"Guilford Courthouse." Topic

Ah, so you, or the authors you quote, are referring to Cornwallis 'cherrypicking.' I am flattered but I can clain no credit for his Lordship's communications. Interesting you and the authors do not actually make clear what was omitted or mis-stated. One might almost call that cherry-picking.

'That is incorrect'

So you have said.

Cornwallis withdrew etc etc etc

You do know what 'driving' means?

The study and the writing of history is not a democratic evolution

I am suitable instructed. I was however referring to differing opinions in this democratic discussion, made by contributors a good deal better informed than I which suggest that your categorical assertions bear closer scrutiny.

Perhaps you can explain how Cornwallis won the campaign

That would be silly.

The following is an excuse you posted which does not reflect the situation on the ground after Guilford Courthouse. "Having indeed suffered heavy casualties, etc etc"

That is incorrect.

No, I stated specifically that you were cherrypicking what you stated and you ignored the full context of what was going on, such as Cornwallis hiding the truth about Guilford Courthouse until it eventually came to light. Needless to say, Clinton was not pleased.

That would be silly.

Yes, it would be. Cornwallis was defeated strategically which is why he decided to go first to Wilmington and then to Virginia. In short, he gave up.

This is not a 'democratic discussion.' We don't vote on evidence or the value of opinions.

No, I stated specifically that you were cherrypicking what you stated

Correct. However, you have as yet to give examples of how. Citing two other authors' opinion on how Cornwallis may have 'cherrypicked' is not quite the same thing.

This is not a 'democratic discussion.'

Ah, my mistake.

I didn't state that Cornwallis cherrypicked anything. The cherrypicking was your doing in that you failed to detail the entire story as has been shown.

So, did Greek hoplites wield their spears overhand or underhand?

Here's a short article on the "Journal of the American Revolution website – link

The article is attempting to address why Cornwallis marched to Virginia. His conclusive paragraph is:

A dynamic officer best suited to offensive action, Cornwallis was, as stated in The Cornwallis Papers, temperamentally ill at ease with defensive warfare, a prospect now facing him in his immediate sphere of operations. A humane, cultivated man, he was moreover sickened by the murderous barbarity with which the war was waged by the revolutionary irregulars and state troops of the Carolinas and Georgia. Deterrence was essential, but in keeping with his character he had no stomach for the disagreeable measures involved, a point also made elsewhere in The Cornwallis Papers. In short, as the Wickwires make clear, "Cornwallis had no place in a civil war." Also contributing to his malaise was the mental and physical fatigue of commanding a whole year's hard and solid campaigning, fatigue which can be glimpsed during his stay at Wilmington. In his letter to Phillips of the 10th he remarked in a jocular but nevertheless sincere way, "I am quite tired of marching about the country in quest of adventures," to which there need to be subjoined a few revealing words in the draft of his letter of April 18 to Jeffrey Lord Amherst, the Commander-in-Chief of the British Army: "I can with great truth assure your Lordship that I have experienced as much care, anxiety and responsibility as ever fell to the share of any commanding officer." Altogether, it is fairly clear that the weight of his command was bearing down heavily on him. Against this background it is not entirely surprising that Cornwallis should have cast around, perhaps subconsciously, for reasons to release him from the predicament of dealing with a situation which he had come to detest. Always keen to act offensively, he simply opted for the more congenial alternative of doing so in Virginia, well way from the distasteful nature of the war farther south, an alternative, incidentally, which pricked his pride less than the perceived ignominy of conducting a defensive war to the southward after another unsuccessful campaign. These, then, were more likely the real reasons why Cornwallis took the absurd and fateful decision that he did.

I didn't state that Cornwallis cherrypicked anything. The cherrypicking was your doing in that you failed to detail the entire story as has been shown.

I think a sensible reader of this thread might conclude that in your assertions that Cornwallis-
<I."actually lied and/or misrepresented the situation to his superior" and waa
"hiding the truth about Guilford Courthouse"
as you have inferred from Babits & Co, you were accusing his Lordship of 'cherrypicking,' as you have defined it.

If I had intended to 'detail the entire story' I could of course have written another book, I suppose (always room for one more). However, as you know, instead I simply quoted passages from Cornwallis' correspondence that cast light on how he saw the situation in the aftermath of GCH and the proposed move to Virginia.

You have yet to demonstrate what was 'suppressed', etc., etc in those passages quoted, or indeed why it is you agree with Babits & Co in their analyis. Are you able to identify which passages in the correspondence are mendacious or materially misprepresent the situation in April 1781? Where are those decaying and mouldy cherries?

You have been given the evidence and have been shown where you cherrypicked information to fit into your scenario, which is incorrect in fact. I would suggest that it is time to move on.

Perhaps if you keep repeating these bald assertions, they may, by some arcane law of physics, become valid.

I have repeatedly been given re-hashed opinions without evidence and but shown nothing in support of your assertions re. the picking of cherries, despite invitations to do so. Movement in any direction would be refreshing.

We will have to agree to disagree.

There is an excellent book on Guilford Courthouse that was published in 1971 by the National Park Service and was written by Charles Hatch.

The book contains orders of battle, strengths, casualties and an excellent narrative. I have a copy and it is a valuable tool for the study of the battle.

I pulled out Hatch's volume and found the following interesting quotations and statements regarding the battle and its effect on Cornwallis and the British 'position' in the Carolinas because of the beating the British army took at the hands of Greene's army.

'Lord Cornwallis has conquered his troops out of shoes and provisions and himself out of troops.'-Horace Walpole, Whig leader in Parliament.

'…a victory, which, however splendid and honorable to the general and his troops, was not useful or advantageous to Great Britain.'-Banastre Tarleton.

'Never was ground contested for with greater obstinacy, and never were troops drawn off in better order. Such another dear bought day must effectually ruin the British army.'-Charles Magill, ADC to General Huger.

'His Lordship has lost an army, lost the object for which he moved it, and buried himself on the seacoast of North Carolina.'-Sir Henry Clinton.

'Another such victory would ruin the British Army.'-Charles James Fox, opposition leader in Parliament.

'The battle was long, obstinate, and bloody. We were obliged to give up the ground, and lost our artillery; but the enemy have been so soundly beaten, that they dare not move toward us since the action…I have never felt an easy moment since the enemy crossed the Catawba until since the defeat of the 15th but now I am perfectly easy, being persuaded it is out of the enemy's power to do us any great injury. Indeed, I think they will retire as soon as they can get off their wounded.-Nathaniel Greene to Joseph Reed, 18 March 1781.

'I am to acknowledge the receipt of your favors of the 16th and 23d instant and to congratulate you on the effects of the action of the 15th in which though the field could not be retained yet you have crippled your adversary in such a manner as to oblige him ultimately to retire which best shows which party was worsted.-Thomas Jefferson to Nathaniel Greene, 30 March 1781.

'On no occasion, in any part of the world, was British valor more heroically displayed. The officers of every grade did their duty; and each corps surpassed its past, through arduous exertions, in this terrible conflict. But the advantage of the ground, the weight of numbers, the skill of the general, and the determined courage of such portions of the American army as fought, presented obstacles not to be surmounted by inferior force. So maimed was the British army, that notwithstanding the flight of the North Carolina militia, had the second regiment of Maryland acted like the first, little doubt can exist but that Cornwallis must have shared the fate on this day which he experienced afterward. Afflicting were the sensations of the British general, when he looked into his own situation after the battle. Nearly a third of his force slaughtered; many of his best officers killed or wounded; and that victory for which he had so long toiled, and at length gained, bringing in its train not one solid benefit. No body of loyalists crowding around his standards; no friendly convoys pouring in supplies; his wants pressing, and his resources distant.'-Henry Lee.

'In this battle, the victory of the British general was complete, but to himself disastrous; his glory was great, but his loss prodigious. Nearly one-third of his troops were killed or wounded, while the loss to the Americans did not exceed one-twelfth-facts which, as soon as they were ascertained, gave prominence to the republicans in North Carolina, and made Greene a conqueror, and Cornwallis a fugitive.'-Henry Lee.

Casualties at Guilford Courthouse:

US:

Killed: 79
Wounded: 185
Missing: 1046

Of the 'missing' 216 were from the Virginia militia, 552 from the North Carolina militia. Most of these left the army and went home during and immediately after the action.

British Army:

Killed: 93
Wounded: 411
Missing: 26

The Guards had a casualty rate of 45%, the 33d Foot 31%; 23d Foot 29%; 71st Foot 26%, Regiment von Bose 25%.

Part II…

link

Armand

The article is incorrect in one respect: There was no '5th Maryland' at Guilford Courthouse. There were two Maryland regiments, the veteran 1st and the newly-raised and untested 2d.

The 2d Guards Battalion routed the 2d Maryland and were then engaged by the 1st Maryland which defeated them in hand-to-hand combat, ably supported by Washington's cavalry.

>US:

>Killed: 79
>Wounded: 185
>Missing: 1046

Interesting ratio--if there were 79 killed outright, the wounded should number around 240--usually a 3:1 ratio is standard unless it's something unusual like a surprise attack.

A lot of the "missing" were probably casualties. The Howard/Babits book talked about that quite a bit--if British losses were not always accurate, the Rebel ones often enter the realm of fantasy, given the really poor record keeping in most units.

Agreed about the missing VT. There was not the incentive on the American side to determine the casualties suffered by the militia. All that mattered was that the troops were not there when the next count was made.

Except, Bill N, those militiamen either returned home or didn't. Their local authorities knew precisely who lived and who disappeared or died. There was no incentive for CONTINENTAL commanders to determine (or be much concerned about) militia casualties. But the state records and correspondence are hugely concerned. This discrepancy in concern about losses was one of many reasons militia field duty was a last resort. The BEST records would have been the various county court martial record books, which are now sadly lost except Augusta's. (Courthouses burn down.) We really need to move away from seeing everything through a Continental Army lens.

Many thanks!.

Armand

Good points, doc mcb.

The loss reporting always drives me nuts. They numbers rarely make sense, especially for the Rebel side. Mark Boatner had a whole entry/discussion on this in his Encyclopedia of the American Revolution (still one of my go to sources).

Yes, Boatner is VERY useful indeed.

VT, you'd probably enjoy my dissertation.

link

John McBride, THE VIRGINIA WAR EFFORT: MANPOWER POLICIES AND PRACTICES, 1977

All this talk of GCH has me thinking of running this game if there an HMGS Con in the fall.

VT, you'd probably enjoy my dissertation.

Oooh! I'll check it out. Mine was on early Russian aviation, so it's not really on topic.

HG--I'm on board with that--definitely!

I've run it a few times.
Unfortunately, in order for the second and third line commanders to pass the time, they usually abandon their lines and come forward to join in on the fun. I'm not saying that's a Bad Idea, just that you throw the plan under the bus.

In one game, the von Bose and 71st commanders hated each other, and the militia in the front line won the battle all by themselves.

So, yeah. The games that I ran, using different rules, were definitely not recreations of the original battle.

I'll likely run multiple games, allowing different players to come in as the battle progresses. That's what I did before. It's a long game.