"Protection for the infantry on the battlefield?" Topic

Why did commanders in the Napoleonic Wars so rarely seem to try to provide their infantry with hard cover on the open field?

I can think of only Borodino in the NW, as an example when a commander actively sought to shelter his troops on the battlefield. Even then the Great Redoubt and Fleches were largely there to protect the Russian *artillery*, surely? Wellington's reverse-slopes seem to have been a clever way of protecting the troops from French artillery and skirmisher fire, without having access to trenches, stone walls, etc. But he was unusual in attempting this (and presumably this was one of the reasons why he so often won). On the day of the battles of Quatres Bras and Ligny, he supposedly accurately predicted that Blucher would be "damnably mauled" when he rode over to take a view of the Prussian dispositions.

Yet by the time we get to the American Civil War, fighting behind stone walls (Marye's Heights at Fredericksburg), in natural or man-made falls in the ground (Antietam's sunken road or 'Bloody Lane') or even in prepared entrenchments seems to have been the norm.

How come Napoleonic commanders didn't demand picks and shovels and get their men digging-in? Is the answer largely to do with the growing effectivess of weaponry, esp. *artillery*?

Thanks all for any observations!

It was not necessary for Napoleonic armies to be under cover. They could happily maneuver around the battlefield with little danger until the battle lines almost met. This is due to the effective range of the smooth bore musket that was the standard small arm.

The effective range of small arms increased by the time of the ACW. Or more accurately, during it, as both armies acquired more rifle muskets. Artillery size and reach also improved. As a result ACW armies kept a greater distance away from each other when not directly engaged in fighting and could only stay in close contact for any length of time by building trenches. The idea of taking cover was slow to develop during this era and the early battles were conducted just like those of the Napoleonic era.

I imagine arming a muzzle loader was much more difficult in anything but a standing position. Once breech loaders became commoner riflemen could even fire and load lying prone….and cover became compatible with sustained fire?

There is always a spirited debate over the alleged greater effectiveness of rifled muskets, with some claiming there was really no difference from smooth bores. This being due to an almost total lack of marksmanship training of these huge hastily assembled ACW armies and the inherent difficulty of long range aiming with the rife musket due to its "rainbow" trajectory. Most of the time small arms fire was initiated at ranges no greater than those of the Napoleonic era.

All this is true, but in my opinion it misses two points. First is the empirical evidence that there was a very real change in this era. And second, although individual accuracy with the rife musket must have been abysmal, the combined weight of brigades of men firing at ranges beyond those possible in the Napoleonic era caused a very real change in warfare. The cavalry and artillery arms now had to keep a respectful distance from massed infantry or be annihilated. Enemy infantry could often approach closer before the killing began simply because they are a shorter and harder to see target.

I think part of the difference was votes. The Napoleonic wars had unlimited access to manpower with very little accountability. As far the Great Powers were concerned, men were expendable. I dont know how the Russians recruited but I'll bet it was just a matter of going to a village and rounding up x number of peasants while the French and Prussians just drafted whatever they wanted. The Austrians had "serfs" and the British recruitment probably relied on extreme poverty in their islands.

During the ACW, we are talking about citizens and voters and accountability for battle casualties.

I think the answer lies more in logistics than weaponry, and with a good dose of strategic philosophies thrown in. During the 17th and 18th Centuries and into the Napoleonic Wars, armies generally had to forage to feed themselves. Once they left their fortresses and depots and ventured into the open field, they could only carry a very limited amount of food. The armies had to forage to feed themselves and they would deplete a region of food pretty quickly and have to move on. Which meant that if the armies were in the field they wanted to fight each other. If one side or the other entrenched, it meant they didn't want to fight. But once they had concentrated and dug in, they could only stay put for a short period of time before they would run out of food. So if the opponents didn't want to assault entrenchments, all they had to do was wait for a bit (foraging all the while) and the other side would eventually have to leave their entrenchments and either fight or retreat. This is why you see so few battles in this period with extensive entrenchments.

By the time of the ACW, however, things had changed. With railroads and steam boats, armies could entrench and still be supplied indefinitely. In the first two years of the war you still have open field battles because both sides were hoping to score an Austerlitz or Cannae, a win-the-war-in-an-afternoon decisive battle. By 1864, however, most generals realized that wasn't going to happen and you see far more entrenchments in use.

At the individual battle level, you also have the effect of battlefield conditions. 1) Is it hard clay or soft soil? Are there stone, fence or hedge farm field barriers? Is there a ready supply of wood to build with? I.e., a field commander can look about and see if entrenching is possible or even worth the effort. 2) Do you want to advance, hold or retreat? Your men are not going to want to move out of protecting fortifications. It might be smart not to build if you know you plan to move. You don't usually win the war behind a barricade. 3) Entrenching can be hard work. Do you want your men tired out when you might need then to do something else? 4) The opposite. You might build just to keep the men busy.

In the 18th Century, musketry was only effective at short range. If you were more than 300 metres from your enemy, your troops were pretty safe. If you could keep them going in a steady advance, then they would probably only suffer one or two effective volleys before someone broke. Similarly, cavalry would be on infantry without suffering too much. Of course, artillery was still the great 'killer at a distance', but in the 18th Century there was not that much of it, it was rarely massed and therefore, its effects could be endured.

Things began to change with the Napoleonic Wars. Rifles, albeit in small numbers, began to appear and the use of light infantry changed on the battlefield with the classic skirmishing techniques we know so well. However, the big difference was Napoleon's massing of artillery. Not a new concept, but the Emperor was the one who instigated the greatest use of it. As a result, casualties on the battlefield (as opposed to a broken army being pursued) began to climb. The commanders at the time were officers brought up in the 18th Century way of doing things and it took them time to grasp how things were changing (i.e. a big touch of 'we have always done it this way'). The lack of respect for soldiers lives ('Just so many chickens') had some part in things but I think inertia and ignorance played a bigger part.

Wellington was unique in that he planned specifically to counter the French way of war. On his way to the Peninsula for the first time he opined that he understood 'their method' and felt he could beat it. No other allied commander made such a statement as far as I can see and most concentrated on strategy and grand tactics in their attempts to beat the French. Also, Wellington was very aware of the fact that he commanded Britain's 'only army' and with supply lines so stretched he could not afford to waste his men's lives. Military common sense rather than anything too humanitarian.

By the start of the ACW, I believe that commanders had learned the lessons of the Napoleonic Wars, but had not taken into account the new technologies. However, as far as I can see (and this is not my period) after the First Bull Run, they quickly saw that the increased range of infantry weapons was a game changer. Hence the strength of the defence in most battles. Added to this, the soldiers themselves and the regimental officers soon saw the advantage of taking cover and using natural cover or even digging in increased as the war went on. The nature of battles at the end was more WW1 than Napoleonic, something European commanders did not learn for many years.

In short, a classic case of preparing for the next war with the methods of the last.

As late as the unsuccessful allied defence of the Austrian Netherlands 1793-94, the campaign was structured around a network of fortress in Flanders and Brabant and along the Rhine frontier. In addition, when out in the field, both sides would also take-up positions in entrenched camps, be it the French at Famars in May 1793 or the Duke of York's army on the Aa in August 1794. From about 1797 onwards there seems to have been a growing use of natural terrain and manoeuvre, independent of fortresses and their magazines.

However, battlefield redoubt were stilll being employed by the Frenchto bolster positions in the fighting for the Pyrenees in 1814 and we might consider Hougoumont and La Haye Saint made use of man-made features to the same end. Wellingotn's successful use of reverse slope positions has already been mentioned.

In the 18th Century, musketry was only effective at short range. If you were more than 300 metres from your enemy, your troops were pretty safe.

No

tactics – long range firing

Date: 12/12/2014, 12:11 pm
In Response To: Thomas Legler and the Beresina song
Die feindlichen Kanonenkugeln sprangen ä la Ricochette dicht an der linken Flügelspitze unserer Masse vorbei auf das Grenadierbataillon des zweiten Regiments, welches sogleich einige Mann verlor. Wir deployirten darauf unsere Massen und begrüssten die rasch anmarschirende feindliche Infanterie aufs Beste mit einem wohl unterhaltenen Rottenfeuer, so dass sie auf 7 — 800 Schritte vor uns doch stehen blieb.

Legler, p.28
Very interesting, so the units deployed form close column into line to reduce the effect of artillery and then they greeted the adavancing enemy with a well norished fire of files so that the enemy stopped 7 to 800 paces in front of them!!
So – at what range did they open their musketry – 1000 paces – and with a good effect?
link

Oman also refers to Dumas in a footnote. Neuf mois a la suite du Marechal Soult p275.
Valentini : Die Lehre vom Krieg. Erster Theil. Der kleine Krieg und die Gefechtslehre, 4. Auflage, Leipzig 1820

§ 52.
Die im 45sten §. Gegebene Regel, daß Infanterie nie auf eine größere Distanz als auf dreihundert Schritt feuern muß ist überhaupt nicht auf Schützen auszudehnen. (…) Was will man ferner gegen einen Feind thun, der, wie die Franzosen im Revolutionskriege, auf fünf- bis sechshundert Schritt auf uns feuert, und uns Leute blessiert, wenn das Terrain nicht erlaubt, im näher zu rücken."
Seite 77 ff.
Those in § 45 issued rule that infantry mustn't never fire at a longer distance than of 300 paces, is never applied to skirmishers. (…) What can be done against an enemy, who, like the French in the Revolutionary Wars, fires at us from five – to 600 paces, and wounds our men, when the terrain doesn't allow us to approach him closer.

Jany, Curt : Die Gefechtsausbildung der Preußischen Infanterie von 1806. Mit einer Auswahl von Gefechtsberichten.
Urkundliche Beiträge und Forschungen zur Geschichte des Preußischen Heeres.
Herausgegeben vom Großen Generalstabe, Kriegsgeschichtliche Abtheilung II.
Fünftes Heft
Berlin 1903
18. Ein Preußischer Jägeroffizier Leutnant von Seydlitz, später Yorks Adjutant und bekannt als Herausgeber des Tagebuchs des Yorkschen Korps von 1812, berichtet 1808 das „die französischen Tirailleurs schon auf 1600 Schritt blessierten." Ferner : „Die Belagerung von Danzig giebt als Beispiel, daß Jäger ohne Bajonett eine Schanze weggenommen und keine Blessierten hatten, und ihe Repli, Linieninfanterie mit Bajonett, was 1500 Schritt hinter ihnen stand, dazu eine Menge hatte." (…)
S. 103
Footnote 18
A Prussian Jäger officer, lieutennat von Seydlitz, later ADC of York and famous as editor of the diary of York‘s corps in 1812, reported 1808, that ; "the French tirailleurs wounded already at 1600 paces." Also : "The siege of Danzig shows as example that Jäger without bayonet took a redoubt without any wounded and their support, line infantry with bayonets, who stood 1500 behind had many of them."
„Zahlreiche Schilderungen erwähnen besonders die „Bogenschüsse" der feindlichen Tirailleurs auf Entfernungen auf denen mit gezielten Schuß gar nicht zu denken war. Gneisenau erwähnt in einem Bericht an dem König vom 27. Februar 1807 als eine Erfahrung, die ermit einer Füsilier-Kompagnie bei Saalfeld gemacht habe, daß diese ungezielten Bogenschüße „zwar selten treffen, aber doch durch ihre Menge Viele, obgleich nicht gefährlich verwunden und immer unsere Leute unruhig machen."
S. 39
Numerous reports especially take note of the „arc shots" of the enemy tirailleurs at a distance whereupon it wasn't even to imagine of aimed shots. Gneisenau mentions in a report to the king, at the 27th of February 1807 as an experience, which he made with a company of fusiliers at Saalfeld, "that those unaimed arc shoots : rarely hit, but by their sheer numbers wounded many, though not seriously and made our man nervous."
„Ein Veteran des Siebenjährigen Krieges, General v. Tempelhoff, bemerkt darüber ; „Man feuert bei einer Schlacht ganz anders, als auf dem Exerzierplatze; denn die anrückende Infanterie fängt trotz allem dem, was ihr auf dem Exerzierplatze gelehrt und eingeprägt wird, oft schon auf 800 Schritt vom Feinde an zu feuern; doch wenigstens 600. Gewöhnlich glaubt man, daß ein solches Feuer nichts thut, allein hierin irrt man sich. Eine Kugel aus dem kleinen Gewehr tödtet oder verwundet einen Mann, wenn sie ihn nur trifft, ebenso gut, sie mag in einem Bogen oder horizontal abgeschossen werden,
S. 38 ff.

A veteran of the Seven Years War, General v. Tempelhoff remarks about that : One is firing at a battle totally difference compared to the drill ground, as the advancing infantry opens fire, regardless what being taught and drilled on the drill ground, already at 800 paces distance of the enemy – or at least at 600. It is the common believe that such a fire doesn't harm, however this is an error. A ball from the small arm, kills or wounds a men, in case it is hitting, as well as it is shot in an arc or horizontally.

Titze, Jörg : Die Berichte der sächsischen Truppen aus dem Feldzug 1806 (I) – Brigade Bevilaqua, books on demand 2014

Bericht Artillerieoffizier – Premierlieutenant v. Hiller
S. 93 ff
Eine große Intervalle, zwischen dem Regiment Churfürst und Xavier nunmehr zu schließen, zog sich das Regiment Churfürst rechts, bei welchen, so wie von den Vorrück an, wir immer von leichter Infanterie beschoßen wurden. Sie verwundeten mir auf die Weite von 7 bis 800 Schritt Leute, waren hinter Hecken und Zäune postiert, wo ich ihnen keinen Abbruch thun konnte mit Cartäschenschüßen deren ich einige mit großer Elevation versuchte, nicht die geringste Wirkung aber verspührte.
(Gecht bei Saalfeld)
S. 95
Here the observations oft he artillery officer von Hiller who commanded the regimental artillery of regiment von Churfürst, at the clash at Saalfeld
To close a big gap between the regiment Churfürst and Xavier, the regiment Churfürst was drawing itself to the right, by that as also in the advance we were always under fire from light infantry. They wounded me men at a distance of 7 to 800 paces, where placed behind hedges and fences, where I couldn't do any harm with grape shots, which I tried to use with high elevation but didn't feel the slightest effect.

Kleßmann (editor) : Deutschland unter Napoleon in Augenzeugenberichten, pocket book edition, München 1976
Leutnant von Borcke (Koprs Rüchel, 14. Oktober 1806) berichtet

„Dagegen erreichten uns in einer sehr großen Entfernung schon die Kugeln der feindlichen Tirailleurs, die in dem vorliegenden Feldgestrüpp und hinter einzelnen Deckungen, ohne daß wir sie sahen, so vortrefflich aufgestellt waren, daß uns Unkundigen die Kugeln aus der Luft zu kommen schienen. So beschossen zu werden, ohne den Feind zu sehen, machte auf unsere Soldaten einen üblen Eindruck, denn, unbekannt mit dieser Art des Gefechts, verloren sie zu ihren Gewehren das Vertrauen und fühlten die Überlegenheit das Feindes sofort. Sie büßten daher in dieser ohnehin schon bedenklichen Lage schnell an Mut, Ausdauer und Ruhe ein und konnten die Zeit nicht abwarten, wo sie selbst zum Schießen kamen, was sich bald zu unseren Nachteil zeigte.
S. 136
However (before that he noticed that the enemy artillery was overshooting them) the bullets of enemy tirailleurs reached us from a very big distance, who were placed with advantage in the field brushes and single cover before us, so that we couldn't see them, that for us ignorants it seemed that the bullets come out of the air. To be under such a fire, without seeing the enemy made a bad impression at our soldiers, because – ignorant with that kind of fighting, they lost trust in their own guns and felt immediately the superiority of the enemy. The suffered quickly therefore, in this by all means bad situation in courage, endurance and composure und couldn't wait the time to also start shooting, which soon showed to be of our disadvantage.
p. 136

Regiment Low
„Mit dieser Masse, und indem ich … den übrigen Teil des 1sten Bataillons links anschlagen ließ, war es uns noch möglich, den andringenden Feind zurück zu halten. Allein, da das Regiment von Niesemeuschel und mehrere bei uns befindliche Bataillons, nicht allein durch eine heftiges Kartätschen Feuer und durch einen starken Kavallerie Angriff auf das 1ste Bataillon geworfen, und jener mit dem linken Flügel gebildete Zirkel durch dieses Andringen gesprengt, und durch die mit jenen Bataillons zugleich eindringende feindliche Cavallerie teils niedergehauen, teils niedergeritten und zu Gefangenen gemacht worden; so war alle fernere Verteidigung ganz unmöglich." (Major von Melletin, 1.Bataillon)

„Am Tage der Bataille, als am 14ten Oktober, wurde das Bataillon gegen 3 Uhr Nachmittags durch Annäherung der französischen Kolonne mit Angriff bedrohet und einige Tirailleurs schossen gegen 500 Schritt 2 Unteroffiziere von meinem Fahnen Peleton tot."
„Es wurde verschiedentlich mir zugerufen, dass dieses preußische Truppen wären, allein der Irrtum ergab sich als wir näher kamen; ich kommandierte daher: Halt! und das Bataillon wollte einschwenken, in diesem Augenblick aber stürzte diese feindliche Kavallerie auf uns und hieb ein. Zwei Chasseurs jagten auf mich zu und beim zweiten Hieb, der den Kopf traf, ward ich vom Pferd gehauen, und weiß nicht weiter, was vorgefallen, weil ich bewusstlos lange auf dem Wahlplatz liegen blieb." (Major von Boxberg, 2.Batailon)

Böhme beim Gefecht bei Wolkowysk, 15 November 1812
„(…) sei es nun der Grund, dass ich mich so schnell und immer weiter entfernte, und nun die Entfernung dazu betrug, indem die Russen größtenteils sehr hoch schießen, die Kugel dann in einen weiten Bogen fortgeht und gewöhnlich noch am Ende ihrer Laufbahn in Wirkung tritt, kurz ich kam nun erst in einem bedeutenden Kugelregen, in welchen ich nun freilich meinen angefangenen Galopp nicht verminderte; in weiterer Entfernung traf mich eine Flintenkugel an der linken Seite des Halses, allein da sie ziemlich ihre Kraft verloren und ich übrigens eine bedeutende Emballage um mich hatte, so war das Bemerken hiervon nicht mehr, als wenn mir Jemand einen bedeutenden Schlag mit der Faust auf diesen Fleck versetzt hätte, (…)"
S. 23
Titze, Jörg (Herausgeben) Carl Friedrich Böhme Tagebuch 2te Periode (II) vom 10.11.1812 bis mit 11.05.1813, Books on demand, Norderstedt 2017

It is worth noting that much of the long distance fire effect mentioned above was that of Tiralleurs – presumably skirmishing light infantry. Skirmisher fire, man for man, was considered about 3x more effective than volley fire by a formed body of troops.

Two add'l thoughts -

Large bodies of formed troops, especially in column at deployment or half-deployment intervals mad attractively deep targets.

IMO the nature of musket fire at that time, especially at a distant target, was not so much a matter of individual marksmanship as density of the cone of fire delivered by the unit as a whole.

Strictly my opinion, of course.

B

A change in doctrine, especially in the United States Army, also played a part in the more widespread use of field fortifications. Dennis Hart Mahan (father of the naval theorist Alfred Thayer Mahan) was a member of the West Point faculty from 1824 to 1871. In 1836 he published A Complete Treatise on Field Fortification which became a standard textbook at West Point.

According to Edward Hagerman, "From Jomini to Dennis Hart Mahan: The Evolution of Trench Warfare and the American Civil War", Civil War History, 31 (Sept. 1967), p. 204, "…there grew up in American tactical thought and doctrine in the 1830's and 1840's this detailed and systematic formalization of a tactical system championing the entrenched defensive. Widely circulated by Mahan's teaching, textbooks, and manuals, there was scarcely a Civil War officer who had not been exposed to it."

There was also an awareness of the theoretical increased lethality of the rifle- musket. This served to reinforce the doctrinal disposition towards entrenching. But keep in mind this theoretical advantage of the rifle-musket was largely negated by the complete lack of training in both range estimation and long range fire by the vast bulk of Civil War infantry.

FWIW-

American Kriegspiel has lots of modifiers created just after the ACW. These are based on breach loaders, but you can adjust the ROC for rifled muskets to arrive at (re: argue over) correct mods for rifle link

See section 89 for mods to rifle fire.

It is worth noting that much of the long distance fire effect mentioned above was that of Tiralleurs

true but there are also examples of line infantry firing, like that of Legler and also the comments about the 7YW.

Hi von Winterfeldt,
By no means do I dispute the ability of a (well trained and led) body of formed infantry to deliver such distant fire against suitable targets. French infantry employed massed Chassepot fire at ranges exceeding 1,000 meters (see Balck's "Infantry Tactics") during the Franco-Prussian War.

Same concept, except that the range of engagement was dictated by the weapon in use.

The only thing to be taken into consideration is that such fire would likely have been seen as "harassing fire" rather than "decisive fire".

Strictly my opinion, of course.

B

The lack of defences during the napoleonic wars and the extensive use during the Napoleonic period has zero to do with technology.

If you in Europe during the 18th or most of the 19th century bothered building good defences on a battlefield. 9 out of 10 times the enemy general would say, well you buddy and simply flank your army and all you have accomplished is tire your soldiers and engineers.

Except for the big rivers and 1 or 2 forests there would be very little strategic hindrances. So you just move your army to a place there there wasn't any defences and threaten the enemies lines of communications.

Borodino being special in that it was the Russians last chance to defend Moscow and they knew Napoleon wanted to fight more than anything. Even so Davout vanted to flank.

During the ACW you could build defences for two reasons. 1 the cities didn't have walls so while in Europe the big cities already had them, in America they had to be built on the spot.
Secondly north America was far more troublesome strategically. If you built defences it was far harder to strategically flank (also don't underestimate that both armies consisted mostly of amateurs leading amateurs and so strategic flanking might be to hard for quite a few of the generals to come up with)

In Sherman's campaign for Atlanta in 64, when the terrain was suitable. He just kept flanking Joseph E. Johnston forces. Why charge head on, when you can just outflank.

That's probably why the casualty rates were so horrible. I can't imagine how terrible it would have been at Borodino, Leipzig, Wagram, or Waterloo.

For serious analysis of the forms and functions of fieldworks and how they evolved during the nineteenth century in response to developments in weaponry etc, I recommend Professor Murray's 'The Rocky Road to the Great War: The Evolution of Trench Warfare to 1914'.
link

(Full disclosure: I am a friend of and collaborator with the author.)

Chris

Bloody Big BATTLES!
groups.io/g/bloodybigbattles
bloodybigbattles.blogspot.com

Great thread, some very interesting points.

It has always annoyed me how the SYW was ignored by ACW historians. The ability of Frederick or Daun to attack each other frontally when in prepared positions was just as hampered as those of Grant vs Lee i spite of the differences in technology. Nonetheless the book by Murray looks very interesting and goes on my Bucket list thx Chris!

Thank you to Winterfeldt for the exhaustive list of long range quotes. There seems to be no doubt that the harassing fore of skirmishers extended to a much greater range than we normally assume. This is consistent with points made by Paddy Griffith and Hess on the ACW, where regular firefights most often occured between 75-150 meters in spite of the rifled musket, but skirmishing could be done at 600-800 meters.

Although the effect of long range fire was propably not decisive as pointed out by Blutarski, the harassment effect could impoact deployment and tactical decisions. Should skirmishers have longer range in wargames than formed infantry????

The only thing to be taken into consideration is that such fire would likely have been seen as "harassing fire" rather than "decisive fire".

I am not that much disagreeing, but when an enemy is attacking and he gets stopped because you open fire at a long range and he is not pressing his attack home, the mission is achieved, or when his morale is slowly chipped away, this is of equal importance, it is not just about inflicting casualties – it is to affect morale, and here seemingly smoothbore muskets could well have an effect at long ranges.

There they did it – it must have had an effect.

Frederick attacked those positions with a tremendous artillery support, usually ignored, not without reason the 3pdr gun was re placed by 6 pdrs of the first line and grenadier battalions even got howitzers attached as well, to inflict destruction on battle field works.

But ACW field works were much different to redoubts in the 7YW

Hi von Winterfeldt,
Once again, I do not disagree. Organized fire of any sort can have an effect upon an opponent – probably in an inverse proportion to the morale/elan/discipline of the targeted unit.

As wargamers, we are often prone believe our little figures to all be of the stoutest heart. Not the case in real life, methinks.

B

Fix your enemy in place and then maneuver around him to smash him. It would seem to me that entrenching your troops is fixing yourself in place and thus giving up the ability to maneuver.

There is a difference between trenches (digging down) and breastworks (building up). The latter is seen occasionally in the Revolutionary/Napoleonic Wars because it not only gives cover but also creates an obstacle to the attacker. However, it needs rather more time and effort than digging a trench. Trenches, though, are really not a good idea if you are armed with smoothbore muskets. They may give you a +1 in the firefight (the cover offsetting the inconvenience of loading in a trench) but by the time your opponent is standing over you, they give you a -1 in the bayonet fight which is where the action is really decided.

Once weapons have longer effective range, the trade-off between bullet and bayonet changes, and trenches become more appealing.