Korvessa | 07 Jun 2020 9:52 a.m. PST |
While thinking on another thread (and not wanting to hijack it) something occurred to me. Napoleon's invasion of Russia in 1812 was not too unlike Hannibal's invasion of Italy. Both could win all the battles, but it didn't matter in the end as they had no hope of conquering or occupying the enemy. Both Rome & Russia pretty much had inexhaustible resources, and as long as they refused to give up or negotiate, Napoleon/Hannibal would never win. |
MajorB | 07 Jun 2020 9:59 a.m. PST |
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Brechtel198 | 07 Jun 2020 10:06 a.m. PST |
It was not Napoleon's object to 'conquer' Russia or to occupy it. His object was to bring the Tsar to sue for peace. And one of the things that the Tsar worried about was that if he negotiated with Napoleon at all he might end up like daddy…dying of 'apoplexy.' That was the Russian reason for both Peter's and Paul's assassinations. |
Legionarius | 07 Jun 2020 10:08 a.m. PST |
Both Rome and Russia were also fiercely proud of their land and culture and were willing to suffer extreme sacrifices and privations. They also practice scorched earth and delaying tactics and used time to their advantage. Russia and Rome were too tough to die. |
Korvessa | 07 Jun 2020 11:53 a.m. PST |
Brechtol, I think you could say same thing about Hannibal: he wasn't trying to conquer or occupy Rome, just bring them to negotiating table. |
4th Cuirassier | 07 Jun 2020 12:57 p.m. PST |
Napoleon had two absolutely critical advantages over Hannibal. One was that he was also head of state, so could put forth whatever effort was necessary in support of his military campaigns. Hannibal had no such advantage and was refused reinforcements on the basis that if he was so successful why did he need them? – as though all his victories had come at nil cost. His other advantage was that unlike Hannibal he didn't command a voluntary alliance who could bitch and moan about what they would and wouldn't do. He commanded a lot of constructive protectorates who could do what they liked as long as it was what he liked (Wellington soars in my estimation because he always commanded coalitions and did so with spectacular skill). Napoleon as head of state was of course a complete, total and unmitigated disaster, losing his throne twice and getting his capital occupied twice by Russian and British troops who'd marched halfway across a continent to depose him. So in his hands, it wasn't such an advantage. As Correlli Barnett puts it, Napoleon the statesman repeatedly set Napoleon the general impossible tasks. His two epochal strategic defeats, Russia and the Peninsula, happened because of the same mistake made in 1806. Napoleon as head of the army with someone like Bismarck as head of government would have been unstoppable. Whether we'd all now be speaking German or French I wouldn't like to say. Of course, Napoleon wouldn't have been satisfied with being #2, and would certainly have had Bismarck kidnapped and bumped off like the Duke of Enghien. |
Gunfreak | 07 Jun 2020 1:32 p.m. PST |
4th cuirassier gives a great break down. Remember Napoleon didn't do total war, he expected the enemy to know when they were defeated and give him the peace he wanted. This is how most armies in most periods operated. Not Romans. They did total war(most of the time) either you killed every last living Roman or they would beat you. Carthagenians learned it the hard way. So did the hellenic world (Pyrrhus being the first to feel it.) Followed by the rest of the hellenics the next 200 years. |
Brechtel198 | 07 Jun 2020 1:46 p.m. PST |
Corelli Barnett's book on Napoleon is one of the worst I have ever read. It is short on references and makes too many errors in fact to be worth anything as a reference. What 'mistake' was made in 1806? If anyone is going to reference any books on Napoleon those that are at least attempting to be accurate should be used, not nonsense by Corelli Barnett. |
evilgong | 07 Jun 2020 5:46 p.m. PST |
Napoleon's mistake was not taking enough elephants into Russia. (The cold would not be a problem, a Persian diplomatic delegation to Russia made up warm boots for their elephants). David F Brown |
KimRYoung | 07 Jun 2020 6:33 p.m. PST |
Perhaps both Hannibal and Napoleon thought that their foes would capitulate like the Persians and Indians did after Alexander beat them in all the Battles, Kim |
Legionarius | 07 Jun 2020 7:48 p.m. PST |
You do not win until your enemy decides he has lost. Losing was not an option for the Romans and the Russians. |
Brechtel198 | 08 Jun 2020 3:31 a.m. PST |
The Russians lost, and lost badly in 1805 and 1807, so it seems it was an 'option' then… |
Murvihill | 08 Jun 2020 4:13 a.m. PST |
Hannibal was defeated by the Romans. Napoleon was defeated by the size of Russia. |
Brechtel198 | 08 Jun 2020 6:18 a.m. PST |
Agree. The expanse was just too big to operate efficiently in. The span of command and control was too great. |
Legionarius | 08 Jun 2020 4:44 p.m. PST |
Alexander could affect defeat in Central Europe, especially when Napoleon appeared to be reasonable and partition territory with him. Years later, after Napoleon had become Europe's hegemony and there seemed to be no limit to his ambition, defeat was not an option for Alexander. Napoleon may have been history's greatest tactician, an even better at operational art, but he failed as a strategist. In Spain, at sea, in his continental system, in maintaining his alliances, and most disastrously, in Russia. That is what happens when one is seized by ones own dreams. Also, credit must be given to that old fox-Kutuzov. He knew how to trade space for time, how to bleed the French (at Borodino) and how to use general winter. A general uses all the tools in his toolbox and Napoleon failed seduced by belief in his greatness. Also, from the zar on down to the lowest peasant conscript, Russians fought for "holy Mother Russia." No, for Russians failure was not an option in 1812. |