"The Tiger Tank That Wouldn't Die" Topic

"Discover the almost unbelievable story of Tiger 231, the tank the Soviets could not kill at Kursk, no matter how many times it was hit by anti-tank shells."

YouTube link

Amicalement
Armand

Astonishing

The crew, being merely flesh and blood, were certainly tougher than the tank.

More like the myth that won't die. Nice to see Mark Felton (the go-to source for those who can't figure out how to do their own Google) pop up yet again with his half-truths and inventions. Anyone who references his work without confirmation from other sources is a fool. He can't even get the date right as it was Feb 1943 and not 'Kursk'. A tank that has lost all its weapons and has running gear damage, fire damage and popped welds is definitely 'knocked out'and the fact the Germans scrapped it just confirms the obvious.

The truth is not as sensational. 9 Tigers from 11 knocked out and the attack failed.

link

There is another video that purports the incident being in Feb 1943 and not at Kursk.

YouTube link

I don't know Zabel's account directly but here's a picture of 231 with German soldiers in obviously mild conditions and with summer vegetation around it. If it was knocked out in February 1943 near Rostov how is this picture accounted for? Can't be summer 1942!

Maybe it's a different Tiger #231? The turret numbers weren't unique to each tank you know, only within a given battalion. Perhaps the picture above is tank 231 (1st tank, 3rd platoon, 2nd company under the usual German scheme) of some other unit? Or perhaps the replacement vehicle for the one that was shot up in February?

Yes, Mserafin, that is a possibility. The citation with the picture says the following,

"Here is a photo of "231" during 'Operation Zitadelle' in the Belgorod area of Russia. Early August 1943. The 503rd (attached to XI. Armeekorps), took part in Operation Zitadelle, an offensive operation meant to destroy the Kursk salient."

"…The truth is not as sensational. 9 Tigers from 11 knocked out and the attack failed…"

Failed? …. what else could you expect when the Russians knew in advance every detail of the German offensive and were waiting for them with everything they had at hand? … it is a miracle that any tank could have survived such a full defense line crowded of cannons of all kinds and with many more Russian tanks than the Germans had waiting to act in the rear …

Amicalement
Armand

By the way…Mserafin is right…

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Amicalement
Armand

A late-war Tiger Abteilung had 3 command tanks and 3 kp of 14 tanks each. 2 Command tank per kp and 3 zug each of 4 tanks numbered by the kp, the zug and then the individual tank number in that zug.
Nearly all the Tiger units had a current '231' and then probably several tanks that were numbered '231' when that tank was knocked out. In all 30-50 Tigers could have carried the number '231'. 1943-45
This is all because Mark Felton got confused by his Google results. If people stopped linking his rubbish this type of confusion would not be so frequent and we would not be constantly reinventing the wheel. .

Failed? …. what else could you expect when the Russians knew in advance every detail of the German offensive and were waiting for them with everything they had at hand?

More rubbish from Felton. That is an incorrect statement of fact.

it is a miracle that any tank could have survived such a full defense line crowded of cannons of all kinds and with many more Russian tanks than the Germans had waiting to act in the rear …

It did not survive. It was so badly damaged that they sent it back to Germany for homeland repair (this means it was written off by the Unit) and when they saw the extent of the damage they scrapped the tank. It had it gun destroyed, it had its hull welds burst open and a badly damaged suspension. What you mean to say it was not blown to smithereens rather it was 'just' reduced to scrap.

If you had read the link I gave earlier you would know all this anyway.

This link from 2007:

link

To start with Lt Zabel's report can be found in Tomas Jentz's “Die deutsche Panzertruppe, Band 2, pages 34-35. It should also be in the English language version.

This Tiger I did not come from sPzAbt 502, rather 1 Kompanie sPzAbt 503. Tomas shorter version is correct in outline, but differs in details. This may be due to translations back and forward, so it is perhaps nothing to get hung up about.

Further details can be found in Egon Kleine's and Volkmat Kuhn's 'TIGER, Die Geschichte einer legendaren Waffe 1942-45', page 72. The source of the report is stated to be the Tigerfibel D 656/27. The day of the assault was not the 10th, rather the 9th of February and the target was named Wesselyj. Participants were the sPzAbt 503 with 11 Tigers and 12 Pz III, the grenadiers of II/PGR 128 and an unnamed lFH battery.

The first attack went in at 0545, and was stopped. A second went in at 0935 and was also stopped. The third and last one also ended in failure. Net result of the activities was heavily losses to the grenadiers and two (2) tanks left operational. Certainly the Soviets had sustained losses too, but the attack ultimately failed.

Out of this mess emerges Tigers no'121' and '141'from the battalion repairs unit on the 10th. Both of these are so badly damaged that they need to be sent home to Germany for factory repairs. One of these two is the badly damaged one from the report. Due to initiative of Oberst Thomale, and in agreement with the OKH, it sent to the PzErs.-und-Ausb.-Abt 500 in Paderborn, and then put on display there 'as is'.

mkenny certainly seems be upset with Mr Felton. I wonder what happened between them.

B

Yes, I realize now that I am conflating two different Tiger 1 tanks. Over a couple of years there would be many different tanks with the numbering "231". That there was at least one at Kursk has says nothing to the events at Rostov in February, 1943.

mkenny certainly seems be upset with Mr Felton. I wonder what happened between them.

We don't talk about that here.

Previous knowledge via espionage of the details of the offensive is…More rubbish from Felton?…

Well my friend … then we have nothing more to talk about….

Amicalement
Armand

"Mserafin is right…"

Between that and Corona virus, I think we can be sure that the world is ending.

Well my friend … then we have nothing more to talk about….

I doubt we ever had.
Felton clearly states ENIGMA intercepts (Hitler's Plans')were passed to Stalin. That is not correct. The British knew (through ENIGMA) the Germans were reading the Soviet codes and so they severely limited the information they gave the Soviets to prevent the leaking their secret. The British knew an offensive was being prepared but a blind man could have worked that one out and the Germans cancelled it several times anyway. A huge Soviet salient projecting deep into the German lines was always going to be attacked and it was obvious. What the Soviets did was wait and let the Germans attack. They had several of their own Armies waiting to launch a huge offensive and had every possible German breakthrough was covered. Stalin had to be persuaded by his Generals to stay on the defensive so as to wear down the Germans before launching his attack. In fact ENIGMA did not get definite information about the German attack until 10th July(see British Intelligence In The Second World War page 327) that is 6 days after it started! On July 12th the Soviet counter-attacks began and on July 13th Hitler called off his offensive. That is how fast the situation developed.
So Felton really is making things up when he claims ENIGMA gave 'Hitlers Plans' to the Soviets.

I found this on-line and it seems to contradict what you are saying mkenny. [I like on-line because it saves me from having to type in information.]

From link

"As the Germans prepared their third Eastern offensive, against the Soviet forces in the Kursk Salient, more and more of the actual German orders for the planned attack were decrypted at Bletchley. Once more, the British were able to alert Soviet Military Intelligence. One of the most important decrypts to be shown to Churchill was a Tunny decrypt of 25 April 1943. It contained a detailed German appreciation of the Soviet order of battle before the German offensive in the Kursk Salient.[32]"

"Churchill made sure that this information was passed to Moscow, two months before the offensive was to open, together with detailed estimates, likewise based on the Germans' own top secret signals, of the strength and composition of the German divisions deployed around the Salient or the Kursk and Orel pincer movements. This information alerted the Soviet High Command to exactly what the Germans knew of what was facing them, enabling the Soviet High Command to alter the balance of the facing forces to Soviet advantage. The Battle of Kursk was the last and fatal attempt by the German Army to continue its eastward advance."

So there is a bulge into the German lines and top-secret information is discovered that shows the Germans are going to attack either side of the Bulge to try and eliminate it?
It is a good job they had ENIGMA as there is no way anyone would work out this was something that would be attempted…………
The codes broken by ENIGMA did not contain 'Hitlers Plans'. Getting the enemie's assessment of your own dispositions is not the same as getting the detailed lines of advance and even composition of the attacking forces. This may come as a shock to some but the Soviets had their own very effective spy network and it provided them with first -class information (google 'Lucy') so it was not a case of the Germans losing the battle because their plans were stolen. That is the old 'never beaten in a fair fight' excuse.
The issue is complex and all I said was that Felton's claims that: 'Hitlers Plans became known to Stalin via ENIGMA decrypts' is .

youtu.be/raAx57MHH7k?t=80

Felton made that up.

So tell me how both of these are possible?

The British knew (through ENIGMA) the Germans were reading the Soviet codes and so they severely limited the information they gave the Soviets to prevent the leaking their secret.

This may come as a shock to some but the Soviets had their own very effective spy network and it provided them with first -class information (google 'Lucy') so it was not a case of the Germans losing the battle because their plans were stolen

You are saying the Russians had their own spy network and the Germans knew about it.

Sometimes you just get lucky … or happens …

An old thread but it accurately describes the way Kursk ENIGMA information was passed to/used by the Russian. 'Hinsley' is the 5 volume work 'British Intelligence In The Second World War'.
link

You are saying the Russians had their own spy network and the Germans knew about it.

Enigma was not always a help. Nearly every German Unit had its own version of the machine and settings. It is a mistake to believe the British were reading everything. They most broken codes were The Luftwaffe ones and Luftwaffe observers attached to Army Units provided the bulk of decodes. Thus it was never the full picture.
The British were paranoid that the Germans would find out about ULTRA and they took great care to never act on information in a way that would make the Germans suspect their codes had been broken. During the battle of the Atlantic they knew the positions of all the German resupply vessels but decided not to sink them all as that would have been too obvious. They knew from ULTRA that Some Soviet Codes had been broken so they never ever gave the Soviets anything that could be traced back to Ultra.

I like on-line because it saves me from having to type in information.

There is nothing wrong with online resources. What is a problem is shallow third-rate superficial googles passed off as original research. In this specific case it is a fairly simple tale and Felton decides to add all sorts of bells and whistles to the story so as to pad it out and make it look like he is some sort of expert on the matter. He is far from such and he can't even get the date right.
His WW2 films are aimed at a specific group (low -info)and he knows what they want to hear so he makes sure he can deliver it. He is not interested in historical fact if it gets in the way of his viewing figures.

It's my understanding the Soviets were getting top grade intel regarding German plans until late in the war. It's been awhile since I've read up on it, but I believe the Germans knew it and were actively looking for the leak.

Still, it wouldn't surprise me if the other allies gave the Soviets some notice regarding what they knew.

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"…their are numerous books on the Lucy Spy Ring and the info it provided at different times to the Soviet Union…NOT a MYTH…information for Lucy Spy Ring was passed on by to the SU from Switzerland from information obtained by Gen Erich Fellgiebel from OKH, whom was hanged in Sept. 44 due to July 20th bomb plot…

…numerous facts also point to SU knowing prior to where the Kursk/Citadel attack was going to be, with the help of the Lucy Spy Ring enabling the SU to build To prepare for the defense, Zhukov summoned 300,000 civilians and built a series of defenses including tank traps, mine fields, and various defensive positions. Militarily, Zhukov wielded a strength consisted of 1,300,000 men, 3,600 tanks, 20,000 pieces of artillery, and 2,400 aircraft…defensive position the SU would not have and could not have completed without prior knowledge about and where said battle was going to commence and exact date known and attack orders…"

Felton clearly states ENIGMA intercepts (Hitler's Plans')were passed to Stalin. That is not correct.

I think you are incorrect mkenny with respect to Enigma intercepts and the battle of Kursk. No amount of bobbing and weaving will change that (which is what you do on later posts.) So on this it is Mark Felton 1, mkenny 0. That doesn't take away from your larger point but I think a bit of humility would go a long way on this (ie. I over spoke on this particular fact.)

their are numerous books on the Lucy Spy Ring and the info it provided at different times to the Soviet Union…NOT a MYTH…i

You should check what I said Felton made-up before getting your flabber so gasted. I specifically addressed the quote in the film you linked which says:

unfortunately for Hitler his plans became known to Stalin via British decrypts of German ENIGMA signals traffic….

No mention of Lucy there so what on earth are you trying to prove-other than you don't seem to know anything about your links.

think you are incorrect mkenny with respect to Enigma intercepts and the battle of Kursk. No amount of bobbing and weaving will change that

You are welcome to your opinion but I have more faith in Hinsley's multi volume work 'British Intelligence In The Second World War'

link

than Youtube videos.

A lot of people are getting confused about the difference between knowing the Germans were going to attack and knowing the exact details of the German attack. In fact the Germans themselves did not know their objectives until just before the engagement as it was delayed several times.
Perhaps they missed this in an earlier link I gave:

For being able to read the other side's mail, the Soviet dispositions don't reflect this well, having areas not in the German attack plan well defended (the 40th Army area) while areas that are in the German attack plan are lightly defended (the southern half of the Seventh Guards Army). It is almost as if the Soviet positions were set up to defend against the German plan as of 15 April, and never updated to reflect the changes in the German plans.

Translation-the German plans were not fixed in stone.

It is my understanding that the only thing Cairncross provided was Luftwaffe data, as that is all he had access to at Benchley Park.

Translation-The British were reading the Lufwaffe traffic not the Army and so could not provide 'all the details'

I also said earlier:

This may come as a shock to some but the Soviets had their own very effective spy network and it provided them with first -class information (google 'Lucy')

Translation-Granny, eggs, suck, etc.

Found this on "Google" -

The right-hand column (see below) contains is a rare survivor—a word-for-word translation of an intercepted Tunny message.15 Dated 25 April 1943 and signed by von Weichs, Commander-in-Chief of German Army Group South, this message was sent from the Russian front to the German Army High Command (‘OKH'—Oberkommando des Heeres). It gives an idea of the nature and quality of the intelligence that Tunny yielded. The enciphered message was intercepted during transmission on the ‘Squid' radio link between the headquarters of Army Group South and Königsberg.17
The message concerns plans for a major German offensive in the Kursk area codenamed ‘Zitadelle'. Operation Zitadelle was Hitler's attempt to regain the initiative on the Eastern Front following the Russian victory at Stalingrad in February 1943. Zitadelle would turn out to be one of the crucial battles of the war. Von Weichs' message gives a detailed appreciation of Russian strengths and weaknesses in the Kursk area. His appreciation reveals a considerable amount about the intentions of the German Army. British analysts deduced from the decrypt that Zitadelle would consist of a pincer attack on the north and south flanks (‘corner-pillars') of a bulge in the Russian defensive line at Kursk (a line which stretched from the Gulf of Finland in the north to the Black Sea in the south).18 The attacking German forces would then attempt to encircle the Russian troops situated within the bulge.
Highly important messages such as this were conveyed directly to Churchill, usually with a covering note by ‘C', Chief of the Secret Intelligence Service.19 On 30 April an intelligence report based on the content of the message, but revealing nothing about its origin, was sent to Churchill's ally, Stalin.20 (Ironically, however, Stalin had a spy inside Bletchley Park: John Cairncross was sending raw Tunny decrypts directly to Moscow by clandestine means.21)

- – - – -

To OKH/OP. ABT. and to OKH/Foreign Armies East, from Army Group South IA/01, No. 411/43, signed von Weichs, General Feldmarschall, dated 25/4:-
Comprehensive appreciation of the enemy for "Zitadelle"
In the main the appreciation of the enemy remains the same as reported in Army Group South (Roman) IIA, No. 0477/43 of 29/3 and in the supplementary appreciation of 15/4. [In Tunny transmissions the word ‘Roman' was used to indicate a Roman numeral; ‘29/3' and ‘15/4' are dates.]
The main concentration, which was already then apparent on the north flank of the Army Group in the general area Kursk--Ssudsha--Volchansk--Ostrogoshsk, can now be clearly recognised: a further intensification of this concentration is to be expected as a result of the continuous heavy transport movements on the lines Yelets--Kastornoye--Kursk, and Povorino--Svoboda and Gryazi--Svoboda, with a probable (B% increase) [‘B%' indicated an uncertain word] in the area Valuiki--Novy Oskol--Kupyansk. At present however it is not apparent whether the object of this concentration is offensive or defensive. At present, (B% still) in anticipation of a German offensive on both the Kursk and Mius Donetz fronts, the armoured and mobile formations are still evenly distributed in various groups behind the front as strategic reserves.
There are no signs as yet of a merging of these formations or a transfer to the forward area (except for (Roman) II GDS [Guards] Armoured Corps) but this could take place rapidly at any time.
According to information from a sure source the existence of the following groups of the strategic reserve can be presumed:- A) 2 cavalry corps (III GDS and V GDS in the area north of Novocherkassk). It can also be presumed that 1 mech [mechanised] corps (V GDS) is being brought up to strength here. B) 1 mech corps (III GDS) in the area (B% north) of Rowenki. C) 1 armoured corps, 1 cavalry corps and probably 2 mech corps ((Roman) I GD Armoured, IV Cavalry, probably (B% (Roman) I) GDS Mech and V Mech Corps) in the area north of Voroshilovgrad. D) 2 cavalry corps ((B% IV) GDS and VII GDS) in the area west of Starobyelsk. E) 1 mech corps, 1 cavalry corps and 2 armoured corps ((Roman) I GDS (B% Mech), (Roman) I GDS Cavalry, (Roman) II and XXIII Armoured) in the area of Kupyansk--Svatovo. F) 3 armoured corps, 1 mech corps ((Roman) II Armoured, V GDS Armoured, (B% XXIX) Armoured and V GDS Mech under the command of an army (perhaps 5 Armoured Army)) in the area of Ostrogoshsk. G) 2 armoured and 1 cavalry corps ((Roman) II GDS Armoured, III GDS Armoured and VI GDS Cavalry) under the command of an unidentified H.Q., in the area north of Novy Oskol.
In the event of "Zitadelle", there are at present approximately 90 enemy formations west of the line Belgorod--Kursk--Maloarkhangelsk. The attack of the Army Group will encounter stubborn enemy resistance in a deeply echeloned and well developed main defence zone, (with numerous dug in tanks, strong artillery and local reserves) the main effort of the defence being in the key sector Belgorod--Tamarovka.
In addition strong counter attacks by strategic reserves from east and southeast are to be expected. It is impossible to forecast whether the enemy will attempt to withdraw from a threatened encirclement by retiring eastwards, as soon as the key sectors [literally, ‘corner-pillars'] of the bulge in the frontline at Kursk, Belgorod and Maloarkhangelsk, have been broken through. If the enemy throws in all strategic reserves on the Army Group front into the Kursk battle, the following may appear on the battle field:- On day 1 and day 2, 2 armoured divisions and 1 cavalry corps. On day 3, 2 mech and 4 armoured corps. On day 4, 1 armoured and 1 cavalry corps. On day 5, 3 mech corps. On day 6, 3 cavalry corps. On day 6 and/or day 7, 2 cavalry corps.
Summarizing, it can be stated that the balance of evidence still points to a defensive attitude on the part of the enemy: and this is in fact unmistakable in the frontal sectors of the 6 Army and 1 Panzer Army. If the bringing up of further forces in the area before the north wing of the Army Group persists and if a transfer forward and merging of the mobile and armoured formations then takes place, offensive intentions become more probable. In that case it is improbable that the enemy can even then forestall our execution of Zitadelle in the required conditions. Probably on the other hand we must assume complete enemy preparations for defence, including the counter attacks of his strong mot [motorised] and armoured forces, which must be expected.14

Notes -
14 General Report on Tunny, p. 4.
21 Cairncross [2], p. 98, Hinsley [21], pp. 322-3, interview with Hinsley.

B

In the book "Colossus:The secrets of Bletchley Park's code-breaking computers" it states that the British did, in fact, learn not only the German understanding of the Russian strengths and weaknesses in the Kursk area but also gained gained insight into the German battle plans codenamed Zitadelle for 1943. Note that the decryption was from Army Group South, not the Luftwafte. This intelligence was relayed to Churchhill who passed it on the Stalin without revealing methods. I found this excerpt from Goggle Books for those who want to read it directly.

link

A lot of people are getting confused about the difference between knowing the Germans were going to attack and knowing the exact details of the German attack. In fact the Germans themselves did not know their objectives until just before the engagement as it was delayed several times.

As the date was April 25, 1943 the planning for Zitadelle was already well developed so its incorrect to assert that the Germans were ill formed of the upcoming attack.

Again, on this particular fact Mark Felton is correct. The British did share Enigma intercepts with the Russians related to Kursk.

I believe that Blutarski has copied the actual intercept that I am referring to.

an intercepted Tunny message.15 Dated 25 April 1943 and signed by von Weichs, Commander-in-Chief of German Army Group South, this message was sent from the Russian front to the German Army High Command (‘OKH'—Oberkommando des Heeres). It gives an idea of the nature and quality of the intelligence that Tunny yielded. The enciphered message was intercepted during transmission on the ‘Squid' radio link between the headquarters of Army Group South and Königsberg.17
The message concerns plans for a major German offensive in the Kursk area codenamed ‘Zitadelle'. Operation Zitadelle was Hitler's attempt to regain the initiative on the Eastern Front following the Russian victory at Stalingrad in February 1943. Zitadelle would turn out to be one of the crucial battles of the war. Von Weichs' message gives a detailed appreciation of Russian strengths and weaknesses in the Kursk area. His appreciation reveals a considerable amount about the intentions of the German Army. British analysts deduced from the decrypt that Zitadelle would consist of a pincer attack on the north and south flanks (‘corner-pillars') of a bulge in the Russian defensive line at Kursk (a line which stretched from the Gulf of Finland in the north to the Black Sea in the south).18 The attacking German forces would then attempt to encircle the Russian troops situated within the bulge.

Hitlers Order 6 was issued on April 15th. This is the Order that gave detailed deployment and objective information. It set the start date as May 3rd. This is the information passed to the Soviets by Lucy.

The British had an April 25 decrypt that gave the German estimate of the Soviet dispositions and Lucy had Hitler's Order 6 of April 15th that gave tactical information. Tell me again that Felton is correct when he claims:

unfortunately for Hitler his plans became known to Stalin via British decrypts of German ENIGMA signals traffic….

In the book "Colossus:The secrets of Bletchley Park's code-breaking computers" it states that the British did, in fact, learn not only the German understanding of the Russian strengths and weaknesses in the Kursk area but also gained gained insight into the German battle plans codenamed Zitadelle for 1943.

If you read Hinsley you will see that the German intentions were not 'known'. Hinsley records that the reading of the Luftwaffe traffic (their main source) showed transfers of aircraft to Italy and that on June 20 'it was doubted whether 'Germany would undertake any major operations in Russia before she had gauged the scale and purpose of the next Allied thrust in the Med' and went as far as concluding Germany had been forced into a posture of 'active defence' in Russia
and had decided to defer the next, and decisive, offensive in Russia until the spring of 1944

Felton is just using the 'we wuz robbed' excuse for the German defeat. They could not be beaten in a 'fair fight' and all failures have to be because the Allies had an unfair advantage.

As the date was April 25, 1943 the planning for Zitadelle was already well developed so its incorrect to assert that the Germans were ill formed of the upcoming attack.

April 25 to July 6th is 6 weeks. It was postponed several times and objectives and new Divisions brought in.
Again I give you Chris Lawrence:

According to Hinsley, only one peice of Kursk Ultra intel was passed to the Soviet Union, and they displayed little interest in exchanging intelligence.

Who's to say that the Soviets may have already known whatever was passed to them by the Lucy ring?
My argument is grounded on the fact that other Soviet capabilities in obtaining this intelligence existed. Through the network of partisans, resistance members, and agents within the occupied Soviet Union, largely coordinated by the NKVD. Through the work of the NKVD's OMSBON and GRU's special department usually in concert with the above-mentioned network. Through the more conventional means of intelligence collection by the Red Army via aircraft, radio, troop, artillery and engineer razvedka. Through the intelligence processing done by the GRU and all its subordinate RO's within the Red Army.

And this on the way the Soviets were caught by the German changes to the April 15th Order 6:

it does appear that the Soviet defenses in the south were organized to defeat the attack as outlined in the 15 April orders, as opposed to the later plan that the Germans actually used.

on this particular fact Mark Felton is correct. The British did share Enigma intercepts with the Russians related to Kursk.

That is not what Felton said.

unfortunately for Hitler his plans became known to Stalin via British decrypts of German ENIGMA signals traffic…

The clear intent is to say that Stalin became aware of CITADEL because of ULTRA intercepts (plural). Given that The Soviets had this information prior to the (single) shared ULTRA intercept Felton is wrong-just as he is wrong in placing the Tiger at 'Kursk' or in claiming it 'survived'.

mkenny, I went back to the original video an listened to it again. Now I understand why you are annoyed by the video (beyond the original mis-identification of the Tiger 1 tank.) Yes, you are correct that the video seems to give the impression that the Russians only discovered the plans for Zitadelle through the British. This is, of course, wrong. You are correct to assert that the Russians had already figured out by the spring of 43 that the Germans were planning something for the Kursk salient. Even without any intelligence gathering any half decent strategist could predict some kind of German campaign in the Kursk area in 1943 (something you remind us of.) The information relayed the British was still useful on several levels and it shouldn't be diminished however.

Felton clearly states ENIGMA intercepts (Hitler's Plans')were passed to Stalin. That is not correct.

Your statement above is incorrect however. Enigma intercepts were shared with the Soviets (minus sourcing) and I know you are stickler for detail so I imagine you are grateful for your friends on TMP correcting the record. :)

"April 25 to July 6th is 6 weeks."

For the sake of good order, you may want to update your calendar. It is actually 73 days (10+ weeks)

- – -

"Again I give you Chris Lawrence:
Who's to say that the Soviets may have already known …

When a writer prefaces a remark with the phrase "Who's to say …", it may be a hint that he is offering up a speculation as opposed to a categorical statement of fact. Just saying.

B

Since the Soviets were already starting to dig in around the Kursk salient in March of 1943 there is clear evidence that they had already discerned the likelihood of a German offensive in that direction. On this I agree with mkenny. Nonetheless, that is a far cry from the kind of detail found in the Tunny decrypt. Obviously this was only one source of information used the Soviet High Command in planning for the spring/summer German offensive.

Hi MB,
I suggest you consider reading the study "Soviet Operational Intelligence in the Kursk Operation" by David Glantz. I posted it as a separate thread; you can find the link there.

Glantz states that the Soviet operational plan for 1943 was to first stand on the defensive to receive an expected German thrust in the Spring, going over to the offensive only after repulsing the German offensive (hence the rapid entrenchment of the recently acquired territory of the Kursk salient). The problem for the Russians was that the Germans were working up plans for three different 1943 offensives and they were at first uncertain as to which the Germans would ultimately choose to execute.

There were a great many moving parts involved in this matter; it was not by any mens a simple exercise. For example, some well-supported arguments make the case that the "Dora" spy ring was actually not so much an espionage ring, but a "cut-out" for the British to route useful ULTRA material to the Soviets without revealing the true crypto source. There is a ring of sense to it, in as much as the value of material being supplied by the Dora ring suddenly dried up very shortly after Kursk, simultaneously with Churchill's decision to shut off the supply of ULTRA intelligence to the Soviets in retaliation for Stalin's refusal to reciprocate in an information exchange. According to Glantz, the Dora ring quickly fell out of favor with the Soviets and were inconsequential players by 1944.

FWIW.

B

Thanks for the heads up Blutarski. I will take a look. I have been reading Valeriy Zamulin's "The Forgotten Battle of the Kursk Salient" which is excruciatingly detailed in the early defensive constructions of the Russians around Belgorod right after the end of the German Kharkov offensive in early 43. I haven't sensed, so far at least, in Zamulin's narrative that Russian uncertainty in March 43 was influencing their "digging in."

Of possible interest?

link

Amicalement
Armand