"Cornwallis and the Winter Campaign..." Topic

I have already described how it worked in Va. But here's more detail. Each "division of 20 militiamen was responsible for providing one Continental recruit. (2000 divisions, 40,000 miliita) They had options: LAST resort was pick a name from a hat. They could raise money and hire someone -- and the county tax records were open so that assessments could be equitable. (It is clear that putting a rich man in with a poor man was likelly to result in the first paying the second to go.) Another option was to catch a deserter and return him to the army, and I have read at least three accounts in pension applications of militia forming a "posse" and doing just that. So voluntary service was always preferred, and there was some effort to make things equitable. Nevertheless, the 1780 law was as unpopular as drafts typically are, and widely resented and opposed, sometimes by riots.

Bill, I agree with you on your assessment of Va in 1781.

Virginia is the state whose revolutionary experience I know intimately. Of course things varied from state to state (and from year to year). Were I writing baout other states I would use secondary materials. Doing Va I can rely on the primary ones because I have read nearly all of them. (Although 45 years ago!)

It IS surprisng if no one has done a comprehensive study of how the Continentals were raised in each state. It is very complex, among other reasons because what the relevant law SAYS, and how it was enforced and applied, could be quite different.

The bottom line still is-without the Continental Army, the US would have lost the Revolution.

The militia was a weak system that did not provide the ability to fight and defeat the British army and the German auxiliaries.

That was clearly demonstrated at Kip's Bay, Camden, Guilford Courthouse, and on other fields.

The militia lacked the staying power of the Continentals as well as the training and discipline needed to fight a European professional army.

The value of the Continentals was repeatedly proven at Freeman's Farm, Bemis Heights, Germantown, Monmouth, Stony Point, Guilford Courthouse, Cowpens and on other fields. If the American army was composed of nothing but short-term militia, the war would have been lost and the French would never have allied themselves with the United States.

Ah, the old bottom line!- Hurrah

Kevin, I think you are arguing FOR something that no one really is against. But it is equally true to say that without the militia (an armed society and a political system that mobilized armed men) the US also would have lost the Revolution.

Though I do think the militia at Guilford -- at least the Virginians in the second line -- performed quite well.

But it is equally true to say that without the militia (an armed society and a political system that mobilized armed men) the US also would have lost the Revolution.

And that is what is incorrect. The militia system hindered recruiting for the Continental Army and detracted from the US war effort.

The Virginia militia under General Stevens ran at Camden. The North Carolina militia at Guilford Courthouse failed in its assigned mission and left the battlefield in a hurry. The Virginia militia at Guilford did much better thanks to General Stevens, who was wounded, and who had stationed picked men in the rear of the position to shoot anyone who ran.

The real bottom line is that the militia debate is pointless. The same opinions have been expressed before and will no doubt be expressed again. Nobody's position changes. And putting in the last word doesn't mean you are right.

Meanwhile its late January and Cornwallis's army, badly worn down but recently reinforced is in northwest South Carolina. Behind him the South Carolina back country is in rebellion and rebel forces are threatening the British position in north Georgia. Should he move forward to try and destroy Morgan while isolated? Should he move forward in a more limited way to try and create a buffer between rebel resources and the South Carolina partisans? Should he stay where he is? Should he weaken his field army to reinforce those fighting the partisans in South Carolina and Georgia? Were there other realistic options?

The real bottom line is that the militia debate is pointless.

I don't agree. As long as false and erroneous information is being repeated that the war could not have been won without the militia, then it should be countered with factual material.

The militia winning the war is an oft-repeated myth, as has already been posted.

The Long Faces did not win the war. The Continentals did having to put up with the militia when it shouldn't have had to.

The bottom line is that conventional military operations RE based on concentration of force. Counter insurgency induces the opposite.

42flanker, yes, precisely. It is like arguing which side of the coin is most important.

That analogy is not correct when comparing the Continental Army and the militia.

Meanwhile, back at the ranch…

Its January 1781. You are Cornwallis. Your field army is in the roughly the same position it was in in the aftermath of Camden, but its numbers have been diminished despite the arrival of replacements. The situation in the South Carolina back country has gone from bad to worse since Camden. Rebel partisans have largely cleared the British presence in northeast South Carolina. Partisans who nearly captured Augusta in September are now again threatening the British position in north Georgia. The tory militia has proven itself of little value in controlling the partisans. All your principal field subordinates in the last four months have been killed, beaten or embarrassed. The Continental field army after months of avoiding you has finally put itself back in play, with elements operating to your west and to your east. Pickens is taking the field against you. You are now being significantly reinforced by Leslie.

What do you do? What DO you do?

Yes, I expect Cornwallis invaded Va because he didn't know what else to do. Even defeating Greene yet again would not have accomplished much, unless he succeeded in destroying Greene's force entirely. Which Greene was careful to avoid, as his actions, e.g., at Guilford demonstrate. I do think the Loyalist miliita MIGHT have been made into a reliable population-control force, had Marion and Sumter not been so aggressively successful in breaking them up. But the Brits could not turn out their supporters over and over again, because the local authorities, through the militia system, would suppress anyone who had demonstrated such loyalty. A lot of suspected loyalists get disarmed and some were forced to enlist in the Continentals.

In January 1781 the string of British fortified posts was still in existence and would be until it began to fall apart after Guilford Courthouse.

Greene's army remaining in existence around its core of Continental units was the reason that the partisans were operating so well and they were supported by Greene who understood their employment.

The destruction of Ferguson's command as well as Tarleton's and the resulting failure of Cornwallis' pursuit to the Dan River crippled Cornwallis, and that was further accomplished by the crippling losses at Guilford Courthouse.

By leaving the Carolinas and going to Virginia, Cornwallis admitted that the British 'southern strategy' was a failure and he sought success elsewhere. The 'victory' at Guilford Courthouse set up the disaster at Yorktown.

In the realm of 'what ifs' Cornwallis could have added the other British troops in the Carolinas to his field army and pressed after Greene and attempt to destroy him. Greene's army in existence was the main reason that the British finally gave up and lost in the Carolinas.

That British forces were holding fortified posts in 1781 does not negate that in large areas of the countryside surrounding those posts the rebels had the upper hand. As to what happened to those posts starting in January 1781 Continental/Primarily Continental forces captured 3, militia 3, mixed forces captured 3. During that same period Greene failed to carry one fortified post, Marion (with Lee) failed to carry one and Sumter failed to carry two.

All of which has nothing to do with the situation facing Cornwallis in January of 1781. Before Leslie arrives Cornwallis (including Tarleton) only has a field army of about 2,000 men. Stripping garrisons could have added to his field strength, but as it was British officials on the scene were worrying that Cornwallis was leaving South Carolina and Georgia inadequately protected.

Cowpens and Guilford Courthouse are not the point where things start going to pot for the British in the south. They are the actions which show that things have already gone to pot.

Greene (and Morgan) surely deserve most of the credit for developing and implementing a winning strategy. Cornwallis' problem fundamentally was that he simply did not have enough troops. That, of course, is to a great extent a result of the French alliance. Maybe if Clinton had relied on the Navy to keep Washington away from NY, and sent 10,000 more troops to Cornwallis? I expect, though, thta such would have lengthened the war without changing the outcome.

The Brits could have held Charleston and Savannah forever. Tne only reason to occupy the Carolina back country was to mobilize the loyalist militia. When that project fell through, it was time to retreat to the coast.

Cowpens and Guilford Courthouse are not the point where things start going to pot for the British in the south. They are the actions which show that things have already gone to pot.

I disagree. The British held the upper hand after Camden and Greene's operations after he took command marked the beginning of the end of British superiority in the Carolinas.

And without Greene's field army, the British could have concentrated on the partisan war and might have won it.

Greene (and Morgan) surely deserve most of the credit for developing and implementing a winning strategy.

Morgan quit after Cowpens because of illness, and he was replaced with Otho Williams who commanded the light troops and rear guard in the retreat to the Dan. I believe that he was a better soldier and commander than Morgan, despite the propaganda.

At least Williams didn't have rheumatism. But has he any battlefield feat, any independent command, comparable to Cowpens? I'm willing to be convinced thta Williams was better, but what evidence is there for it?

Fighting a battle and conducting the aggressive rear guard action with all that entails are two different things. Williams excelled at the latter. He was one of the group of talented senior officers produced by Maryland during the war which also included Mordecai Gist and John Eager Howard.

In the retreat to the Dan Williams displayed a very high skill level in keeping the British pursuit away from the American main body while not becoming decisively engaged.

I'm not so sure that Morgan was that skilled.

Williams commanded the Maryland Brigade at Guilford Courthouse among other assignments. His memoir is interesting and a valuable source of information for the southern campaigns, including Camden.

No question he was good. But Cowpens was a masterpiece.

And…?

That does not qualify Morgan to be able to command the rear guard in the retreat to the Dan. That, too, was a masterpiece-one of maneuver and delay, and over a much larger area than Cowpens.

Trying to compare both actions is illogical as they were two types of actions that were completely different. And both were successful and led to Cornwallis' eventual strategic defeat and withdrawal from the Carolinas.

Have it your way.

The Burger King response. ;-)

Yeah, I should have said where's the beef.

Apparently you're from the 'Higginbotham School' who presented Morgan as winning the war all by himself.

Incredible.

Nope. Read his book thirty years ago, is all. Try again, or not.

Try again, for what? This isn't a contest nor is it a race.

Coffee, nose, spurt.

42flanker, yeah, pretty much.

At least Williams didn't have rheumatism. But has he any battlefield feat, any independent command, comparable to Cowpens? I'm willing to be convinced thta Williams was better, but what evidence is there for it?

Williams was younger and by the time of the southern campaigns probably had already contracted tuberculosis while a prisoner of war of the British. It would eventually lead to his early death.

As an aside, Williams and Morgan were friends as Williams began his military service with riflemen.

The following material is taken from Otho Holland Williams in the American Revolution by John Beakes. I highly recommend the book.

Williams conduct commanding the light force that screened Greene's army in the retreat to the Dan River is a masterpiece of its kind. The mission was difficult and Williams conducted it with great skill. Further, his battlefield performance at Camden, Guilford Courthouse, and Eutaw Springs was exemplary. He was an outstanding officer and commander.

‘In personal appearance Williams is said to have been graceful, with a military erectness of carriage, and an open, expressive countenance. In character he was warm-hearted and expansive; but on moral questions firm to a degree which savored somewhat of sternness. As a soldier he was rigid in discipline, requiring from his subordinates the prompt obedience which he always paid to his superiors. Beginning his military career with no advantages of military training, his rare intelligence led him directly to the true sources, and gave him a clear perception of the fundamental principles of the science. His counsel was always the clear counsel of a clear, deep and perspicacious mind. His conduct in the field was ardor, tempered by judgment and self-possession.'-George Washington Greene.

‘I think that the public are not a little indebted for our exertions. The southern states were lost, they are now restored; the American arms were in disgrace, they are now in high reputation. The American soldiery were thought to want both patience and fortitude to contend with difficulties; they are now remarkable for both.'-Nathaniel Greene to Otho Holland Williams.

‘…the Virginians under LtCol Campbell, and the Maryland troops under Col Williams were led onto a brisk charge with trailed arms, through a heavy cannonade, and a shower of musket balls. Nothing could exceed the gallantry and firmness of both officers and soldiers upon this occasion. They preserved their order, and pressed on with such unshaken resolution that they bore down all before them. The enemy were routed in all quarters.'-General Greene's after-action report of the action at Eutaw Springs.

‘I cannot help acknowledging my obligations to Colonel Williams for his great activity on this and many other occasions in forming the army and for his uncommon intrepidity in leading on the Maryland troops to the charge, which exceeded anything I ever saw.'-Nathaniel Greene on Williams charge at Eutaw Springs.

‘Colonel Williams, adjutant general, was conspicuous throughout the action; cheerfully risking his valuable life out of his station, performing his assumed duties with precision and effect, and volunteering his person wherever danger called.'-Henry ‘Light Horse Harry' Lee remarking on Williams conduct at Camden in August 1780.

‘The late Battle of Camden is a melancholy comment upon this doctrine. The Militia fled at the first fire, and left the Continental troops surrounded on every side and overpowered by numbers to combat for safety instead of victory. The enemy themselves have witnessed to their valor.'-George Washington on the battle of Camden commenting on the difference between militia and Continentals.

‘Throughout the night, the corps of Williams held a respectable distance, to thwart, as far as was practicable, the nocturnal assault. The duty, severe in the day, became more so at night; for numerous patrols and strong pickets were necessarily furnished by the light troops, not only for their own safety, but to prevent the enemy from placing himself, by a circuitous march, between Williams and Greene. Such a maneuver would have been fatal to the American army; and, to render it impossible, half of the troops were alternately appropriated every night to duty; so that each man, during the retreat, was entitled to but six hours' repose in forty-eight…Williams always pressed forward with the utmost dispatch in the morning, to gain such a distance in front as would secure breakfast to his soldiers, the only meal during the rapid and hazardous retreat. So fatigued was officer and soldier, and so much more operative is weariness than hunger, that each man not placed on duty surrendered himself to repose as soon as the night position was taken.'-Henry Lee.

‘The first [Maryland] Regiment embraced the opportunity and…they bayoneted and cut to pieces a great number of British Guards, who had taken our field pieces.'-Otho Holland Williams on the performance of the 1st Maryland Continental Regiment at Guilford Courthouse.

‘Nothing could exceed the gallantry of the Maryland line. Col Williams, Howard, and all the officers exhibited acts of uncommon bravery, and the free use your line and some other Corps made of the bayonet gave us the victory.'-Nathaniel Greene on Eutaw Springs.

Debating which of two excellent commanders was most excellent is probably a waste of energy.

Kevin, you might know this. At Eutaw Springs Marion commanded the militia, who are reported in several books to have fired seventeen volleys before breaking. But I've never seen any primary source for that, and we know errors and imaginative embellishments can get picked up and repeated in secondary works. I read for many years that Crockett tried to blow up the magazine in the Alamo, and John Wayne shows that -- or that it had been agreed that the last surviving officer would do that -- which would have been Dickenson whose wife and child were nearby! No primary source for that, as far as I know.

Have you seen the 17 volleys statement?

link

Troiani states in the American Heritage article above. And I have seen it several places.

link

Wiki repeats it citing a recent secondary book on the battle.

That would be pretty impressive if true, and with marion's leadership and the accumulated experience of the militia it might be -- but seventeen is such a specific number it had to have come from somewhere??

Debating which of two excellent commanders was most excellent is probably a waste of energy.

You asked the question and I believe it was sufficiently answered.

Wiki repeats it citing a recent secondary book on the battle.

The use of Wikipedia for any historical resource is an 'iffy' proposition at the best of times. There are much better sources to use which are much more reliable and credible.

Regarding the militia at Eutaw Springs, John Beakes comments that 'Governor Rutledge of South Carlina, who was a few miles from the action, reported later that the militia were engaged long enough to fire seventeen rounds. They endured heavy artillery fire in addition to the enemy's musketry.' The source for this is Otho Holland Williams.

Firing 'seventeen rounds' sounds much more realistic that 'seventeen volleys' especially as the Americans were initially attacking. And firing rounds may not equate to volleys, but may refer to individual fire.

Nathaniel Greene, no great admirer of the militia in general, commented on the militia's performance:

'General Marion, Colo Malmady and General Pickens conducted the troops with great gallantry and good conduct, and the militia fought with a degree of spirit and firmness that reflects the highest honor upon this class of soldiers.'

Otho Holland Williams commented on the militia's performance:

'Nor had the militia been wanting in gallantry and perserverence. It was with equal astonishment, that both the second line and the enemy, contemplated these men, steadily, and without faltering, advance with shouts and exhortations into the hottest of the enemy's fire, unaffected by the continual fall of their comrades around them.'

Nathaniel Greene also commented on Sumner's militia, who were inexperienced:

'These were all new levies, and had been under discipline but little more than a month, notwithstanding which they fought with a degree of obstinacy that would do honor to the best of veterans; and I could hardly tell which to admire most the gallantry of their officers or the bravery of the troops.'

Marion and Malmady attacked in the first line; Sumner was in the second line to the right of the Maryland and Virginia Continentals with Lee to his front.

Regarding the Continentals:

'Otho Williams noted in a later narrative that the Maryland troops were '…emulous to wipe away the recollections of Hobkirk's Hill,' and that they '…advanced with a spirit expressive of the impatience with which they had hitherto been passive spectators of the action.''

'When the second line approached the British within forty yards, the Virginians under Campbell fired a destructive volley, and then the entire line '…with trailed arms, and an animated pace, advanced to the charge.''

John Beakes' volume on Williams has a wealth of excellent information on Greene's southern campaign and battles and on the performance of Williams and the Light Corps in the 'race to the Dan.'

You need not push the" Wikipedia bad"Button on me. We've debated that and I do not agree.

And yes, it is likely the seventeen rounds were not disciplined volleys.

And thank you for the Governor Rutledge source.

Have you seen the marvelous cartoon of Greenle and Rutledge and the pig?

You need not push the" Wikipedia bad"Button on me. We've debated that and I do not agree.

When you use a source that isn't reliable then take what comes. I did not let my students use it for that reason and it definitely was not allowed in grad school.

Using it, in my opinion, lessens what anyone has to say on a historical subject.

The reference to Wikipedia was in relation to a secondary source that it cited.

I see no reason why, as a man devoted to the citation of secondary sources, you should question the good doc's indication of itself; unless you wish simply to be argumentative. In which case carry on.

42flanker, yes, thanks.

I see no reason why, as a man devoted to the citation of secondary sources…

I never said that. What I said was that credible secondary source material should be used and that much of it contains primary material, such as the volume on Otho Williams that I cited.

If you're going to make a reference to me on the forum, at least attempt to get it right instead of misrepresenting it.

And many of the sources cited and referenced in a Wikipedia article are good and useful. So instead of citing Wikipedia, use and cite the source.

I never said that

My dear fellow, I wasn't quoting you. My comment was the result of a considerable period of observation, and as such required no confirmatory statement from you; any more than I would necessarily consider your remonstration as reason to alter my conclusions.

I regard myself as a primary source in this instance.