"Guilford Courthouse." Topic

" " As at Camden, the British went forward as soon as they were in line. Captain Peter led the 23rd on as acting commanding officer, with the regiment effectively in two wings under captains Saumarez and Champagne. As they went forward, one of them noticed the ‘field lately ploughed, which was wet and muddy from the rains which had recently fallen'…"

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Amicalement
Armand

Enjoyed the read and found the drawing of the battle very useful for when I do a refight!

Agreed, THANKS!

The current definitive work on Guilford Courthouse is Long, Obstinate, and Bloody by Lawrence Babits and Joshua Howard.

Their work on this volume is simply outstanding. I spent some time with Joshua Howard and found him highly intelligent, open-minded, and a diligent researcher.

Their work is highly recommended for anyone interested in the battle.

While tactically Greene lost, he ruined Cornwallis' command and the beating the 33d Foot and the 2d Battalion of Guards is noteworthy, especially the latter who were defeated by the 1st Maryland and Washington's cavalry.

Corwallis withdrew first to Wilmington to refit and then to Virginia which ended at Yorktown seven months later.

Guilford Courthouse was the largest battle in North Carolina during the Revolution and was decisive to the outcome of the war.

If anyone ever has the chance and opportunity to visit the battlefield, I highly recommend it.

Happy you enjoyed it guys!. (smile)

Amicalement
Armand

By happy coincidence I'm working on my 2mm Guildford Courthouse armies as we speak! Agree on Messrs. Babits and Howard's work as the best out there.
All the best…….Mark

Little was decided by the battle of Guilford Courthouse. It the very least, Cornwallis's move to Virginia from Wilmington waited on other factors. Greene meanwhile chose to march on Charleston where he was defeated at Hobkirk Hill (2nd Camden) even as Cornwallis set off northward.

TO MAJ GEN PHILLIPS,

'Camp near Wilmington, April 10 1781

Now, my dear friend, what is the plan? Without a plan we cannot succeed, and I can assure you that I am quite tired of marching about the country in search of adventures. If we mean an offensive war in America, we must abandon New York, and bring our whole force into Virginia; we then have a stake to fight for, and a successful battle may give us America. If our plan is defensive, mixed with desultory expeditions, let us quit the Carolinas (which cannot be held defensively while Virginia can so easily armed against us) and stick to our salt pork at New York, sending now and then a detachment to steal tobacco, &c…"

TO LORD GERMAIN

'Wilmington April 18, 1781

…I take the liberty of giving it as my opinion, that a serious attempt upon Virginia would be the most solid plan, because successful operations there might not only be attended with important consequences there, but would tend to the security of South Carolina, ans ultimately to the submission of North Carolina.'

TO LORD GERMAIN

Wilmington April 23, 1781

I yesterday received… dispatches from Sir Henry Clinton notifying me that Major General Phillips had been detached to the Chesapeak with a considerable force, with orders to co-operate with this army, and to put himself under my orders… I have resolved to take advantage of General Green having left the back of Virginia open, and march immediately into that province to attempt a junction with General Phillips.'

Greene never won a battle in his campaigns in the Carolinas. However, the three battles of Guilford Courthouse, Hobkirk's Hill, and Eutaw Springs mauled three different British armies and caused the British to give up the Carolinas with the exception of Charleston and that was thanks to the Royal Navy.

Greene drove the British out of the Carolinas by winning all of his campaigns while never winning a battle.

Cornwallis's move to Virginia from Wilmington waited on other factors.

What were the 'other factors'?

"mauled three different British armies and caused the British to give up the Carolinas"

Would you care to expand on those assertions?

What were the 'other factors'?

Reading the excerpts from contemporary documents may indicate an answer.

Would you care to expand on those assertions?

All you have to do is take a look at the casualties incurred by the three British armies commanded by Cornwallis (Guilford Courthouse), Rawdon (Hobkirk's Hill) and Stewart (Eutaw Springs) and compare them with Greene's losses. And then see what the three British commanders did after each action.

Cornwallis lost fully a quarter of his army at Guilford Courthouse and withdrew to Wilmington, in effect giving up the Carolinas. 'The retreat to the Dan and the battle of Guilford were to the South what the retreat across New Jersey and the battles of Trenton and Princeton were to the North. They turned the tide; and each attracted equal attention in Europe. Greene lost the battle but won the campaign, and the first step toward Yorktown was taken.'-General Francis Vinton Greene, The Revolutionary War.

After Hobkirk's Hill Rawdon abandoned both Camden and the post of Ninety-Six as well as Fort Granby. He stopped at Monk's Corner and after maneuvering against Greene and relieving Ninety-Six after reoccupying it, he destroyed it and withdrew, eventually turning over his command to Stuart because if ill-health he took ship for England and was captured by the French and sent to Brest.

The string of British fortified posts, referred to as a 'T' were gone-either taken by the Americans or abandoned.

Greene lost one-fourth of his command at Eutaw Springs, Stuart lost two-fifths. Total losses were 522 all ranks for the Americans and 866 for the British-43 percent. The British retired to Charleston. The state governments of both Carolinas and Georgia were reestablished and the British held only Charleston and Savannah-again thanks to the Royal Navy. Greene had driven the British out of the Carolinas and won each campaign without winning a tactical fight.

I would suggest that sweeping generalisation and reductive elision, while perhaps convenient for the narrative, are not a convincing basis for historical argument. Attending to the details presents an altogether more nuanced picture

"Cornwallis lost fully a quarter of his army at Guilford Courthouse and withdrew to Wilmington, in effect giving up the Carolinas."

Well, no. Having indeed suffered heavy casualties, in defeating Greene at Guilford (disproportionate in the number of wounded suffered) Cornwallis withdrew to Wilmington to refit, evacuate his wounded, receive reinforcements and await orders. Until they arrived nothing was decided, despite Cornwallis' belief that the Crown's efforts would be best concentrated in VA, which dated from before GCH.

You can read about that in the previous post (see above). Greene influenced this decision, not by his stand at GCH, but by leaving the land route to Virginia unguarded.

"After Hobkirk's Hill Rawdon abandoned both Camden and the post of Ninety-Six as well as Fort Granby."

Well, again, no. Having checked Greene at Hobkirk's Hill, Rawdonwithdrew to Camden and remained there for a fortnight. He had suffered 39 dead to the 19 reported by Greene. Wounded were more evenly balanced. Disproportionate, as one might expect for a smaller force attacking superior numbers, and unwelcome as was any attrition of a small force, but hardly a 'mauling.'

Rawdon recognised that the position up country was not sustainable and subsequently withdrew. Again, Greene's unsuccessful probe towards Camden had not been the deciding factor. Rawdon's subsequent ill-health and capture at sea are neither here nor there.

Your discreetly crunched figures for Eutaw Springs do not take into account that some 400 of the 800-odd Crown casualties were unarmed foragers caught unawares before the battle; undeniably an regrettable loss of personnel but not the result of the hard-fought action that ensued, which perhaps you wished to suggest.

All in all your colourful but misleading image of the British elk being repeatedly 'mauled' in the paws of an American panther is less and less convincing.

As you rightly point out, it was the overall strategic situation not least the numbers, which made the British position in the Carolinas increasingly precarious; not Greene's successive defeats on the battlefield.

Of course, like Volkswagen, your mileage and emissions may vary.

You are incorrect in your assessment and I would suggest taking a look at credible source material on the subject.

The bottom line is that Greene drove the British out of the Carolinas and that is just plain fact. And to do it he caused irreplaceable casualties in the three British armies that he faced in three separate battles.

Unless, of course, you are trying to believe that the British won in the South and therefore won the War of the Revolution?

I would suggest that sweeping generalisation and reductive elision, while perhaps convenient for the narrative, are not a convincing basis for historical argument. Attending to the details presents an altogether more nuanced picture

I didn't post any 'sweeping generalization' but a quick survey of the situation in the South with Greene's campaigns. If you would like or need a list of references, I would be happy to list one for you.

And what I posted was in answer to one of your queries…

Mark has a nice website. I also agree with Kevin that for anyone looking to learn more, Babits and Howards book is the best starting point for Guilford Courthouse. Now unto the breech.

Guilford Courthouse didn't force Cornwallis to move to Virginia. Even after the bloodletting of the battle Cornwallis's army was stronger than Greene's Continentals. That is before taking into consideration the reinforcements that Cornwallis got when he reached Wilmington. I believe Cornwallis was already inclined to remain out of South Carolina regardless of the outcome of Guilford Courthouse. He had tried to do it in the fall of 1780 only to be frustrated by Kings Mountain. Cornwallis could not stay in the North Carolina backcountry after GCH. The opportunities operating out of Wilmington were limited. In Virginia though he could join up with Arnold's army and operate in a healthier environment.

The Guilford Courthouse to Hobkirks Hill to Eutaw Springs is a gross oversimplification of what happened in the Carolinas in 1781. GCH was the culmination of a series of actions that Cornwallis fought in the North Carolina backcountry. Those actions proved to Cornwallis that he couldn't maintain himself in the North Carolina backcountry and still be strong enough at the same time to face Greene's field army. That Greene's continentals survived GCH intact meant Cornwallis had to retreat.

Hobkirks Hill played out a little differently but with the same factors. When Cornwallis moved north he took the field force with him. The 63rd and 64th were left behind but they were shadows. Over a dozen actions were fought in South Carolina between the time Cornwallis left and the battle of Hobkirks Hill. The rebels were already gaining territory. With Greene approaching, Rowden had to pull in troops that were previously trying to hold territory. Hobkirks Hill didn't cripple Rowden's force. He held on to Camden in the immediate aftermath of the battle and even made another stab at Greene's army. He couldn't ignore the fact that with his troops concentrated to face Greene, Marion, Lee and Sumter were overrunning large amounts of territory behind him. Some of Marion's partisans had even penetrated south of Charleston. Clarke's Georgians and SC partisans had Augusta under blockade. So Rowden was faced with the same problem after Hobkirks Hill that Cornwallis was after GCH. Either stay and risk being cut off, or withdraw to the coast.

Good analysis and right on the money with the exception of Cornwallis not being forced to leave North Carolina for Virginia. He could not face Greene again in open combat as he would undoubtedly be mauled again. Two of his best regiments-the 33d Foot and the 2d Guards battalion were mauled at Guilford Court House and he could not make up those losses.

Cornwallis left for Virginia because he quite literally had no choice.

The bottom line is that Greene drove the British out of the Carolinas and that is just plain fact.

"I didn't post any 'sweeping generalization' but a quick survey of the situation in the South with Greene's campaigns."

Ah, the old bottom line. Please yourself, old chap. What was I thinking?

As for credible sources, Cornwallis' own contemporary reports, providing a contemporary insight into his thinking, would seem an acceptable starting point for the interested reader. Your mileage and emissions may of course vary.

The narrative usually presented is that Cornwallis skedaddled down to Wilmington after Guilford Courthouse while Greene turned to attack Camden. Cornwallis actually maneuvered close to Greene's army for several days after the battle before turning to Cross Creek on March 25. Greene failed to attack Cornwallis during this time. This is blamed in part on Greene's lack of draft animals and ammunition after GCH and because Cornwallis managed to cross the Deep River before Greene caught him. I think there is more to the story.

Despite having several clashes with militia on his march and losing men who were sick or who were wounded at GCH, Cornwallis lead a force of over 1,600 men into Wilmington. When Greene moved south towards Camden his force consisted of around 1,400 men. The large army that Greene lead against Cornwallis at GCH had broken up after the battle. Greene was still strong enough to force Cornwallis to keep his army concentrated. He had enough militia to harass Cornwallis's foragers. He no longer had the 2:1 superiority in numbers he had at GCH, and thus didn't force another battle.

The next part is that Tarleton was critical of Cornwallis's decision to go to Wilmington rather than march south to Camden. Tarleton was writing with the benefit of hindsight, so maybe we should take this with a pinch of salt. However Cornwallis did feint towards Camden in the days after GCH. When he arrived at Cross Creek on March 30, Camden was only a few days march farther away than Wilmington. No supplies were coming up the Cape Fear River. I do not know whether the Royal Navy had the resources to move Cornwallis's army from Wilmington to Charleston. I don't know whether an overland march from Wilmington back to South Carolina was possible for Cornwallis's army. However from the aftermath of GCH until at least Cross Creek a return to Camden was possible for Cornwallis.

I therefore believe Cornwallis at least thought he could face Greene again after GCH. He also did have a choice in the immediate aftermath of GCH and as late as when he arrived at Cross Creek whether to return to South Carolina or move on to Virginia.

The bottom line, however, is that the Carolinas were cleared of the British and that Greene was responsible for that strategic victory.

Whatever was 'possible' is not the issue. The American army under Greene stayed and accomplished the mission. Cornwallis left and found defeat and surrender in Virginia.

Whatever was 'possible' is not the issue

Thank you, Kevin. You have made my day. The world in 2020 may well be going to hell in a supermarket stroller, but some things can still be relied on.

May I ask: are you shifting your argument for considered strategic reasons, or becaue you literally have no choice?

Which argument did I 'shift'?

Three British armies were gutted by the three battles with Greene and the British were forced to withdraw from the Carolinas, losing the campaigns and the territory.

I don't believe that is disputable.

It is quite clear that Greene drove the British from the Carolinas.

It was impossible for the British to hold the Carolinas as long as Virginia was free to send wave after wave of re-enforcements to Greene. Virginia was a major supply center for the Continental war effort, with gunpowder laboratory, leather works, the lead mine, etc. It had more than 40,000 militia, and they were learning how to use them effectively.

@docmcb

Indeed, and verily. As Charles Cornwallis realised all too well.

TO MAJ GEN PHILLIPS,

'Camp near Wilmington, April 10 1781

If we mean an offensive war in America, we must abandon New York, and bring our whole force into Virginia; we then have a stake to fight for, and a successful battle may give us America. If our plan is defensive, mixed with desultory expeditions, let us quit the Carolinas (which cannot be held defensively while Virginia can so easily armed against us) and stick to our salt pork at New York, sending now and then a detachment to steal tobacco, &c…"

TO LORD GERMAIN

'Wilmington April 18, 1781

…I take the liberty of giving it as my opinion, that a serious attempt upon Virginia would be the most solid plan, because successful operations there might not only be attended with important consequences there, but would tend to the security of South Carolina, ans ultimately to the submission of North Carolina.'

TO LORD GERMAIN

Wilmington April 23, 1781

I yesterday received… dispatches from Sir Henry Clinton notifying me that Major General Phillips had been detached to the Chesapeak with a considerable force, with orders to co-operate with this army, and to put himself under my orders… I have resolved to take advantage of General Green having left the back of Virginia open, and march immediately into that province to attempt a junction with General Phillips.'

It was 'the most solid plan' because Cornwallis was driven out of the Carolinas.

He was putting the best face on the situation that he could under the circumstances. Although he held the field at Guilford Courthouse his army was seriously hurt and had to withdraw.

And the British had gone into Virginia as early as May 1779, but they failed to reinforce and the commander withdrew.

In October 1780 General Leslie invaded Virginia, but later moved his command to the Carolinas to reinforce Cornwallis.

In December 1780 Arnold invaded Virginia with Loyalist troops, Hessians, and British regulars. He was later joined by General Phillips with a further 2,000 British troops who stayed in Virginia until joined by Cornwallis.

So, a British 'presence' in Virginia predated Cornwallis' arrival. Cornwallis could not win in the Carolinas which is one of the reasons that he went north.

Where was the '40,000 Virginia militia' when the British invaded Virginia?

Please yourself, old chap. Good to see that you have now read the source quoted.

Virginia had (or had had) a very large state line, which it sent into the Carolinas where they were mostly lost by Continental commanders.

There were basically two ways to use Virginia's militia, and the preferred way was to draft Continentals. The 1780 (iirc) draft of 2500 men was accomplished by dividing the militia into groups of 20 men, each of which had to provide one recruit. They could pool money and hire a man, they could catch a deserter and return him to the army, or they could draw a name from a hat (in which case the other 19 had to support his family). This draft was met with some resistance, which the militia officers were able to suppress. But it did produce a good man men.

Mustering units of militia for field service was frought with problems (see, e.g. Camden), but sometimes necessary.

By 1781 Virgina had several thousand former Continentals (now once again menbers of their county's militia) and many supernumerary Continental officers. The militia battalions (sometimes called "militia grenadiers") in the Yorktown campaign were mostly composed of these veterans, who were paid by the common militia in whose places they they were serving.

Thanks, Doc. Most interesting. Would it be fair to say the men with former Continental service in the militia, to some extent,in an informal sense created a pool of men akin to regulars serving in the reserves after leaving the colours, as we find in later periods?

The Virginia Line was mostly lost at Charleston.

The new Virginia Continental Regiments raised and sent to Greene performed very well and at least one of them was responsible for the defeat of the 33d Foot (which included the mortal wounding of their commanding officer) at the US 3d Line.

Yes, but in the Yorktown campaign it wasn't an informal arrangement. The state organized, I think three, battalions with a full slate of supernumerary Continental officers. The militia officers who mustered with their county's levy were allowed to double up with the Continental officers, who had the command. There was some periodic replacement of men in the ranks, but as much as possible the former Continentals were paid to remain, the money coming from the other militia who basically hired them as substitutes -- but not this individual hiring that individual, but rather all the county's levy paying in to a fund out of which the veterans were maintained in service. In a wargame I would treat these militia battalions as either veteran militia or as green regulars. The other consideration was weapons; Virginia had lost a lot of muskets in various disasters, and replaced some with French imports kept under state control; the militiamen were much less likely to have their own weapon.

You might be able to find a copy of my 1977 PhD dissertation: John D. McBride, THE VIRGINIA WAR EFFORT, 1775-1783; MANPOWER POLICIES AND PRACTICES. University of Virginia. All of the above is laid out in it.

What about the '40,000 militia' referenced earlier?

The state of Virginia was woefully unprepared for the British invasion in 1780 and the defense was limp-wristed. The Governor, Thomas Jefferson, ran for his life and then resigned his position, leaving Virginia with a chief executive in the crisis.

The Virginia militia ran at Camden in August 1780 leaving the Maryland and Delaware Continentals on their own to face the entire British army on the field. Their commander, General Stevens, was mortified and when he again commanded the Virginia militia at Guilford Courthouse he stationed 25 picked men behind the line and ordered them to shoot anyone that ran.

This is off the top of my head. I suspect Doc may be able to give more accurate information.

In the fall of 1780 about the time of Leslie's raid it was reported to Jefferson that the militia resources then available in Virginia, not counting certain western counties, was about 45,000 men. Within a week of being notified of the sighting of ships bearing Arnold's troops in 1781 3,000 Virginia troops had been mobilized in various commands. This was in addition to militia then serving with or headed to Greene and Morgan in the Carolinas.

As of 1775-76 Virginia had 50,000 militia. Obviously they would never put that many in the field. There was a permanent need for warning posts along every river in the tidewater, as otherwise British privateers would plunder the plantations. The western counties had to garrison the numerous small forts to which civilians would flee during Indian raids. So probably 20% of militia was tied down on the western and easter frontiers.

At least half of Virginia's economy was small farmers who owned few if any slaves. So the economic impact of large scale militia service was great.

The following information on the Virginia Continentals is from The Continental Army by Robert Wright, pages 283-293 and 319:

-1st Virginia Regiment: Captured at Charleston on 12 May 1780.

-2d Virginia Regiment: Captured at Charleston on 12 May 1780.

-3d Virginia Regiment: Captured at Charleston on 12 May 1780.

-4th Virginia Regiment: Captured at Charleston on 12 May 1780.

-5th Virginia Regiment: Consolidated with the 3d Virginia Regiment on 12 May 1779.

-6th Virginia Regiment: Consolidated with the 2d Virginia Regiment on 12 May 1779.

-7th Virginia Regiment: Captured at Charleston on 12 May 1780.

-8th Virginia Regiment (German Regiment): Consolidated with the 4th Virginia Regiment on 12 May 1779.

-9th Virginia Regiment: Consolidated with the 1st Virginia Regiment on 12 May 1779.

-10th Virginia Regiment: Captured at Charleston on 12 May 1780.

-11th Virginia Regiment: Captured at Charleston on 12 May 1780.

-13th Virginia Regiment (West Augusta Regiment): Authorized on 16 September 1776 and assigned to the Main Army on 27 December 1776. Organized on 12 February 1777 with nine companies. Reorganized to consist of eight companies on 1 November 1777 and assigned to the Western Department on 24 May 1778. Reorganized and redesignated at the 9th Virginia Regiment with nine companies on 12 May 1779. Reorganized and redesignated as the 7th Virginia Regiment of two companies on 1 January 1781. Disbanded at Fort Pitt on 1 January 1783.

-14th Virginia Regiment: Captured at Charleston on 12 May 1780.

-15th Virginia Regiment: Captured at Charleston on 12 May 1780.

-Virginia Independent Companies: Authorized as two independent companies on 8 January 1777 to garrison Fort Pitt and Fort Randolph. They were organized between 12 February and 4 April 1777 and assigned to the Western Department on 9 April 1777. They were consolidated and named as Heth's Independent Company and were disbanded on 1 January 1781 at Fort Pitt.

-Maryland and Virginia Rifle Regiment: Initially organized as three independent rifle companies on 14 June 1775. The rifle regiment was authorized on 17 June 1776 and assigned to the Main Army. The regiment was organized on 27 June 1776 and was partially captured at Fort Washington on 16 November 1776. The regimental organization was then disbanded and the Virginia units were transferred on 3 February 1777 to the 11th Virginia Regiment. On 21 March 1779 the remnants were reorganized as Rawlings' Independent Corps and assigned to the Western Department and were finally disbanded on 1 January 1781.

The following information is from Berg's Encyclopedia of Continental Army Units, 124:

Two provisional Continental battalions were recruited after Charleston, and commanded by Green and Hawes and sent to Greene's southern army. They fought well at Guilford Courthouse.

That does not accurately reflect the history of the Virginia line or what happened after Charleston. However it is fairly far removed from GCH so will save it for another day.

Little was decided by the battle of Guilford Courthouse. It the very least, Cornwallis's move to Virginia from Wilmington waited on other factors. Greene meanwhile chose to march on Charleston where he was defeated at Hobkirk Hill (2nd Camden) even as Cornwallis set off northward.
TO MAJ GEN PHILLIPS,
'Camp near Wilmington, April 10 1781
Now, my dear friend, what is the plan? Without a plan we cannot succeed, and I can assure you that I am quite tired of marching about the country in search of adventures. If we mean an offensive war in America, we must abandon New York, and bring our whole force into Virginia; we then have a stake to fight for, and a successful battle may give us America. If our plan is defensive, mixed with desultory expeditions, let us quit the Carolinas (which cannot be held defensively while Virginia can so easily armed against us) and stick to our salt pork at New York, sending now and then a detachment to steal tobacco, &c…"

TO LORD GERMAIN
'Wilmington April 18, 1781
…I take the liberty of giving it as my opinion, that a serious attempt upon Virginia would be the most solid plan, because successful operations there might not only be attended with important consequences there, but would tend to the security of South Carolina, ans ultimately to the submission of North Carolina.'
TO LORD GERMAIN
Wilmington April 23, 1781
I yesterday received… dispatches from Sir Henry Clinton notifying me that Major General Phillips had been detached to the Chesapeak with a considerable force, with orders to co-operate with this army, and to put himself under my orders… I have resolved to take advantage of General Green having left the back of Virginia open, and march immediately into that province to attempt a junction with General Phillips.'

Cornwallis' comments, seemingly cherrypicked above, are put into more context by Babits and Howard in Long, Obstinate, and Bloody, pages 187-188:

'Cornwallis's fortunes were much different. After reaching Wilmington, Cornwallis refitted his army, sent to wounded to Charleston or to England, and made perhaps the most fateful decision of his military career. The earl decided to invade Virginia and join forces with Maj Gen William Phillips and Brig Gen Benedict Arnold…Cornwallis had given up attempting to pacify the interior of North and South Carolina…

'As word of British losses at Guilford reached Clinton and Phillips, their moods changed. Clinton became enraged upon learning the actual situation of the British army in the South and that Greene still dominated the Carolinas…Clinton attempted to have Cornwallis court-martialed…Phillips stated that Cornwallis's supposed success was 'that sort of victory which ruins and army and the Carolinas, like all America, are lost in rebellion…'

"The earl decided to invade Virginia and join forces with Maj Gen William Phillips and Brig Gen Benedict Arnold"

There you go.

'Cherry picked' Meaning?

And it was followed by '…Cornwallis had given up attempting to pacify the interior of North and South Carolina.' That seems to me that Cornwallis had given up-or Greene had driven him out.

Cherry Picking:

Definition of Cherry picking

'Cherry picking, suppressing evidence, or the fallacy of incomplete evidence is the act of pointing to individual cases or data that seem to confirm a particular position while ignoring a significant portion of related cases or data that may contradict that position. It is a kind of fallacy of selective attention, the most common example of which is the confirmation bias. Cherry picking may be committed intentionally or unintentionally. This fallacy is a major problem in public debate.'

There you go…

Then you also have failed to include what was stated by General Phillips:

'Phillips stated that Cornwallis's supposed success was 'that sort of victory which ruins and army and the Carolinas, like all America, are lost in rebellion…''

There you go, again…

Regarding the two units of Virginia Continentals that were with Greene at Guilford Courthouse, they were the new 1st and 2d Virginia (mistakenly stated to have been the 4th and 5th Virginia, just as the 2d Maryland in Williams Continental Brigade was mistakenly identified in some publications as the 5th Maryland). They were 18-month regiments, the 1st being commanded by Colonel John Greene and the 2d by LtCol Samuel Hawes. The brigade was commanded by BrigGen Isaac Huger.

That does not accurately reflect the history of the Virginia line or what happened after Charleston. However it is fairly far removed from GCH so will save it for another day.

Really? And why is that? I listed the eventual fate of the Virginia Continentals, the overwhelming majority of which were lost at Charleston in May 1780. Are you saying that they were not either consolidated before Charleston and not lost there?

I didn't list the entire history of the regiments but what happened to them. And I gave the reference which does have their history. Perhaps you can show where Wright got it wrong?

As I said Kevin I will happily do so, in another thread.

Cool pictures.I live only a couple hours away from Guilford and wanted to go the reenactment a couple weeks ago but it was cancelled because of CV.

I will happily do so, in another thread.

All you have to do is to check Wright's and Berg's books. Pretty easy I should think.

And if you're going to bring up the subject and claim that material that was posted is incorrect, then you should actually post what you think. If not, then whatever point you're trying to make is moot.

The reason I posted only part of the Virginia Continentals' history was to show where they were and what happened to them. It was not intended to be a complete history. If you want that, read the books.

And it was followed by '…Cornwallis had given up attempting to pacify the interior of North and South Carolina.' That seems to me that Cornwallis had given up-or Greene had driven him out.

The key words in the phrase I quoted were the words 'decided' and 'invade.' There is a reason why the authors chose words that are active not reactive.

Cornwallis indeed thought that directing further Crown resources to suppressing the Carolinas militarily would be fruitless a)without an efffective Loyalist base of support b) while Virginia remained a source of logistical support.

So his decision was to 'invade'- (slightly grandiose choice of words but nonetheless). Were Greene's activities a factor in the successful rebel resistance in the south? Of course. However your determination to characterise Greene as driving Cornwallis anywhere is simply fallacious.

'Cherry picking'

I could have posted all published Cornwallis' correspondence for early 1781. I suspect that would have been tedious and unhelpful for anyone reading this thread (note). Instead, I quoted passages from his Lordship's correspondence relevant to the discussion, illustrating his analysis and reccommended course of action. Isn't that how historical discussion works?

You might engage with the substance of those illustrative passages rather than hedge them with rhetorical metaphor. If you wish instead to seek evidence in the correspondence that I have suppressed, ignored, etc. passages that contradict the views expressed in the passages quoted, do by all means point them out.

As for Phillip's comments, not at all cherrypicked, there was no failure. I chose not to cite them since, as they do not touch on Cornwallis' analysis and decision re. moving the fight to Virginia, they are not relevant.

Phillips of course was, as Babits point out in the previous paragraph, wholly supportive of a concentration of forces in Virginia. His subsequent death of fever prevented his contributing to the success of such an enterprise.

However your determination to characterise Greene as driving Cornwallis anywhere is simply fallacious.

That is incorrect. Cornwallis left because he lost the campaign and a quarter of his army. That was because of Greene.

You have cherry picked your evidence and that has been shown. It seems to me that all you are doing is offering excuses for the British effort in the Carolinas-which were an abject failure. And that is what is fallacious in your 'argument.'

"You have cherry picked your evidence and that has been shown."

Really? Shown where? In which portion of the Cornwallis correspondence have you identified my doing as you described. viz. 'suppressed', 'ignored'. etc?

your determination to characterise Greene as driving Cornwallis anywhere is simply fallacious." That is incorrect. Cornwallis left because he lost the campaign and a quarter of his army. That was because of Greene."

After which of Greene's battlefield defeats did the driving took place?

"Cornwallis left because he lost the campaign and a quarter of his army."

That would be your assessment; with which several posters here disagree.

all you are doing is offering excuses for the British effort in the Carolinas

For my enlightenment can you identify any excuses have been offered?

Very informative, thanks. Personally I've always thought of Cornwallis invading Virginia a kin to Hitler invading Germany. :)

"You have cherry picked your evidence and that has been shown."
Really? Shown where? In which portion of the Cornwallis correspondence have you identified my doing as you described. viz. 'suppressed', 'ignored'. etc?

This is what you quoted:

TO MAJ GEN PHILLIPS,'Camp near Wilmington, April 10 1781If we mean an offensive war in America, we must abandon New York, and bring our whole force into Virginia; we then have a stake to fight for, and a successful battle may give us America. If our plan is defensive, mixed with desultory expeditions, let us quit the Carolinas (which cannot be held defensively while Virginia can so easily armed against us) and stick to our salt pork at New York, sending now and then a detachment to steal tobacco, &c…"
TO LORD GERMAIN
'Wilmington April 18, 1781…I take the liberty of giving it as my opinion, that a serious attempt upon Virginia would be the most solid plan, because successful operations there might not only be attended with important consequences there, but would tend to the security of South Carolina, ans ultimately to the submission of North Carolina.'
TO LORD GERMAIN
Wilmington April 23, 1781I yesterday received… dispatches from Sir Henry Clinton notifying me that Major General Phillips had been detached to the Chesapeak with a considerable force, with orders to co-operate with this army, and to put himself under my orders… I have resolved to take advantage of General Green having left the back of Virginia open, and march immediately into that province to attempt a junction with General Phillips.'

And this is what is written about the above words of Cornwallis, where he actually lied and/or misrepresented the situation to his superior General Clinton.

The following from Babits and Howard, Long Obstinate, and Bloody, pages 186-187 which clearly shows how Cornwallis misrepresented the aftermath of Guilford Courthouse:

‘Cornwallis wrote a series of letters to Lord Germain, British secretary of state for the American colonies, concerning his theories but discussed the matter little with the overall British commander in North America, Gen Sir Henry Clinton, before marching. He wrote Clinton, ‘I cannot help expressing my wishes that the Chesapeake may become the seat of war, even at the expense of abandoning New York.' Clinton apparently assumed that Greene had fled north from Cornwallis army. He responded, ‘It is my wish that you should continue to conduct operations as they advance Northerly; for except as a visitor, I shall probably not move to Chesapeake, unless Washington goes thither in great force. The success which has hitherto attended your Lordship excites the fullest assurance of its continuance.' In Virginia, William Phillips was under a similar impression, writing Clinton, ‘the year 1781 may prove the glorious period of your command in America, by putting an end to the rebellion.' Phillips himself believed that with Cornwallis's aid, he could drive north into Maryland, eventually retaking Philadelphia.'

‘As word of British losses at Guilford reached Clinton and Phillips, their moods changed. Clinton became enraged upon learning the actual situation of the British army in the South and that Greene still dominated the Carolinas. His indignation, and the heated correspondence that followed between him and Cornwallis, became known as the ‘Clinton-Cornwallis Controversy.' Clinton attempted to have Cornwallis court-martialed, and one story, although likely apocryphal, claims Clinton challenged him to a duel. Phillips was equally outraged. In a letter to Clinton, Phillips stated that Cornwallis's supposed success was ‘that sort of victory which ruins an army and the Carolinas, like all America, are lost in rebellion.' Phillips anger may have been tempered by ill health. He died in Petersburg on 13 May of a contagious fever.'

your determination to characterise Greene as driving Cornwallis anywhere is simply fallacious."

That is incorrect. Cornwallis left because he lost the campaign and a quarter of his army. That was because of Greene and the action at Guilford Courthouse.

After which of Greene's battlefield defeats did the driving took place?

All three. Cornwallis withdrew after Guilford Courthouse, Rawson finally had to withdrew after Hobkirk's Hill and Stuart withdrew after Eutaw Springs. Greene's actions also destroyed the British posts in what was referred to as the ‘T' in South Carolina

"Cornwallis left because he lost the campaign and a quarter of his army."
That would be your assessment; with which several posters here disagree.

The study and the writing of history is not a democratic evolution. The majority opinion may or may not be correct or accurate. Accuracy of facts and conclusions based on those facts is called historical inquiry. I've been studying the southern campaign for decades which is how I came up with my conclusions.

Perhaps you can explain how Cornwallis won the campaign and didn't lose one-quarter of his army at Guilford Courthouse if that is indeed your position.

Interestingly, John Elting wrote this in The Superstrategists regarding Greene:

‘The students among Washington's subordinates included Nathaniel Greene, Henry Knox, and Wayne, and there can be little doubt that they profited by their reading of the great captains. Nathaniel Greene, the limping, clear-minded, reformed Quaker who had studied even as he worked at his forge, waged a campaign much after the style of Turenne across the southern states through 1781-1782.'-110.

‘In the closing year of the war, Nathaniel Greene made masterly use of strategic partisan warfare across the southern states. Fixing the British regular forces there with his own small army, he utilized existing partisan bands-in particular, that of Francis Marion-to destroy the British communication system and to put down any Tory groups favoring the British. To stiffen Marion's militiamen, Greene reinforced him with Lee's Legion, a highly trained, smartly uniformed vest-pocket task force of Continental light infantry and dragoons…This strategy was most effective; their supply lines cut, the British forces in the interior of the Carolinas had to fall back into the Charleston and Savannah areas, where they were blockaded for the rest of the war.'-102.

‘Napoleon proclaimed Turenne ‘the greatest of the French generals: he is the only one who became bolder with age' and carefully studied his campaigns, as did Maurice de Saxe and Frederick the Great. And Nathaniel Greene read his Memoirs, along with Euclid's geometry and Saxe's Reveries, beside his forge while he yet was only a Quaker ironworker. Greene's daring campaign with a weak, almost-forgotten army through the Southern states during 1781-1782 showed what Turenne had taught him.'-77.

There is a great difference between just winning battles and winning campaigns. Greene was a strategist and an awkward tactician. He drove the British out of the Carolinas beginning with Cornwallis.

Cornwallis admitted that he couldn't win in the Carolinas and that is why he withdrew to Virginia.

For my enlightenment can you identify any excuses have been offered?

The following is an excuse you posted which does not reflect the situation on the ground after Guilford Courthouse.

Having indeed suffered heavy casualties, in defeating Greene at Guilford (disproportionate in the number of wounded suffered) Cornwallis withdrew to Wilmington to refit, evacuate his wounded, receive reinforcements and await orders. Until they arrived nothing was decided, despite Cornwallis' belief that the Crown's efforts would be best concentrated in VA, which dated from before GCH.