"Combined-arms tactics" Topic

Hi all,

I would understand this term to mean the coordinated use of all arms to achieve tactical success.

I'd see the French Napoleonic all-arms corps system as an excellent example of this concept in practice, with Davout's crushing victory at Auerstadt, over a Prussian force twice his own force's size, as a shining example.

But I don't recall a lot of mention of combined-arms tactics in C19th warfare, or indeed until the last years of WW1. Monash's brilliant assault at Amiens in August 1918 is another outstanding example: fifteen miles or so gained in a day, by an army combining the use of inf, artillery, tanks and aircraft.

So did combined-arms tactics simply fall out of favour between these two points? There's plenty of evidence of artillery being used to fire preparatory bombardments before infantry attacks, whether before Picket's Charge at Gettysburg or Haig's seven-day bombardment before the 1st day of the Somme. But does this really count as combined-arms tactics?

And, for that matter, would Napoleon's use of Grand Batteries represent a good example of combined-arms tactics, or would this really be a 'corruption'? The massive (and largely ineffective?) bombardment at Waterloo would surely seem to have more in common with the artillery bombardments referenced above (Gettysburg and the Somme).

Any observations gratefully received, folks!!

With the improvements made to infantry weapons during the 19th century cavalry charges became marginally effective. Cavalry turned into mounted infantry and until the tank the third leg of the combined arms was lost. That said, you'll find examples of effective cavalry charges throughout the nineteenth century, iirc there was a big one during the Franco- Prussian war.

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The operations of the Grande Batterie at Waterloo was 'hindered' by the mud which also reduced the effectiveness of roundshot and common shell.

After the French cavalry were defeated, the French infantry closely supported by artillery attacked the allied line in skirmisher swarms with the artillery moving with them and reducing allied infantry squares. Cavalry also supported the attacks which forced the allied infantry to stay in square.

The Confederate bombardment at Gettysburg suffered from both poor fuses and overshooting the target. The federal artillery's response during the Confederate infantry assault was devastating and was the main reason the attack failed.

Monash's action at Le Hamel, which pre-dated Amiens, is often pointed to as a shining example of combined-arms tactics but it was by no means the first such in WW1. The Battle of Mons in 1914 (to pick but one example) involved: aircraft spotting; cavalry; infantry; machine-guns; light- and heavy artillery operating together. You mentioned Haig – he wrote the textbook on British cavalry tactics before WW1, emphasizing the need to achieve fire superiority with artillery and MGs in support of cavalry operations.

The 7 day preparatory barrage for the Somme was not Haig's recommendation; he wanted a massive sudden barrage as was used in the Battle of Amiens. It was General Rawlinson who ordered the long preparatory barrage. Even this was, however, combined with massive use of aircraft to achieve aerial dominance, spotting, ground attacks on key bridges, as well as preparations for exploitation by cavalry, use of Russian saps, gas attacks and smoke screens by engineers, etc, etc.

Robert

That said, you'll find examples of effective cavalry charges throughout the nineteenth century, iirc there was a big one during the Franco- Prussian war.

Adalbert von Bredow "Death Ride" the attack of the Prussian 12th Cavalry Brigade at the Battle of Mars-La-Tour. Using dead ground he was able to approach within 1,000 meters of the French position before he came under fire. He attacked elements of Canrobert Corp on the French left. The charge was successful and managed to defeat a force outnumbering them 4 to 1. The Bredow's force of 800 suffered 48% casualties. he event was used in the following decades by military tacticians to argue that cavalry charges could still win battles.

The cavalry wasn't really present on many American Civil War battlefields, and was frequently separated from infantry into a cavalry corps. Unlike the French corps structure, ACW corps were almost all infantry and artillery, with perhaps a squadron of cavalry to carry messages and provide security.
Later in the war, you do get foot and mounted working together, along with artillery support. At Nashville (Dec 1864), Wilson's Cavalry Corps was initially used as fast moving mounted infantry to extend the Union right around the Confederate left farther than plain infantry could have reached on both days, switching to a pursuit role on the second day. Cavalry and infantry also worked together during the Appomattox campaign to cut off and surround Confederate forces.

Grelber

Redcoat, you seem to have an unspoken assumption that "all arms" means cavalry or armor. Put like that, there's bound to be something of a hiatus between the invention of the minnie ball and getting the tanks to beta testing. There were exceptions, of course. In addition to the examples cited, I might note the Shenandoah Valley in 1864--and there are a few successful mounted actions later than Amiens, notably in the Russian Civil War.

But yeah, overall you've got about a 70 year window during which armies are using cavalry strategically, and tactics is mostly coordinating infantry and artillery with machine guns becoming more prominent later in the period. I'm not quite sure why you feel this shouldn't count. Might want to read what the infantry write when the artillery doesn't provide adequate support, or the infantry have failed to make good use of it.

It is, of course, less fun to wargame, which is why I run a little thin between 1815 and 1940. But that's different.

The Battle of Matz was an example of French combined arms tactics that pre-dated Monash in WW1. There is a replay of this battle described here:

link

A photo of the action, featuring infantry, tanks, aircraft, and artillery:

Robert

As noted above, fo much of the period, combined ams was mainly about coordinating the fire of artillery with the manouvre of infantry, and the challenges therein as battlefields became larger and emptier.

New toys such as planes and tanks made it more complicated, but the problem was still essentially the same. Fie and manouvre.

I always thought it was a big mistake for US Civil War cavalry to be separated from the infantry corps. Those infantry formations were essentially blind. A single brigade of cavalry attached at corps level would have provided much needed scouting and long range recon.

Both the 'Charge of the Light Brigade' at Balaclava in 1853 and 'Von Bredow's Death Ride' at Mars-le-Tour in 1870 were surely so horribly costly (50% casualties!!) that they were surely symptomatic of the way that cavalry could no longer effectively operate as the army's 'breakthrough' or 'exploitation' arm, as it had done during the Napoleonic Wars?

Where did cavalry actually play this vital 'breakthrough' role, after 1815? I can't think of an example.

Megiddo is one example – Palestine, 1918.

Robert

There were lots of cavalry charges throughout the C19, right up to Winston and the 21st Lancers at Omdurman in 1898. Cavalry was still potent during the Hungarian War of Independence in 1848, especially the Austrian cuirassiers (I could cite several instances of them providing the 'breakthrough'). And the uhlans at Custozza in 1866 were glorious, etc etc.

But it is true that as the decades passed, firepower made cavalry less of a threat and more of a target, so cavalry diminishes in importance and numbers, and the perfect firepower-protection-mobility triangle becomes a bit lopsided.

Chris

Bloody Big BATTLES!
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And, for that matter, would Napoleon's use of Grand Batteries represent a good example of combined-arms tactics, or would this really be a 'corruption'? The massive (and largely ineffective?) bombardment at Waterloo would surely seem to have more in common with the artillery bombardments referenced above (Gettysburg and the Somme).

Well, if we are going to talk about combined arms tactics, a cannonade does not necessarily count if no other arms were involved and only the success of the artillery is considered. [FYI a bombardment is against a fortification, a cannonade is what is done on the battlefield…just one of those pointless military distinctions…]

There were some examples of combined arms tactics at Waterloo, late around La Haye Sainte. The French I Corps attack could be counted as a failure of a combined arms attack.

Some British cavalry lost close to 50% at Waterloo, no minie ball in sight.
Can't use the minie ball as an excuse for everything.
It seems people think the rifled musket is the 19th century version of nukes.

Gunfreak is absolutely right!

There is also a lot of evidence that the battlefield efficiency of the minieball is not that much higher than the musket (Griffith, Hess).
If you read about 1859, it seems that the rifled artillery was much more of a threat to cavalry than the minie ball.

The impotence of frontal cavalry chrges agaisnt breechloaders is propably best shown by the colonial cavalry at Sedan, but then again, you have no succesfull frontal cavalry charges during the SYW against steady formed infantry in line – and they only had muskets…..

Yeah the British and Hanoverians didn't have rifled muskets at Minden.

A personal weapon is never very efficient especially when there is very little training, particularly mental training.
You can have the best weapon in the world with laser guided bullets and smooth jazz playing Ipod. But if you have no interest in hitting the enemy, you aren't going to hit the enemy. And up to and including ww2 the vast majority of infantry did not actively try and hit the enemy.

During training soldiers could score 20% hits on targets several hundred yards away with muskets, in combat the average was less than 0.5%, that's worse then random chances. It comes from the fact most soldiers purposely tried not to hit.

That's why cannons and later heavy machine guns were so effective. My making the weapon crew served you make it a machine not a weapon. Subconsciously the people operating it are just working a machine, it's the machine that kills, they only do "maintenance " who kills people with a cannon? The loader? The sponge guy? The aimer? Or the guy who fire it off?

So no having a slightly more effective weapon (rifled musket) was not a game changer. As the same % of soldiers would still try and avoid hitting the enemy.

"It comes from the fact most soldiers purposely tried not to hit."
I suggest it is not that but systematic error, e.g., if you don't know how to allow for range or how to give enough lead or how to use the sight correctly, you will always aim in the wrong place, so you will almost always miss.

My favourite illustration of this is General Skobeleff in the Russo-Turkish War 1877-1878. He wore a distinctive white uniform and rode a white horse, so he attracted a lot of Turkish fire. Because the Turks weren't great shots, the actual target – Skobeleff – was untouched, while people all around him got hit in the error zone.

Chris

Bloody Big BATTLES!
groups.io/g/bloodybigbattles
bloodybigbattles.blogspot.com

I suggest it is not that but systematic error, e.g., if you don't know how to allow for range or how to give enough lead or how to use the sight correctly, you will always aim in the wrong place, so you will almost always miss.

Doesn't hold water, as soldiers in ww1 and 2 actually had marksman training. Yet the number of times officers and men stood in the open just 100 metres away from the enemy with dozens or hundreds of bullets whizzing past them or hitting the ground is countless.
And nobody are going to say the Mauser, Garand, Enfield, mosin magat had an effective range of less then 100 meters or 150 meters which is the excuse used against the musket.

At best the soldiers are pointing in the general direction of the enemy and firing off and letting "fate" decide if the bullet hit or not. At worst they are actively aiming away from the enemy.

At best the soldiers are pointing in the general direction of the enemy and firing off and letting "fate" decide if the bullet hit or not. At worst they are actively aiming away from the enemy.

How about simply popping up, firing and then taking cover again? Even at 100 yards, it takes some time exposed to aim accurately. And while they were taught to aim, how often did they practice and what happens when the idea becomes laying down a 'volume' of fire?

Not the same as intentionally missing enemy combatants.

And while they were taught to aim, how often did they practice

I once read (can't remember where) a GI telling about the one time he actually fired "like we did on the range," by which I assume he meant the one time he actually took careful aim -- it was to knock out a machine gunner that had his entire squad (maybe platoon) pinned down. From that I assume that the rest of the time he just pointed his rifle in the general direction of the enemy.