week

Even IF the master genius Roosevelt could mystically predict Hitler's response (like ANYONE had been able to predict Hitler up to that point?), what exactly did a war with Japan do to protect Moscow from the Panzers in December of 1941? After Roosevelt's master play, how many US M6 37mm AT guns were shipped to Russia in time to defend Moscow? How many M2 Medium Tanks were used for their winter offensive?

How many? Hmmm? Anyone? Ferris?

See for the conspiracy theory to work, you have to accept a US government that is so clever that it can fully predict how the Japanese and Germans will react at each and every point, so that the Washington can maneuver the Japanese and the Germans into doing their exact bidding … but at the same time you have to accept a US government that is completely unable to get US forces to prepare for the result. So the Japanese did exactly what we bid them to do, and the Germans did exactly what we bid them to do, and we knew exactly what they would do and when … but the US Navy and Army just stumbled along unprepared, and Washington had no guess about whether they would or wouldn't be ready.

Silly. Just plain silly.

Google Search Halsey Battle Order #1 … line one of which states the Enterprise is operating under wartime conditions …

That was Halsey's order to his crew. Not an order from Washington to Halsey. Halsey was a no-nonsense commander, and while his order may appear dramatic, it succeeded in getting his crew to pay attention. Pearl was a plum assignment, lots of liberty, lots of sunshine and pretty girls, and he wanted to shake his crew out of their lethargy.

And by the way, it is interesting that you make a big deal about line 1 stating the Enterprise was operating under war conditions, but make no mention that the ONLY threat mentioned to the crew in the order, under line 3, was the threat of enemy submarines … as in there was not one word about any risk posed by hostile aircraft, or any extra measures to be taken to defend from such. And his Order #2 gave explicit instructions to open fire and begin maneuvering in the case of unidentified submarine contact, but very explicitly NOT to open fire on unidentified air contacts until consulting with the captain (or when under deliberate attack).

So please explain to us, was the great conspiracy actually to get the Japanese to attack the US Pacific Fleet in Pearl Harbor by submarine?

The word from Washington was encapsulated in the war warning issued to Kimmel. Has nothing to do with Halsey, one of Kimmel's many subordinates.

The warning to Kimmel, on November 27, BEFORE Halsey sailed, was:
THIS DISPATCH IS TO BE CONSIDERED A WAR WARNING … AGGRESSIVE ACTION EXPECTED BY JAPAN IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS.

So yes, tensions were high. Naval intelligence picked up many indications that the Japanese were going to get more aggressive against US interests, or those of European nations we were trying to support.

After the war warning, Kimmel decided to immediately re-enforce his distant outposts. Is that somehow remarkable? Or is it simply what you would expect a commander to do?

In that case, why should Halsey's order be a surprise? Why should it be evidence of anything other than a no-nonsense commander doing his duty? If you were in command of a mission to re-enforce an outpost, and had been warned by your superiors that conflict seemed imminent, why would it be at all remarkable that you tried to shake the sleep out of the eyes of your crew?

And so TF-8, with Enterprise, was ordered to ferry a squadron of Marine fighter planes to Wake, and to return to Pearl by December 6. And TF-12, with Lexington, was ordered to depart on December 5 to ferry a squadron of Marine dive bombers to Midway.

Now seriously, if you actually knew the Japanese were going to strike at Pearl Harbor, how does that even make a single bit of sense? First, the USN did not consider the carriers to be their most important ships. Those were the battleships, and the battleships were ordered to stay in port under all those defenses.

And if there was some super-secret never documented unspoken unwritten protocol not disclosed to the USN fleet commanders that considered carriers to be more important than battleships, why would the carriers have both been ordered out with ONLY ONE DAY of overlap between their deployments? Halsey delayed his return and arrived on mid-day on December 7. There were no oders sent to him to instruct him to delay his return, so are we to believe the ubermaster chessplayers had secret mind-meld communications to let him know he must delay his return? Exactly how fine-tuned was the knowledge of the Japanese attack? To the day? To the hour? I mean, I can hardly imagine a worse scenario, if you wanted to defend your carriers, than having one of them steaming INTO the harbor at the time of the attack. So they must have known to the hour right? Sure, you believe that, don't you?

Not only must the conspiracy define why the carriers were sent out in such piecemeal fashion, but also why they were sent north-westwards, TOWARDS Japan, and even TOWARDS the Kido Butai striking fleet, rather than towards safety to the East. So let's hear the explanation for that.

If you wanted to protect your carriers but just accidentally sent them out in the wrong direction, or even if you sent them that was deliberately to ambush the Japanese, WHY would you send them out with their decks full of Marine planes whose pilots where not carrier-qualified? Yeah, that's the first thing I'd do, send my "oh I have to keep them safe" assets towards an enemy that outnumbers them 3-to-1, but send them out one at a time so they can actually each be outnumbered 6-to-1, after first placing them in a condition in which they could not fight a naval engagement.

Sure, it all fits into the perfect plan, in someone's imagination. Not in the real world.

-Mark
(aka: Mk 1)

Quite interesting….

Amicalement
Armand

The whole story still carries an important message of multiple system failure, because of complacency and lack of preparation.

In my former work we often had new monitoring systems (eg a device that watched out for risk of facial nerve damage) introduced, which never actually went off. Until one day they did, but no one could see any problem. So what do you do, when it keeps doing this? You switch it off.

Just like a radar set that sees nothing day after day, until one day it does.

The whole story still carries an important message of multiple system failure, because of complacency and lack of preparation.

Quite agree.

But I would add, that there are a few more issues than just complacency and lack of preparation, that are found behind most cases of multiple system failures.

First, as anyone who has ever worked in a large organization probably knows, it is exceedingly difficult to get any organization of more than 30 or 40 people to behave as a monolith. Individuals wander off in their own directions in their daily work. Keeping them all on the same path, on the same track, on a daily basis is very challenging. So there are always individual weak links in a complex system solution that involves actual human beings.

Second is that, as you have noted, sensor inputs (or any type of inputs) may be easily seen as important after the fact, but are often not obviously important before the fact. There are typically hundreds and even thousands of inputs, and 2 or 3 are picked out after the fact for those who want to point fingers and say "see, it was obvious!". Well, when you are sorting through hundreds of inputs, it isn't obvious. Having data triage mechanisms becomes important -- here are the 20 most significant data inputs out of 200. OK, with 20 maybe you can actually pay each one enough attention to discern that 2 or 3 might be important enough to raise the alarm. But then, how good are your data triage mechanisms? Have you filtered OUT the important inputs rather than highlighting them?

Third is the management of information flow in hierarchies. Everyone in a hierarchy, even (and perhaps particularly) those who are very conscientious about their duties, will want to add value to communications that cross their desks. With that, every level of the hierarchy will add "delay" and/or "noise" to the signal. The technical rating sees something on the radar. Does he put enough attention into it raise the alarm to his NCO? If he does, does his NCO recognize the importance of this one rating's observation to report it to the officer of the day? And does he add his own interpretation? If he does, does that officer, who sees perhaps dozens of NCO inputs, see this one as important enough to pass it up the line? And if he does, does he pass it up the line immediately and urgently, or just as another item buried in the routine information package that flows each day. Does he add his own comments on how he interprets the observation? By the time anyone with the authority to do something about the observation gets the observation, is it too late to do anything about it, and does the information have any resemblance to what was originally observed?

All of these issues are commonly understood now, after so many decades of work on organizational behavior and technology management in so many business and engineering schools. But in the 1930s these were not topics that were studied and taught at universities across the country.

-Mark
(aka: Mk 1)

Lee494 makes a perfectly cogent argument. Is it correct? We will NEVER know. But the US government (i.e., FDR's inner circle) was well aware that the US had it within its power to very quickly collapse the Japanese economy at any time of its choosing; they assured the British government of this fact as a means of placating their concern about possible aggressive moves by Japan towards Malaya and Singapore. Furthermore, they had to know that the forward positioning of the US Pacific Fleet from the US west coast to the Hawaiian Islands could not be viewed by Japan as anything other than a direct military provocation. We can argue about what FDR's people really anticipated as the likely Japanese response, but it appears (to me at least) that they were not terribly concerned one way or the other. To imagine that the US failed to consider an outbreak of war as a distinct possibility is IMO impossible to swallow.

Read "The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in World War II – The War Against Japan".

B

Second is that, as you have noted, sensor inputs (or any type of inputs) may be easily seen as important after the fact, but are often not obviously important before the fact. There are typically hundreds and even thousands of inputs, and 2 or 3 are picked out after the fact for those who want to point fingers and say "see, it was obvious!". Well, when you are sorting through hundreds of inputs, it isn't obvious.

Every curriculum for training new intelligence analysts for every US Intelligence agency I know of has always either required or highly suggested Roberta Wohlstetter's "Pearl Harbor: Warning & Decision". The concept of "signals" to "noise" ratio (freely borrowed from radar concepts) is critical not only to Pearl Harbor but the intelligence profession as a whole.

If you are going to argue the signs were clear and you have not read this work or, at the very least, have a firm grasp of the main concept then your argument is built on a poor foundation at best.

Mark I that is a superb analysis 0f system failures. You expressed it far better than I did.

Marc335944, I have just ordered from Amazon UK!

You won't regret it. For others here is an older book review by the CIA:
link

Thanks!

Amicalement
Armand

Mark 1. Life is too short to respond to all of your criticisms of my post so I'll stick to the major ones. And the answers are obvious so I'd have thought you knew them. But here goes.

1. War with Japan did not guarantee war with Germany. True. But being at war was one giant step closer than sitting on the sidelines. Roosevelt was astute enough to realize that once at war including Germany as an opponent would be infinitely easier than otherwise. It doesn't take much imagination to see the many ways that goal could have been readily accomplished.

2. Pearl Harbor doesn't help Russia in 1941. Well of course not! With less than a month left in 1941 nothing would help. The real help came in 1942. No intention here of rearguing the impact of Lend Lease, but again the US position to aid Russia was much stronger as a participant than a bystander. It also meant that Russian had no worries about a possible Second Front with Japan. They say Stalin knew Japan WOULD not attack. After Pearl Harbor they COULD not attack. Major difference.

3. Ferrying the planes to Wake and Midway. A Ruse. They were out there looking for the Japanese Fleet albeit in the wrong places. Hence Halsey's order to the crew … BTW I never claimed it was from Washington.

The US Top Brass were not stupid. The Old Slow Dinosaur Battleships at Pearl could not fend off a major Japanese Air Attack AT SEA. Their best shot was under the protection of the AAC planes at Pearl.

Approach this like a gamer. According to American Thinking at Pearl you have over 100 fighters for air cover (at sea less that half that number). You still have all the ships AA. The enemy can't use Torpedos. If a Battleship gets sunk in harbor most of the crew survives and you simply refloat it. And with your carriers out on patrol maybe you discover and thwart the attack or at least blunt it without losing your Cause for War.

If I had needed to get into WWII moving the fleet to Pearl, goading the Japs into attacking it and making sure it was IN PEARL when attacked is exactly what I would have done to provoke WWII with the least damage to our forces. That the Army was so inept at defending Pearl even with the War Warnings, that the Japs figured out how to use torpedoes and cause massively more damage than anticipated, and that a lucky hit would blow up the USA Arizona just proves how a Perfect Plan can go awry.

Consider this though … The Jap Plan was to take the US out of the War. The US Plan was to get the US into the war. Fast forward which plan worked better? Short term and long term.

Roosevelt was a genius. Pearl was planned. Fact not Fiction.

To imagine that the US failed to consider an outbreak of war as a distinct possibility is IMO impossible to swallow. </>

But an outbreak of war and starting it with an attack on Pearl Harbor are two different questions!

donlowry wrote – "But an outbreak of war and starting it with an attack on Pearl Harbor are two different questions!"

Hi don,
I suggest that it is necessary to view this in the context of the US domestic political situation at the time. Given the strong isolationist sentiments among the American public, an unprovoked US declaration of war against anyone was HIGHLY unlikely to pass Congress. Roosevelt required some dramatic military provocation against the US to wave as a bloody flag in order to enrage the American public into supporting a war. Roosevelt got what he needed through a rapidly escalated campaign of economic provocations against Japan until they provided him the necessary excuse.

Japan's only other option was to surrender its entire national strategy to achieve status as a independent major power (like Great Britain, for example), and accept a future as a vassal or glorified client state of the West.

Strictly my opinion, of course.

B

why did halsey delay his return by a day?

Halsey was delayed by weather … the same weather front that effectively masked (and challenged) the Japanese approach to Hawaii.

His fleet (with Enterprise) was delayed by one day, and was about 150 miles west of Hawaii, steaming for Pearl, when the Japanese attack began. Enterprise had already begun the process of flying her planes off to land at Ford island. In fact, the first word Enterprise received of the attack was when they overheard one of their own pilots, Ensign Manuel Gonzales, from Scouting Six shouting over the radio "Don't shoot, we're Americans!" Gonzales' Dauntless was shot down during the attack, and he did not survive.

Even with the confusing transmissions received, Halsey continued steaming for Pearl. If the Japanese had in fact launched their third strike, they might well have discovered Enterprise at sea approaching Oahu. It was not until the confusion of the attack settled a bit that Halsey received orders not to return to port, and to sail SW to scout for the Japanese fleet. Fortunately for him the Japanese were not to the SW, but were to the N, closer to the area he had just come from (he was approaching from the NW).

If Enterprise had in fact engaged Kido Butai she would almost certainly have been sunk, particularly as she was now without her Scout Bomber squadron.

The lack of Scout Bombers meant that she had to fly her fighters as part of her scouting patterns later on that day (Dec. 7). The Wildcats didn't have the full range of the Dauntless (particularly at economical cruise), but if they covered the arc towards Hawaii as the Enterprise sailed away, they could in fact recover at Pearl. This seemed reasonable, but tragically led to more casualties, as several of the Fighting Six Wildcats were shot down by friendly fire (AA), and their pilot's killed, when they tried to land at Ford Island at dusk.

-Mark
(aka: Mk 1)

An interesting extra bit of the intelligence material available in that time frame was that the British had identified a Japanese naval force sailing off the coast of Malaysia. In fact a British fighter was engaged and shot down in scouting out that information.

The British concluded that a Japanese attack on Thailand was imminent. They already had that scenario in mind, and had considered moving troops into Thailand in advance, but delayed that over fear it would in fact spur the Japanese to action.

During the day of Dec. 6 they informed the US Government of their intelligence, and their belief that a major Japanese force was sailing towards Thailand. Roosevelt went so far as to send a telegram to Hirohito, imploring him to not take further military actions in the areas of French Cochinchina, Malaya, the Philippines and Thailand, and promising that the US would not move in, and suggesting he could obtain assurances from those nations and even China to forego further military expansions if Japan did not expand it's forces.

The great majority of the intelligence seemed to point to the pre-existing American model, which said that the Japanese would start any war by striking SE Asia. The US actions were entirely consistent with their actual Warplan Orange (rather than the plan, a FACT as we are told, for which there is no record or evidence), which while out of date still was basically followed. That plan anticipated a Japanese move toward SE Asia. After hostilities began, the US Pacific Fleet was to sail to re-enforce the Philippines, and to engage the IJN in that area.

For that plan, a major port and airfields had been constructed over a period of several years on Oahu, and the Pacific Fleet moved there from the West Coast. Outlying airfields had bee constructed on several small atolls to the W of Hawaii to provide outposts to cover the sailing of the fleet. These outposts were not exactly finished, but were well underway, and were re-enforced as war seemed imminent.

The great majority of the intelligence fit that pre-conceived model of how a war with Japan would go.

Except of course that Roosevelt, while evidently unable to get the American voting public, the US congress, or US military leadership to give him the war he wanted with Germany, had evidently managed to manipulate the Japanese and German political and military hierarchies into doing his bidding with a 100% success rate, according to a master plan that no one wrote, modified, reviewed, recorded or even communicated to anyone (except through magic telepathy).

-Mark
(aka: Mk 1)

Mark,
I suggest that you read The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in World War II: The War Against Japan". Just reading the introduction will do; it illuminates the lengthy pre-war negotiations (starting as early as 1937), contingency planning and successive agreements between the USA, Great Britain, and the Netherlands regarding protection of their colonial interests against possible Japanese incursions. Roosevelt was kept fully informed by the JCS and had final yea/nay approval on everything – all handled "unofficially" by the White House due to Roosevelt's concern over political repercussions if these secret military discussions were exposed to the attention of a strongly isolationist Congress and public.

You might also wish to examine the circumstances and background of the US freezing of Japanese assets in July 1941. The Japanese government had negotiated a huge purchase order for US oil (equivalent to about two years consumption). The export licenses were formally approved and issued by the federal government and Japan made advance payment in full to the seller. As soon as these funds entered the US banking system, the export licenses were summarily revoked and all Japanese assets in the USA, including those funds, were frozen. Roosevelt knew all about it.

B

Blutarski:

If you are referring to the official history, assembled by Grace Person Hayes, I commend you for your choice and the depth of your research.

I do not disagree with much of what you say on this subject. And even when I do disagree with your conclusions, I can at least examine the sources you have read to give you your views.

I will note that the book in question was based on a full collection of documents and historical records. There are numerous memos, meeting minutes, and correspondences that record the process, even if many of them were classified as secret at the time, and some of the communications with the President himself were done orally in-person.

A case can be made, with reason, that the US was trying to manipulate or play "aggressively" with Japan. We may disagree on the end game that FDR's administration had in mind, but the facts we use are largely the same.

That's a little different than the suggestion made by others that FDR knew the place, the day, and the time of the Japanese attack, and that it was all some sort of super-secret conspiracy, with a plan never written down, and communications never recorded, that somehow led to dozens of navy and aircorps personnel issuing all the right orders half-way across the world at exactly the right moments.

Holding up orders given by a Captain to his crew on November 29 while his ship was underway, as clear evidence of the "FACT" that FDR knew that the Japanese were going to attack Pearl Harbor on December 7, as part of the "FACT" of his master plan to get us into a war with Germany in time to save the Russians from Panzers in Moscow, is not reasoning, not analysis, not historical investigation … it is just tin-foil-hat conspiracy mongering.

I've done research in the National Archives. There is almost nothing that our government does, or has done for the last 200 years, that is not in the written record. Every government meeting generates minutes. Every correspondence includes a copy-to-file.

Even TOP SECRET correspondence between Washington and Hawaii had to be given in WRITTEN form to an an intelligence officer to be encoded, who then took a WRITTEN version of the encoded message to a communications rating, who noted the message he was going to transmit in his logs, then transmitted it. Then the receiving communications rating noted it in his logs, took a WRITTEN form of the message to be decoded, where a WRITTEN decoded message was then delivered to whomever the secret message was for.

All of those written notes and logs were kept, and most have made their way into the archives.

The idea that a president can get anyone to do anything without copious documents being produced is simply wrong. Even more wrong in the era of telegraphy.

If there was a plan, produce the plan. If there was a policy, produce the policy briefing.

You can't run an organization of hundreds of thousands of individuals, with tens of thousands of managers, without writing down what you want people to do. It's just not the way organizations work. The boss can't be everywhere every time any decision is made. No matter how much he wants something to happen, it won't happen if he doesn't write down the direction, the priorities, the intentions, or the explicit instructions. The guy at the end of the hierarchy can't just read his mind and know what he wants, and if you don't provide instructions in a written form, they won't make it through the layers of hierarchy to get from the president to the guy who actually tells the ship where to go or the pilot where to fly.

That's a different topic than the question of whether FDR froze Japanese funds because he was a greedy money-grubbing imperialist war monger, or because he wanted the Japanese to stop their military expansion across China.

-Mark
(aka: Mk 1)

@ Mark

You can't run an organization of hundreds of thousands of individuals, with tens of thousands of managers, without writing down what you want people to do. It's just not the way organizations work.

I agree, it's always the historiography that debunks conspiracy theories. Those who deny the holocaust need to explain why thousands of supporting documents evidencing it exist. Those who argue PH was a set-up need to explain why thousands of such documents don't.

@ Blutarski

You imply that there was something underhanded about the U.S. decision to shut down the sale of oil to Japan and seize Japanese financial assets. The Japanese may have thought in the summer of 1941 their business dealings in the U.S. could continue independent of whatever military or foreign policy Japan may have chose to carry out. However the year before the U.S. made clear that Japanese aggression would be met with U.S. economic sanctions when FDR chose to use the Export Control Act of 1940 to ban certain exports to Japan. Japan took a gamble in July 1941 that it could continue expanding its control in IndoChina without risking its oil deal with the U.S., or at a minimum at least being able to recover its financial assets. It lost.

In any event the Japanese plan for launching a near simultaneous attack or Pearl Harbor, Malaya and the Dutch East Indies predated the U.S. decision to cut off Japanese oil and seize Japan's financial assets.

Mark,
Thank you for your reasonable and measured reply. Allow me to offer a couple of comments:

> The lifeblood of any great bureaucratic institution indeed consists of paper and records. It does not, however, follow that all such archival records are available to the public. Documents marked "top secret" that one might access in NARA today are in fact de-classified items that the government is willing to release to the public. Records and documents currently classified as top secret are not available for public scrutiny. Do we even know whether "top secret" is the most sensitive classification level? How long may a document remain secret? No idea. What I do know is that the UK still maintains an official "one hundred year rule" for very "sensitive" records and retains a unilateral right to extend that period as it sees fit.

> Drawing upon my personal experience in both working for and dealing with certain large global corporate entities (Associate Metals and Minerals Corp, Dupont, Monsanto, Daimler-Benz, Kyocera, ALPS, Sinochem, RBS, etc) I have personally encountered more than a few occasions when big issues of a time sensitive or politically sensitive nature have been handled by very "informal" means (a phone call with the office door shut, an argument across a desk, a quick chat outside the office over lunch) and never officially documented. I would be very surprised if such situations did not arise in government. To paraphrase Yogi Berra – "we don't know what we don't know". That has been my personal experience; take it for whatever you think it might be worth.

As I mentioned in my first post, we will likely never know the complete truth underlying the events in question. But it is fair to say that the available puzzle pieces can be assembled to form more than one picture.

B

Bill N wrote -
"You imply that there was something underhanded about the U.S. decision to shut down the sale of oil to Japan and seize Japanese financial assets."

> Put yourself in the position of Japan. The fact that the export licenses had been formally issued was a clear commitment on the part of the government of the United States that approval for the transaction had been officially granted. Let's assume that, even after issuance, the US retained the right to unilaterally cancel the licenses (I do not know that to have been a fact). On what grounds did the government then freeze all Japanese assets, when a simple refusal to sell would have sufficed. One possible answer – one can quite reasonably argue that Roosevelt was waging a campaign of "non-kinetic" warfare against Japan and took the opportunity to give the screws an extra turn to raise pressure Japan into complying with its demands.

- – -

"The Japanese may have thought in the summer of 1941 their business dealings in the U.S. could continue independent of whatever military or foreign policy Japan may have chose to carry out. However the year before the U.S. made clear that Japanese aggression would be met with U.S. economic sanctions when FDR chose to use the Export Control Act of 1940 to ban certain exports to Japan."

> Deals of this magnitude do not get done in a week – take my word on that. The US could at any point have simply revoked its approval for the oil deal under the ECA. Why did the US choose to take the extra and unusual step of freezing Japan's assets?

- – -

"Japan took a gamble in July 1941 that it could continue expanding its control in IndoChina without risking its oil deal with the U.S., or at a minimum at least being able to recover its financial assets. It lost."

> On what grounds of international law did the US justify its exercise of such dire economic pressure on Japan. Did the US have any formal alliances with Great Britain, France, Netherlands, China? If not, how can the conduct of the US government be described as anything other than raw self-interested international power politics? Well prior to the outbreak of WW2 in 1939, in discussions between the JCS and the British delegation had requested the US to commit military forces to help protect Singapore. The JCS demurred on actual US military involvement, but assured Great Britain that the US was in a position to rapidly collapse the entire Japanese economy if it became necessary to do so (they were telling the truth – Japan's Achilles Heel was its utter economic reliance upon the US. Non-kinetic warfare).

- – -

"In any event the Japanese plan for launching a near simultaneous attack on Pearl Harbor, Malaya and the Dutch East Indies predated the U.S. decision to cut off Japanese oil and seize Japan's financial assets."

> Every nation makes plans, for a variety of anticipated contingencies. But plans, in and of themselves, do not constitute acts unless/until they are set into physical motion.

- – -

At the end of the day, when examined dispassionately, the policies adopted by the US government with respect to Asia presented Japan with two stark choice:

(a) relinquish all ambitions to achieve independent regional power status, accept the existing Asian colonial structure erected by the European powers and effectively submit to the status of vassal state of the US.

(b) pursue its own economic expansionist program in SE Asia at the price of going to war with the West.

(c) Roosevelt was not a stupid man; he cannot have possibly been unaware of the very palpable war risk the above entailed. If so, then it must be concluded that he was willing to accept the risk (or perhaps actually embraced the likelihood) of embroiling the US in war. We will never know the truth at this distant remove.

Welcome to the unseemly world of international power politics. There are no white hats here, IMO – only self-interested ones.

Your mileage may, of course, vary. This is my opinion.

B

donlowry wrote – "But an outbreak of war and starting it with an attack on Pearl Harbor are two different questions!"

Blutarski, I think you missed my point, although I thought it was straight-forward enough. FDR might well have expected Japan to attack sometime soon, but he did not necessarily expect it to be at Pearl Harbor.

I just dont understand how many of these discussions devolve into Japan being the aggrieved party and somehow blameless. Japan carried out clear provocations despite numerous warnings.

Lets forget for now they invaded Manchuria and set up the puppet regime of Manchukuo in 1932. Or withdrawal from the Washington Naval treaty in 1934 to become effective in 1936 (and despite warnings from Admiral Yamamoto that it was actually in Japan's interests to continue to abide by the treaty). Or the invasion of China proper using the Marco Polo bridge incident as a pretext in 1937. Or even the undeclared border incident (to be kind) with Russia in 1939.

Instead we get the US being provocative by moving the Pacific Fleet to Pearl Harbor in 1940. Of course totally ignored is the fact the Japan was forward basing its own military assets prior to this. For example in 1939 Japan began making major improvements to its anchorage at Truk and forward based their 4th fleet there.

I dont agree the only choices Japan faced were the two you give.There was a middle ground where Japan could leverage diplomatic power vice purely military power to forge alliances in the Pacific. By this point, however, not only was Japan impatient but the military held sway to the point that civilian authorities who disagreed with their approach risked losing their lives.

And we are left with what response the US should have pursued. What response would have been appropriate given the circumstances?

There is no reason that the United States or the United Kingdom was obligated to put themselves in the position of Japan. Both the U.S. and U.K. had interests in the area including trading relationships with China that had been adversely affected by Japanese actions. Both the U.S. and U.K. had clearly stated their opposition to the Japanese actions and had issued calls for Japan to return to the status quo ante. Japan had ignored these calls.

As you say deals like the negotiation for the right to purchase oil do not happen overnight. Japanese officials negotiating for the right to purchase the oil were on notice of both the Export Control Act which authorized the U.S. to embargo the sale of goods to Japan and U.S. laws such as the Trading with the Enemy Act which allowed the seizure of foreign financial assets. They had already seen the U.S. flex its economic power in response to actions by Japan which the U.S. felt harmed its interests. Japanese officials should have been aware that any concessions obtained in negotiations could easily be revoked at the stroke of a pen. So since Japan should have known both its ability to access U.S. oil and its financial assets were at risk, why didn't they restrict their activities during this time period.

The response we in the U.S. usually get is that the Japanese military (specifically army) had its own agenda that they were not willing to defer, even if it put the oil deal and finances at risk. I have no idea whether that explanation is true or not. What I don't buy for a second is the argument that Japan in good faith believed it could act as it wished in the Far East without putting its deal at risk.

Blutarski:

Documents marked "top secret" that one might access in NARA today are in fact de-classified items that the government is willing to release to the public. Records and documents currently classified as top secret are not available for public scrutiny.

This is not entirely true. Yes, documents can be de-classified by the classifying agency. But since 1967, under the Freedom of Information Act, any US citizen has the right to request any document from any Federal Agency.

Once an FOIA form is submitted, that Federal Agency must, by law, defend any document it is determined not to disclose, according to very specific guidelines. There are 9 categories of exemptions that might lead to a document not being disclosed. The first one is the most commonly thought of by the lay public -- that a presidential executive order identifies a national security issue, that requires the document to remain secret.

But note that for the exemption to apply, the national security issue that led to the classification of the document must still be a national security issue.

It is not possible today to make a case that a court would uphold, that a national security interest exists today on correspondence related to US – Japan relations in 1941.

Do we even know whether "top secret" is the most sensitive classification level?

It makes no difference what the security levels are. Any citizen has the right to demand any document from any Federal Agency.

How long may a document remain secret? No idea. What I do know is that the UK still maintains an official "one hundred year rule" for very "sensitive" records and retains a unilateral right to extend that period as it sees fit.

You may not know. But that does not mean that it is not known.

The 5th Exemption Category:

Protects certain records exchanged within or between agencies that are normally privileged in the civil discovery context, such as records protected by the deliberative process privilege (provided the records are less than 25 years old)…

So any agency meeting minutes or inter-agency correspondence which might have been classified, can not be defended from an FOIA request after 25 years.

There are still exemptions for issues like personal information (a member of the public's taxpayer ID or social security number can never be obtained by an FOIA request), and corporate / industrial trade secrets (the recipe for Coca Cola, if it does exist in Federal Records, can not be obtained through an FOIA request). But if items such as these are included in other records, that portion will be redacted and the remainder of the documents released when requested.

To paraphrase Yogi Berra – "we don't know what we don't know".

The hardest part of doing research in the archives is finding what you want. The archives do not have a keyword search function. There are hundreds of thousands of boxes of paper stored in many many levels of archival halls. The boxes are indexed, but only by the most general process. So for example there may be a box in the index described as "Meeting Minutes of the Tank Development Board, April 3, 1943 to June 30, 1943". What is in those meeting minutes? What is missing from those meeting minutes? Well, as a researcher you don't know -- you call for the box by index number, and you get the box, and you go through the papers in the box, and you find what you find.

How did you know you wanted that box? Well, you found something in another box -- maybe a box on "Correspondence of the Chief of Ordnance, May 1 1943 to May 31, 1943)" that referred to a request or a requirement or a statement of the Tank Development Board, and you figured that seemed like a likely place to look for more information on the topic.

This is the work of the historian. It's not sitting and doing a Google search and then hypothicating on what it all must mean, but is digging, and digging deeper, to get at, find, and bring to light the relevant core records of history.

This is one of the ways that the better writers of WW2 history, even the better writers of pulp WW2 history such as Steve Zaloga, Harry Yiede, and Gordon Rottman, spend large portions of their time.

And by the way the US National Archives also include substantial bodies of foreign material. All of the Japanese and German records that were found at the end of WW2 are in the National Archives. All of the correspondence and documents sent by allies are in the National Archives. It is even asserted that the Arc of the Covenant is in the National Archives*.

The reason I describe this process (other than just to share it with those who may not understand what historians actually do), is to highlight how we come to know what we don't know. As you do the research, you find the pointers, the links, the clues. You find references to the document that you didn't know existed. Then you know it exists.

-Mark
(aka: Mk 1)

*American pop culture reference, but probably only to those who are old enough to have been pops for a few years now.

Do we even know whether "top secret" is the most sensitive classification level?

In the US there are 3 levels of classification: Confidential, Secret and Top Secret. However there are certain compartments within those classifications. Some compartments are so sensitive only a handful have access (need to know). There are also various handling caveats added when warranted.

So someone cleared for Top Secret, even for sensitive information, might not have access to all compartments.

donlowry wrote -
"Blutarski, I think you missed my point, although I thought it was straight-forward enough. FDR might well have expected Japan to attack sometime soon, but he did not necessarily expect it to be at Pearl Harbor."

Perhaps some imprecise language on my part; if so, my apologies. In point of fact, I agree that the actual point of attack almost certainly remained unknown. My intention was merely to say that Roosevelt's aggressive stance toward Japan leads me to speculate that he did not seem terribly concerned if his policies did ignite war with Japan.

B

Marc33594 wrote -
"I just don't understand how many of these discussions devolve into Japan being the aggrieved party and somehow blameless. Japan carried out clear provocations despite numerous warnings."

A lot depends upon how you look at the issue. Unless Japan were threatening the Philippines or Guam, what business was it of the USA to aggressively intervene in Japan's program of expansion elsewhere in SE Asia. The USA declined to act with similar aggressiveness when the USSR occupied Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, when the USSR invaded Finland, when the USSR forcibly seized a swathe of territory from Romania, when the USSR invaded Poland. Based upon that differential and the clear and unambiguous effort on the part of the US to cripple Japan's economy unless it immediately acceded to the political demands of the US, one could make an argument that Japan had grievances on that basis.

Was Japan "blameless" with relation to the outbreak of the Pacific war. No, and I don't believe I ever made such an argument. Japan they did after all "cast the first stone". Nevertheless, it is difficult to see what options short of abject surrender to American demands were available to them.

- – -

"Lets forget for now they invaded Manchuria and set up the puppet regime of Manchukuo in 1932."

See USSR discussion above.

- – -

"Or withdrawal from the Washington Naval treaty in 1934 to become effective in 1936 (and despite warnings from Admiral Yamamoto that it was actually in Japan's interests to continue to abide by the treaty)."

I believe Japan was within its rights to do so, irrespective of Yamamoto's warning; Yamamoto was not after all a senior member of the government. If I'm incorrect in this point, please advise.

- – -

"Or the invasion of China proper using the Marco Polo bridge incident as a pretext in 1937. Or even the undeclared border incident (to be kind) with Russia in 1939."

See USSR discussion above.

- – -

"Instead we get the US being provocative by moving the Pacific Fleet to Pearl Harbor in 1940. Of course totally ignored is the fact the Japan was forward basing its own military assets prior to this. For example in 1939 Japan began making major improvements to its anchorage at Truk and forward based their 4th fleet there."

Truk was a Japanese possession; they had every right to establish a military base there. The US already had military bases in the Philippines and Guam. Just saying.

- – -

"I dont agree the only choices Japan faced were the two you give.There was a middle ground where Japan could leverage diplomatic power vice purely military power to forge alliances in the Pacific. By this point, however, not only was Japan impatient but the military held sway to the point that civilian authorities who disagreed with their approach risked losing their lives."

How does Japan leverage diplomatic power in a region where almost the entire region was under colonial rule by western powers? How does Japan exercise diplomatic power when it is common knowledge that its economy is utterly reliant upon the good graces of the western powers? China was the only area even remotely free for expansion or exploitation. Once again, just saying.

- – -

"And we are left with what response the US should have pursued. What response would have been appropriate given the circumstances?"

IMO, there was no alternate response after the US had cast its lot so decisively with the western colonial powers. And the fact that the US had identified Japan as its number one potential military opponent right from the end of WW1 speaks volumes. Japan was basically stuck playing a losing strategic hand; her only option was to take the position she currently occupies today – vassal state of the west.

I understand you may disagree, but the above is my take on the entire sad drama we call WW2 in the Pacific: the unhappily foreseeable result of a twenty year long strategic vector.

B

Mark,
Thanks for the extensive discourse on classification standards. Do forgive me for remaining somewhat skeptical that absolutely everything related to our government's activities is open to citizen access. If so, it would be the first such occasion in human history.

B

BTW, interesting essay here – hsdl.org/?view&did=38470

B

So someone cleared for Top Secret, even for sensitive information, might not have access to all compartments.

I was cleared for a compartment for 2 years and never saw a classified document. I never had a need to know. I was cleared in case I saw something maintaining the computers.

Of course I didn't have a "want to know" either.

Truk was a Japanese possession; they had every right to establish a military base there. The US already had military bases in the Philippines and Guam. Just saying.

And here is precisely an example. So it was ok for Japan to build up an existing base and forward deploy one of their fleets yet when the US moves to Pearl Harbor, which was already well established as a major base, and they had every right to do so in reaction, it was provocative.

And you are correct we fundamentally disagree. I find it especially egregious that not only were we not allowed to convey our disagreement with their militaristic policies but if we didnt actively support it by providing the materials needed to pursue that policy we were once again at fault and provocative.

I do commend you for sticking to the issues which is somewhat of a rarity for many of these discussions. But we will just have to agree to disagree.

Thomalley you are correct. In fact it was very possible that one could hold a Top Secret clearance and not have access to a compartment in a Secret program.

I also understand your circumstances. In at least one case I was cleared for an extremely restricted program because I couriered documents within the Pentagon and clearance was necessary not because I was able to read the material, I wasnt, but in case any material was inadvertently exposed while I was couriering it!

My intention was merely to say that Roosevelt's aggressive stance toward Japan leads me to speculate that he did not seem terribly concerned if his policies did ignite war with Japan.

If you had quit here I would not have jumped back into this thread. I don't believe that FDR was not terribly concerned about a war with Japan. I think as does the author of your link that the war FDR was angling to fight in was the one in Europe. This is just my interpretation though. I would not feel obliged to comment just because you had a different one.

What I have a problem with is your implication that there was something underhanded about the actions the U.S. took in July of 1941. Japan knew or should have known that its continued aggression could provoke just this response. Your own link shows this. Yet Japan proceeded anyways. You talk about the U.S. giving the Japanese two stark choices. That does not make it underhanded. If it did though, how was what Japan was doing any different?

Marc33594 wrote -
"And here is precisely an example. So it was ok for Japan to build up an existing base and forward deploy one of their fleets yet when the US moves to Pearl Harbor, which was already well established as a major base, and they had every right to do so in reaction, it was provocative.

And you are correct we fundamentally disagree. I find it especially egregious that not only were we not allowed to convey our disagreement with their militaristic policies but if we didnt actively support it by providing the materials needed to pursue that policy we were once again at fault and provocative.

I do commend you for sticking to the issues which is somewhat of a rarity for many of these discussions. But we will just have to agree to disagree.

- – -

What I am saying is that acts have consequences.
> The US moves the Pacific Fleet to Pearl Harbor; Japan views it as a provocation.
> Japan establishes a base at Truk; the US sees it as a threat.

B

Bill N wrote -
"What I have a problem with is your implication that there was something underhanded about the actions the U.S. took in July of 1941."

It all depends upon the point of view of the observer; put yourself in Tokyo. The US killing of the oil deal by revoking the export licenses is one thing; freezing Japanese assets, including the money put up in good faith (from a business perspective) is quite another thing. What do you suppose the Japanese thought about that development? Please understand that I'm not arguing rights and wrongs here; I'm simply examining events and the reactions they evoked among the various actors.

What this all boils down to, I think, is an unwillingness to consider the possibility that Roosevelt was not so much playing raw and aggressive power politics in order to nobly save China from Japan, but to protect the important SE Asian colonial interests of Great Britain, France and the Netherlands while they were "otherwise occupied" by the European war. For example, the Rape of Nanking occurred in 1937 and the Sino-Japanese war had been ongoing for nearly four years. But it was not until 1940-1941 that Roosevelt really put the economic screws to the Japanese. What happened in 1940/1941? Vichy France had signed an agreement with Japan to take over administration of French Indochina and the Japanese were moving a considerable number of troops there – which (per the JCS history) was being viewed as a dangerous threat to British and Dutch interests in Thailand, Burma, Java, Singapore, Malaya, Borneo, etc.

As I mentioned before to Mark, the true portrait of events will likely never be known, but the available puzzle pieces can be assembled to display a variety of possible scenarios.

B

Whoa. There used to be an expression losing sight of the Forrest for the Trees. Sometimes people can lose sight of the Trees for the Toothpicks!

Let's talk Binary choices. If I'm standing holding a coffee cup (say I've finished the coffee for arguments sake) and I let go and drop it on the floor I know with ABSOLUTE certainty that one of two things will happen; either it will break or not break. I don't even have to watch it fall and hit the floor to know those are the only two outcomes possible.

Fast forward to Pearl. The actions of moving the fleet to Pearl and cutting off the Japanese supply of oil had only two possible outcomes (assuming the US didn't back off). They were going to give in to US demands (probably after negotiations) or they were going to be provoked into a war with the US.

You don't need years of research to know that. And the two most likely targets were the Philipines and Pearl. An attack on either one would have sufficed. Pearl was the juicier target with the bulk of the Battlefleet there. Intentionally.

So with respect to all the cogent arguments in this thread I respectfully still say the top American Leaders were all anticipating an attack by Japan within a short time probably by the end of 1941 (hence Halsey's Battle Order). They expected that attack on Pearl or the Philippines or BOTH.

Did they "know" it was going to start with Pearl on the morning of December 7th. Obviously NOT. But in the event Japan did end up attacking Pearl AND the Philippines in the short term just as the US actions were designed to provoke them to do. If I drop a cup either it will break or it will not.

All of the research needed to show this has already been published in many books. So it's not a Conspiracy Theory to say that Pearl Harbor was anticipated and planned by the US.

I'll go further and say it was fervently hoped for. Cheers!

PS and to restate what I said in my original post those using Pearl as bait for an attack could never have anticipated the huge success or tremendous casualties of the actual attack … no more than they could have anticipated the complete collapse of the defenses in the Philippines (or the Brits have anticipated the Singapore Disaster for that matter). FDR had to believe his top commanders would give a much better account of themselves.