"Distribution of Long Arms in the Union Cavalry" Topic

Garryowen recently posted some very interesting observations on the use of long arms by Confederate cavalry. He pointed out how the shortage of such weapons affected the deployment and tactics of Southern mounted units. However, even into the mid-war period, when the Northern cavalry is said to have come of age, the distribution of long arms determined how they too deployed and fought.

I first started thinking about the interplay of weapons and tactics when I was looking at Buford at the first day at Gettysburg. Gettysburg is probably the best sourced battle of the ACW so by default it can well serve as a model for the mid-war period.

In his blog Hoofbeats and Cold Steel link David Petruzzi provides an order of battle for Buford's Division that includes the strengths of each regiment. On page 32 of John McAulay's Carbines of the U. S. Cavalry,1861-1905 (1996), is a listing of the number of long arms carried by Buford's men. From the context I assume this is the Quarterly Ordnance Report for 30 June 1863. When the number of troops is compared to the number of long arms in each regiment there are a noticeable number of men that were armed at best with only pistols and sabres.

In the list below both the strengths of each regiment and the long arms they carried are as follows (the % is that of Enlisted Men carrying long arms):

First Division / AoP Cavalry Corps

First Brigade

8th Illinois (12 Cos)
537 Enlisted Men – 311 Sharps.
Cos. A, C, H, and M did not file an Ordnance Report so if the EM strength is reduced by 4/12ths the numbers would be:
357 Enlisted Men – 311 Sharps carbines (87%)

12th Illinois (5 Cos)
253 Enlisted Men – 86 Burnside. Only 3 of the 5 Cos. filed an Ordnance Report so reducing the EM strength by 2/5ths would the following:
152 Enlisted men – 86 Burnside carbines (56%)

3rd Indiana (6 Cos)
393 Enlisted Men -12 Sharps carbines, 182 Gallager carbines (49%)

8th New York (12 Cos)
685 Enlisted Men – 210 Sharps carbines (31%)

Second Brigade

6th New York (6 Cos)
292 Enlisted Men – 232 Sharps carbines (79%)

9th New York (10 Cos)
394 Enlisted Men – 381 Sharps carbines, 1 Smith carbine (97%)

17th Pennsylvania (9 Cos)
464 Enlisted Men – 127 Smith carbines, 108 Merrill carbines (51%)

3rd West Virginia (2 Cos)
59 Enlisted Men – 89 Gallager (or should this read 59?) (151% or 100%)

This list of long arms would seem to indicate that 2796 (total of 3077 less the 6 companies that did not file ordnance reports) men of Buford's cavalry had only 1709 men armed with carbines. The one-in-four men designated as horse-holders would only total 699 individuals, so even if one makes the unlikely assumption that these men were not issued long arms the numbers still do not add up. It therefore opens up the possibility that 1087 men, approximately 40%, of Buford's cavalry were not armed with carbines and instead functioned as "Sabre Squadrons" to support their dismounted comrades.

If one expands the data base to the entire AoP Cavalry Corps we have the following numbers. The strengths are from Busey and Martin, Regimental Strengths and Losses at Gettysburg (1986). Note that these numbers do differ from Petruzzi.

1st Division

1st Brigade
8th Ill – 470 men reduced by 4/12s is 314 men, 311 carbines (99%)
12th Ill – 233 men reduced by 2/5ths is 140 men, 86 carbines (61%)
3rd Ind – 313 men, 194 carbines (62%)
8th NY – 580 men, 210 carbines (36%)

2nd Brigade
6th NY – 218 men, 232 carbines (106%)
9th NY – 367 men, 382 carbines (104%)
17th Penn – 464 men, 235 carbines (51%)
3rd WV – 59 men, 59 or 89 carbines (100% or 151%)

Reserve Brigade
6th Penn – 242 men, 231 carbines (95%)
1st US – 362 men, 361 carbines (100%)
2nd US – 407 men, 245 carbines (60%)
5th US – 306 men, 373 carbines (129%)
6th US – not listed

2nd Division

1st Brigade
1st Md – 285 men, 101 carbines (35%)
Purnell Legion (Md) – 66 men, 100 carbines (151%)
1st Mass – 292 men, 278 carbines (95%)
1st NJ – 199 men, 135 carbines (68%)
1st Penn – 355 men, 305 carbines (86%)

2nd Brigade
2nd NY – 264 men, 166 carbines (63%)
4th NY – 298 men, 278 carbines (93%)
6th Oh – 482 men, 471 carbines (98%)
8th Penn – 391 men, 50 carbines (13%)

3rd Brigade
1st Me – 315 men, 164 carbines (52%)
10th NY – 333 men, 93 carbines (28%)
4th Penn – 258 men, 165 carbines (64%)
16th Penn – 349 men, 317 carbines (91%)

3rd Division

1st Brigade
5th NY – 420 men, 39 carbines (9%)
18th Penn – 509 men, 337 carbines (66%)
1st Vt – 600 men, 140 carbines (23%)
1st WV – 395 men, 83 carbines (21%)

2nd Brigade
1st Mich – 427 men, 251 carbines (59%)
5th Mich – 646 men, 479 carbines (74%)
6th Mich – 477 men, 344 carbines (72%)
7th Mich – 383 men, 178 carbines (46%)

Busey and Martin's numbers indicate that the total strength of the AoP Cavalry Corps was 11,765 men. Adding the 410 men of the 6th US Cavalry gives a total of 12,175. According to Coates and McAuley, Civil War Sharps Carbines & Rifles (1996), p. 21, the Union cavalry at Gettysburg carried 7474 long arms, 10,120 sabres and 10,379 revolvers. If these totals do not include the 6th US and Busey and Martin's numbers include officers it can be seen that all the enlisted cavalrymen were at least equipped with at least a pistol and saber. However, only about 75% of the troops carried a carbine or rifle.

A similar analysis can be done for the Union cavalry at Chickamauga. This reveals a similar discrepancy between the strength returns and the Ordnance Report of long arms. The strength of the Union cavalry can be found in David Powell, The Maps of Chickamauga: An Atlas of the Chickamauga Campaign, Including the Tullahoma Operations, June 22 – September 23, 1863, (2009). The following is a comparison of the cavalry strength at Chickamauga (less casualties) with the number of carbines in field service as of September 30, 1863 as found in McAulay, pp. 35-37, and Eric Wittenberg, Holding the Line on the River of Death, Union Mounted Forces at Chickamauga, September 18, 1863 (2018), p 9.

First Division

First Brigade
2nd Mich – 263 men, 3 Sharps carbines (1%)
9th Penn – 394 men, 420 Burnside carbines, 51 Sharps carbines (120%)
1st Tenn – 677 men,191 Gallager carbines (28%)

Second Brigade
2nd Ind – 383 men, 384 Smith carbines (100%)
4th Ind – 307 men, 209 Smith carbines (68%)
2nd Tenn – 473 men, 70 Burnside carbines, 228 Merrill carbines (63%)
1st Wisc – 378 men, 46 Maynard carbines, 303 Merrill carbines, 15 Sharps carbines (96%)

Third Brigade
4th Ky – 110 men, 28 Smith carbines (25%)
5th Ky – 343 men, 99 Burnside carbines (29%)
6th Ky – 393 men, 54 Ballard carbines, 19 Burnside carbines (19%)

Second Division

First Brigade
3rd Ind – not present
4th Mich – 210 men, 147 Colt rifles (70%)
7th Penn – 477 men, 115 Burnside carbines, 22 Sharps carbines, 242 Smith carbines (79%)
4th US – 704 men, 588 Burnside carbines, 166 Sharps carbines, 20 Smith carbines (110%)

Second Brigade
2nd Ky – 284 men, 197 Merrill carbines, 72 Smith carbines (95%)
1st Oh – 382 men, 288 Sharps carbines (75%)
3rd Oh – 533 men, 76 Burnside carbines, 11 Merrill carbines, 153 Sharps carbines (45%)
4th Oh – 511 men, 57 Burnside carbines, 293 Sharps carbines (68%)

The total number of troops is 6513 men but they are equipped with only 4567 carbines. This means only 70% of the Union cavalry carried long arms.

While there are still questions about the accuracy of both the strength returns and the Ordnance Reports the distribution of long arms suggests that there may have been a good tactical reason behind these numbers. Dismounted cavalry usually formed up in skirmish order, which would leave them vulnerable both to advancing infantry and mounted cavalry. By retaining part of the cavalry as mounted troops support could be provided either on the flanks or in a rear supporting position. This could be done either on a regimental basis with designated "Saber squadrons" or on a brigade level with "Sabre regiments".

Lastly, to put this into a gaming context, the number of dismounted figures/stands do not necessarily need to match the number of mounted figures/stands. For example in both Brigade and Regimental F&F the rules assume all the stands of a cavalry unit will be either mounted or dismounted and the ratio of horse-holder stands to dismounted stands is set at 1 in 4 stands. The historical deployment was actually more nuanced. However, both these rules allow an "opportunity charge" for cavalry that would accurately simulate the interplay between dismounted and mounted cavalry.

An interesting fact on the East Cav battlefield… Jenkins' brigade had mostly cut down rifles but ONLY 10 rounds per man. *gulp*

Don

I agree with all you have said Ryan. I had noticed that lack of long arms to supply all of the men in the Federal cavalry.

I use RF&F rules for my ACW games. Most wargames authors don't concentrate too much on cavalry. I made some modifications I use. In the Gettysburg campaign, for sure the CS cavalry has to be able to dismount only part of a regiment. That was a common tactic.

At Aldie the Confederates did dismount more than their "sharpshooters" as the Federal cavalry was galloping up the Snickersville Pike in a column of fours. From behind the waist high stone wall lining the road they were able to do good execution with even their pistols. I have also done some rules for this.

Lots of fun to game if you are really into cavalry.

Tom

The seeming shortfall of long arms can be seen well into 1864. A comparison of Union cavalry troop strengths and arms in June 1864 shows a similar pattern. In Eric Wittenberg, Glory Enough for All: Sheridan's Second Raid and the Battle of Trevilian Station (2001), pages 331-333, is a listing of the regimental strengths of each of the participating Federal cavalry regiments. Trevilian Station occurred on June 11 and 12. On June 30 an Ordnance Report was filed listing all long arms in the possession of the AoP cavalry. This list can be found on pages 46-47 of McAulay.

The following list is compiled by using the Trevilian Station strengths and then subtracting the casualties from that engagement. This strength is then compared to the list of each regiment's long arms.

1st Division – BG Alfred Torbert

1st Brigade – BG George Custer
1st Mich – 446 men, 304 carbines (68%) *
5th Mich – 292 men, 152 carbines (52%)
6th Mich – 253 men, 246 carbines (97%)
7th Mich – 249 men, 92 carbines (37%) *

*The 1st and 7th Michigan were specifically designated as "Sabre Regiments" by Custer.

2nd Brigade – Col Thomas Devin
4th NY – 209 men, 182 carbines (87%)
6th NY – 317 men, 238 carbines (75%)
9th NY – 380 men, 230 carbines (60%)
17th Penn – 523 men, 241 carbines (46%)

Reserve Brigade – BG Wesley Merritt
19th NY – 353 men, 244 carbines (69%)
6th Penn – 276 men, 195 carbines (71%)
1st US – 331 men, 129 carbines (40%)
2nd US – 241 men, 204 carbines (85%)
5th US – 153 men, 89 carbines (58%)

2nd Division – BG David Gregg

1st Brigade – BG Henry Davies
1st Mass – 366 men, 404 carbines (110%)
1st NJ – 668 men, 288 carbines (43%)
10th NY – 422 men, 243 carbines (57%)
6th Oh – 665 men, 211 carbines (32%)

2nd Brigade – Col Irvin Gregg
1st Me – 445 men, 358 carbines (80%)
2nd Penn – 540 men, 392 carbines (73%)
4th Penn – 374 men, 203 carbines (54%)
8th Penn – 387 men, 191 carbines (49%)
16th Penn – 407men, 392 carbines (96%)

The imbalance between men and weapons this late in the war strongly suggests that it was a tactical choice that left a percentage of troops without long arms.

Ryan

That's fascinating research!

What is your conclusion about the tactical use of the individual sub units then?…

That only some companies skirmished and others charged w sabre and pistol?

Are there similar figures for the distribution of pistols and sabres?

Although Ryan has pointed out that the numbers themselves don't entirely work I still fancy there's some merit in thinking that horse holders were not issued with Carbines.

They clearly didn't need them and the last thing I would want is one flailing about while trying to keep my own horse and three others under control!

I have to admit it has never occurred to me before but in practical terms it seems obvious.

Huevans, the quick answer is I don't know. Right now I'm still gathering source material and starting to work through it.

Several points to consider so far. In December 1861 BG Stoneman, the AoP Chief of Cavalry, wrote that "The volunteer cavalry thus far with one or two exceptions have been armed with pistols and sabers and ten carbines to each company." This would imply that to fight dismounted each company would have to contribute 10 men while the rest remained mounted – or fought dismounted with only pistols. But this statement also suggests that carbines were distributed equally through a regiment and not concentrated in certain sub-units. But did this change as more long-arms became available?

Poinsett's School of the Platoon briefly addresses dismounted drill:

"572. The platoon being supposed to form a part of the squadron, it is dispersed as skirmishers, in order to cover the front and flanks of the squadron."

From this I assume that one platoon out of the four that comprise a squadron would act as dismounted troops. The rest of the squadron would remain mounted. But is the same platoon always the dismounted sub-unit? That would make sense if each squadron had only enough long-arms for a quarter of their strength to be so armed.

But when an entire regiment was in the field would ad-ahoc units of carbine armed platoons be drawn together to form a dismounted "task-force"? Or were certain entire squadrons, each all armed with carbines, the designated dismounted units for the regiment? It seems that's what the Confederates did (in Virginia at least), but more research is needed to say for sure what the usual practice was.

The only source I have found so far on the distribution of pistols and sabres is Coates and McAuley, Civil War Sharps Carbines & Rifles, which states that the Union cavalry at Gettysburg carried 7474 long arms, 10,120 sabres and 10,379 revolvers. Given troops strengths we can conclude that all the enlisted cavalrymen were equipped with at least a pistol and saber. However, only about 75% of the troops carried a carbine or rifle.

As an aside, Poinsett's dismounted drill assumes a platoon of 32 men less 6 horse-holders. These 32 men would then only deploy half their strength into the actual skirmish line, the other half remaining in reserve 100 to 150 yards behind the skirmish line. The horse-holders were, according to McClellan in Regulations and Instructions (1862), "about one hundred yards in rear of their riders", which I assume would place them at that distance behind the skirmish reserve.

Trajanus, I don't think that horse-holders were necessarily armed differently. The men in line were numbered off 1 to 4. Numbers 1, 2, and 3 were dismounted while Number 4 was designated as a horse-holder. I believe the numbering off would be done when the unit first forms up in place. Changes in troop strength or any casualties would change individual numbering if and when a unit needed to reform. If Number 4s now ended up carrying carbines it would mean a hurried exchange of arms and accouterments.

However, overall the only thing I know for sure is I need to do more digging into the sources.

We are dealing with a range of alternatives:

1. All troops are able to skirmish dismounted. If so, why didn't the late war US army equip them for that task?

2. Certain sub units skirmished. Did they skirmish mounted, like Napoleonic hussars? Or dismount?

3. ACW tactics were essentially the same as Napoleonic tactics, carbines be damned! And American cavalry behaved pretty much exactly as European cavalry of the same period – sabres and charges on horseback!

Disagree with 3. above. While cavalry was in transition, fighting on foot was quite often done, witness Buford's division on July 1, '63. Probably even more so in the Western Theater than with AoP ( prime example Brady Station of course). At the East Field fighting on July 3rd,'63 was a mix of mounted/dismounted fighting. Wilson's Cavalry Corps fought almost exclusively on foot (basically as Mounted Rifles except with repeating carbines.) By the Indian Wars Yellowstone Campaign in '76, cavalry units were generally no longer carrying sabers on campaign.

I don't see the list of three alternatives as necessarily being exclusive. All troops could act dismounted but not all of them were armed with long-arms. Dismounted pistol fire was possible and was done although I don't believe it was that common. More likely was a mixture of mounted and dismounted troops. The question is how was this done?

Cavalry could skirmish both mounted or dismounted. The drill books provided training for both eventualities.

Cavalry could also deliver effective mounted charges. It was more common in cavalry vs. cavalry but was also used against infantry. For an interesting look at the effectiveness of such actions see James Chapman, Sound the Charge! Custer and the Saber Charge, (MA Thesis 2017).

PDF link

Just to complicate the issue, however, there were differences in the use of cavalry between the Union and the Confederates as well as between the East and the West.

By the Indian Wars Yellowstone Campaign in '76, cavalry units were generally no longer carrying sabers on campaign.

Yeah but in fairness neither were the Lakota!

The difficulty is that the distribution of carbines doesn't clearly support any of the alternatives above.

That brings up a couple of other questions:

What was the effective range and accuracy of a Sharps or Spencer? And was it that much more effective than a revolver?

Was the whole issue of cavalry skirmishing just a "scare away" tactic? Or were they actually expected to inflict serious casualties?

What was the effective range and accuracy of a Sharps or Spencer? And was it that much more effective than a revolver?

All the various types of carbines were effective out to 250 -300 yards so from that stand point considerably better than a revolver. In fact the Spencer and probably the Sharps were good for 500 but the accuracy suffered at longer ranges due to the shorter barrel length, compared to Rifle Muskets, or the rifle version of either of them come to that.

Revolvers did have an advantage in a melee situation and a lot of mounted actions resulted in gun fights on horse back. That said there was a War long controversy between the supporters of the Sabre Charge and the Shootout.

Range wise, they were really only effective at not much more than a tenth of the carbines distance. Not to mention the Spencer's seven shot capacity and the fact that all the revolvers were "Cap and Ball" weapons, so once empty had to be reloaded like six individual mini muskets.

Even the Sharps could maintain a higher rate of fire overall, as it was a breach loader, even though it still needed a percussion cap for each round.

The Confederates who often suffered from a lack of Sabres probably favoured the Revolver, although they could be as fond of cut and thrust as anyone if the situation required.

The gradual improvement in Union horsemanship over time, meant that on several occasions Sabre equipped Union troopers took their opponents by surprise and really cut them up!

Was the whole issue of cavalry skirmishing just a "scare away" tactic? Or were they actually expected to inflict serious casualties?

The skirmish element was essentially part of reconnaissance, or to slow an enemy down although it could be used to swarm a position. In reality it only referred to Troopers operating in a lose formation, unlike the infantry and yes there was an expectation they would do damage but of course they were not expected to be as effective as an infantry volley.

That said, the drill books did stipulate method for close order volley fire, in two ranks, just like those who walked everywhere and it was used.

Cavalrymen equipped with pistils could quickly start firing again once the cylinder was empty, simply by carrying spare cylinders ready loaded. Easily swapped.

Said to be why bushwhackers had so many embroidered pockets on their shirts and pants

Ryan,

I think part of the problem is that Commanders at the time had a split view of things.

As you know there was the ongoing Sabre or Firepower debate which really clouds matters. Then of course there were individual Brigade and Regimental commanders who either routinely, or as circumstances required, split their forces into dismounted shooters, backed by a mounted reserve.

Custer, for one, was fond of this approach as you noted earlier, but of course he may have been influenced by the Wolverines access to repeating weapons, which upped the per capita firepower.

Just returning to the Horse Holder matter for a minute.

As you point out, if you were a #4 that was your job until it wasn't. I'd love to know how you got stuck with it. Did the 1st Sargent just wander down the line on day one and just count off, or did those who showed an aptitude with horses get picked out first. You certainly needed to be a confident rider, or a quick learner, to handle the job.

Then as you pointed out, what happened when people started getting themselves shot if #4s never got a Carbine? Of course, as a #4, in dismounted action, you probably had a better survival rate but there was mounted fighting and catching some nasty illness to take into account. Losses in potential Carbine owners and non-Carbine owners alike would occur.

In the infantry (who saw way more action) Regiments "Equalised" the number of files per company, before, after and sometimes even during, battles to take account of losses and adjust for the Drill required to handle a unit, so the Army as a whole was well used to sorting these matters on the fly.

I'm certain there was a Cavalry equivalent. There had to be, or manoeuvring would go to hell just like the infantry.

I think that in this process lay the opportunity to reallocate Section numbering and along with it weapon allocation.

The Regiment still had to have 1:4, or as near as could be achieved, Horse Holders. OK you might have a different man as your #4, or be a #4 with different #1-3s, tough, time to move on. Hand over your Carbine, or take this one and get on with it!

I tend to think this is one of those many items that has long flown below the Radar of history authors as being too much down in the weeds to pick up on, or too routine to merit a mention by those actually present at the time.

deadhead,

I believe its now generally accepted that the cylinder swap is more legend than fact. Which is not to say it couldn't be done. Some early Colts and the Remington Army in particular were made to take advantage of that method.

The Remington however was only supplied to the Union, although they could have been procured in other ways, but they were in no way near the numbers of the Colt Army or Colt Navy.

The matter of doing the cylinder swap on horse back is another issue. Its a two handed job, so not the kind of thing to be done in or around a fight unless you hold the reins in your teeth, or have a horse well trained enough to fully control with your knees/thighs.

Perhaps the clincher are reports of members of Quantrill's Raiders and Bloody Bill Anderson being killed or captured with 4 – 6 pistols stuffed in all manner of places which would indicate it was a lot more reliable to grab six more rounds ready to fire in another gun!

That's not to say it couldn't be done or never was – some bodies were found with spare cylinders over the years – but it wasn't the option of choice.

Spare cylinders were not supplied with the guns as a matter of course and as far as we know were never supplied to cavalrymen of either side as general issue.

Swapping cylinders while on foot is a lot easier but you are still wandering about with pockets full of black powder which
certainly would not appeal to me.

The other advantage of multiple guns per person is that it would have been possible for the likes of Quantrill's band to put up a wall of close range fire, like imagined the in post Lawrence, Kansas Raid sequence of the movie "Ride with the Devil", although if it ever happened this way I have no idea.

Sidebar:

What rules do you use for ACW cavalry gaming?

And do you game in 28mm? Or 18mm?

Trajanus

Many thanks for that. ACW is way out of my comfort zone, indeed I had never even heard of the Kansas/Missouri Border War and its place in ACW until my youngest lad started researching it for his doctorate. mind you, profound ignorance has never stopped me talking with great authority!

I am bound to agree that several pistols do sound a better investment than pockets full of black powder, sitting next to a nice fire…

Hugh,

Personally, I game in 28mm, although I used 15mm for many years.

Rules wise, I think its safe to say that its hard to get a true reflection of period tactics, at all levels, from those on the market as ACW rules. Now that sounds mad but it applies to Infantry combat too, although possibly to a lesser extent.

As "Garryowen" pointed out near the top of this thread rules authors don't allow much for Cavalry. Most of the larger actions of the War didn't feature Cavalry that much and the overall proportion of Cavalry in the rival Armies wasn't that high, compared to the Napoleonic period.

So in a lot of rules they exist because they have to but as the majority of fighting was done between Infantry and Artillery they get the lions share of rule space!

Also it depends on the rules set up. In the original Fire & Fury, where the table units were one per Brigade (may well apply to the recent revamp too) it was assumed that all Regiments represented, by the block of stands that were the Brigade, were doing the same thing.

Not an unreasonable assumption for most Infantry units but of course it meant you couldn't have dismounted Cavalry and mounted supporting units represented and the rules didn't allow for it.

There again these were for fighting bigger battles, though naturally they got used for everything!

Regimental Fire and Fury where individual Regiments are the basic representation, do things better but don't allow dismounted Cavalry to fight in anything but a skirmish/loose order fashion.

These days, when I actually get to play ACW, I use Dave Brown's "Pickets Charge" where everything operates in Brigades (as it should) but fights in Regiments, so you can use historic Cavalry tactics there too.

I would suggest that if you want to concentrate on Cavalry actions alone that it might be an idea to look at some larger scale Skirmish rules, as a base, and modify figure scales if needed.

I've been toying with using Osprey's "Rebels and Patriots" myself, after having some fun with using them for just infantry affairs. Cheap and simple, so adding and subtracting details is easy.

deadhead,

No problem.

BTW it occurred to me that I name dropped "Ride with the Devil" without thinking and the darn thing is now twenty years old! Eeek!

If you haven't seen it try and hunt it down on Netflix, Amazon Prime, Google, Sky or whatever.

It gives a good picture of the muddle and contradiction of the immediate pre war Boarder States, where every killing was followed by two reprisals!

Plenty of good action sequences and horses, lots of horses! :o)

At the battle of Cedar Creek, 1864 (northwestern flank), Union cavalry would ride up to the Confederate infantry, empty their revolvers at the Rebels; ride back and reload; charge forward and do it again. They kept this up until the Rebels got to expect it, then one time they didn't ride back, they kept on going and charged the Rebels, who fled.

Like it!

Also proves there's not much new around. They were doing that in Europe when Wheel Locks were invented! :o)

Trajanus,

Cavalry actions were usually fought separately from infantry actions – raids or larger engagements like Brandy Station. You could draft up a set of cavalry rules with specific fire factors for muskets, carbines and pistols and rules for charge and melee.

Basic unit is the company – 4 figures on 1 stand for mounted and 3 figures on a stand for dismounted with a separate horse holder.

Hello Gentlemen,

My apologies for not getting back to this thread earlier.

The procedure for counting off in fours is described in Article I of Cooke's Cavalry Tactics:

Assembly of a Regiment Mounted.

When a regiment is to mount boots and saddles is sounded. At this signal the horses are saddled, bridled, and fully equipped for the occasion. At the signal to horse, non-commissioned officers and troopers lead into rank. The 1st sergeant calls the roll, or the sergeants of divisions may be required to call the division rolls; the officers are present in superintendence. The Captain then, or the senior Lieutenant by his order, orders the squadron to count fours in each platoon, and to mount. The Captain, first observing that every one is in his prescribed place, and the general appearance of the squadron, marches it, habitually by fours, to the place of assembly. If required, on reaching there he reports absentees, by his 1st sergeant, to the Adjutant. In case of alarm or surprise, to horse is sounded; the men then saddle, pack up, bridle, and mount with the utmost celerity, and repair to the place of assembly, which is always previously designated.

While the wording is slightly different the procedure is essentially the same in Poinsett's Cavalry Tactics. Neither have any mention of swapping arms and accouterments. And it isn't just as simple handing over a carbine. The cartridge box attached to the waist belt also would have to be removed from the belt which would mean first removing the holster and cap box or the scabbard belts to be able to slide off the cartridge box. One could alternatively swap pistols and swords as well as the carbine, but I see trouble ahead here too. Much easier to designate some sub-units as carbineers/sharpshooters knowing one in four of these men will not be in the front line.

I do agree, though, that the internal workings of a regiment or squadron are badly neglected in the literature. It seems to be something that everyone took as a known and thus needed no further mention.

Our club games in 15/18 mm and has abandoned Johnny Reb some time ago for the brigade level Fire & Fury rules. So far we have not yet played Regimental F&F, but a cavalry game with these rules – prompted in part by these postings – is in the offing.

On page 37 of RF&F is a description of charges and counter-charges that seems to simulate use of cavalry to both counter a charge and use supports to reinforce the charge. Oddly enough, however, supporting units have to be in line (p. 57), which may be problematic as cavalry very often deployed in Columns of Squadrons which would be somewhat akin to what RF&F terms Field Columns.

It is not just in respect to cavalry the RF&F rules fail to make use of tactical nuances. There is no real provision for the proper use of skirmishers. The Extended Line formation is supposed to cover this, but it does not address the use of a skirmish line reserve. Although, to be fair, no other rules incorporate this into their skirmish rules either.

RF&F also does not address the "combined arms" use of mounted and dismounted cavalry, although house rules could be figured out to take care of this issue.

And just to add to the matter, dismounted cavalry was also supposed to retain a dismounted reserve behind the dismounted skirmish line.

I have a copy of Pickett's Charge but have not yet played them. I'll give them a re-read tonight.

Now I realize that I am becoming overly pedantic here and most gamers prefer to abstract these details into the rules. But I still imagine that there may be a rules set that both indulges my enjoyment of drill and tactics and still be a playable system.

Ryan

Hi Ryan,

The Cooke extract (never thought to look it up!) sounds pretty similar to the idea of Equalisation. Although its more oriented to a basic getting ready to move out process.

Which considering its listed as "Assembly" is not really a surprise! :o)

On the swapping of things, I had taken it for granted that for flexibility, everyone would wear a cartridge box
it wouldn't that big a deal.

Much easier to designate some sub-units as carbineers/sharpshooters knowing one in four of these men will not be in the front line.

Well yes, but it doesn't really cover the issues around people getting themselves killed – hence my wondering about a cavalry version of Equalisation.

I do agree, though, that the internal workings of a regiment or squadron are badly neglected in the literature. It seems to be something that everyone took as a known and thus needed no further mention.

Yes indeed. I'm always up for digging around on this stuff. We have had some really good discussions on TMP regarding Cavalry matters most people wouldn't even know about!

BTW: You are not getting "pedantic" overly or otherwise. Or if you are, then so am I!

Historical Gaming should be levelled at the point of the individual. If someone says to themselves "Did it really work like that?" Why the hell shouldn't they?

Ryan,

Another thing that has occurred to me.

Does Poinsett actually mention Carbines at all? (I've never read it) because Cooke (written 21 years later) certainly doesn't!

Not that I'm suggesting this has any baring on the numbers of weapons I just find it curious that neither of them do. Given that Cooke for sure deals with Fighting dismounted, Skirmish lines etc.

Its really strange that concerning 1862 you have to make the assumption that when conducting drill, Officers and NCOs were having to make adjustment in this regard.

I'm also assuming that Poinsett in 1841 or even what updates there may have been was in the same place?

I skimmed through Cooke again and yes, it does not mention carbines at all. In contrast, Poinsett has several sections on both drilling with and firing small arms, it even has a drill specifically for the Hall's carbine.

One online reference to Cooke states "Cooke penned a manual that was intended to be employed by cavalry-proper, fighting mounted exclusively, … there is no reference to a long arm or dismounted combat anywhere in Cooke's manual (and this is no mere oversight, it is professional tactical doctrine)."

I'll state again that descriptions of what actually was going on with the smaller tactical details of how cavalry operated is neglected by contemporary writers and so not understood by modern writers.

There is another question as to whether ACW cavalry fought in one rank or two. Cooke was predicated on the former whereas Poinsett used the latter. But how widespread was the usage of these different manuals. For the most part it seems that Poinsett (two ranks) was used by the ANV and AoP in the east, but western cavalry was more likely to use Cooke (one rank) or at derivative of it.

About 12 years ago there was a big discussion about this on the Authentic Campaigner cavalry forum that at times seemed to rival TMP's Napoleonic board for acrimony. It can be found at:

link

Had a brief look at that link, which seems like a whole other rabbit hole, as regards to number of ranks. I always thought it was two and then got soundly beaten by those thinking its one for such heresy.

Like other items history authors themselves are not much help as they tend to go with whoever they have read rather than any definitive answer.

There's plenty out there still to debate, on all manner of things.

We had a really deep dive on the matter of organisation and terms in use regarding Regiment, Battalion, Squadron, Company, Platoon and Troop etc back last year (I think).

Which I was going to refer you to, in case you never saw it. Typically I can't remember what the hell it was called now but it was good fun!

BTW: I have know idea where the guy got the idea around there being no reference in Cooke to dismounted fighting – School of the Platoon #306, Page 163 has details including how to operate horseholders properly!

Trajanus, I found the thread you mentioned – Cavalry tactics and sub-units . It is from late October 2017:

TMP link

I had forgotten about this conversation, thanks for the reminder.

Para. 306 in Cooke indeed does deal with dismounting. But it does not have any details on tactical drill after dismounting. Paras. 1-75, the School of the Trooper, Dismounted is on how to teach drill before the recruit is introduced to mounted training.

The historical questions still need more research, but isn't that half the enjoyment of all of our fascination with history? The harder part may very well a discussion on how to re-create these historical tactical situations. What rules, if any, allow for this to be done properly and without endless convoluted rule issues?

Ryan, I would be very interested in any house rules or rule adaptations. I was wondering about the idea of gaming one of the big US cavalry raids in 1864 and some of the battles like Yellow Tavern.

I was thinking in terms of special rules for dismount, formation changes and morale tests when conducting or receiving charges, but it sounds like you're far more advanced than any of my basic ideas!

Ryan,

Thanks for that. I find the TMP search engine more than a little frustrating at times!

I might have known you were in the discussion but as you will have guessed, as I couldn't even recall the topic name, nor when it actually occurred, two and a half years down the line it had all faded a bit.

Really glad you found it as I had forgotten the detail it threw up – even the bits that where mine!

I guess that's discussion boards for you. I gets put out there and ………. its gone!

Hugh, our club is planning a cavalry game (15 mm) at around the end of the month. We want to try out a modified version of R F&F. I also am reading through my pile of rules to see if there are any ideas I can incorporate. I'll post my ideas/rule proposals once I have things worked out.

Trajanus, I fully understand your recall issues. I only found the Oct 2017 thread when I went back though my own files and found my copies of some of the posts. But repeating and rereading old posts (mine included) does have some merit in that it refreshes the discussion at hand.