"Tet – What Really Happened at Hue" Topic

"As dawn broke on the holiday morning of January 31, 1968, nearly everyone in the old walled city of Hue could see it. The gold-starred, blue-and-red National Liberation Front banner was flying atop the historic 120-foot-high Citadel flag tower. When the residents of the elegant former capital city had gone to bed just hours earlier on the eve of Tet, they were filled with anticipation for the festivities and celebrations to come. But now, a shroud of fear and foreboding descended upon them as they found themselves swept up in war. Seemingly in a flash, the Communists were now in charge of Hue.

Of course, months of meticulous planning and training had made this moment possible. The Communists had carefully selected the time for the attack. Because of Tet, they knew the city's defenders would be at reduced strength, and the typically bad weather of the northeast monsoon season would hamper any allied aerial re-supply operations and impede close air support…"
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Amicalement
Armand

A very good article indeed. If you have already read Bowden's Hue 1968 there is little new, but this is concise. It also does give some attention to the ARVN forces for a change and the final analysis of the massacres is well done.

More than most, I tend to concentrate on Tet and above all Hue, because it was so well documented at the time and the place must have been filled with great photographers. FIBUA does lend itself to modelling dioramas after all.

The story always goes that all NLF planning was based on a popular rising in support. Has anyone ever seen any evidence of planning for that eg arming the civilians, intelligence suggesting it was remotely likely?

As I posted on another thread here. The US won Tet on the ground, almost wiping out most VC/NLF units. And both the VC & NVA took heavy losses. They were not able to go on the offensive again, until '72. With the Year of the Rat offensive. As after the losses of Tet, '68, the NVA had to rebuild itself.

After Tet the NVA held little to no objectives, in the South. E.g. Hue. With heavy losses to show for it. It is said Giap did not want to go a major offensive in '68. But his civilian leadership ordered him to.

Plus the VC had taken very heavy losses as the NVA pushed them forward in many locations. They knew that many of the VC were not hard core communists but very much Nationalists. The just wanted another "round-eyed" invader in their country out. This time it's the US and it's allies(SEATO), replacing the French they had thrown out less than a decade before.

The NVA knew they didn't want to deal with these Southern Nationalists once they defeated the ARVN, etc. So getting them out of the way worked out well for them. Pushing them forward in a general offensive like Tet. Adding to the massive amount of attacks the NVA were executing. Tying up US/SEATO units, causing them some losses of assets, using up ammo, etc. As I saw one Vet say in a documentary, that they stacked them up like cord wood.

In '72 the VC had about 3 operational regiments. In some cases fleshed out with NVA.

Happy you enjoyed it my good friend!. (smile)

Amicalement
Armand

Completely agree with Legion 4. In my mind, Tet was never intended to be a military victory. I think Ho and Giap both knew that this was an effort to sour the American public on continuing involvement in Vietnam, much as they had been able to do with the French. In that strategic respect, they were successful.

From what I've read on Tet I believe the NVA did indeed expect this offensive to bring the war to a successful conclusion by inciting a mass uprising in the south. My understanding is that Le Duan, and a few others (not Ho Chi Minh and Gen.Giap), was the main architect behind the Tet offensive and they felt the US would only negotiate after it was decisively defeated on the battlefield (just like the French). I think the NVA had every intention to win a Hue and committed a great deal of assets to that end.

Yes I had heard the same. And agree, I also had heard Giap didn't want to go into a major offensive at that time. But Le Duan and some others pushed it.

As I said, the result was the VC were almost wiped out. And it was not until '72 that the NVA and remaining VC could rebuild to go on the offensive again. And again both took some loses from not only the South and the remaining US forces on the ground. And US air and naval assets/firepower did a lot of damage to them … again …

Also in '72 the NVA walked away from the Paris Peace Talks, as they couldn't get all that they wanted. The US Air offensives Linebacker I & II brought them back to Paris. As they were running out of SAMs and the US firepower was turning Hanoi into a moonscape.

I have heard ….that the main objective from those from the North was that the Vietnamese from the south were massacred and so they prevail…

Amicalement
Armand

Whether that was in their plans or not … they did kill a lot of people from the South. Both military and civilian.

As did the US/SEATO … even if did we try to be careful to limit collateral damage.

Great responses and insight into the planning for Tet…or even the lack of it. Seems to have been a major intelligence failure by NV to expect a popular rising in SVN in support. I can find no instance of any urban uprising, not even that sure anyone suddenly then joined the rural VC (folk who had kept out of it up until then that is). Everything is about the alleged US intelligence failure and, increasingly, the suggestion that Khe Sanh was "just" a diversion in preparation. One heck of a long drawn out diversion if so.

Well if nothing else from my experience after joining the US ARMY after Vietnam. We know how to react effectively even if there is limited Intel. We have the firepower to do so. As well as some very well trained units across the board.

That is true today. But even more so with out the draft taking many off the streets that shouldn't have been in military. Or even having access to firearms and explosives. Hindsight is 20/20 …

It is still discussed whether Khe Sahn was just a big diversion. Or meant to be a big battle of attrition. But the North knew some of the USA's mindset. The US said it in the media. There is be no DBP for the US.

Had the NVA/VC overrun Khe Sahn. I'd imagine they believed it would have the same affect as it did with the French at DBP. Not long after that defeat they left …

But the US had much more firepower than the French had at that time. There was an OPLAN for large numbers of US B-29s with French insignia to turn the surrounding countryside around DBP into a moonscape. Who knows it may have worked ? In the short run at least… maybe ?

There's much to ponder over the use of US bombers over DBP. I believe the Viet Minh began to have morale issues as the siege dragged on and heavy bombers probably wouldn't have helped the matter.

Eventually the VM got pretty close to the French lines and those that weren't were spread out in the jungle around the French camp. To my knowledge the VM heavy guns (that were causing much of the damage) were not only well hidden, but were dug into the sides of hills.

Without visible targets I'm just not sure US bombers would have been effective enough to change the outcome.

The VM were taking some heavy losses due to French CAS, FA and even some Quad .50s. That seemed to be the norm in both wars. They started to dig trenches using the classic entrenching assault techniques. Digging towards the French Strongpoints. To get close enough to make assaults. Without crossing too much open ground.

Many of the VM guns were hauled by hand up the sides of those large hills. Surrounding the DBP positions. Concealing and digging them in. They could generally fire on every one of the French positions and airstrip.

With massive B-29 strikes it certainly would have destroyed some of the FA positions on the surrounding hills. As well as inflicting some heavy losses to the VM forces. Suggest reading B. Fall's Street Without Joy and Hell In A Very Small Place. The VM when they first were hit with Napalm. Some thought those were Nukes. And of course the fire burned everything. Including people as we know.

The B-29s with a lot of HE and Napalm could have made them think twice about continuing their siege of the DBP Strongpoints. But again, they seemed more than willing to take the losses. In both conflicts.

The difference between DBP and Khe Sanh I think merits more discussion.

Am I right that DBP was dominated/overlooked by hills, which could not possibly accommodate artillery (unless the VM actually did manage it somehow) whereas Khe Sanh was a high point? Stress this may only be a schoolkid recollection, from 67/68 based on BC News.

Khe Sanh falling to NVA was literally "unthinkable". That number of US becoming prisoners, no administration could have survived. Tactical nuclear weapons might have done as much damage to both sides, but does anyone doubt their use?

I suspect even nukes on Hanoi or the Ho Chi MInh Trail, before allowing thousands of USMC become prisoners, as with the poor old French. Any measure indeed, before a defeat like that.

But then again the US never lost a single pitched battle in the VN War anyway, whatever it took. They won the battles, at any cost, while the politicians lost the war

That is all true. We learned from the French not to set up in a valley but on the surrounding hills.

Also there we US ARMY Troops there too. Mostly M42 and Quad .50 crews.

And once again, we'd not have to use Nukes and could still turn Hanoi into a moonscape. We almost did in the '72 Linebacker Air Offensives.