"French tactical virtuosity" Topic

Hi all,

In his rather lovely Osprey 'French Napoleonic Infantry Tactics' (pp. 58-59 and Plate E), Griffiths used Morand's Division at Auerstadt as an examplar for the way that well-drilled and experienced French battalions of N's earlier campaigns could shift speedily from one formation to the other under fire, beating off less handy Allied attacks: from column of march, to line (to beat off Prussian infantry), to square (to beat off Prussian cavalry), and then back into column (for the final advance).

I'm sure I recollect another example, used in various books on the period, which indicates similar (and possibly even more impressive) French tactical virtuosity. It may have been a *single* battalion, and it may have involved significantly more formation changes in one battle than those outlined in Griffiths' example.

Anyone have any ideas / suggestions, please?

Chandler also used Morand's Division as an example of the same thing.

Are you thinking of St. Hilaire's Division at Austerlitz? Rory Muir made much of that.

On the other hand, changing formation from march column to line to square to column over the course of the battle doesn't actually sound that impressive to me, there are loads of Allied examples of this kind of thing in the Peninsular and Waterloo. Sure, very well played to Morand's troops for their acheivement in 1806; but French troops fought very well against Prussians in 1813, 1814 and 1815 too.

I would recommend Brent Nosworthy's With Musket, Cannon and Sword: Battle Tactics of Napoleon and His enemies for an excellent treatise on the evolution of horse and musket battle tactics throughout the 18th and early 19th Centuries. Although somewhat 'old' (published in 1996), Nosworthy has covered in detail the tactical virtuosity of the various European armies during the 'Napoleonic' period and examined the genesis of those tactics during the mid-part of the 18th Century.

He covers those two examples cited above as well as many others.

I just finished reading it and am pondering what, if any, changes need to be made to the Napoleonic rules our wargaming group uses.

Jim

Nosworthy's book has too many errors in it for accurate reference and use.

George Nafziger's Imperial Bayonets is much better and the applicable chapter in John Elting's Swords Around a Throne is quite succinct on the French tactical system.

The Background of Napoleonic Warfare by Robert Quimby is also quite useful.

>>Chandler also used Morand's Division as an example of the same thing.

I hesitate to be critical of the great and the dead, but Chandlers cited example is merely a recitation of Napoleons instruction…

And they didn't use this formation to attack at Austerlitz either, except perhaps when marching off from camp. They had a defile to pass in Puntowitz first and redeploy to advance. Did they do this in the 'famous' "20 minutes Sire" – I don't think so.

I've never seen an actual field drawing or map that shows this- I do have some plans from SHAT that show Bernadottes advance via the defile of Girzikowitz a couple of hours later.

There is a significant difference between manoeurvring on a plain and an actual assault. Even on the gentle slopes leading to Pratze (Pratzen) this formation was not used. Indeed it was to my horror and discontent that I discover from Théibaults own pen that he d it up.

The Division was mostly of battalions in line. The 10e legere on the left flank of the Division, not in front as skirmishers, adjacent but nowhere near Vandamme (around the hill).

Théibaults Brigade (4 bns) seems to have been in two battalion lines with each regiment abreast. However the 'assault' on Pratze village was to be performed by the 1/ 14eme de Ligne on the right.

This battalion in line, without skirmishers nor scouts in advance*, was 'suprised' in Théibaults own words, buy a Russian musketeer battalion standing up from the (drainage) ditch in their front and delivering a withering full volley at a close distance.

The 1/ 14eme de Ligne broke immediately from this rebuke and fled back approximately 200m behind their second battalion who took up the battle. Both Generals St.Hilaire and Théibault were necessary to calm and reform the men before they could again advance.

What a calamitous start to the master stroke of Austerlitz!
*Are we to infer that they had no voltigeurs?

Recitation of 'regulations' and 'decrees' in modern works doesn't make it so. Colin covers this 100 years ago…
reagrds d

I would venture to guess that these successes had more to do with the commanding officers timing than the troops ability to change formations

Good Day RedCoat,

here's the 4 croquis for Auerstaedt, from Bressonnet

link

link

link

link

I would venture to guess that these successes had more to do with the commanding officers timing than the troops ability to change formations

It was a combination of the troops' training and the skill of the commander. The French tactical excellence was a combination of the training and experimentation in Normandy and at Metz in the late 1770s that was continued when the shooting started.

The French were combining regular light troops with regulars in formation supported by artillery. The French artillery schools taught infantry/artillery cooperation and that can be seen quite plainly at both Jena and Auerstadt in 1806.

One of the practices used by most French infantry commanders was that instead of having their first line in a regular formation they were deployed in a heavy skirmish line. Lannes did this at Jena and Friedland and Soult did the same at Eylau. At the battle of Heilsberg, Legrand deployed the 26th Legere as well as the Tirailleurs du Po and the Tirailleurs Corse as skirmishers backed up by battalion columns to attack Russian formations in the woods. Davout did the same thing in the 'hill fighting' west of Ratisbon in the first phase of the Campaign of 1809.

It wasn't just a matter of changing formations, but of deploying the infantry in the best manner in order to be successful. And all troops did not use the same formation at once, but a different combination depending on the situation.

Thanks those croquis explain a lot and demolish Elting's myth of how French infantry acted on the battle field.

Please explain, if you are able, how Col Elting's explation of French infantry tactics is a 'myth.'

And perhaps you could also reference your answer, if you choose to reply, with source material that contradicts what Col Elting has chosen to write.

Since you often reference, without citations, the two-volume work of Jean Morvan's Le Soldat Imperial perhaps that will be of assistance in the thread. And along with any relevant sections of Ramsay Phipps five-volume work, The Armies of the First French Republic, you might reinforce your 'point' instead of constantly denigrating the work of an authority in the field.

John Lynn's The Bayonets of the Republic might also be helpful as a reference if you have it to hand.

Opinions are good; opinions backed up by soures are better. Both are better than unsourced denigration of a useful source.

Re: Brent Nosworthy's With Musket, Cannon and Sword: Battle Tactics of Napoleon and His enemies

Nosworthy's book has too many errors in it for accurate
reference and use.

Are these errors analysed and available for easy viewing anywhere?

Are these errors analysed and available for easy viewing anywhere?

Kevin's criticisms can be seen in his review here: link

Most of his criticisms can be divided into those which are trivial, those which are false and those which are both, so can be safely ignored. Nosworthy is much better than Elting on tactical combat and is typically more useful than the Nafziger; however Nafziger's main use is as a digest of the drill books, so is attempting something slightly different, whilst Elting's main value is in French and Imperial organizational stuff, so they all complement each other.

Better look into Colin, who provides into his very lengthy foreword plenty of battle field reports which demolish Elting, for links see the useful stuff thread.

Caveat on Nafziger he used also a proposed drill book, or revised drill of 1791 – which was never introduced in the French army, A Treatise Upon the Regulations of the French Infantry by Général de brigade Meunier.

For French tactics, there is no substitute for Colin, Foucart and Bressonnet, especially for the early Napoleonic Period.

@WW & Von WF – thank you for the pointers.

I've just dragged out NOSWORTHY Battle Tactics of Napoleon and his enemies; ROTHENBERG The Art of Warfare in the Age of Napoleon; and MUIR Tactics and the Experience of Battle in the Age of Napoleon – all these close-to-hand on my wargaming shelf.

I always enjoy reading them for the tactical things; ROTHENBERG The Emperor's Last Victory I've found the best for higher-level operations and explanation of the staying power of proper Corps d'Armee..

I can see BRESSONET Battle Studies- still in its packaging on the atlas shelf – i can't bear to open it yet – maybe when it gets to USD1,000 on Amazon!

I've also found a copy of ELTING (Col) Swords Around A Throne – ex the uniforms guide shelf – GBP5.99 from a discount bookshop. I note the linked Amazon review is 20 years old!!!

I know QUIMBY is somewhere – Brechtel recommended it me in the past.

Which one by COLIN should I get – must I learn French?

The 10e legere on the left flank of the Division, not in front as skirmishers, adjacent but nowhere near Vandamme (around the hill).

SHaT1984:

Goetz in his book 1805 Austerlitz shows the 10e Legere on the right flank. Soult's report has the legere regiments in front of each division, one per division, making a total of three lines in the advance. Other accounts describe the same arrangement.
What is your source[s]?

They had a defile to pass in Puntowitz first and redeploy to advance. Did they do this in the 'famous' "20 minutes Sire" – I don't think so.

Are you talking about Soult's advance? What defile are you referring to?

@Stoppage

this Colin

link

one has to read the extensive preface – much better than any other work in English, with the exception of Lynn, Bayonets of the Republic – for the French Revolution.

Learning French, a good idea – w wealth of high quality publications, lot of them for free download within easy reach.

McLaddie- at what time is he showing that?
The 10eme definitively countermarched from the left flank (of Division) to the right flank when Kamenski? turned some regiments around and marched back up the hill late in the combat. That was late, my reference was to the morning advance.

Soults report? Yikes, I'm sure he was a good administrator, but he's unlikely to report anything but the Emperors wishes. Had the 10eme been in front- how is it that the 14eme de ligne got into such a confrontation? As reported by Thiébault (yes I mispelled his name above).

The Defile- Puntowitz- the village behind which the 'French centre' was formed overnight.

Each village along the lower Goldbach was garrisoned with troops. The stream was a swamp, morass, partly laked and virtually impassable by foot or horse, hence the defensive ground.

Just as the Allies had to 'force' their way across via defiles (the bridges or earthworks that constrained the tracks across it); so the French 'advance' also had to first cope with it.
As I said I have sketches that show 1 Corps progress later in the day via Girzikowitz.
cheers d

@von W

Thank you for the link – I will read the preface.

On after action reports:

'On the next morning Solnicki, the former commandant of Monzon, called me into his room and I found him rather agitated. 'I have received,' he told me, 'the order to write a full report on yesterday's battle. Would you sit down there and set the ball rolling. Here is a pen, ink and paper.' I sat down, and regurgitated a brief resume of what had happened, adding the number of dead and wounded, some fifteen men. I read all this off to the captain and he pointed out that I had missed a couple of essential details. He then dictated some additions and corrections which had the effect of turning this minor skirmish into a colorful struggle of heroic proportions, and accorded full credit to its fortunate outcome to himself. 'That, my friend, is how you write a report,' he boasted and then got me to write ou the report once again, scribbled his name with difficulty at the bottom of the page and rewarded me with a cup of coffee, a luxury I had been deprived of since Pamplona. Military histories are all too often written in the manner of Solnicki's report, if not all histories.'-Heinrich von Brandt, an officer of the Vistula Legion in Spain, taken from his memoir, In the Legions of Napoleon, page 71.

McLaddie- at what time is he showing that?
The 10eme definitively countermarched from the left flank (of Division) to the right flank when Kamenski? turned some regiments around and marched back up the hill late in the combat. That was late, my reference was to the morning advance.

SHaT1984:

10:30 am. If Soult did start his advance at @9:45, and reports being heavily engaged at @10:30, the 20 minutes to top the Pratzen isn't all that unreasonable.

Soults report? Yikes, I'm sure he was a good administrator, but he's unlikely to report anything but the Emperors wishes. Had the 10eme been in front- how is it that the 14eme de ligne got into such a confrontation? As reported by Thiébault (yes I mispelled his name above).

Having the Legere brigade leading two brigades in two lines is the same formation that Soult, Lannes etc. used in their advances at Jena the next year. You raise a good question, but the position of the 14e ligne during the battle doesn't automatically prove the 10th wasn't formed in front. Several reports state that is where the Legere brigades were for Soult's two divisions.

The Defile- Puntowitz- the village behind which the 'French centre' was formed overnight.

Each village along the lower Goldbach was garrisoned with troops. The stream was a swamp, morass, partly laked and virtually impassable by foot or horse, hence the defensive ground.

So, you are saying that at least one entire division passed through Puntowitz in the morning in their advance?

according to Colonel Poitevin :

Enfin le colonel Poitevin, dans son Journal, dit que l'infanterie légère de la division Staint – Hilaire se trouvait ein avant; "les quatre régiments formant les deux brigades de bataille sur ine seule ligne : mais chaque bataillon en colonne par disivision, et l'artilleriesur deux ailes"
(…)
Nous admettrons donc, en réunissant les donnés de ces trois documents, que chaquae bataillon était en colonne par division à distance de peloton ; que de régiment d'infanterie légère se tenait en avant, ses deux battailons accolés, l'artillerie sur les flancs

p. 174

Alombert & Colin : La Campagne de 1805 en Allemagne, tome V, Nouvelle édition, Editions Historiques Teissèdre, Paris 2002

This is not a volume of the original work, but compiled from various artciles in REvue d'Histoire

More can be learned in detail from p. 175 onward.

Unless SHat is not disclosing his sources and citing them, a further discussion on this subject is moot.

How the French infantry performed at Austerlitz alone proves the over simplistic approach and misunderstandings of Elting.

How the French infantry performed at Austerlitz alone proves the over simplistic approach and misunderstandings of Elting.

If you're going to continually criticize Col Elting's work (which undoubtedly you will whenever you can), it would be useful to give examples and compare and contrast what he has written to what the references you cite actually say. If not, you are merely, in Guibert's words, 'beat[ing] the air with vain sounds.'

Yeah ok apologies, [coming back to life after/ during mid-life PC crisis] I got my directions wrong (right/left) abot the 10 Legere location.
I see Duffy also cites that both Divisions were in position across the Goldbach before 9am. According to Thiebault they were ordered to muster at 0300.

It was the line battalions that countermarched to the flank of the lights.
I've re-trawled many tomes over recent months and it all merged into one big shemozzle for me.
Funny tho Thiébault admonishes Colonel Mazas of the 14th for not deploying 'eclaireurs'- but who was in charge here? They had time to make a slow march up a gradual slope only 100m in a 1000metre walk and apparently Saint Hilaire, Thiébault and Morand were 'chatting' as they went.

Anyway, another interesting point was that on December 1, the two Corps marched off the Heights in 30 battalion squares, without interference from the Allied cavalry.
Quite a feat and not columns.
d

Intersting discussion. Two thing which seems to pop up is sometimes, which I find hard to believe is

1) The ordre mixte as an attack formation where you have columns mixed with lines. It is described as a defensive formation in sources, and Thienault mentions putting his leftmost btn. in line to be prepared for defense, but actually marching along in a regulated line with columns together with lines does not seem to be an used formation, and only one which is regurgitaed from secondary sources.

2) Complete batallions deployed at skirmishers 1000 meters from the enemy. All later accounts from the 19th century mentions specifically the difficulties of controlling skirmishers, and the problems of advacning them under fire. There seems to be a big difference between a few men deployed as eclarieurs and a thick full battalion skirmish line. Why would the French deploy full batallions before advancing on the Pratzen heights, thus potentially delaying their advance. Is it not more likely that the first line was advanced as a formed body and then deployed (or not) when within combat range?

In case we like to discuss, I would urge to use quotes – like I did – I know it is tedious – but then I can look at those source myself and see the context.

The ordre mixte can also easily deploy into a square so it is not only good for attack.

Complete battalions deployed 1000 metres away into skirmishers, I did not know or don't know, so a source or quote along with a source would be highly appreciated.

Sparta:

1. There are plenty of examples of mixed formations. A couple of examples that come to mind are Myer's Brigade at Albuera and more than one Russsian division took up mixed formation at Borodino.

2. In his advance at Vittoria, Hill threw 1600 skirmishers forward a mile a head of his division.

I am not sure that full battalions were deployed as skirmishers at Austerlitz, only that the light battalions were in the first line as they were at Jena. Whatever their deployment, it obviously didn't delay the advance.

While deploying large numbers of skirmishers [battalions] had its difficulties, it was done by all the nations involved at one time or another.

While deploying large numbers of skirmishers [battalions] had its difficulties, it was done by all the nations involved at one time or another.

But, again, all skirmishers were not equal nor were how they were employed. The French did it by evolution of practice and without regulations. They institutionalized it, just as they did their artillery employment. The allies did not-with the exception of the British.

McLaddie wrote:

2. In his advance at Vittoria, Hill threw 1600 skirmishers forward a mile a head of his division.

Please can you expand on this detailing exactly who these 1600 skirmishers were and the source for them being a mile ahead?

I can't square this statement with any account of the battle that I have read. If you are talking about the separate attack on the Heights of Puebla, this surely cannot be described as a skirmish line ahead of the division.

Yes, I also don't undertsand where 1000 anythings come from.
50 or 100 paces perhaps, but…

From Colin:-
p29
Circumstances, moreover, were rarely suitable for the formation of attack columns on the battlefields, as Chambray points out:

"The attack column is not used as often as one might think, here is the reason: the infantry, as long as it follows the roads and is at a certain distance from the enemy, usually walks by the flank; when one is close enough to the enemy that it is necessary to extend in order to take a position, it leaves the roads and forms platoons; then we form the divisions, then we squeeze at a section distance; Finally, we put the weapon in our arms and take the accelerated step, if necessary…
We see that, in order to form an attack column, one would have to deploy beforehand. »

Seems to cover it.
d

I don't agree with Chambray that the infantry marched in files, it should march in sections, and usually it did march at the side of the roads.

about marching, this is what an eye witness has to say

Je viens de dire que ces épais nuages de poussière étaient soulevés par la marche de front de plusieurs colonnes en masse ; voici, en effet, dans quel ordre ces colonnes cheminaient : la route, fort large et plantée d'arbres en bordures, était entièrement occupée par les trains d'artillerie et d'équipages rangés sur plusieurs voitures de front ; de chaque côté de la route marchait l'infanterie en colonnes serrées, par division, c'est-à-dire sur environ 80 hommes de front (chaque compagnie d'environ 120 hommes donnant le chiffre de 240, par division, sur trois rangs de 80 chacun) ; de chaque côté, en dehors de ces colonnes d'infanterie et à la même hauteur, marchaient des masses de cavalerie par escadrons.
P. 253
Girod de l'Ain : Dix Ans De Mes Souvenirs Militaires De 1805 A 1815, re print Paris 2000

Good day HK, : )

thanks a lot for the quote from Girod de l'Ain. I suspect it's a case where that large marching column was eventually wishing, expecting or anticipating a *contact* with enemy troops (condensed formation, ie marching by sections, or worse by division).

that passage is specifically located on the road to Moscow, which must have been very large to allow such a formation for marching (division frontage). On French imperial roads or large European roads, the widest formation for army marches would be by section or peloton.

the next chapter is about La Moscowa.

there are precisions in Escalle and in Lewal about marching on the side of the roads : very tiring in fact along a 20-24 km regular day of march (because of all sorts of obstacles to negotiate, in contrast with the road itself)

i wonder what are the relevant authors on the subject of army marches from England, Austria, Prussia & Russia … i have many references for the French, but not for the others nations .. ?

Best Regards,

salut

One has to consider the length of such a marching column – in case you would do only pure file marching, 3 abreast, it would be endlessly long for a division.

However in case close to the enemy (not necessarily striking distance) a division would be in distance to one hour march to each other (see Foucart on this) – so in my view this could only be achieved in subdivision units, like an section.

However on a usual march – seemingly there was no order as such, I forgot who commented on that – Chlapowski, or Grabowski, seeing French infantry marching rather individually and then on the beat of the drum they quickly reformed.

Regarding British infantry march columns of this era, the regulutions stated that they should not be less than 4 men wide if operating 2 deep or 6 men wide if operating 3 deep.

However, in the Peninsular War the infantry marched in columns 3 men wide, referred to as "sections of threes", by general order from Wellington. References to this can be found in many memoirs, but the best short summary is to be found in the memorandum that Wellington wrote to Sir William Clinton, who was about to embark on an expedition to Portugal in 1826. This memorandum also confirms that although the initial reason for this was the narrow roads of Portugal, this width was maintained on wider roads as well:

I likewise refer him to my orders of the 3rd May, 1809, respecting the mode of marching through the country. The roads, bridges, and villages will not admit of the march of more than one carriage abreast, nor of a heavy column. The infantry, therefore, marched by sections of threes, and we found this front so convenient, and it lengthened out so little that we continued the practice even when the communications of the country were broader.

Interesting, what is a section of threes, 3 files wide and two ranks deep?

Yes, in the Peninsular War sections of threes were 3 files wide and 2 deep.

The companies would all be "told off" into sections of threes every morning prior to a march, well described by John Gurwood (Gurwood being a participant and very familiar with these procedures) in the introduction to Wellington's General Orders:

It is singular to refer to these orders to see how a division of 6000 men, and so on in any proportion, rolled up in their blankets ‘in the arms of Murphy,' were all dressed, with blankets rolled, packed, equipped, squadded, paraded in companies, told off in subdivisions, sections, and sections of threes, marched by companies to the regimental alarm-posts, and finally to that of the brigades, formed in close columns, all by sounds as familiar to the soldier as the clock at the Horse Guards to a Corporal of the Blues.

And when all was ready to march:

The report of "All present" being made in succession by the Brigade Majors to the Assistant Adjutant General, and by him to the General commanding the column, the word "By sections of threes, march," was given, from the right or left, as directed in the Quarter Master General's instructions, the whole being formed either right or left in front, according to the views of the General in command of the army.

many thanks

Regarding Redcoat's original post about examples of French Army tactical virtuosity, here are a few possible examples:

Barrosa, 1811 by Francois Vigo-Roussillon: The French 8th Line thought they were facing British cavalry and formed square, only to come under canister (case) fire from British artillery at close range. While under artillery fire they changed formation by cycling through column of divisions and into line (!). They then held fire when attacked by Portuguese infantry, only volleying at 10 paces which I'll go ahead and call point-blank range. There was more to the action, but I think this demonstrates tactical competence both under fire and in the face of the enemy well enough.

Salamanca Campaign 1812: Admittedly circumstantial but I believe Marmont's outmaneuvering of Wellington on the Duero River on July 16-17, 1812 could not have been executed if that French infantry were not tactically highly proficient (acknowledging that we're only talking about troops who had the requisite experience to have become tactically proficient). The operation involved several river crossings, feints, tactical withdrawals and establishment of bridgeheads in the face of the enemy. Their opponents were impressed.

Some examples of tactical virtuosity end up tied to grand-tactical proficiency; they rather compliment each other and become indistinguishable at times. Some cases of tactical "incompetence" could more accurately be assigned to reasonably drilled troops who had inadequate grand-tactical training/experience.

Correcting and adding to my initial (incorrect memory) regarding Soults corps advance/ Austerlitz. Whilst observng the tactical 'theories' in use, in practise :

The Division was by the time of approach to their targets/ objectives (from advance outside Puntowitz (East of Goldbach) up slope actually more than a kilometre, mostly of battalions in line.

The 10e legere came on the right flank of the Division because their objective was the Pratzeberg heights ridge to the South (only approx 50m higher), more than a kilometre South of Pratze village, the objective of Théibaults Brigade. They could not be in front as skirmishers at all adjacent, but nowhere near in front of Thiébault Brigade.

Théibaults Brigade (4 bns) seems to have been in two battalion lines with each regiment abreast as 'described by the regulations. However the 'assault' on Pratze village was to be performed by the 1/ 14eme de Ligne on the right.

This means they were separated with no support on their right except for the backs of the disappearing 10e Legere moving toward the Pratzeberg ridge height (this ran slightly SW-NE direction oblique to the line of attack).

The stretching of the battle line is even more tenuous than I had previously conceived. 20 battalions were marching up hill/ slope toward the heights in dull, then brilliant sunshine toward expected empty space. Not a single reconnaisance had been undertaken! The space between objectives, for sure a relatively gentle slope between them except at the heights, was more than 3 kilometres.

Of those 20, only 6 battalions belonged to St.Hilaires Division on the right, he being shorn of a brigade so that Vandamme had 14. Two major objectives, separated by at least a kilomtre of sloping ground were their targets.

Vandamme was obviously slower to reach a parallel position (to St.Hilaire), due perhaps to the increasingly steeper slope of the Stare-Vinorahdy (also only approx 50m higher) from Girzikowitz.

This 'dispersion' of a brigade by higher authority very nearly cost St.Hilaire his life and command, while it doesn't seem that the vaunted Vandamme actually gained anything from its assignment as the tactical deployment or control over his brigades was flawed.

This (1/ 14e) battalion in line, without skirmishers or scouts of any kind in advance, was 'suprised' in Théibaults own words, by a Russian musketeer battalion abruptly standing up from the (drainage) ditch below Pratze village in their front and delivering a withering full volley at a close distance.

Goetz describes this whole grand Divisional advance in a similar fashion as previous authors, hiding the formal march of the 'lines' uphill as a fact when at some point it ceased to be so.

Given the 'sun' of Austerlitz I venture to suggest that Thiébaults 1/14e was the first French unit broken in the battle, and that it was in plain sight of N. and the HQ staff on the Zuran as well!

Some subsequent order/ suggestion that the artillery better get up there, hence the 'surprise' arrival of the Divisions artillery compagnie comprising six 12 punders (12e/ 5e regt d'art a pied) under the commandant Chef de Bon Fontenay at an opportune moment half an hour later.

Intersting that Goetz research uncovered for me the fact that despite the 'secondment' of one of his Brigades formally to Vandamme, he still rode up to its commander (GBD Varé) at a grave moment of despair and gave orders, or strong suggestions perhaps, to support his left flank as a gap was created as Vandammes troops drew further North around the now disputed Stare-Vinobradhy ridge.

In this event alone, gaming rules do not allow the adaptability that real men take in circumstances warranting change.
d