"The positions of the Prussian and French armies before and" Topic

…after the Battle of Jena.

Of possible interest?

link

Amicalement
Armand

To be really brutally honest the Prussian army didn't actually have a position after the battle of Jena!

The rank and file had fought hard all day from dawn against a French army that out-manouvered, out thought and out fought them. The rank and file had been led into a valley of death in Saxony, by their own commanders, into a situation they could not triumph but they still fought hard and courageously, stood where they could, followed their orders as long as possible, returned fire, fell back, rallied and stood their ground again … until they just couldn't anymore and they broke and routed up the roads behind them.

There was no "position", just mobs of exhausted, wounded men who had given all they had and dissolved into a rabble harried by the French cavalry all the way to Stettin and Berlin and a dozen other places.

The positions shown on those maps on your link are where the last organised stands were made while the rank and file still gallantly offered resistance.

The Prussian rank and file at Jena and Auerstadt could not be faulted for their courage and determination. But they were poorly trained and led for the new modern warfare and their commanders were largely old men incapable of the task of meeting a French Army at the height of its powers.

"Rossbach Avenged."

GdeP

The Prussian rank and file at Jena and Auerstadt could not be faulted for their courage and determination. But they were poorly trained and led for the new modern warfare and their commanders were largely old men incapable of the task of meeting a French Army at the height of its powers.

Certainly poorly led and relatively unexperienced, but they weren't poorly trained and considering that in every encounter at Jena the Prussians were outnumbered 2:1 or better, I would say they fought very well for over eight hours. The uncoordinated way the Prussians maneuvered is very much the fault of the commanders and the reason for the 2:1 engagements.

Agree!.

Amicalement
Armand

It was an 'encounter' battle, the terrain wasn't what they were trained for;
-N. was just as surprised as anyone on the other side;
-given the French command structure was more flexible even under 'his' eyes compared to the Prussians, neither had the advantages they hoped for.

Many small successes multiplied the defeat.

Auerstadt was the 'greater battle' by far.
regards davew

As Napoleon (perhaps uncharacteristically) acknowledged. He wasn't noted for witticisms, but on receiving a report from Davout concerning the numbers of Prussians faced by III Corps he said, "Tell your Marshal he must be seeing double". Davout's Corps led the parade through Berlin.
The original map doesn't show Davout's position, or Bernadotte's, as far as I can discern. One of these omissions is more important than the other.

It was an 'encounter' battle, the terrain wasn't what they were trained for;

SHaT1984: In what way?

-N. was just as surprised as anyone on the other side;

About which army he was fighting? Perhaps, but outnumbering the Prussians 2:1 in each engagement during the battle wasn't because he was surprised.

given the French command structure was more flexible even under 'his' eyes compared to the Prussians, neither had the advantages they hoped for.

In what ways? The Prussian units responded when ordered. There doesn't seem to have been any lack of 'flexibility' in carrying out the orders. The command structure, such as it was, new and then reorganized a day before, functioned well. Where weren't they flexible?

Again, I think it was the lack of leadership at the top which resulted in any lack of flexibility rather than some failing of subordinates or divisional units.

…considering that in every encounter at Jena the Prussians were outnumbered 2:1 or better…

Overall at Jena the Prussians were outnumbered two-to-one, but since the French had 96,000 against approximately 48,000 Prussians and Saxons, 40,000 of the French were not engaged. So the actual numbers engaged in the fighting were relatively equal, especially since the French were attacking.

If the Prussians and Saxons were outnumbered 'in every encounter at Jena' that was because of superior French leadership, better tactics, better staff work, and better coordination between the fighting arms, especially the infantry and artillery.

It was a battle of 'accident and incident' and because of a varity of factors, Napoleon's initial plan fell apart, and the French had to react to that. They did successfully, the Prussians did not.

Again, I think it was the lack of leadership at the top which resulted in any lack of flexibility rather than some failing of subordinates or divisional units.

And why was that?

I see it is going in the same direction again.

The Prussian infantry was well trained, much better than for example the Reserve infantry of 1813 or the Landwehr.

In case you look at the battle of Jena, it is pretty much evident that they lost due to lack of concentration, in fact Hohenlohe had the order not to be drawn into a battle.

In no way the Prussians and Saxons could have won this battle – regardless of their quality of soldiers.

Auerstedt, pretty much the same – Brunswick the cic was mortaly wounded quite early in the battle, his chief of staff – Scharnhorst was a complete failure – instead of advising the King, who had to take over – and was in no way suited to do so, he took over a division whose commander was severely wounded, out of 5 division – only 3 came into full action.

The cavalry failed abysmally, due to leadership deficiency as well, the "great" cavalry charge of Blücher was just 10 squadrons of 3 different regiments, a sad joke.

Also the Prussian army, regardless of legend – did not collapse – there were lots of rear guard actions, albeit not successful – who failed where to commandants of the fortresses, who delivered some very strong ones including garrison without putting up a fight.

And no – the Prussian army did not fight at all like in the 7 YW – one just had to look at the firing doctrine.

Best book in English – is a translation of a French author – Bressonnet.

Also the Prussian army, regardless of legend – did not collapse…

Really?

In three weeks of maneuver, marching and fighting the Grande Armee destroyed the Prussian army: 140,000 prisoners, 250 flags and 800 field guns. That certainly is a collapse. Clausewitz termed it 'the catastrophe.'

The only thing left were units that had been in East Prussia. The greater majority of the army was gone.

The only units that remained were in East Prussia and they only remained intact because they had not been committed against the French.

And the Grande Armee conducted the most complete pursuit of the period.

You are right Kevin… the Prussians just collapsed…

Then they accuse Napoleon of propaganda …(smile)

Amicalement
Armand

Prussian infantry drill and doctrine in 1806 laid down that Fusilier Battalions were trained to fight in woods and built up areas and not Musketeers. Musketeers were to fight in lines.

I call that poor training for fighting a much more flexible French army.

In addition to what has been said, the Prussian-Saxon army fought piecemeal. For several hours after the opening of the battle, the Jena plateau was covered by a fog so thick that several Prussian units lost their way moving from bivouac to battle order.

The French army commenced the battle after drawing up in battle order and so was less hampered by the fog.

I think we should have a constructive discussion. Von Winterfeld's point is that the Prussian army did not collapse immediately after the battles of Jena and Auerstedt. In fact, there were many minor and major combats and sieges after those battles. Some examples: Nordhausen, Halle, Zehdenick, Altenzaun, Soldau, Biezun, Gadebusch, Lübeck, Schwartau, Waltersdorf, Wackern, Danzig, Colberg, Cosel, Brieg, Graudenz, Eylau, Heilsberg, Königsberg, and many other combats in Silesia, Pomerania and East Prussia.

We should avoid childish and useless discussions about who won and who lost. We know very well who won and who lost in 1806-1807. That is not the point. Repeating statements which we are evident facts adds nothing relevant to this discussion.

The point is to analyse deeply the tactics and performance of Prussian army, but focusing on the troops and not on generals or politicians. We know well all the problems caused by poor and disorganised Prussian leadership, and the consequent impact on the operational decisions, operational decisions which led to defeat. There are many studies and books on those matters: political, social and military aspects of Prussian society in 1806.

But there are few works that study deeply the tactical aspects of Prussian units in 1806. We, wargamers and historians, need modern studies on tactical characteristics and performance of Prussian troops in 1806-1807 based on primary sources, especially battle reports from Prussian side. And we need new books that avoid old generalizations and prejudices. We know everything about the magnificent French army in 1805-1807, but we know little about the tactical characteristics and performance of Prussian troops.

We need serious and well researched studies that avoid the typical generalisations and the emotional subjectivity caused by national feelings or preferences. I do not have "favorites armies" or national preferences. By the way, my name here, Ruchel, is from Portuguese origins, nothing to do with the Prussian general Rüchel.

Good posting Ruchel, a lot of those bombastic claims – about captured guns or colours, have to be evaluated in context, just to note that neither the grenadier battalions, nor the Füsilier battalions, nor the Jäger did carry colours, so I am asking myself, did the French cut existing colours in 4 and then took this for the number?
Also – in case a fortress is capitulating, all colours of those units are lost as well at one sweep.
There is no doubt from my side, that the dual defeats of Jena and Auerstedt – were catastrophic defeats – that the French Army was as a whole better than the Prussian one and much better led. On the operational art of war Boney was at his prime and his army as well.
Also the Prussian Army had seen the last action in 1795 – whereas the French were on almost a string of constant war fare and were trained by the war itself.
And again, as Ruchel pointed out, the Prussian Army as such did not collapse, they were not on a rout but conducted numerous rear guard action, a fully defeated army would have been on the run.
One of the future Helion publications will have a chapter on the Prussian light infantry of 1806 – based on a lot of interesting sources – including battle reports, and one will see that for example the Schützen of the musketeer regiments – were very well trained on aiming, shooting, how to attack or defend villages and much more.
Ignoring German sources and without consulting them leads exactly to the typical generalizations Ruchel is mentioning.

Overall at Jena the Prussians were outnumbered two-to-one, but since the French had 96,000 against approximately 48,000 Prussians and Saxons, 40,000 of the French were not engaged. So the actual numbers engaged in the fighting were relatively equal, especially since the French were attacking.

Not so. It is all about who was involved. The first engagement was Tauentzien's 12,000 men vs
Lannes' Corps, @ 21,000 plus the Guard in Reserve and St. Hilaire's division Coming up on the right flank and Desjardin on the left. It is no surprise that the Prussian defense collapsed in a couple of hours.

Second engagements saw Tauentzien defend Vierzehnheiligen against Suchet's division which still represented a 2:1 match.

To the French right, Holtzendorff with 3,000 met Saint-Hilaire's division of 7,500. Again outnumbered 2:1

By the time Hohenlohe arrived with Grawert's Division, the Prussians still had maybe @30,000 or so after losing the 15,000 routed or retreated represented by Tauentzien and Holtzendorff:

However, through an oversight or bad communication, two brigades of Saxon's on the right, Burgsdorf and Nehrhi never came into action.

So, basically by 11:00, 20,000 Prussians and the rest of the Saxons faced more than 40,000 French counting Lannes and Augereau's Corps, plus Ney's contingent of 6,000, but not counting the Guard held in reserve or Soult's 26,000 with St. Hilaire leading who were forming up on the Prussian flank unhindered. By 12:30 another 40,000+ French had arrived on th field. By the time Ruchel showed up, he too was outnumbered 2:1…

The lack of coordination was the major reason for the Prussians being outnumbered in every encounter--regardless of raw numbers.

I disagree with your inaccurate 'not so.'

If the Prussians were outnumbered locally, that is both a leadership and tactics problem. They had the troops available and failed to employ them properly.

In the case of the French, they applied their tactical system and achieved local superiority in the fighting.

If the Prussians were outnumbered locally, that is both a leadership and tactics problem.

Uh, I just said that above.

The lack of coordination was the major reason for the Prussians being outnumbered in every encounter--regardless of raw numbers.

Again, I think it was the lack of leadership at the top which resulted in any lack of flexibility rather than some failing of subordinates or divisional units.

I think we should have a constructive discussion. Von Winterfeld's point is that the Prussian army did not collapse immediately after the battles of Jena and Auerstedt. In fact, there were many minor and major combats and sieges after those battles.

By constructive do you mean give the Prussians credit where it isn't due?

The Prussians were crushed at Jena and Auerstadt and many were hopelessly scattered from the beating they received. Of the main army beaten at Auerstadt, only Kalkreuth's two divisions, who were considerably beaten up, were anywhere near intact.

On the 16th, Hohenlohe had only 15,000 men at Nordhausen where Frederick William found him. Frederick William gave him command of the remaining Prussian forces, requested an armistice, and then left the army.

Prussian detachments under Saxe-Weimar, Wurttemberg, and in various garrisons were not rallied or massed and were left on their own. Wurttemberg would be defeated and routed by Bernadotte on the 17th.

The Prussian remnants were retiring on Magdeburg and were not attempting to stand. Blucher was chased into Lubeck, was defeated, driven out of Lubeck and surrendered.

The small rear guard actions were of little significance during the pursuit and the Prussians were ground to destruction.

That isn't 'grandstanding' merely fact.

And all I am seeing are excuses for the Prussians ignoring the facts of the campaign and the results.

By constructive do you mean give the Prussians credit where it isn't due?

It is easy to understand what a constructive discussion is, and in this case it has nothing to do with giving anybody credit or discredit. Please, read my last post again. We are not talking about who won and who lost. We know it very well.

From Jena/Auerstedt to Tilsit, there were many battles, combats and sieges. So, the Prussian army did not collapse immediately after Jena/Auerstedt. It is evident and no discussion about this issue is necessary. But maybe it is your desire to keep on discussing who won and who lost. It is fine, but you have to discuss with yourself. I do not want to waste my time in childish discussions.

Again, the operational results and the outcome of that campaign are not the points here. There are many books and studies about them. Also, there are many books on generalisations about Prussian politicians, commanders and society in 1806. The historiographical conclusions, agreements and disagreements about the main facts and processes during that campaign are well known.

But there is a lack of modern historiographical studies focused exclusively on tactics, procedures and performance of Prussian troops in 1806-1807, that is, referred to infantry battalions, cavalry regiments and artillery batteries, and their real evolutions and procedures in the battlefield.

In fact, the Prussian army of 1806 remains a great unknown. I repeat: we need serious and well researched studies and books based on primary sources, especially battle reports, accounts, memories, from the Prussian side. This is the point here. I prefer to learn from new approaches and evidences about little-known issues. It is more constructive than repeating needlessly old well-known songs.

And all I am seeing are excuses for the Prussians ignoring the facts of the campaign and the results.

Well, God only knows what you are seeing here. It is a mystery. Nothing to do with the issues we are talking about.

As I mention above, we are not discussing about "the facts of the campaign and the results". Perhaps it is your obsession, not ours.

So, in your opinion, if I am interested in the tactics, procedures and performance of Prussian troops in 1806, automatically I am excusing and negating facts and results. It is an absurdity. So, someone who would like to study an army who lost a war, automatically he/she wants to deny facts and results…

For example, we know that the French army lost the Battle of Waterloo, but that fact has nothing to do with the knowledge on the tactics and procedures used by the French troops. In other words, you may study the tactics and procedures used by an army even though this army lost a war. I assure you that it is compatible. It is not prohibited.

It seems that the French army lost Waterloo at least as decisively as the Prussians and Saxons lost at Jena. Perhaps more so, as there were no more delaying actions in the days to come.

By constructive do you mean give the Prussians credit where it isn't due?

I do not think that this justifies to not give any credit to the French troops for their performance at Waterloo, though. Neither should the overall outcome cloud our view on the Prussian performance in detail at Jena.

I agree that the tactical performance of the Prussian army during that campaign – not to speak of the Saxons – is a blank, and often just overshrouded with our knowledge of the Prussian army of the Seven years war.

And, to GardeDeParis: if Jena was revenge to Rossbach, what was Leipzig or Waterloo in regard to Jena/Auerstedt? We can assume that in the later relation they even had some protagonists on both sides and both occasions. Actually I think that petty thoughts like these did play a role in the motivation of many soldiers and officers on the ground for a century or five, rolling back to the conflicts between Charles and Maxilimian, or later Francis and Charles and up to 1945. While the soldiers at Jena probably did not have Rossbach in mind, the Prussian invasion of France 1792 may still have been remembered in person by some.

It seems that the French army lost Waterloo at least as decisively as the Prussians and Saxons lost at Jena. Perhaps more so, as there were no more delaying actions in the days to come.

There are some significant differences between Jena and Waterloo.

The Armee du Nord rallied after Waterloo, and it should be remembered that Grouchy's command won at Wavre and were undefeated when they rejoined the rest of Nord.

The French state did not collapse after Waterloo as the Prussian state did after Jena.

The subordinate French armies were successful in their assigned missions. That wasn't the case in 1806 with subordinate Prussian commands.

And Waterloo was close to a French victory when the Prussians came in. That wasn't the case with either Jena or Auerstadt.

Ruchel & von Winterfeldt,

Thank you for your comments here. Very thoughtful and well spoken.

in case anybody is interested how the Saxons fought and their experience, Jörg Titze published 4 booklets about their experience in 1806 – battle reports etc. of Saxon units – mostly Jena – also

Unterricht für die Scharfschützen bey der Churfürstlich Sächsischen Infanterie vom Jahre 1804 – also published by Jörg Titze -

Lessons for the Sharpshooters of the Prince-electors Infantry of 1804.

There you will find lots of very interesting instructions, including signals and even the possibility that two independent battalions could be formed out of those (which indeed happened in 1809).

All published in German, and that might cause difficulties for those interested but who are not speaking it.

VW: Great books if you can find them. I have only found one of the four Jörg Titze books on 1806, centered on the Burgsdorf brigade. Would you know where to find the others?

The French state did not collapse after Waterloo as the Prussian state did after Jena.

Huh? The Prussian state didn't collapse after Jena. The government fled and set up in the far East, where it remained until the peace of Tilsit. One can argue about how relevant it was, given how little of the country it still governed, but it sill functioned, still had cabinet meetings, still sent out orders to commanders, etc. It never ceased functioning.

Napoleon's government lasted exactly three days after Waterloo. He abdicated on June 22. Two days later there was a provisional government.

@McLaddie

Try Amazon.de – they have them all 4

Just insert

Jörg Titze

Let me know in case you have no luck.

VW:

I had to do some hunting, but thank you for the directions.
I did find them all. Thanks.

The Prussian state didn't collapse after Jena.

Then why did Clausewitz refer to the defeat as 'the catastrophe?'

The Prussian state lost half its territory and the civil population submitted meekly to the French.

The Prussians were lucky that Napoleon didn't dismantle the state entirely and it's too bad that he didn't.

Brechtel:

It's obvious that your notion of 'collapse' is different from Garth's.

The king was still the King after what was a 'catastrophe.' The Prussian state did lose half its territory, but so did several states including Austria during this time period, but saying the Prussian population 'submitting meekly' to the French skews a lot of pertinent history. Whether Napoleon could have dismantled the Prussian state or not, he didn't, so the same army still existed, the same government still existed, the same leader[s] still held power and would for quite a while.

After Waterloo, none of that was true for the French.

It all depends on what you see as 'collapsed.' What's your definition?

I can only assume that people know the meaning of the words they use.

The state is: the government and the administrative apparatus of government: its organs, bureaux, and employees.

You – nobody else – made the strange assertion that:

"The French state did not collapse after Waterloo as the Prussian state did after Jena."

As an assertion of fact, it is obviously wrong, since the Prussian state continued to exist and function after Jena, whereas Napoleon's state lasted only three days after Waterloo and was replaced by a provisional government.

Since you can't argue with that fact, you are now attempting to change the subject to: (1) An opinion about what to call the Prussian military defeat, (2) How much territory was lost and how the civilians behaved, and (3) what Napoleon should have done about it.

Rather than trying to start three new arguments, might it not simply have been a better idea just to say, "Sorry, yes, I was wrong about that one detail" ?

one has to look into the army after the defeats of Jena and Auerstedt, POWs escaped to form new units, a lot of new units were raised, everything what was available was used to increase the left over troops.

Not without any reason Prussian units captured two eagles – after Jena and Auerstedt.

Neither the Prussian Army nor the Prussian State collapsed.

I can only assume that people know the meaning of the words they use.

Yes, but do we? That was my question…