"3 ranks or 2 ranks - Which was better?" Topic

Factors to consider:

Command and file-closers: later French pelotons were 140 r&f strong – 46 x 3-rank files (under Un capitaine); Brits had -say – 60 r&f in a platoon – 30 x 2-rank files ( one captain). Assuming simolar numbers of ncos per platoon – 2-rank for Brits wouldn't have diluted nco command at all.

Artillery: Brits faced a preponderance of enemy artillery. 2-ranks equals less casualties (excepting canister).

Cavalry: Quantities dependent on theatre. Not much in Iberia – 2-rank can be used. Europe – lots of horse – 3-rank deep open squares from line the norm. NB. Brits formed open square with doubled front-face (ie 4-rank)

Manoeuvres. Brits used quarter-distance columns either platoon frontage (30 files) or grand-division frontage (60 files)

PS that info re forming a wing (50 paces) or battalion (200 paces) reserve. V interesting

I would take for granted that changing formation in 2-rank battalions would take a lot longer, if only because frontage would be 50% greater and the march to the new position that much longer.

I would take for granted that changing formation in 2-rank battalions would take a lot longer, if only because frontage would be 50% greater and the march to the new position that much longer.

Only if the marching distance is the thing which takes the time in formation changes.

I was under the impression, that when the Brits had big battalions 900 plus rank and file, they used half battalions for manoeuvering?

From 1794 infantry battalions were provided with a senior and a junior lieutenant colonel, both as simple redundancy to allow for filling of staff posts and also to allow the operation of a battalion divided into two separate 'wings.' Strong battalions were being divided into two informally as early as AWI.

500 men has been the upper bound in the size of force that can be commanded by voice for about 3,000 years, so it figures that you would split a 1,000-man battalion into two (or pack it tighter somehow so that the blokes furthest from the voice of command can hear it).

From 1794 infantry battalions were provided with a senior and a junior lieutenant colonel, both as simple redundancy to allow for filling of staff posts and also to allow the operation of a battalion divided into two separate 'wings.' Strong battalions were being divided into two informally as early as AWI.

Good point. So those mega massive guards and highland battalions should probably be divided into 2 normal size battalions on the table top?

The strange thing is that in the War of 1812 both sides used drill books based around a three rank line but both actually fought in two ranks.
Perhaps the military mind likes to do stuff by the book (or books in this period) even when it recognises its irrelevance.

The Peninsular method = The Sir John Moore System.

Apparently many regiments, Light infantry or otherwise, adpoted the movement and firing tactics of the Light Brigade.

DB

The Peninsular method = The Sir John Moore System.

Apparently many regiments, Light infantry or otherwise, adopted the movement and firing tactics of the Light Brigade.

DB

On what do you base this, DB?

I have seen the claim that many regiments adopted "Moore's System" in the Peninsular in a couple of secondary works, along with a rather vague idea of what this system actually consisted of.

What was basically Moore's System can be found in the Regulations that were made official in 1824. The introduction to these regulations state that the army had adopted some of these methods but in a rather haphazard manner. Some of the things introduced officially included the use of sections of threes for some manoeuvres and a generally increased speed of manoeuvring which had certainly been adopted in the Peninsular by the whole army.

Loosening of the files of a close order line is not mentioned and the frontage taken up by an infantryman was now stated to be 21", rather than 22" under the Dundas Regulations.

Likewise when James Shaw Kennedy (who had served with the Light Division) wrote about the frontage taken up by British infantry (this is in his Notes on The Battle of Waterloo, but he is talking in general terms about how much space infantry and cavalry took up) he is quite clear that each British infantryman occupied 21".

In order to show that the British were operating under some unique system in the Peninsular, where close order formations were deliberately loosened up, evidence from participants would be required stating that this actually took place.

M Snort,

Also mentioned in at least one, if not two primary sources as well.

Major General Sir John Colville being one.

DB

But in Colville's case, is that not just in reference to a particular way of forming a square?

The issue that is being questioned is whether British infantry loosened the formation of their close order lines in the Peninsular.

Maj. Snort,

The system encouraged, amongst others, three main points that differed from Dundas. Each aspect contributed, to a greater or lesser degree, to improved firepower.

a) Looser Files, rather than shoulder to shoulder; each man had 6" elbow room.

b) Improved Drill, as we have touched on.

c) Aiming and Firing, when the individual soldier fires when ready rather than by word of command – which is the most pertinent point to this thread, I think.

The Light Division initially adopted this "Peninsular method" which was: "On the word Present…each man slowly and independently levelling at the particular object his eye has fixed upon, and as soon as he had covered it, fires of his own accord."

DB

@David Brown

Interesting – but on what do you base all this, in case the train like this – there must have been some printed or handwritten regulations.

Like those of Cross about the 52nd Light infantry or the handwriting of Moore, are there any specific quotes on Looser Files and that they were used in battle.

Aiming and firing when ready and not by use of command was very common in a lot of other armies as well, after the first volley, also like not bringing the musket at present at leveling the musket for firing but from a position where the musket is kept at the right in an oblique position so that you have a much better view of the field and by that targets in front of you.

It wasn't Moore who introduced the 6" gap between files for Light Infantry, it was Dundas, in the 1792 Regulations.

He wrote that when Light Companies are detached from their battalions, or when several light companies are formed into a battalion and not part of the line of battle (i.e. they are operating independently) they could loosen their formation and allow a gap of 6" between files. This was sometimes referred to as "close order for light infantry". This was basically to allow them to move at a much more rapid pace than normal.

Dundas also wrote that when light infantry were formed in close order they would fire as individuals.

Moore's system was far more than these two points and it is not really appropriate to go into much more detail on this thread as it would stray from the subject completely.

To suggest that British line battalions in the Peninsular adopted this 6" gap between files is very difficult to swallow as it represents such a fundamental change to normality, it would surely have resulted in many comments from British soldiers in the field, yet they are silent on this. Close order regularity was maintained by the touch of elbows. Gaps between the files would have removed this guide and would have required extra training. No accounts that I have seen mention this.

In the 1824 Regulations, this open file formation is not mentioned at all either for line or light troops. These regulations incorporated Moore's system. John Cross, who had served with the 52nd Regiment gave a copy of this system to Sir Henry Torrens in order to incorporate it into the 1824 Regulations and while there might have been some changes, it is obvious that this is basically Moore's system and that was also acknowledged by several British officers at the time.

Things like what John Colville referred to as the "Light Infantry Square" (not actually very much different than Dundas' square from quarter distance column) which he had employed at El Bodon in 1811, are clearly described in the text of the 1824 Regs, not for light infantry, but as a formation for all infantry. Strange then that this open file line formation does not even get a mention in the same work if it had been common practice in the Peninsular and appears to have completely dropped out of use.

To suggest that British line battalions in the Peninsular adopted this 6" gap between files is very difficult to swallow as it represents such a fundamental change to normality, it would surely have resulted in many comments from British soldiers in the field, yet they are silent on this. Close order regularity was maintained by the touch of elbows. Gaps between the files would have removed this guide and would have required extra training. No accounts that I have seen mention this.

Yes – I agree

Major Snort or anyone else:

If the British line outflanked the opposing French line by 50%, would the troops on the extreme ends of the British line still be able to fire? Or fire effectively?

In other words, was there some guidance on the maximum angle off that troops were allowed to fire? – i.e. 45 degrees?

Have a look at this old thread that covered the subject of oblique fire. There are examples there from regulations and theory and also some accounts of British troops firing into the flank of columns. There was some debate about how practical oblique fire would have been in action.

TMP link

Considering that troops were forming up in three and two ranks well after then Napoleonic wars, I doubt that contemporaries came to any uniform conclusions about which were better, two or three rank lines.

When the French deployed the third rank en tirailleurs ('en compagnie-peleton') the remaining peletons would naturally have two ranks remaining. Davout was particularly critical of this and instructed his own officers not to use it, which perhaps indicates it was commonly used.

Allan; You seem to be quoting something here. Where did that come from?

Have a look at this old thread that covered the subject of oblique fire. There are examples there from regulations and theory and also some accounts of British troops firing into the flank of columns. There was some debate about how practical oblique fire would have been in action.

Cheers! Have book marked it.

Bill,

en "compagnie-peleton" is the opposite of en "compagnie-division"
or what is the method used to detach a *sub element* in order to act as tirailleurs (third rank only or a whole peloton). After the 1808 Imperial decree, using the en "compagnie-peleton" method would violate the principle of mass (3 x three ranks depth) and celerity with the Bn now at 6 pelotons., and the rules of Endivisionnement.

Can anybody tell me where the claim that the "third rank" can't fire originates? I've seen it repeated many times, but it's contradicted by any period manual that I've read (maybe I'm not looking at the correct manuals?). The front rank simply kneels when firing volleys. So I don't believe that three ranks is inefficient in terms of firepower.

Instead I'm inclined to believe that two ranks was preferred when the troops needed to be spread out a bit more. (Even the French used two ranks from time-to-time). Although it looks like it was debated at the time as to which was more efficient, that debate was not *settled* by the results of Napoleonic Wars. I thought I read somewhere that the British even returned to three ranks in the 1820s (or was it that some British generals were advocated a return?).

From what I can tell, two or three rank systems (i.e. manuals were written for both) continued to be used until the introduction of rifle-muskets, at which point everyone seems to have settled on two ranks. (Jomini predicted this).

Can anybody tell me where the claim that the "third rank" can't fire originates?

'Originates' is a tricky question. But Napoleon, Marmont and St.Cyr all said it.

Although it looks like it was debated at the time as to which was more efficient, that debate was not *settled* by the results of Napoleonic Wars.

True, although the army which used lines the most preferred 2 ranks, which seems a useful indicator.

'Originates' is a tricky question. But Napoleon, Marmont and St.Cyr all said it.

I've seen a quote from Napoleon in 1813(?), which stated something to the effect that the fire from the third rank wasn't very useful, but not that "it couldn't fire." But even then, Napoleon doesn't seem to have been too serious about using two-ranks in the long run? And I suspect you can probably find just as many quotes by those who were proponents of three ranks.

True, although the army which used lines the most preferred 2 ranks, which seems a useful indicator.

That's fair, however, lines cover a wider front than columns. Two ranks cover a wider front than three. This, I think, is the best correlation, i.e. that two ranks were preferred when outnumbered and there was a desire to cover more ground, although I admit I haven't studied it that closely. Nevertheless, there does seem to be anecdotal evidence supporting both two and three ranks.

the third rank could and did fire, but their fire was not that usefull other than engaging soldiers doing something.

The tallest men were in the first rank, the smallest in the second and the middle height men in the third.

In theory – for three ranks, usually the first rank would kneel down, and by that the two back ranks standing could fire in two ranks standing, by either shooting overhead or in between the interfall created by the body pose of the second rank.

However in the field it very rarely happened that the first rank knelt down. So even the second rank had difficulties to push their muskets through some gaps, the third standing more back, had even more difficulties to do so, so they could fire only in the air.

A lot of armies realized this, in the Prussian 1812 regulation the third rank did not take part in firing vor example.

As to two rank infantry having a wider front than a three rank one, it is a musing questions, it would depend on the strength of the battalions, a 900 battalion strong 3 rank infantry would be as wide as a 600 strong two rank battalion and due to battle losses would not shrink while a two rank battalion would do.

Also it would be rare that one battalion in line would encounter another in line without any neighbour battalions and support.

lines cover a wider front than columns

Yes and no. The physical width of target a column presents is clearly smaller, but the idea was that you always allowed space for your column to open out into line. So in practice, while space might allow it, you didn't get to put 10 battalions in column up against five in line. It would be five against five, with deployment gaps between the columns.

It was probably some such consideration that led to d'Erlon's oft-criticised formation at Waterloo. His Peninsular experience informed him that he needed to be ready to counter heavy musketry. So he went forward in a formation optimised to return fire, i.e. a column of already-deployed battalion lines. His Peninsular experience misinformed him that he did not need to be ready to counter heavy cavalry. So he went forward in a formation wholly unsuited to doing so. If he'd gone forward in battalion columns spaced out to allow deployment, he'd have been shot to pieces.

I had always wondered who ordered d'Erlon's columns; Napoleon, Ney or d'Erlon, or perhaps it was some discussion between all of them on how to counter the British fire superiority as you suggest. However, included in Stephen Beckett's new books is the 1st Corps War Diary which says,

'Towards eleven o'clock, the Emperor came to reconnoitre the position, having left his headquarters and his suite behind la Bonne Alliance [sic] and moved with only Count d'Erlon, Count Bertrand, the Prince de la Moskowa and several other officers to the line of our sentries, to the right of that place close to the main road. He ordered Count d'Erlon to make his plans to attack the enemy by the left, to form for this reason each of his divisions in colonne par bataillon and to march in echelon, directing that of the right so as to attack the enemy's left towards Smohain, taking care to hide as long as possible what he could of his movement.'

This, according to your interpretation of 'colonne par bataillon', suggests it was Napoleon.

Going from recollection, which is sometimes off – But didn't the French sometimes pack columns together with no deployment distance between them when they wanted to simply "march over" their opponents?

I have Albuera in mind, but again to be sure, I would have to go re read the sources.

In terms of target size, I am guessing that most misses were either over shoots or undershoots due to the crude leveling of the shooters' muskets. So a 12-rank deep column would present a pretty juicy target.

Thanks everybody for the responses.

4th Cuirassier -- thank you for reminding me that a typical battalion in column of divisions would usually leave enough space to deploy.

von Winterfelt -- that's interesting about putting the tallest men in the first rank, I'm going to have to see if I can find some more references to manuals from that era. Here's my opinion of firing in three ranks: If the unit is firing disciplined volleys it shouldn't be an issue, but I have heard of accounts from the 18th century that sometimes when firing volleys discipline would break down. The soldiers would simply start to load and fire as rapidly as possible (at will), and the officers would have trouble regaining control. I think by the Napoleonic Wars firing independently had been introduced in the manuals. If it's anything like the 1830s manual that I'm more familiar with, only the first two ranks fired, but the center rank traded muskets with the rear rank, allowing the center rank to fire again, before both center and rear reloaded. However, reports from the American Civil War noted the same problem of discipline, i.e. once the soldiers started loading and firing independently, even if ordered to do so, command and control could be hard to reestablish. So it may have been that once discipline broke down, the third rank became useless (or a danger to the front rank) in a firefight.

The claim that three ranks allowed a unit to take more casualties and maintain its front is logical and sound. But I question how important a consideration it was: if we look at the historical overview, the debate between two and three ranks was settled with the introduction of rifle-muskets. However, the claim that three ranks would allow a unit to take more casualties while maintain its front, would still apply to rifle-muskets.

Anyway, those are my musings on the subject.

as for drill regulations please check them I am aware of the French and Prussian one – they did place the tallest men in the front rank, why – they would make the impression on the enemy – wargamers are seemingly very obsessed about who could fire better and inflict more casualties, in war is is not to inflict more casualties but to brake the morale of the enemy – this would lead to victory.

Here some other quotes which might be interesting :

Une exception ( ) signalée par le capitaine Chapuis du 85e de ligne (division Durutte):
"… Il [le colonel Masson] fit former au 85e un seul carré sur deux rangs, sa faiblesse numérique s'étant opposé à ce qu'il fût sur trois."
Les Carnets de la Campagne – n°4; p.47

Le 13 octobre 1813, les régiments français sont très amoindris car ils combattent et marchent sans cesse depuis l'été (aoüt). Ne peut-on y voir une façon de maintenir le front (la longueur) des régiments, divisions… malgré ces effectifs réduits?
A cette époque la supériorité numérique des alliés devient énorme (voir à Leipzig 3 jours plus tard).

Lettre de Napoléon à Murat :
« J'ai pris hier un ordre du jour pour ordonner que toute mon infanterie fut placée sur deux rangs ; mettez-le sur-le-champ à exécution ; je ne veux plus qu'on soit sur trois rangs : le feu du troisième rang, la baïonnette du troisième rang sont insignifiants…Quand on se placera en colonnes par division, chaque bataillon se trouvera former une colonne de six rangs outre les trois rangs de serre-files. Cela est plus que suffisant, et cela a le grand avantage qu'un bataillon de 500 hommes paraîtra à l'ennemi être de 750 hommes. »

Mon cher Cyril, cette lettre à Murat date-t-elle bien d'octobre 1813?

Oui.
J'ajoute celle écrite le 13 à Marmont :
"Mon intention est que vous placiez vos troupes sur deux rangs au lieu de trois. L'ennemi, accoutumé à nous voir sur trois rangs, jugera nos bataillons plus forts d'un tiers. Donnez les ordres les plus précis pour l'exécution de la présente disposition."

The French used two ranks before 1813, the only difference was that in 1813 Napoleon issued an official order about it.
Girod de l'Ain, who was an officer in the 9e Légère wrote at that battle of Medellin :
Mon régiment fut immédiatement formé en ordre de la bataille, sur deux rangs, au lieu de trois, pour donner plus d'étendue à notre ligne.
p. 131

„Ein Veteran des Siebenjährigen Krieges, General v. Tempelhoff, bemerkt darüber ; „Man feuert bei einer Schlacht ganz anders, als auf dem Exerzierplatze; denn die anrückende Infanterie fängt trotz allem dem, was ihr auf dem Exerzierplatze gelehrt und eingeprägt wird, oft schon auf 800 Schritt vom Feinde an zu feuern; doch wenigstens 600. Gewöhnlich glaubt man, daß ein solches Feuer nichts thut, allein hierin irrt man sich. Eine Kugel aus dem kleinen Gewehr tödtet oder verwundet einen Mann, wenn sie ihn nur trifft, ebenso gut, sie mag in einem Bogen oder horizontal abgeschossen werden,
S. 38 ff.

A veteran of the Seven Years War, General v. Tempelhoff remarks about that : One is firing at a battle totally difference compared to the drill ground, as the advancing infantry opens fire, regardless what being taught and drilled on the drill ground, already at 800 paces distance of the enemy – or at least at 600. It is the common believe that such a fire doesn't harm, however this is an error. A ball from the small arm, kills or wounds a men, in case it is hitting, as well as it is shot in an arc or horizontally

An old Prussian Officer writes about the Prussians in the 7YW :

One started to fire with pelotons, two, three fired well, but then a common burning started and the usual fire where each who finished loading pulls the trigger, files and ranks are intermingling, the front rank is not even able to kneel down, even if they intended to, and the officers from below up to the generals cannot do anything any longer with this mass, but have to wait till they will move forward or backwards.
(Jany, page 47)

Gaudi, another eye witness writes about the Prussians of the 7YW :

Who will think back will have difficulties to remember that in a battle or action to have witnessed that at firing the first rank will have knelt down or did do this constantly, despite such a thing happens constantly on the drill ground, but they kept standing as the rear ranks. There one witnessed this at those troops who rightly were classed as being the best taught and disciplined, so the thought to kneel down in action must be un natural.
(Jany, page 47)

Tempelhoff another veteran writes :

The Bataillenfeuer (feux de bataille) as the fire at will was typically was called replaced in the hitherto battle in the end the drilled art. Then everybody fired who could fire and wanted to and everybody as often as he was capable without giving a damn about his neighbour or front man.
(Jany page 46 / 47)

It is surprising the the rifled musket used in the ACW caused so few casualties when still used when infantry fought in rank and file, the answer is rather simple, you wouldn't hit a lot when firing in rank and file, other when you were in entrenchment and fortified positions.

Didn't they even use attack columns in the ACW?

In the Civil War the only "column of attack" that I've ever seen are when regiments in line would be formed in mass, one behind the other. This was used in order to punch through a fortified (improved) position. Two examples are Upton's attack at Spotsylvania, where 12 regiments were lined up one behind the other, and Harker's brigade at Kennesaw Mountain, where seven regiments were lined up one behind the other. The regiments themselves almost always formed in line.

An interesting note on Civil War tactics, the brigades of the Union army usually formed with their regiments in two lines (with an additional regiment in front in skirmish order) while the Confederate brigades formed their regiments in a single line, and for depth in the attack or defense, could position brigades in depth.

The following is a quote from General Sherman. This is referring more to the Union western armies.

"Very few of the battles in which I have participated were fought as described in European text-books, viz., in great masses, in perfect order, manoeuvring by corps, divisions, and brigades. We were generally in a wooded country, and, though our lines were deployed according to tactics, the men generally fought in strong skirmish-lines, taking advantage of the shape of ground, and of every cover. We were generally the assailants, and in wooded and broken countries the "defensive" had a positive advantage over us, for they were always ready, had cover, and always knew the ground to their immediate front; whereas, we, their assailants, had to grope our way over unknown ground, and generally found a cleared field or prepared entanglements that held us for a time under a close and withering fire."

Interesting points about the first rank no longer kneeling to fire after the first couple of volleys. I would have thought that making yourself as small as possible would be instinctive.

I recall reading about the ACW that the firing line degenerated into an uncontrollable mass pretty quickly. After the first couple of volleys, the line dissolved. Some guys shrank behind the formation; others loaded robotically, sometimes loading two or three rounds before remembering to pull the trigger. Adrenalin and instinct pretty much took over and few seemed to have thought consciously about what they were doing.

von Winterfeldt -- thanks for the quotes. To answer your question, yes they did use "assault columns" (column of divisions) during the American Civil War. I haven't found a definitive source that lists all the examples of it being used, but digging around on the internet, I keep finding more examples than I thought there were. Nevertheless, it was probably still fairly rare, as the terrain is said to have usually favored lines. (I vaguely recall that the French often used linear tactics in Spain because of the terrain).

As for the first rank not firing after the first few volleys, this relates to the problem that I had heard about, i.e. that the troops discipline broke down and they just started to load and fire as quickly as possible. During the American Civil War, this was noted as a problem, and some officers began to avoid using independent firing, preferring to keep control over their men by using volleys. The details are a little different, because the claim during the 18th century was that even when firing volleys the discipline broke down. But, ultimately this boils down to a command and control issue.

So perhaps the problem with fire in three ranks wasn't theoretical, but practical. And the practical problems with firing in three ranks may have been influenced by multiple variables (discipline, training, the ability of the officers to keep their men from getting too excited). So perhaps if properly trained and competently managed, soldiers could be expected to fire well in three ranks -- that wasn't always achieved so that's why there was debate?

As an extension, I've also heard that during the ACW that, contrary to expectation, units that fired more slowly, inflicted *more* casualties on their opponents! The explanation is that these soldiers were loading their guns more carefully, taking a little more time aiming (there's not much time spent aiming in volley fires, but there is an advantage to not rushing), and just generally being more calm under fire. Whereas those loading and firing as fast as possible were so rushed to be almost in a panic. Note: the context was musket armed soldiers -- obviously the rate of fire from a repeater can be much higher, without the soldiers being rushed. Most of these statistics are generated by collecting anecdotes, so expect to find contradictions, and healthy skepticism is appropriate.

I do know many wargames often give a bonus to the first volley, perhaps because of carefully loaded muskets, well controlled/directed fire . . .

I do remember a story from the Mexican American War of an American soldier who stated that the Mexican troops loaded and fired so rapidly, that if it wasn't for their poor aim they would have killed them all. (The Mexican government's practice overcharging the muskets may also have been a factor in poor aim).

Correction -- In my previous message I meant to write:

As for the first rank not kneeling after the first few volleys, . . .

Can probably throw in the old adage that once troops engaged in firing it was "difficult to get them moving again" as a reference to loss of C&C.

And also the frequent statement by British officers that they wanted a clean, quick success when facing a French opposing force – two volleys, a cheer and a charge – and not a prolonged musketry duel.

G'Day Hugh,

In regards to the Napoleonic period, I notice you refer to the following a few times in your thread:

"And also the frequent statement by British officers that they wanted a clean, quick success when facing a French opposing force – two volleys, a cheer and a charge – and not a prolonged musketry duel."

Unless Mark H. has given you examples, could you please give us the firsthand accounts of the British officers who frequently stated their preference of an execution of late fire.

Do you also give a bonus to those countries that formed their bodies of troops in three ranks that have a greater front?

Any thoughts on the link that "Major Snort" provided…did it help?

Best Regards
Art

What was basically Moore's System can be found in the Regulations that were made official in 1824.

MS: Just to clarify.

1. Moore's System in any form didn't show up in Dundas's 1798 regulations.
2. When you say 'made official' in 1824, you don't mean that Dundas' regulations in 1798 were not official.

Cdr Luppo:

I find it interesting that in 1808 the use of the third line as skirmishers was seen as "violate the principle of mass" and yet in 1811, in developing light infantry procedures for the regular infantry in his Corps, Davout [through Morand] considered that method in deciding to use deployment by company.

If it had been 'outlawed' by the 1808 Imperial decree regarding six company battalions, why did Davout even refer to it three years later as a point of discussion?

I do know many wargames often give a bonus to the first volley, perhaps because of carefully loaded muskets, well controlled/directed fire.

While that is true, fouling and smoke also cut down on the effectiveness of further fire.

McLaddie,

Just to clarify those points:

1. Moore's System, or the system that had been introduced at Shorncliffe, was an improvement on the Dundas' system. Looking at the 1824 regulations, which incorporated Moore's system, and comparing them with the 1792 Dundas Regulations shows a lot of similarities, but also many things that were changed.
2.The Dundas 1792 Regulations were official and not replaced officially until 1824, although the army had unofficially adopted some of Moore's improvements already. Exactly how widely, or even when, these changes had been adopted is not clear. Some things that appear to have been adopted in the Peninsular War are the increased speed of movement and "sections of threes".

Some more specific things like Colville's mention of forming the "Light Infantry, or Sir John Moore's square" also show up in Peninsular memoirs. Luckily Colville explains exactly what this manoeuvre was and at first glance it may leave you wondering what was actually different from the Dundas Regulations. The so-called "Light Infantry Square" was formed from open (full distance) column. The basis of this manoeuvre is in the Dundas Regulations, in S178 paragraph 9 but it was improved upon so that there were no halts during the process. Also Dundas assumed that the troops would be formed 3 deep and only close the column up to half distance before forming square, whereas the "Light Infantry" square assumed the troops are formed 2 deep and close up to quarter distance before forming square. This can be found in the 1824 Regulations in S103.

Good Day Bill,

You certainly master all that stuff better than me ! : )

it has surely a notion of establishing some kind of uniformity given the 1808 modification to the # of pelotons in a Bn, vs previous eventual "variable field practices". it might involve the notion of "Mass", the notion of Elite peloton and non elite peloton, and the notion of "Endivisionement". i simply shared the relevant entries in Bardin's dictionary as a quick reference on that matter, which gives another view to the question of three ranks vs two ranks.

courtesy of Oli from his Demi-Brigade site :

i note that the "destinataires" of the instructions seems limited : the colonels and the general de Brigade… " recommend that more copies are not made of it by the rest." ("recommandez du reste qu'il n'en soit pas fait plus de copies.")

- "it will be proper to exercise the centre companies with the companies of voltigeurs"

- "for the first time, it means a mixing of the fusiliers with the voltigeurs."

- "Forward this instruction to each of the colonels of the regiments under your orders"

- " and one for each general of brigade"

six pelotons in column by division has only six ranks if skirmishers are out from the third rank. Perhaps Art can elaborate on those elements better than me ?

best regards,

Eric

G'Day Bill,

The regles for endivisionnement caused considerable problems with a colonne with three divisions that had a voltigeur peloton and grenadier peloton, and it always violated the general principles for the colonne directe and renversee.

A colonne…so as not to violate the principle of mass, needs 3 divisions and a minimum of 9 ranks.

By using center factions en compagnie-peloton en tirailleurs from the 3rd rank, now left a colonne with 6 ranks (which now changes a colonne into what is considered en ligne double and not a colonne).

By detaching an entire peloton enabled a colonne to form two divisions of two pelotons, and the third division consisting of only one peloton centered at the rear of the colonne, thus making the colonne with 3 divisions and 9 ranks.

The only colonne that was practical was the colonne double, because the elite pelotons were not en endivisionnement with a center pelotons. But the colonne double went against one of the reasons why Napoleon wanted a battalion with 6 compagnies.

Also each epagoglique colonne has a certain purpose, so the French could not always stay in a colonne double.

As for why Davout even refers to it three years later as a point of discussion?

During this time period; nearly every Corps was attempting to change the conventions of each regiment by various means (by order of the minister de la guerre). They were also receiving bodies of troops (both French and foreign from Spain), which were not operating under the French Imperial Decree of 18 February 1808.

The French forces in Spain; were still operating under the old system of 19 September 1805 for the ligne, and the system of 13 March 1804. Such as doubling of pelotons by demi-pelotons or by sections, from the colonne d'attaque, to include bataillons en colonne par divison and demi-bataillons.

Troops in Spain were also still operating under the 1804 system for light infantry in 1810 because they hadn't received the 1810 "Tableaux Synoptiques Des Manoeuvres D'Infanterie. Or they hadn't implemented the change. It's never really explained why, and this is to include the foreign body of troops.

I hope this helps

Best Regards
Art

G'Day Gents,

to add on to Hans-Karls posting…

1555: Duben (20 miles from Leipzig), 13 Octobre 1813

Napoleon orders that the entire army is to form 2 ranks, whether it be en ligne ou meme colonne par division. He states that the third rank is relevant (since they are now fighting mainly defensive battles -not totally useless as some suggest), and it shall give "the greatest advantage" for a battalion of 500 men, with the impression of a battalion of 750 men. This effect shall have a great impact, because the enemy will not know of this nouvelle ordonnance. One hour after the receipt of this order, everything must be arranged.

Now Napoleon makes certain he doesn't go against the principles of mass:

He then goes on to say that a colonne par division (not colonne d'attaque formed on the center) gave a colonne a depth of six ranks and three more for the serre-files.

-remember that the colonne par division and colonne d'attaque formed on the center are not derivative in all roles.

Napoleon now means that by including the serre-files into the equation of depth, he now meets the requirements for mass in any particular circumstance that require shock.

Best Regards
Art

Cdr Luppo, Thank you for that information. Very helpful.

Major Snort, I appreciate the clarifications and further details. I wasn't sure what you meant.

Hi Art: Thank you for those explanations. A big help.

While I know many of the French troops in Spain or the foreign troops hadn't switched over to the 1808 system and I was aware of some of the reasons for deploying tirailleurs by peloton, I am not sure that Davout's corps in 1811 was dealing with those issues, but rather many new recruits, hence the need for training and a set of instructions.

If he was dealing with troops still operating under the 1804-1805 system, then it would explain his comments/arguments against the use of the 3rd rank… otherwise it means it was still an issue enough to be mentioned after three years of the 1808 system. [I assume by your comments that the 1804-05 systems included the use of the third rank fo skirmishing]

Certainly Ney was recommending using the 3 rank in 1803 with his instructions.

G'Day Bill

"Certainly Ney was recommending using the 3 rank in 1803 with his instructions."

The instructions written for Ney's Corps were principles for a battalion with 9 sub-factions and not 6 sub-factions. Even if you remove the 3rd rank with a battalion of 9 sub-factions, you still have 4 divisions with a total of 8 ranks.

The voltigeur peloton were not even created during that time. Therefore even without a compagnie de volitgeur, a battalion ployed in column were able to detach fusiliers as skirmisher en peloton-compagnie (ou l'ordre binaire sur le troisieme rangs). From within the battalion, the commander could use the 3rd rank, eclaieurs, or genadiers (if present) en tirailleur.

Ney issues orders that the voltiguers were to be created on the field of battle, in accordance to the decree imperial on 24 September 1805, on 23 October.

As for your comment of: "otherwise it means it was still an issue enough to be mentioned after three years of the 1808 system".

Le regles d'endivisionnement were such an issue/concern that it was brought up in the Manuel d'Infanterie 1813. Even in 1816 they publish a circulaire on it…then in 1825 they tried to adjust the principles again…and then…even in l'ordonnance de 1831 as well ;-)

One reason I like the Russians from 1812 onward, is because a battalion has 10 sub-factions and their columns are normally formed on the center.

Best Regards
Art

"Elle sera ainsi à la gauche de la première division de fusiliers, et au centre du bataillon garde-aigle.

Ce placement, qui est le plus analogiquement imité du règlement, suppose que les grenadiers formeront une division particulière , ou bien qu'ils seront de division avec les voltigeurs; mais que jamais ils ne seront endivisionnés avec la première compagnie de fusiliers , ce qui seroit contre les principes et l'usage.

Si cet endivisionnement des grenadiers et de la première de fusiliers avoit lieu , l'aigle , au lieu d'être à l'aile gauche de la seconde division, se trouveront au centre de la troisième, et jamais drapeau n'a pu être placé autre part qu'à une aile de division."

Manuel d'Infanterie 1813, P 446, Note (2)

G'Day Hugh,

In regards to the Napoleonic period, I notice you refer to the following a few times in your thread:

"And also the frequent statement by British officers that they wanted a clean, quick success when facing a French opposing force – two volleys, a cheer and a charge – and not a prolonged musketry duel."

Unless Mark H. has given you examples, could you please give us the firsthand accounts of the British officers who frequently stated their preference of an execution of late fire.

Do you also give a bonus to those countries that formed their bodies of troops in three ranks that have a greater front?

Any thoughts on the link that "Major Snort" provided…did it help?

Best Regards Art

Hey, Art! You reminded me of M Snort's link, which I had bookmarked and then forgotten about. (Combination of busy and being old.) I started to read through today and it's very interesting and helpful and discusses many of the ideas that got me to start this thread.

Re British tactical practice: – What I had in mind was the discussion at pages 252 – 255 of Peter Edwards' Salamanca book. Gen'l Clinton was roundly criticized by his officers – among them Leith Hay – for allowing his division to engage in a stationary musketry duel with the French troops opposing them. The suggestion was that Clinton's tactical choice was unusual, contrary to accepted "best practices" and thought to have caused the wreck of one of his brigades from excessive casualties with no corresponding success over the French.

The instructions written for Ney's Corps were principles for a battalion with 9 sub-factions and not 6 sub-factions. Even if you remove the 3rd rank with a battalion of 9 sub-factions, you still have 4 divisions with a total of 8 ranks.

Good Morning Art. Glad you are back visiting civilization. ;-7

The voltigeur peloton were not even created during that time.

Yes, I realize that. In other Corps at the time/in the past, other methods were being used including entire companies. I was noting that right up to the official change, it was used.

Ney issues orders that the voltiguers were to be created on the field of battle, in accordance to the decree imperial on 24 September 1805, on 23 October.

You mean by 'the field of battle', on campaign. Or are you saying he was creating them ad hoc preparing for a particular battle?

As for your comment of: "otherwise it means it was still an issue enough to be mentioned after three years of the 1808 system".

Le regles d'endivisionnement were such an issue/concern that it was brought up in the Manuel d'Infanterie 1813. Even in 1816 they publish a circulaire on it…then in 1825 they tried to adjust the principles again…and then…even in l'ordonnance de 1831 as well ;-)

Interesting. Can you say why it was still an issue, if the established practice was deployment by company? Just reviewing options, or was there a call for 3rd rank skirmishing to return?

The instructions written for Ney's Corps were principles for a battalion with 9 sub-factions and not 6 sub-factions. Even if you remove the 3rd rank with a battalion of 9 sub-factions, you still have 4 divisions with a total of 8 ranks.

Good Morning Art. Glad you are back visiting civilization. ;-7

The voltigeur peloton were not even created during that time.

Yes, I realize that. In other Corps at the time/in the past, other methods were being used including entire companies. I was noting that right up to the official change, it was used.

Ney issues orders that the voltiguers were to be created on the field of battle, in accordance to the decree imperial on 24 September 1805, on 23 October.

You mean by 'the field of battle', on campaign. Or are you saying he was creating them ad hoc preparing for a particular battle?

As for your comment of: "otherwise it means it was still an issue enough to be mentioned after three years of the 1808 system".

Le regles d'endivisionnement were such an issue/concern that it was brought up in the Manuel d'Infanterie 1813. Even in 1816 they publish a circulaire on it…then in 1825 they tried to adjust the principles again…and then…even in l'ordonnance de 1831 as well ;-)

Obviously, other nations such as Prussia kept the 3rd rank deployments of line and fusilier troops will into the 1870s.

Interesting. Can you say why it was still an issue, if the established practice was deployment by company? Just reviewing options, or was there a call for 3rd rank skirmishing to return?