"France 1940 Battle Narrative, Part 1" Topic

OK, technical difficulties…>:O

Here we go:

BATTLES IN THE ARDENNES, ON THE MEUSE RIVER AND IN THE MONT-DIEU AREA (10-25th May 1940)

For Fall Gelb, on 10th May 1940, the main German forces attack in an unexpected place, the Ardennes. These troops include 7 armored divisions (1762 tanks) and 3 motorized infantry division which are concentrated on a small front. They push on almost without concern for their flanks, leaving the cleaning up to the classical infantry divisions which follow. The southern flank of the attack is protected by the 16.Armee (Busch), which enters in the Luxembourg. Meanwhile, the Luftwaffe attacks as support for the Panzers and the infantry.

During the same time a large faked attack is undertaken by the German troops :
in the Netherlands : including the 9.PzD (153 tanks), the 1. Kavallerie Division, the SS Verfügung (mot.) division, the SS Totenkopf (mot.) division, the SS "Der Führer" regiment and the SS "Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler" regiment
in central Belgium : including the 3.PzD and 4.PzD (674 tanks), moving towards the Gembloux gap
Airborne troops (paratroopers and glider troops), commandos and special assault engineers are used to secure important points, to capture bridges or to rapidly neutralize fortifications like the Belgian fort of Eben Emael.

The German forces had been reorganized after the campaign in Poland (Fall Weiss) :
- At the eve of Fall Gelb there are 155 German divisions available (136 engaged), including 2 Waffen-SS motorized divisions instead of 105 divisions (63 engaged) in September 1939. The Leichten-Divisionen have been transformed into Panzerdivisionen. The armored units were better armed (more tanks were armed with 3.7cm and 7.5cm guns (16% – 452 tanks – in 1939 and 36% – 955 tanks – in 1940) and also better armored (for example more Panzer IV Ausf. A/B in Poland and more Panzer IV Ausf.C/D in France, more early and lightly armored Panzer III in Poland and more Panzer III E/F in France).
- The 3. and 4. Wellen Infanterie Divisionen from the Polish campaign were largely improved, younger men were enlisted and the equipment was modernized. In 1940, 15 of these divisions were frontline units.
- The chain of command is less centralized and more flexible whereas in Poland the command structures were very traditional. Add to that the important communication means (many radio sets), a well organized logistics and you have a powerful army.
- The German tactics with good inter-arms cooperation (tank / aircraft couple, close air support provided by the Ju87s and Hs123s, omnipresent tactical air reconnaissance) were not mature in Poland but they are ready for Fall Gelb.

A complete new HQ and ad-hoc structure is created with Gruppe Kleist for the initial phase of Fall Gelb. It includes 3 motorized army corps, regrouping 5 armored divisions and 3 motorized infantry divisions, directed towards the Ardennes. Unlike in Poland, the mechanized elements are well concentrated and have a real strategic role. They are well supported by the VIII.Fliegerkorps concentrating all the 300 Ju87 dive bombers and 42 Hs123 assault biplanes. The 5.PzD and 7.PzD of the XV.Armee Korps (mot.) are only several kilometers north of Gruppe Kleist. Therefore 7 Panzerdivisonen are concentrated against the weak area of the Ardennes. In the area of Sedan, 1500 aircrafts are concentrated on a small area to support the German attack. It is the very first time in History that such armored and air support forces are concentrated on such a small area.

During the initial phase of Fall Gelb, the Germans used also extensively airborne troops (paratroopers and glider troops) and commandos (in German uniforms, in allied uniforms or in civilian clothes – Brandenburger commandos, assault engineers or elite infantry of the "Grossdeutschland" regiment etc.). Such a concentration of commandos and airborne troops having a real strategic role is probably also a first time in History.

à For all these reasons, the 1940 western campaign can be seen as the best example of the so-called Blitzkrieg.

On 10th May the French and British troops launch the Dyle-Breda operation, to meet what is thought as the German main effort in Belgium and in the Netherlands. The French 7th Army with the 1e DLM moves to the Netherlands and French troops land also by ships in the Zeeland islands. The BEF and the French 1st Army with the French cavalry corps (2e DLM and 3e DLM) enters in central Belgium. The French 1st Army will secure the Gembloux gap and the cavalry corps will meet the XVI.Panzerkorps (3.PzD and 4.PzD – Hoepner) at Hannut, 30 km in front of Gembloux, for the first big tank battle of WW2.

1. The German advance in the Ardennes (10th – 12th May 1940)

The Heeresgruppe A (Rundstedt) is launched on 10th May 1940n towards the Meuse River. It will cross Luxembourg, advance in Belgium and France through the Ardennes and reach the Meuse River on 12th May.

4.Armee (Kluge)
o 5.Panzerdivision
o 7.Panzerdivision
o 8.ID
o 12.ID
o 28.ID
o 32.ID
o 62.ID
o 87.ID
o 251.ID
o 263.ID
o 267.ID

12.Armee (List)
o 1.Gebirgsdivision
o 3.ID
o 5.ID
o 16.ID
o 21.ID
o 23.ID
o 24.ID
o 25.ID

16.Armee (Busch)
o 15.ID
o 17.ID
o 34.ID
o 36.ID
o 58.ID
o 68.ID
o 76.ID

Heeresgruppe A reserves
o 6.ID
o 9.ID
o 33.ID

—> The spearhead is composed of the fast troops from Gruppe Kleist (and the 2 Panzerdivisionen of the 4.Armee)

XIV. Armee Korps (mot.) (Wietersheim)
o 13.ID (mot.)
o 29.ID (mot.)

XIX. Panzerkorps (Guderian)
o 1.Panzerdivision
o 2.Panzerdivision
o 10.Panzerdivision
o "Grossdeutschland" infantry regiment

XXXXI. Panzerkorps (Reinhardt)
o 6.Panzerdivision
o 8.Panzerdivision
o 2.ID (mot.)

Heeresgruppe A is therefore composed of 37 German divisions, including 7 armored divisions and 3 motorized infantry divisions. All the attached elements at the level of the army or army corps are not listed here.

Heeresgruppe A contains, among other elements :
- 1762 tanks in the 7 Panzerdivisionen
- About 550 armored cars (392 in the 7 PzD, 78 in the 3 motorized infantry divisions and about 80 in the remaining infantry divisions)
- 6 8.8cm FlaK (Sfl) auf Sd.Kfz.8 (1./s.Pz.Jg.Abt.8, attached to 1.PzD)
- 30 15cm sIG.33 auf PzI
- 18 Sturmgeschütz III
- Probably all the 99 Panzerjäger I (???)
—> 2465 AFVs concentrated against the weak allied forces in the Ardennes

This mighty German force is concentrated against the weak allied forces in the Ardennes :

Belgian army in the Ardennes (general Keyaerts)
1e Division de Chasseurs Ardennais (including 3 T15 and 48 T13 at full strength)
1e Division de Cavalerie (including 8 T15 and 18 T13 at full strength)
1e Guides
2e Lanciers
3e Chasseurs à Cheval
1 motorcycle battalion from VIIth Army Corps
3rd cycle regiment
à 11 T15 light tanks with a 13.2mm HMG and 66 T13 self-propelled AT guns with a 47mm L/33.6 SA-FRC gun, but the Belgian army used them dispersed in groups of 2-4 AFVs

On the front of the French 9th Army
the 61e DI and 102e DIF are deployed in France on the Meuse River
the 5e DIM, 18e DI and 22e DI enters in Belgium to deploy on the Meuse River
the 4e DLC and the 1e DLC, as well as the 3e BS are sent in Belgium to delay the Germans
the 4e DINA will only be engaged on 13-14th May

On the front of the French 2nd Army
the 55e DI and the 3e DINA defend the Meuse River, the 71e DI is deployed between the 55e DI and the 3e DINA on 13th May only
the 5e DLC, 3e DLC and the 1e BC are sent in Belgium to delay the Germans
other troops available in the 2nd Army are the 3e DIC, the 41e DI and the 1e DIC

On the front of the French 3rd Army the 3e DLC supported by the 1e BS enter in Luxembourg

Each of the French DLC includes about 7,800 men, 2,000 horses and 2,100 vehicles :
- 1 divisional HQ
- 1 cavalry brigade of 2 cavalry regiments (horse mounted) (including 8 25mm AT guns)
- 1 light motorized brigade (BLM = Brigade Légère Motorisée) with :
—o a RAM (Régiment d'Auto-Mitrailleuses = armored cars regiment) including 13 Hotchkiss H35 tanks and 12 Panhard 178 (+1 radio car)
—o a RDP (Régiment de Dragons Portés = mechanized cavalry regiment) of 2 battalions including 5 motorcycle platoons, 8 25mm AT guns and 23 AMR33 / AMR35 ZT1
- 1 divisional AT squadron (EDAC = Escadron Divisionnaire Anti-Char) with 12 25mm AT guns
- 1 divisional repair and recovery squadron
- 1 motorized artillery regiment (12 75mm Mle1897 and 12 105mm C with all-terrain tractors)
- 1 motorized AT battery (BDAC = Batterie Divisionnaire Anti-Char) with 8 47mm SA37 AT guns
- 1 motorized engineer company (sapeurs-mineurs company)
- 1 mixed signals company
- 1 HQ horse-drawn transport company
- 1 HQ motor transport company
- 1 divisional quartermaster group
- 1 divisional medical group

Each DLC had therefore :
13x Hotchkiss H35 tanks (generally armed with the 37mm SA18 gun)
23x AMR light tanks armed with 7.5mm or 13.2mm MGs
12x armored cars (25mm SA35 gun)
28x 25mm AT guns
8x 47mm AT guns
24x field guns (the 1e DLC had 24 105mm C field guns)
no AA guns, except 8mm Mle1914 Hotchkiss HMGs used as AAMGs
—> 48 AFVs

As a comparison, a German Panzerdivision had about :
12,500 men
223-315 tanks
56 armored cars
36 field guns (24 105mm and 12 150mm guns)
24 7.5cm leIG (infantry guns)
8 15cm sIG (heavy infantry guns)
51x 3.7cm PaK (AT guns)
9x 8.8cm FlaK (AA/AT guns)
24x 3.7cm and 2.0cm FlaK (AA guns)
6 15cm sIG.33 auf PzI (self-propelled heavy infantry guns) attached to the division
18-27 Panzerjäger I (self-propelled AT guns) attached to the division
sometime 6 StuG III attached to the division
—> 312-410 AFVs

The 5 DLC were spread all over the front and the motorized and horse-mounted units were also often separated for each DLC during the action. Anyway, all these 5 DLC together would represent only 65 Hotchkiss tanks. If all the allied AFVs in the Ardennes are counted there are 240 French + 77 Belgian = 317 AFVs, which have to delay 2465 German AFVs concentrated in the Ardennes (1 vs 8).

End Part 1

Part 2:

1.1 First combats in Luxembourg

The XVI.Armee (Busch) enters in Luxembourg to protect the left flank of the German Panzerdivisionen against the 3e DLC (general Petiet) and the 1e BS (general Jouffrault).

The 1e BS is reinforced by several elements :
- 1 Hotchkiss H35 tank platoon (5 tanks) from the 3e DLC
- several 25mm AT guns from the divisional AT squadron from the 3e DLC
- 61e GRDI
- 25e GRCA
- 1 battery of the 46e RA (4 75mm Mle1897 guns)
- 2 cycle companies provided by the 51e DI and the 58e DI, each with 4 rifle platoons and 1 weapons platoons (2 Hotchkiss Mle1914 MGs, 2 mortars and 1 37mm infantry gun)

Before the war, whole buses of German officers in civilian clothes went to Luxembourg to study the terrain and to observe the French troops on the border. Weapons and ammunition dumps were prepared in Luxembourg to arm pro-German militia and German commandos in civilian clothes were deployed in the cities along the French border.

On 10th May 1940, at 4h30, 25 Fi156 aircrafts transported 125 German commandos (lieutenant Werner Hedderich) in 3 waves. This commando organized sabotages and guerrilla actions to delay the French troops.

Anyway, the French troops moved later as planned and entered only about 6 kilometers deep into Luxembourg before meeting elements of the XVI.Armee. The battle is engaged on a large plateau delimited by a cliff. There are several hills like Zolverknapp, which dominates the plateau at 100-150 meters high. There are numerous woods and villages and industrial buildings around Esch-sur-Alzette.

The first serious encounter for the 3e DLC takes place at Esch-sur-Alzette. German commandos, armed civilians and German infantry are faced. 45 German soldiers are captured.

The 1e BS takes several towns to the Germans like Soleuvre and Niederkorn. There are also heavy combats in Limpach. The French soldiers prove that they are not at all inferior to the enemy. The Moroccan Spahis are difficult to impress and are skilled riflemen. For example, the platoon of lieutenant d'Almont (including 1 officer, 35 men, 3 FM 24/29 LMGs, 1 SMG, 2 VB launcher and 40 horses) has to assault several houses on the road of Sanem, defended by about 30 German soldiers. They advance smoothly and rapidly in small groups, from one cover to an other. The French platoon assaults and captures the enemy position. They have lost 3 horses and 3 men are WIA. On the German side 16 men are KIA and 13 men are POW. One gun (infantry gun or AT gun) was captured as well as several MGs and side-cars.
From 10th to 11th May, the 1e BS had lost :
- 4 officers KIA and 3 officers WIA
- 90 men KIA and 82 men WIA
- 1 25mm AT gun
- 10 motorcycles or side-cars
- 200 horses
During the these 2 days the 1e BS captured about 100 German POWs form 34.ID and 15.ID as well as a significant number of weapons and vehicles.

The German troops are always reinforced by new elements of the XVI.Armee. The French troops stop their progression and will return behind the French lines, covered by the artillery of several fortifications.

The 1e BS rated the German soldiers of the XVI.Armee :
- The infiltrated commandos and armed "civilians" attacked the supply columns, killed liaison officers, spread wrong information etc. but they had little influence on the whole operation. The French Spahis were trained for ambush warfare.
- The German infantry was not of excellent quality and seemed poorly trained, lacking keenness. The German soldiers were generally easily dispersed by the French artillery or infantry fire [of course the German troops of Gruppe Kleist are probably of better quality].
- The German artillery did not follow the German infantry at first. Many German batteries were quickly neutralized by French counter-battery fire, they were probably too self-confident. The French artillery had a far better rate of fire and a better accuracy.
- The German tanks were not seen in Luxembourg, only several armored cars were used. The Germans used a lot of AT mines to delay/hamper the movements of the French vehicles.
- The Luftwaffe was very active. There were many aircrafts, appearing continuously at low level and strafing our units.

1.2 German advance in the Ardennes

— 10th May 1940 —

Operation Niwy (for Nives and Witry) is launched at 5h20 on 10th May 1940 : 400 commandos (10th company and 11th company of the 3rd battalion of the "Grossdeutschland" regiment reinforced by assault engineers) are transported by 98 Fi156 aircrafts (2 waves) behind the Belgian border. The 10th company (lieutenant-colonel Garski) has to be landed near Witry (next to Bodange) in support of the 1.PzD and the 11th company (captain Krüger) has to be landed near Nives in support of the 2.PzD. They have to cut the communication between Neufchâteau, Bastogne, Bodange and Martelange, to block all reinforcements coming from Neufchâteau and to attack the rears of the Belgian troops on the border.
Only 5 aircrafts land at 6h00 near Witry, including Garski. The others planes landed all at Léglise, 15 km south of Nives and 9 km south of Witry. The men manage to join the commander of the battalion at 13h00 only. The second wave arrives as planned at 8h00. At 17h30 the commandos meet the first elements of the 1.PzD after skirmishes with Belgian troops.

During the morning the XIX.Panzerkorps (Guderian) crosses Luxembourg and reaches the Belgian border. About 325 roads and bridges have been mined, destroyed or blocked in the Ardennes by the Belgian troops. Even if they are not defended, they will delay the German troops. Nonetheless, the border is not seriously defended and the German advance will be faster than planned by the French troops.
During the entry in Belgium the combats are rare, the Belgian troops are ordered to move back after having achieved the planned destructions. Nevertheless operation Niwy had unwanted effects since several Belgian troops did not receive the retreat order.

The 1.PzD is on the Sûre River at Bodange and Wisembach (slightly south of Bodange), where the bridges have been destroyed. Auklärung-Abteilung 4, a motorcycle company and the I/1.Schützen Regiment advance at the level of Wisembach, which is taken at 11h30. At Bodange, the 5th company of the 2nd battalion of the 1st Chasseurs Ardennais regiment (capitaine Brocart) fights on the spot since they never received the retreat order. The Belgian troops are entrenched behind the Sûre River and the destroyed bridge. There are AT mines on the banks and barbed wire networks. At the beginning they have a T13 self-propelled AT gun but it is quickly sent to fight against the commandos on the rears. This company will delay the III/1.Schützen Regiment during 6 hours. When it surrenders at 18h00 it has lost 11 KIA (including Brocart) and 20 WIA.
Druing the afternoon, lieutenant Obermaier, from the German commandos, leaves Nives in a requisitioned civilian car to make a reconnaissance on the Neufchâteau-Bastogne road. Near Vaux, the Germans meet a Panhard 178 armored car from the 5e DLC. Thanks to the surprise effect they move back to Nives, followed by the French armored car. The Panhard 178 is damaged by German AT rifles and moves back. At the end of the afternoon 3 Hotchkiss tanks and 3 AMR of the 5e DLC advance towards Nives. The German AT rifle are useless and the Germans retreat. During the night the 2.PzD reaches Nives.

After the first skirmishes, the Belgian troops retreat north / north-west towards Namur. The French cavalry enters in Belgium to delay the Germans, but there is no cooperation between the Belgian and the French. In fact the destructions operated by the Belgian will often hamper the French progression, cutting the reconnaissance elements from the rest of the French units. The Panzerkorps Guderian will have to face the 5e DLC, the 2e DLC, the 1e BC and the 3e BS (more than 1000 Germans AFVs against 96 French AFVs). The 1e DLC and 4e DLC will face the 5.PzD and 7.PzD further north (664 German AFVs against 96 French AFVs).

The reconnaissance elements of the 5e DLC (general Chanoine) meet the first German troops at 10h00 at Petite Rosière, 7 km north-east of Neufchâteau. These first German elements are defeated and the French reconnaissance moves back to Berjeux. A reconnaissance element engages German troops at Wittimont and makes 1 POW. During the afternoon advanced elements engage the German commandos of operation Niwy near Nives. The 5e DLC has reached the planned Neufchâteau-Libramont line on 10th May evening and waits for the 1.PzD and 2.PzD.

The 2e DLC (general Berniquet) is strongly hindered in its movement by the 10.PzD and the "Grossdeutschland" regiment. Contact is established at 9h00 east of Habay-la-Neuve, at 10h00 at Vance and at Arlon. Arlon is held by French reconnaissance troops until 16h30. At Etalle, the Hotchkiss tank squadron makes a successful attack, destroying several German tanks and colonel Föst, commander of the 2nd battalion of the "Grossdeutschland" regiment is KIA. The 2e DLC is also strongly engaged around Poncelle. The French cavalry division moves back to the Jamoignes-Dampicourt line. On 11th May, the 2e DLC will hold its position thanks to the French long range artillery of the area of Sedan. The Luftwaffe reports French armored forces on the moves, whereas the 2e DLC has only 48 AFVs including 13 Hotchkiss tanks. Guderian changes the planned movements and directs he 10.PzD north-west to avoid the French "armored forces". This will hamper the movements of the 1.PzD and 2.PzD.

Further north, the 1e DLC (general d'Arras) and 4e DLC (general Barbe) are ordered to cross the Meuse and to advance in Belgium, where they will meet the 7.PzD and the 5.PzD.

During this time, the French infantry divisions of the 9th Army are moving to the Meuse River, between Dinant and Namur, in Belgium :
- The 5e DIM (general Boucher) has enough trucks to motorize all the elements of the division.
- The 18e DI (general Duffet) has only sufficient trucks to transport 2 battalions. The 7 other battalions will move by foot. This division will hold a front of 21 km (instead of the theoretical 5-7 km) on the Meuse River. The 18e DI has only 21 25mm AT guns (instead of the theoretical 52). 400 horsed as well as 40% of the motor vehicles are also lacking. There are only 3 liaison motorcycles instead of 25. The 18e DI crosses the Belgian border at Riezes.
- The 22e DI (general Beziers-Lafosse) moves to the Signy-l'Abbaye / Givet area completely by foot.

On 10th May nigh, both German and French troops can be satisfied :
- The German plan is successful with the diversion in the Netherlands and in central Belgium. Several Panzerdivisionen have been slightly delayed but not very significantly.
- On the French side, the Dyle-Breda operation is achieved as planned. Only the 2e DLC is a bit late on its schedule after the combats against the 10.PzD. Nonetheless, most of the infantry moving into Belgium on the Meuse River is foot infantry. Unlike the German motorized divisions they will be tired and the divisions will often be incomplete to face the Germans. These French troops will also discover the area they have to defend just before the battle. At least 1 German armoured division has been identified in the Ardennes whereas no important mechanized forces are expected there. It means that motorized German troops will quickly reach the Meuse River.

— 11th May 1940 —

The entry of the French cavalry in Luxembourg (1e BS and 3e DLC) led von Kleist to order Guderian to direct the 10.PzD back towards Longwy. Guderian considers the decision as a mistake; the 1.PzD and 2.PzD alone may have it more difficult to cross the Meuse River in front of Sedan. He manages to convince von Kleist and keeps the 10.PzD. The fact that von Kleist is worried indicates that the French troops in Luxembourg are nonetheless seen as a threat.

The 5e DLC is on the way of the 1.PzD, 2.PzD and 10.PzD.
At 3h00, reconnaissance elements of the 5e DLC are stopped on the Berjeux-Bastogne road by tanks from the 1.PzD and move back. The objective of the 1.PzD is Neufchâteau. Neufchâteau itself is defended by a French detachment and a second detachment is covering the eastern flank. A French artillery battery (4x 105mm C guns) is deployed in Petitvoir, behind Neufchâteau.
At 9h00, the French position is attacked by the 1.PzD with strong air support. 30 German tanks outflank the French troops by the south and reach the artillery battery at Petitvoir. The French field guns open fire at point blank range and 4 tanks are quickly destroyed but the battery is neutralized and submerged (31 gunners are KIA, WIA or POW). The front hold by the 5e DLC is suddenly endangered.
The next city, Bertrix, 7 km behind Petitvoir has to be defended since the French border is only 20 km away. The motorized elements of the 5e DLC are sent to Bertrix at 10h00 and the engineers begin their destructions in the area.
At 12h00, confronted to a strong German pressure, the 5e DLC moves back to the Semois (also written Semoy) River while fighting. Several troops are nonetheless encircled like one squadron of the 11e RC (Régiment de Cuirassiers – horse mounted cavalry). They will surrender on 17th May and only few of these men will manage to join the French lines again on 4th June.
General Chanoine, commander of the 5e DLC, knows that his division is in no way strong enough to stop the German Panzerdivisionen. The 5e DLC defends the city of Bouillon on the Semois River.

The 1e DLC and 4e DLC will have to face the 7.PzD and the 5.PzD.
The 1e DLC is deployed west of Dinant and crosses the Meuse River once the first infantry reinforcement are deploying in Belgium on the Meuse River. The 1e DLC is sent to the l'Homme (also written Lomme) stream. In the evening, because of the retreating 5e DLC, the 1e DLC (and the 1e BS between the 1e DLC and the 5e DLC) is also forced to move back behind the French infantry on the Meuse River.
The 4e DLC is north of the 1e DLC. Its 14e BLM crosses the Meuse River at 1h00 and moves to the Ourthe River, between Durbuy and Marche. The 4e RAM is attacked by numerous German tanks at 13h00 and moves back. The armoured cars regiment supported by the Hotchkiss tanks squadron counter-attacks and the battle lasts until the end of the day. The eastern part of Marche is hold by the Germans and the western part by the French troops. The 14e RDP is deployed further north, between Marche and Baillonvuille. The MG squadron (capitaine Feuillatre) destroys a German motorcycle platoon. On the evening the 4e DLC has reached the planned line, only the situation in Marche remains uncertain.

During this time the infantry of the 9th Army is entering in Belgium to deploy on the Meuse River.
- The 5e DIM is fully deployed at night and defends a front of 16 km (instead of the theoretical 5-7 km). It will face the 5.PzD.
- Only the first elements of the 18e DI are slowly arriving on the Meuse River. The engineers destroy the bridges. The division has to defend a front of 21 km between Houx and Hastière. It will face the 7.PzD and the 5.PzD.
- Only the first elements of the 22e DI are deploying on the Meuse River on 11th May.
In fact, the 18e DI and the 22e DI cannot be completely deployed on the Meuse River before the 14th May. Therefore incomplete divisions and troops exhausted after a long march will face the powerful Panzerdivisionen on 13th May.

On 11th May night, general Gamelin in Vincennes lacks information and good communications with most of the troops on the first line. General Georges, in charge of the north-eastern area, is roughly in the same situation. The hierarchy and the communications are too intricate and too slow for the fast moving German enemy.
The XIX.Panzerkorps reached Bouillon on the Semois River but cannot immediately seize the city, which is defended by retreating elements of the 5e DLC and 2 companies of the I/295e RI (55e DI), which have achieved a 20 km march to reach Bouillon. The 2 bridges are blown after the last troops of the 5e DLC have crossed the river.

End Part 2

Part 3:

— 12th May 1940 —

The 1.Schützen Regiment (1.PzD) assaults Bouillon at 7h45. The 2 companies of the 295e RI are reinforced by a battalion of the 15e RDP and horse-mounted squadrons from the 12e GRCA.

Further west, at Mouzaive, the 1.PzD finds a ford for its tanks. Only weak elements of the 3e BS are defending the area of Mouzaive. The 2.PzD crosses the Semois at Vresse.

At 11h00, Bouillon is abandoned by the French troops after violent combats. At 19h00 the Germans have achieved an engineer bridge. The 5e DLC establishes a new line along the first French fore posts and fortified houses, behind the French border but before the Meuse River. The 1.PzD will for example meet the "Saint-Menges" fortified house, where 1 Panzer I and 1 Panzer IV are knocked out. The first elements of the 1.PzD reach the town of Saint-Menges at 13h30 and the Meuse River north of Sedan at 17h15 on 12th May.

The French fortified houses are located close to the border and on the edge of towns bordering Germany, they have to control all approaches. They were designed to provide early warning of a potential enemy attack. Their main mission is to activate explosive charges to destroy or block accesses, roads, bridges etc. and to warn the rear lines (direct telephone line, liaison motorcycle).

Each of the fortified house in the Ardennes consists in :
- a bunker surmounted by a house and surrounded by a barbed wire fence (or two bunkers side by side with a house in other areas)
- an armored barrier on the road, manned from inside the bunker
- 100x AT mines
- 20x AT stakes or "piquets Ollivier" (an improvised AT mine using a 3.5kg explosive charge or an old 120mm artillery shell (4.2kg explosive) dug vertically in the ground, with a 1m stake attached to the explosive charge or fuze)
- barbed wire networks

6 soldiers inside the bunker equipped with :
- 1x 37mm AT gun
- 2-4x FM 24/29 LMGs
- 2x VB launchers (rifle grenade)
- crenels for the small arms (rifles, carbines)
- 2x "goulotte lance-grenade" (a very close defense device to eject defensive F1 hand grenades around the bunker without exposing the soldiers)
- 1x liaison motorcycle

The rearguards of the 5e DLC cross the Meuse River at Sedan between 17h00 and 18h00. All the bridges are blown away. The first elements of the 10.PzD reach Sedan at 21h00.

On 12th May, the first German elements reach the Meuse River at the level of Dinant, Monthermé and Sedan. All the French cavalry units moves back behind the French infantry on the Meuse River :
- The 3e BS crosses the Meuse between 6h00 and 9h00 at Charleville-Mézières
- The 1e DLC crosses the Meuse at 13h00 at Dinant. The retreat of the 1e DLC is difficult since the division is in contact with the 7.PzD and several 25mm AT guns are sacrificed to protect the retreat. They knock out a good number of German tanks.
- Etc.

The French infantry line on the Meuse River in Belgium is still very weak and the situation is therefore rather critical. Many battalions have not reached the Meuse River yet and even for complete infantry divisions the front to defend is 3 to 4 times larger than the theoretical 5-7 km planned for a division. To add to these issues, the river itself is not especially difficult to cross but very difficult to defend and there are many meanders creating blind spots.

On 12th May, the 18e DI has deployed 5 battalions out of 9 and roughly no artillery to defend a front of 21 km. The support of elements of the 1e DLC is by far insufficient. The 22e DI on its side is rather completely arrived on 12th May but not very well deployed. Only the 5e DIM is really ready for combat.

The French cavalry has been fighting for 3 days and the French infantry for several hours but general Gamelin is still not aware of the gravity of the situation. The German tanks are signalled by the French cavalry and they are spotted by the French Air Force (heading for Bouillon on 11th May and in Bouillon on 12th May) but the various piece of information did not reach the high command and/or were not taken into consideration. In fact the French Air Force had actually found the 4 penetration axis of Herresgruppe A through Luxembourg and Belgium, but at the high command a colonel told them "you don't know what a tank is, they cannot cross the Ardennes".

If, as wanted by general Huntzinger, the French cavalry would have remained in the Semois River to establish a defensive line instead of pushing deeper in Belgium, the German advance would probably have been much more delayed. Nevertheless, all the French cavalry units had not the sufficient strength to stop the 7 German armored divisions.

2. The combats on the Meuse River (13th – 15th May 1940)

On the Meuse River, 7 French infantry divisions (5e DIM, 18e DI, 22e DI, 61e DI, 102e DIF, 55e DI and 71e DI) largely incomplete and lacking armament and equipments have to defend an overstretched front, from Houx to Sedan. Each French division has to defend a 15-30 km front, whereas an infantry division should theoretically defend a 5-7 km front only. On 13th May, they will have to face 7 Panzerdivisionen (1762 tanks), 3 motorized infantry division and the elite "Grossdeutschland" regiment. These 10 German divisions are followed by 26 infantry divisions and 1 mountain infantry division. The German assault is supported by more than 1500 aircrafts concentrated on a small area during hours. These two concentrations (tanks and aircrafts) are a first time in History. The French troops can only rely on very insufficient and largely unachieved fortifications. The Maginot Line by itself is indeed stopping at the border with the Luxembourg.

— SEDAN AREA —

The main German attack will be sustained at Sedan by the incomplete 55e DI, a reserve division, which has to face the "Grossdeutschland" regiment, the 1.PzD, the 2.PzD and the 10.PzD.

The 55e DI is composed of :
213e RI (not on the frontline)
295e RI (incomplete – the 1st battalion was destroyed in Bouillon)
331e RI

The 71e DI on its right is composed of :
120e RI
205e RI (not on the frontline)
246e RI

These divisions have no AA guns (only MGs used in AA role) and have respectively only 12 and 8 AT guns (instead of 62) to defend a front of about 25-30 km per division. There is also a big lack of ammunition hand grenades. The men are 29-40 years old and they lack training. Since 1939 these men were rather used for labor/pioneer tasks. The 213e RI and 205e RI are far on the rears (the 213e RI is in La Neuville-a-Maire and the 205e RI is next to Yoncq). The 295e RI has been reduced, one battalion having roughly been lost in Bouillon. Therefore only 4 reduced regiments are on the front to defend the Meuse River. The 71e DI is also roughly devoid of divisional artillery, which has been included in the 9th Army corps.

The area of Sedan itself is only defended by 6 companies of the 147e RIF (fortress infantry regiment), 3 companies of the 295e RI (55e DI) and 6 companies of the 331e RI (55e DI). The 1st company of the 11e BM (11th MG battalion) is reinforcing the position south of Donchéry. These 16 French companies, roughly the equivalent of 1 strong regiment and weak fortifications will have to face the concentrated assaults of the 1.PzD reinforced by the "Grossdeutschland" elite infantry regiment, the 2.PzD and the 10.PzD. The German superiority in Sedan is simply astonishing.

On the south-western bank of the Meuse River there are several fortifications but most of them are not achieved, they often lack armament, doors or adequate crenels which have to be completed by sand bags. The fortifications are armed only with FM 24/29 LMGs, Mle1914 Hotchkiss HMGs, very few 25mm Mle1934 guns and 37mm TR16 infantry guns. There are also several dismountable Mle1935 turrets armed with a Mle1914 Hotchkiss MG and generally equipped with a camouflage/anti grenade nest around the turret (the MG barrel itself is protected by armor). There are also several open emplacements for Mle1914 Hotchkiss MGs, a few 81mm Stokes-Brandt and Brandt Mle1927/1931 mortars, several former Navy 65mm guns and a few 75mm Mle1897 guns more on the rear.
There are also AT mines but far less than expected. The French doctrine plans the deployment of 1370 mines/km on 1 row or 2740 mines/km on 2 staggered rows. The mines are placed in linear groups of 5 on a length of 2.50m, the groups being separated by 1.40m gaps. At Sedan thousands of AT mines had been laid months before the campaign. Unfortunately they were reported to have been adversely affected by damp (or removed because of the rain) and so were dug up to be fixed or preserved for later use. Sadly, time did not permit them to be laid again, which was kind of unfortunate. Only about 2000 AT mines and an unknown number of AP mines were deployed on a total of only about 70 km all along the frontline. As a comparison, Rommel used about 500,000 AT mines on 70 km in El Alamein in 1942. The 55e DI for example had still 422 AT mines stored in a dump but they were not used. The officers were concentrated on trying to improve the unachieved fortifications, trenches and foxholes for the troops.

On 12th May 1940, the French HQ is still convinced that the main German attack is located in Belgium and in the Netherlands. The Germans are also thought to need about 1 week to concentrate enough artillery and to prepare the crossing of the Meuse River. But, the Germans will initially replace the lack of artillery by the biggest air support concentration of History at this time.

On 13th May, the Luftwaffe placed 61% of its total operational air assets at the disposal of Gruppe Kleist for the assault on the Meuse River. The following numbers are given by Rothbrust :
- 420 Messerschmitt Me109
- 180 Messerschmitt Me110
- 270 Junkers Ju87
- 900 Heinkel He111, Dornier Do17 and Junkers Ju88 bombers
= 1770 aircrafts (1170 bombers and 600 fighters)

Never before were so many bombers concentrated on such a small area. Concentrated over the small Sedan sector alone there are 51% of the aircrafts at the disposal of Gruppe Kleist :
- 280 Messerschmitt Me109
- 90 Messerschmitt Me110
- 180 Junkers Ju87
- 360 Heinkel He111, Dornier Do17 and Junkers Ju88 bombers
= 910 aircrafts (540 bombers and 370 fighters)

These 540 bombers escorted by 370 fighters are concentrated during 4 hours over the single 55e DI. The Luftwaffe targets systematically the unachieved bunkers, the artillery positions, the communication and command posts. It is therefore roughly without artillery support that the weak French first line will have to stop the German assault. Each French battery entering in action is silenced by the Luftwaffe.
During 4 hours, the French troops are heavily bombed. The psychological shock of this air attack is even stronger than for the first use of combat gas during WW1 according to several testimonies. Heavy bombings occur every 20 minutes on the men hidden in their trenches. The 55e DI is devoid of AA weapons and unable to return fire. All the communication by telephone lines between the first lines and the rear are cut. Battalions, companies and platoons are roughly isolated.

During these 4 hours of bombing, no allied fighter appeared to stop the German aircrafts despite support had been asked from the beginning, adding to the bad effect on the morale. All the allied fighters are too busy in other areas.
The French gunners remain hidden in their foxholes and trenches during the bombings. The French infantry is also pinned down, cut from the others, roughly deaf but also blind. The banks of the Meuse River have disappeared in the dust of the explosions and later in the German smoke screen just before the German assaults.

During the bombings the German troops deploy for the attack, without being worried about the French artillery. Ther German assault is launched on 13th May at 15h00 (French time) :
- 2.PzD (general Veiel) at Donchéry
- 1.PzD (general Kirchner) + "Grossdeutschland" regiment for the main effort at Gaulier
- 10.PzD (general Schaal) at Wadelincourt

The available German artillery, the German AA artillery (including 8.8cm FlaK), AT artillery and the German tanks fire from the opposite bank and replace the Luftwaffe to support the crossing. The Luftwaffe targets then the rear lines (HQ, artillery positions, dumps, cross-roads, rail-roads etc.), which will be bombed all day long while the first lines will face the German assault troops crossing the Meuse River on inflatable boats.

The crossing of the 2.PzD is an immediate failure. The Germans in front of Donchéry sustain at first heavy losses and the crossing is defeated because of the intense French MG fire. At 17h30, one group (12 guns) of the 45e RA opens fire on the 2.PzD, which is really unlucky : unable to cross the river and then shelled rather intensively. The 2.PzD will only begin to cross the Meuse River around 22h00, after the successes of the 1.PzD at Sedan itself.

Concerning the 10.PzD, only 2 platoons (86.IR) and several engineers manage to cross the river. They seize by surprise 2 French fore-posts (bunker 220 and fore-post next to the destroyed railroad bridge). The French crews (including WIA) are captured and half of them are executed. Nonetheless, these German platoons are roughly blocked along the bank. They are pinned down and quickly out of ammunition. The crossing point of the 10.PzD has been spotted by a French forward observer ordering a well adjusted artillery fire. The French artillery manages to block the German at 300m from the bank on their side and destroys the river crossing equipments of the 69.IR. Only at the end of the afternoon more German troops will reinforce the 2 first platoons. The elements of the 10.PzD will then benefit from the breakthrough of the 1.PzD and advance about 2 km in the French lines. They meet the "Grossdeutschland" regiment around 18h00 at Wadelincourt.

The 1.PzD and the "Grossdeutschland" regiment are concentrated on a front of less than 2 km around Gaulier, between Glaire and Torcy (eastern part of Sedan). Just before the assault, a Nebelwerfer / artillery unit attached to the 1.PzD creates and maintains 2 smoke screens : one at the level of the Glaire-Sedan road and one more on the rear, along the railroad.
The first assault wave consists in 2 battalions of the 1.Schützen Regiment and 2 battalions of the "Grossdeutschland" regiment for a total of about 2,400 men. To face them on the "French" bank there are only 2 rifle platoons and between them only 4 men with 2 LMGs, for a total of 64 men.
There 64 men are part of the 2 French companies (7th company of the II/147e RIF, capitaine Cordier and 6th company of the II/295e RI, capitaine Auzas) defending alone the area between the Meuse River and the Bellevue-Wadelincourt line. About 300 French soldiers in the first lines have to face the 2,400 Germans of the first assault wave.
The "German" bank is also higher than the "French" bank. The German tanks and guns on the opposite bank can fire directly on the French troops and rare bunkers. Just before the assault, a bunker at Torcy and a blockhouse at Glaire are neutralized, as well as the 2 LMGs between the 2 French platoons. Only the bunker at Torcy will fire several MG bursts. The German crossing is not hampered by the French artillery. To conquer the French positions defended by these 300 French soldiers, the German assault troops will nonetheless need 2h30 (until 17h30).
Many little infiltrations occur, benefiting from the shock and the destruction resulting from the air attacks. Each time a resistance is met the German troops avoid it and go on. Many French positions, cut from the others, are attacked from the rear.
At 17h30, the 1.PzD reinforced by the "Grossdeutschland" regiment is the single division achieving a significant breakthrough. The 4 battalions of the first German wave are reinforced by 3 extra battalions (1 of the 1.PzD and 2 of the "Grossdeutschland" regiment).
After the neutralization of the 2 French companies, these 7 German infantry battalions will face 3 French companies around Fresnois, in front of hill 247 and south of Wadelincourt. The German troops at Wadelincourt are also reinforced by the first elements of the 10.PzD. The French troops are moving back to the northern edge of the hilly woods of La Marfée. Frenois itself is taken around 19h00.
The German remains very cautious in front of the La Marfée woods. A French 25mm AT gun platoon whose guns are towed by Renault UE tractor are reinforcing the French troops but immediately sent back to the rear since there are no German tanks. The only other tanks present in these woods are 4 disarmed Renault FT17 tanks used as pioneer tractors. The Germans may have thought that there are French tanks and it could explain the extreme and amazing caution in front of a position held by only 100 French soldiers.
The infantry of the 1.PzD reaches the south of Donchéry at 22h00 and enables the crossing of the first light elements of the 2.PzD. At 23h00, 2 German companies of the 1.PzD reach Cheveuges and advance on the road next to Chéhéry, reaching the most advanced positions of the German breakthrough.

During the same time, at 18h30 capitaine Fouques commanding artillery batteries from the 169e RAF north of Chaumont (south of the La Marfée woods), phones to the commander of the regiment (lieutenant-colonel Dourzal) and reports gunfire at 500m of his position and the possibility of the presence of French tanks. It remains possible that he thought that there were French tanks because of the same reason than the Germans (Renault UE or Renault FT17 tractors in the woods) or simply because he was too nervous. K.H. Frieser does not think that the presence of the Renault UE tractors of the AT platoon corresponds with the time frame but he seems not aware of the presence of the Renault FT17 in these woods. At 18h45, lieutenant-colonel Dourzal phones to colonel Poncelet, commanding all the artillery of the area. Poncelet asks for extra information but Dourzal keeps saying that he would be encircled in the next 5 minutes and confirms the presence of German tanks. Poncelet orders then the retreat of the French artillery units.
On the first lines the companies of the 55e DI and of the 147e RIF are still fighting desperately but the artillery units (especially the artillery from the Army Corps but also from the 55e DI and 71e DI) will flee away. The rumours of the presence of German tanks near Bulson (despite the fact that no single German tank has actually crossed the Meuse River) will cause what is known as the "Bulson panic".
While the first lines are still fighting courageously in a desperate situation, the rear troops are abandoning their position in panic. The HQ of the 55e DI follows the movement, without being able to check the information. The panic spreads in the rear lines, many men abandoning their weapons. 2 artillery groups of the 55e DI and 5 heavy artillery groups of the Army Corps abandon and/or scuttle their gun before retreating.
This event is often generalized to caricature the whole 1940 French army. Colonel Poncelet will commit suicide a few hours later. This courageous officer had fought during WW1 and felt responsible for the mess, but the actual responsible officers are capitaine Fouques and lieutenant-colonel Dourzal.
All the retreating artillery units with many horse-drawn wagons, ammunition trailers, guns etc. will congest the trails, lanes and the single national road from Sedan to Vouziers. Added to the civilian refugees, these men will considerably hamper the movement of other French units moving to counter-attack the German breakthrough.

General Gamelin in the French high-command at Vincennes receives only at 23h45 the first message indicating that the Germans have crossed the Meuse River !

Guderian is satisfied of having crossed the Meuse River but the German high command is a bit angry. The crossing happened indeed east of the Ardennes canal instead of west of the canal as ordered. Guderian has refused to follow the orders because the planned area contained more open terrain and the German troops would have been easily spotted and more endangered. Von Kleist later recognized that Guderian made the good choice.
On 13th May evening, except very few still resisting French platoons in the first lines, the 55e DI has been pushed back at the level of the La Marfée heights.

The Germans have established a 6 km wide and 3 km deep bridgehead. It is an important German success, but most of the infantry, all the vehicles and the heavy armament of the XIX.Panzerkorps are still on the north-eastern bank of the Meuse River :
- 787 tanks
- 168 armored cars
- 18 15cm sIG.33 auf PzI
- 6 8.8cm FlaK (Sfl) Sd.Kfz.8
- all the attached StuG III (at least 6 of Sturmgeschütz-Batterie 640 included in the "Grossdeutschland" IR)
- all the attached Panzerjäger I (at least Panzerjäger Abteilung 521 with 18 Panzerjäger I, attached to 10.PzD)
- all the artillery and 8.8cm FlaK

More than 1000 AFVs are in front of Sedan itself but have not yet crossed the river. Despite the omnipresent Luftwaffe, a quick and strong French counter-attack would still be able to close the door to the German army.

End Part 3

Part 4:

— DINANT AND HOUX AREA —

The 7.PzD and 5.PzD (540 tanks, 112 armored cars and 12 15cm sIG.33 auf PzI) have to cross the Meuse River in the area of Dinant (7.PzD) and Houx (5.PzD). Elements of the 1e DLC and of the 4e DLC are retreating behind the French lines in that area.

The 5e DIM has to defend a front of 16 km from Cave to Anhée :
- From Cave to Hun : 3e RI supported by 2 artillery groups (24 field guns)
- From Hun to Anhée : 129e RI supported by 2 artillery groups (24 field guns)
- Reserves : incomplete 39e RI (the second battalion is attached to the 18e DI)
- Reinforcements : 2 artillery groups (24 field guns) of the 77e RATTT (4e DLC)
66% of the automatic weapons are on the heights and 33% directly on the banks. Because of the many blind spots the artillery forward observers are all deployed along the bank.

The 18e DI has only 55% of its infantry on 13th May, 4 battalions out of 9 are still lacking and the whole divisions has only 21 AT guns. The division has to defend a front of 21 km between Houx and Hastière :
- At Houx and around Grange : the II/39e RI (5e DIM) makes liaison with the 5e DIM
- From Grange to Bouvignes : 2 battalions of the 66e RI
- Around Dinant : 2 battalions of the 77e RI
- South of Dinant : 1 battalion of the 125e RI
- Reserves : only 2 infantry companies
- Reinforcements : elements of the 1e DLC (the Hotchkiss H35 tank squadron, 2 artillery groups of the 75e RATTT and parts of the 5e RDP (motorized infantry), 19e RD (horse-mounted cavalry) and 1e RC(horse-mounted cavalry))
Even reinforced by elements of the 1e DLC, the 18e DI is too weak to stop a Panzerdivision.

The 7.PzD is opposed to the 18e DI. The 5.PzD is attacking the 5e DIM and the hinge between the 5e DIM and the 18e DI. All the bridges have been blown away when the first German AFVs where trying to cross them but a small lock on both sides of a small island in middle of the Meuse River is still intact. This lock is slightly south of Houx and just at the hinge of the 2 French divisions. If it had been blown away it would have created fords upstream.
Already during the 12th-13th May night, around 22h00 – 23h00, infantry elements of the Aufklärung Abteilung 8 (5.PzD) have crossed the Meuse River thanks to this lock and its small 1-meter wide footbridge. The 5.PzD is therefore the very first German unit having crossed the Meuse River. At 1h00 on 13th May these German troops are spotted. The French tries to warn general Corap (commander of the 9th Army) but all the attempts remain unsuccessful. A liaison manages to inform the general but at 16h30 only !
During all the night and a big part of the 13th May morning the II/39e RI fights alone against 3 German infantry battalions of the 5.PzD before being destroyed.
At 6h00 the small elements of the Aufklärung Abteilung 8 are reinforced by infantry battalions of the 5.PzD. The French artillery fires on all the accesses and exits of the lock. The footbridge is sprayed with LMG bullets from the few French troops in front of the lock. The German troops move to the house of the ford keeper and on the small islands, which hides their movements, by groups of 5 men separated by 100m gaps. One by one they try then to cross the foorbridge. The French LMGs are neutralized by the fire of the German artillery and tanks. At 10h00 about 1 German infantry company has managed to cross the lock with 10% losses.
The 1e GRDIm (reconnaissance group of the 5e DIM) is sent to the area between Haut-le-Wastia and Grange area to maintain the liaison with the 18e DI (about 13 Panhard 178, 12 Citroën-Kégresse P16 Mle1929, 4 AMR33/35s, 15 side-cars, 2 cars, 2 trucks, 4 light trucks, 24 FM 24/29 LMGs, 12 Hotchkiss Mle1914 MMGs, 2 60mm mortars and 4 25mm AT guns at full strength).
The German bridgehead (5.PzD) is still very weak and contains only infantry troops. The combats around Houx and Anhée involve mainly the 5e DIM. The battle around Haut-le-Wastia lasts all the day. The 5.PzD looses 24 KIA (including 2 officers) and 110 WIA (including 11 officers).

During the same time the 18e DI is mainly facing the 7.PzD. South of this bridgehead (5.PzD), the 66e RI is still holding the Hontoir farm, Sommière and Bouvignes. At the beginning of the afternoon, the 18e DI is ordered to counter-attack but with what ? There are not enough troops to defend the frontline which is attacked everywhere by the Germans of the 7.PzD.
A very violent battle opposes the 77e RI (18e DI) which will block the 7.PzD in front of Dinant and Bouvignes all the day long. The war diary of the 7.PzD gives a better view of the events unlike the memories of Rommel which are always tainted by self-advertisement. All the crossing attempts of the 7.PzD in front of Dinant are at first defeated. Unlike the 1.PzD at Sedan the 7.PzD has no Nebelwerfer unit to create smoke screens. Fire is set to several houses to make smoke. During several hours the crossing remains impossible and finally the motorcycle battalion of the 7.PzD is ordered to use the bridgehead of the 5.PzD at Houx to cross the Meuse River.
At the end of the day, only very small infantry elements of the 7.PzD have managed to cross the Meuse River in front of Dinant and Bouvignes. During the night 15 Panzer I and Panzer II reinforce the small bridgeheads thanks to barges. On 13th May the 7.PzD has lost 60 KIA (including 4 officers) and 222 WIA (including 15 officers). The 4 last infantry battalions of the 18e DI will finally arrive exhausted during the 13-14th May night.

On 14th May, the bridgeheads of both the 5.PzD and the 7.PzD are still very small. The 5.PzD has built 2 engineer bridges but one bridge is lost when a medium tank tries to cross it and ends in the river. The remaining bridge enables only the crossing of light tanks (Panzer I and Panzer II).
A French counter-attack is ordered against Houx with :
- I/39e RI
- III/39e RI
- 3/6e BCC (13 Renault R35 tanks)
- artillery support provided by the 18e DI

The infantry battalions have first to walk 14 km before reaching the departure line and they are immediately attacked by the Luftwaffe. The attack was planned at 18h00 but at 20h00 only several troops of the infantry battalions are ready. Nonetheless, the artillery preparation begins at 19h50 and at 20h00 the Renault R35 tanks begin the attack without infantry support.
The French tanks advance among the German troops and cross the whole bridgehead without losses. As they appear, hundreds of Germans surrender but the infantry is not following to capture them. After nightfall, the French tanks have to move back, pushing only several POWs in front of them. During the night more German tanks cross the Meuse River.

The town of Haut-le-Wastia is a strategic position, dominating the German bridgehead of Houx. A French counter-attack is launched on 14th May at 5h30 to seize the town. The troops involved are :
- The weapons squadron of capitaine Feuillatre (14e RDP, 1e DLC) with 8 Hotchkiss MGs, 4 81mm Brandt mortars and 4 25mm AT guns (if at full strength) provides the fire support protecting the advancing troops. There is no artillery support
- 1 squadron of the II/14e RDP attacks the north-east of the town
- Elements of the 1e GRDIm (3 AMR, 5 AMC P16 Mle1929 and 1 motorcycle platoon as foot infantry) attack on the north of the town
- The Hotchkiss H35 squadron from the 4e RAM (1e DLC) is also mentioned by several sources as taking part to the attack north of the town
- 2 companies of the II/129e RI attack the south of the town
[the H35 tanks are not always mentioned and the number of armored cars is varying from source to source]

The squadron of the II/14e RDP reaches the town and the elements of the 1e GRDIm outflank the German troops by the north but the 2 companies of the II/129e RI doesn't move at all for an unknown reason and seem not to have received the order to attack.

The town is seized by the French troops (roughly 2 infantry companies) after violent house by house combats. The AMC P16 Mle1929 armored cars fire in the windows of the occupied houses with their 37mm SA18 gun. In the twon, 46 men and 1 officer from the 7.PzD are taken POWs (other sources indicate troops from the 5.PzD but the French reports elements of the 7.PzD, which is possible since the motorcycle battalion of the 7.PzD has joined the bridgehead of the 5.PzD). The Germans flee, abandoning many weapons. Several captured MGs are used to fire on the retreating Germans. One 3.7cm PaK is towed by men towards the town but it is neutralized by the fire of the MG and the gun is abandoned. Nonetheless, the successful French troops of the 1e DLC and of 1e GRDIm will not be able to hold the town very long. The increasing intervention of German tanks changes the situation in Haut-le-Wastia. One French 25mm AT gun knocks out 7 German tanks but the numerous German tanks and the omnipresent Luftwaffe defeat the French troops, which are forced to move back.

The strategic situation is becoming worse and worse after the breakthrough at Sedan. On 13th May, the 18e DI managed to defeat the assaults of the 7.PzD but on 14th May the front held by the division is collapsing because of the German tanks which crossed the Meuse River. The 77e RI and 125e RI are dislocated and move back while fighting. On 14th May morning, the 7.PzD achieves a breakthrough in the area defended by the 18e DI. Panzer Regiment 25 (7.PzD) attacks Onhaye (about 5 km south of Haut-Le-Wastia) from the west but the attack stops due to heavy French AT and artillery fire. Several German tanks are destroyed. Rommel is the first line in a Panzer III command tank requests air support to take out the enemy AT and artillery positions. The tank of the commander of the 7.PzD is knocked out by an AT gun and Rommel is WIA. The 13 Renault R35 tanks (3/6e BCC) supporting the 18e DI are dispersed in blockades on the roads instead of being used grouped against the German tank regiment. Anyway with the growing number of German tanks crossing the Meuse River they would probably not have been able to change the situation especially not with their 37mm SA18 guns.

On 14th May, after a strong resistance, the 18e DI is defeated and its front is broken. North of the 18e DI, 5e DIM is still holding its position and the 22e DI. South of the 18e DI, the 22e DI is under heavy German pressure but is still holding its position.

The 9th Army engages the 4e DINA (general Sancelme) and the 1e DCR (general Bruneau), recently detached in a hurry from the 1st Army. The 4e DINA begins to move from Trélon to the Meuse River in Belgium on 12th May. It is not a motorized unit. On 14th May morning the division is still moving to the front. Initially intended to counter-attack on 15th May with the 1e DCR, the 4e DINA is ordered to create a new line at the level of Philippeville and to regroup the retreating elements of the 18e DI and 22e DI. The 4e DINA is the last reserve of the 9th Army and will be engaged in small groups, as they arrive on the planned frontline, without being able to create a continuous front.
Both the 4e DINA and the 1e DCR will have to fulfil a mission of sacrifice in a defensive battle against the 5.PzD and the 7.PzD. On 15th May both divisions are dispersed and just arriving in their planned deployment areas. The 1e DCR is just arriving in the area of Flavion about 15 km west of Dinant. The tanks are out of fuel and the unit is not aware of the position or the type of the enemy units. The 4e DINA has just 1 regiment around Philippeville some 12 km south-west of Flavion to face the tanks of 7.PzD avoiding the 1e DCR.

— MONTHERME AREA — (waiting for more details about the artillery for this chapter)

On 14th May evening the 1.PzD, 2.PzD and 10.PzD have established a bridgehead in Sedan. The 7.PzD and 5.PzD have created a bridgehead in the area of Dinant and Houx but the 6.PzD and 8.PzD are still unable to exploit the bridgehead at Monthermé.

The area of Monthermé, north-west of Sedan, is defended by the 102e DIF (general Portzert), which has to defend a linear front of about 40 km. This fortress infantry division is roughly devoid of fortifications. The town of Monthermé itself is located on a small isthmus, dominated by the heights of the opposite bank and difficult to defend. The 102e DIF is composed of :
- 148e RIF (fortress infantry regiment)
- 52e DBMC (colonial MG half-brigade)
- 42e DBMC (colonial MG half-brigade)
- The 3e BM (MG battalion) is attached to the division

The 42e DBMC (lieutenant-colonel de Pinsun) is defending a front of about 25 km with only 3,200 men, against the 6.PzD (about 16,000 men, 223 tanks and 56 armored cars) which is followed by the 8.PzD (about 16,000 men, 212 tanks and 56 armored cars). This regiment-sized unit is composed of 2,800 French and 400 Madagascan soldiers, organized in 2 battalions. Each battalion consists in 3 MG companies and 1 rifle company. The single available AT means are 6 25mm AT guns and blockades. Each company is also supported by 4 old Stokes-Brandt 81mm mortars. The II/42e DBMC (the second battalion) is defending the isthmus and the town of Monthermé itself. This battalion will face roughly alone the German attack and stop it during 2 days.
The artillery support attached to the 42e DBMC consists only in 8 150mm T Fabry trench mortars (2 bateries) from WW1. There are also 8 small bunkers and 4 dismountable turrets Mle1935 and Mle1937 armed with a Mle1914 Hotchkiss MG. The positions are completed by field emplacements, foxholes, trenches and barbed wire networks.
The II/42e DBMC can also be supported by artillery units deployed in the area of Secheval (where is also the
HQ of lieutenant-colonel de Pinsun), apparently four 155mm Saint-Chamond and four 120mm De Bange Mle1877 guns from the 160e RAP.

The 6.PzD, supported by elements of the 8.PzD, is engaged against Monthermé on 13th May 1940. The assault is entrusted to the 3rd Schützen battalion. One German battalion is therefore opposed to one French battalion in Monthermé. The French are behind a river, but in a position dominated by the other bank. The German battalion is supported by the engineer battalion of the 6.PzD for its crossing. It is also strongly supported by the Luftwaffe and by direct fire from the German 11th tank regiment, as well as all kinds of AA guns, AT guns and MGs on the opposite bank.
The French troops deployed on the bank start to panic in front of the huge German armada and the first German advances are rather successful. The men of the II/42e DBMC spot 176 various vehicles in front of them and ask for artillery support. After 2 hours of combat and several French counter-attacks, a small German bridgehead is established. The Germans will nonetheless need 2 days to defeat the French defense, unable to enlarge their tiny bridgehead despite a huge superiority.
During the 13th-14th May night, 2 battalions from the 248e RI are moving from Revin, north-west of
Monthermé, to reinforce the French troops.

On 14th May, a second German infantry battalion reinforces the first one. A renewed attack is launched at 6h00 but they are blocked by several French platoons led by capitaine Villard. At 14h30, a new German assault is defeated by the intervention of 1 company of the 248e RI in reinforcement. At Dinant and Sedan the bridgeheads are being enlarged during the 14th May, but at Monthermé 2 armored divisions are still blocked by roughly 1 infantry regiment.
At 16h00, general Kempf orders a new all-out assault supported by the Luftwaffe but the attack is finally postponed. The Germans wait for the reinforcement of a 3rd infantry battalion and 1 tank battalion in the bridgehead. These 4 battalions are engaged against a single French infantry battalion.
On 14th May evening between 18h15 and 19h30 there is a period of confusion and panic in the French lines. Two French platoons are ordered to move back under the repeated German attacks to prevent encirclement. The 150mm trench mortars are finally out of ammunition, the mortars are scuttled and the crews are used as infantry and move back too. Lieutenant Bosredon is isolated at the left of the road and fights on the spot with his men deployed in hedgehog. The Germans could have taken profit from the retreat of the 2 French platoons to definitely pierce the French lines but apparently they were too exhausted or they didn't notice it. The continuous front is later re-established thanks to elements of the III/248e RI but the II/42e DBMC will still hold all the evening and
all the night long. At this moment, the II/42e DBMC is reinforced by 16 engineers coming from Arreux.

At dawn, on 15th May, the German assault is launched and supported by tanks. A French truck carrying 500 AT mines is just arriving to the front line at the same moment. The crew has just the time to bail out
from the truck before a German tank destroys it. At 9h00 the German tanks are already moving towards Charleville. There are still skirmishes in the woods but nothing that can stop the German spearheads. The II/42e DBMC fought very valiantly but since the battlefield was roughly empty behind this unit, the Germans could advance rapidly after having been belated. The 8.PzD made a 60 km advance during the day. Most of the remaining French troops still fighting are encircled and later captured or killed.
General Reinhardt said : "at Monthermé, the French troops offered a resistance worthy of the 'Poilus' of Verdun in 1916. They defended their position and even counter-attacked despite our superiority in number and armament. During my military career I rarely met so courageous soldiers". Lieutenant-colonel de Pinsun didn't praise his soldiers like general Reinhardt did.
According to the British historian John Keegan, the resistance at Monthermé would mostly be due to the numerous Indochinese troops and not the French ones . this is completely wrong. There are no Indochinese troops at all in this unit and only few soldiers from the colonies. The 42e DBMC is composed of 87.5% French and 12.5% Madagascan soldiers.

From Houx to Sedan, there are only 6 French tank battalions available in the rear lines :
- 3e BCC with 45 Renault R35 (2nd army)
- 4e BCC with 45 FCM36 (2nd army)
- 6e BCC with 45 Renault R35 (9th army)
- 7e BCC with 45 FCM36 (9th army)
- 32e BCC with 45 Renault R35 (9th army)
- 33e BCC with 63 Renault FT17 (9th army)

Only 288 tanks including 63 obsolete Renault FT17 tanks, 90 FCM36 tanks and 135 Renault R35 tanks to face about 2000 German tanks strongly supported by the Luftwaffe, which are currently breaking the French lines. The single French tanks available in Sedan are 4 Renault FT17 unarmed tanks used as artillery tractors.

The tank battalions are sacrificed to delay the Germans like the 33e BCC with its 63 Renault FT17 tanks : 39 FT17c with a 37mm SA18 gun and 24 FT17m (with a 8mm Mle1914 Hotchkiss MG) or FT31 (with a 7.5mm Mle1931 MAC MG). Only the 39 FT17c have a gun able to engage a Panzer I or a Panzer II but they have to be generally < 25m to have a chance to knock out a Panzer III or a Panzer IV. This 37mm SA18 is the same in the FCM36, Renault R35 and most of the Hotchkiss H35 and H39 tanks. Conscious of the suicidal mission, these crews nonetheless went into the battle and 55 out of 63 FT17 tanks are destroyed. 110 out of the 132 men of the battalion are KIA on 15th May.

3. The limited counter-attack on 14th May 1940

— THE AIR STRIKES —

On 14th May 1940, only one big engineer bridge in front of Gaulier (a small town very close to Sedan, see map) is available for the crossing of the German tanks and heavy weapons. This bridge was built with the last available crossing elements. If this bridge is destroyed, the German troops would be in a difficult situation.

The French air force had about 1,400 frontline aircrafts available in 1940 (650 fighters, 240 bombers and 490 reconnaissance and observation aircrafts). From these 1,400 aircrafts only 879 frontline aircrafts are operational on 10th May 1940 on the western front. Only 120 out of the 240 bomber/assault aircrafts were modern ones (10 Amiot 354, 55 Lioré et Olivier 451, 45 Bréguet 691 or 693, 10 Potez 633) with 85 being operational. The others were older ones : 75 Bloch 200 or 210, 10 Farman 221 or 222 and 35 Amiot 143 with about 100 considered operational. Therefore only 185 French bombers (100 obsolete and 85 moderns) are operational ones in May 1940 but they are dispersed and not all available in the north-eastern theatre of operation.
In the north-eastern area, the French army can only rely on a maximum of 65 operational bombers ! All the other bombers are deployed in southern France or in North Africa where the bomber groups are under transformation and training with new aircrafts (Martin 167, Douglas DB7, Amiot 351/354, LeO 451, Bréguet 693).

Available French bombers in the north-east on 10th May :

Day bombing :
- 14 LeO 451 (GB I/12 and GB II/12)
- 25 Bréguet 693 (GBA I/54 and GBA II/54)

Night bombing :
- 29 Amiot 143 (GB I/34, GB II/34, GB I/38 and GB II/38)
- 6 Farman 222 (GB I/15 and GB II/15)

Total = 74 available bombers including 65 operational ones (88%).

The Bréguet 693 and LeO 451 for example were previously hardly engaged in the Netherlands from 11th to 13th May. On 13th May, after reinforcements, only 13 LeO 451 and 12 Bréguet 693 are available = 25 modern bombers in the north-east (you can compare that with the 1170 German bombers engaged on over the Meuse River on 13th May).

The RAF has a total of 416 aircrafts in France : 100 fighters (Hurricane + Gladiator) and 316 attack/bomber aircrafts (Fairey Battle + Blenheim), of which 384 are operational on 10th May.

On 14th May, the allies could only engage 31 French bombers and 109 British bombers to try to stop the flood of the German tanks crossing the Meuse River in the area of Sedan. The allied fighters, mainly French fighters in that case, made 250 sorties to protect the bombers and attack the German fighters. These German fighters made 814 sorties to protect the Gaulier bridge (3.3 times more sorties than the allied fighters) and the bridge is also directly protected by 303 AA guns (2.0cm, 3.7cm and 8.8cm) !

The allied bombing missions on the area of Sedan were followings on 14th May 1940 :

1) 5h00 (British bombers)
- Aircrafts : 6 Fairey Battles (n°103 squadron – 1 emergency landing)

2) 8h30 (British bombers)
- Aircrafts : 4 Fairey Battles (n°150 squadron)

These 2 first missions target possible bridges in Villers, Mairy and Remilly. These objectives are in an area 10 km around Sedan.

3) 9h30 (French bombers)
- Aircrafts : 9 Bréguet 693 (6 from GBA II/54 and 3 from GBA I/54)
They are protected by 11 Bloch MB.152 from GC I/8. The bombers attack German columns and tanks at Bazeilles (south-east of Sedan) each with 8x50 kg bombs (and their 20mm gun + MGs).
During this mission, the bombers are also indirectly protected by patrols from the GC I/3 (Dewoitine D.520) which is also involved in the area in air superiority missions. During the whole day, the GC I/3 looses 2 pilots and 4 Dewoitine D.520s. They destroy 9-11 German aircrafts on 14th May :
- 2 Dornier 17
- 2 Messerschmitt 109 (JG 2)
- 1 Heinkel 111 (I/KG 55) in cooperation with 2 Hurricanes (n°501 squadron)
- 1 Heinkel 111 (III/KG 51)
- 4 Messerschmitt 110 + 1 probable Messerschmitt 110

4) 12h30 (French bombers)
- Aircrafts : 5 LeO 451 (from GB I/12 and GB II/12)
They target the German troops in Bazeilles and on the crossroads south-east of Sedan. There are clouds at the altitude of 1000 m. They bomb the targets at an altitude of 900m with 10kg, 50kg and 100kg bombs. The formation is attacked by Messerschmitt 110 fighters. One LeO 451 is shot down by the FlaK and the 4 other aircrafts returned damaged to their base.

- Aircrafts : 6 Amiot 143 (from GB I/34, GB II/34) + 12 Amiot 143 (from GB I/38) each with 16x50 kg and 2x100kg bombs. Despite being slow night bombers, these aircrafts are engaged in day mission against strongly defended targets.
6 aircrafts from GB I/38 missed the meeting with the fighters and did not take part to the attack and 1 aircraft returns to base after engine problems. Therefore only 11 Amiot 143 arrived on their targets, covered by clouds at 1000-1100m. They attack at the altitude of 900-950m. 2 Amiot 143s are destroyed by the FlaK and 1 Amiot 143 is shot down by 1 Messershmitt 109 and Messerschmitt 110. All the other bombers are damaged.

About 30-40 French fighters are protecting these bombers. The immediate escort is provided by 14 Bloch MB.152 from GC I/8 but they have difficulties to remain with the old bombers, which fly at only 150 km/h. 1 Messerschmitt 109 is shot down and 1 MB.152 is out of use after landing but the pilot is safe and alive.
At higher altitude, the fighter protection is provided by Morane-Saulnier MS.406s from the GC III/7 (12h45 – 14h00) and by Dewoitine D.520s from the GC I/3 (12h50 – 13h30). From 12h54 to 13h26, the GC III/7 destroys 4 Henschel 126 observation aircrafts.

5) 15h00 – 15h45 (British bombers)

a) Group 76 (15h00)
- Aircrafts : 4 Fairey Battles (n°12 squadron) – targets : enemy columns – losses : 4 aircrafts
- Aircrafts : 8 Fairey Battles (n°142 squadron) – targets : bridges – losses : 3 aircrafts
- Aircrafts : 6 Fairey Battles (n°226 squadron) – targets : bridges – losses : 3 aircrafts

b) Group 71 (15h20 – 15h30)
- Aircrafts : 11 Fairey Battles (n°105 squadron) – targets : bridges – losses : 6 aircrafts
- Aircrafts : 4 Fairey Battles (n°150 squadron) – targets : bridges – losses : 4 aircrafts
- Aircrafts : 2 Blenheims (n°114 squadron) – targets : enemy columns – losses : 1 aircrafts
- Aircrafts : 6 Blenheims (n°139 squadron) – targets : enemy columns – losses : 4 aircrafts

c) Group 75 (15h35 – 15h45)
- Aircrafts : 4 Fairey Battles (n°88 squadron) – targets : bridges .
- Aircrafts : 8 Fairey Battles (n°88 squadron) – targets : enemy columns – losses : 8 aircrafts
- Aircrafts : 8 Fairey Battles (n°103 squadron) – targets : bridges
- Aircrafts : 7 Fairey Battles (n°218 squadron) – targets : enemy columns .
- Aircrafts : 4 Fairey Battles (n°218 squadron) – targets : bridges – losses : 10 aircrafts

6) 17h00 – 18h00 (British bombers)
- Aircrafts : 28 Blenheims (n°21, n°107 and n°110 squadron) are sent against 3 targets : the Bouillon-Sedan road, the woods west of Givonne and the bridges in the Sedan area. 5 aircrafts are shot down and 2 have to proceed to an emergency landing. These bombers are from the bomber command and took off from Great Britain. All the other bombers were from the AASF (Advanced Air Striking Force) based in France.

French fighters from GC II/7 (Morane-Saulnier MS.406) and GC I/3 (Dewoitine D.520) are in the Flize-Sedan area respectively at 17h30 – 18h00 and 18h00 – 18h30. 9 MS.406s from GC II/7 meet 12 Bf.109 but no one engages the fight. At 18h15, the D.520s from GC I/7 disperse a formation of Junkers 87 dive bombers and shot down 4-5 Bf.110 (the Bf.110s previously mentioned in the text).

7) During the night (French bombers)
- Aircrafts : 4 Farman 222s (GB I/15) and 2 Farman 222s (GB II/15). These are heavy night bomber, able to carry up to 2.5 tons of bombs. They attack the accesses/exits of Sedan without losses.

- Aircrafts : 6 Amiot 143 (from GB I/38) and 1 Amiot 143 (from GB II/38) which had to cancel their attack at 12h30 are engaged during the night against Sedan.

On 14th May the crucial bridge of Gaulier has not been destroyed. During this time and the following days more than 60,000 German soldiers, 800 tanks and 22,000 vehicles crossed the Meuse on this single bridge at Gaulier.

The main issue is that the allied bombers were engaged in about 25 attacks of 2-12 planes and against scattered targets : various bridges (sometimes already blown or only supposed engineer bridges) and German columns, instead of one concerted attack of more 140 bombers concentrated on the Gaulier bridge. The bridge of Gaulier should have been the primary target but the allied bombers were generally not even assigned with specific and well defined targets. Most of the lost aircrafts were shot down by the dense FlaK.

On 14th May, 48 British and 3 French bombers are shot down in the area of Sedan and 65 other allied aircrafts are damaged.

On 14th May the French air force was also very active more north in the area around Dinant with many fighters and reconnaissance aircrafts but only the bombing mission against the Sedan area has been developed in this article. Of course the RAF was also involved in many areas.
On the western front this day, the allied fighters claim 58 confirmed victories (46 for the French air force and 12 for the RAF fighters based in France) according to Patrick Facon.
The magazine "Batailles aériennes n°7" indicates for the whole 14th May :
- French fighters : 46 confirmed (including 10 Bf 109 and 26 Bf 110) and 16 probable victories for 20 French fighters lost
- RAF fighters : 60 confirmed and 23 probable victories for 28 British fighters lost
That would make 106 confirmed victories. The German data are incomplete for the losses but Patrick Facon gives the number of 52 German aircrafts lost that day (inaccuracies, shared victories which are counted as one victory for each of the pilots etc.). The Luftwaffe (fighters and AA units) claims about 100 allied aircrafts, which seems very close to the reality since if we add the 51 bombers around Sedan and the 49 fighters we reach 99 losses.
Between 10th and 18th May, about 180 German aircrafts are shot down over the Meuse River area. The 14th May was therefore rather intense.

About 500 French POWs are parked directly at the immediate southern exit of the Gaulier bridge, a primary military target. Several of these POWs (lieutenant Devie, soldier Pichonnat, sergent Léger) witnessed the allied air attacks and testified that several aircrafts aborted the attack, probably after having recognized the French POWs. One can really ask about the reason why the Germans placed the French POWs just next to the bridge.

End Part 4

Part 5:

— THE GROUND OPERATIONS —

On 13th May afternoon, during the German assaults, the 4e BCC (FCM36 tanks) and the 7e BCC (FCM36 tanks) are ordered to prepare to move, not yet to counter-attack. The 4e BCC will have to operate with elements of the 205e RI (71e DI) and the 7e BCC with elements of the 213e RI (55e DI), which were left on the rear by these 2 reserve and under-equipped infantry divisions.

The FCM36 tanks was built by the "société des Forges et Chantiers de la Mediterranée", designed to be an infantry support tank. It was somewhat unique for the time because of its rakish angled armor and its diesel engine. The hull as a very well sloped armor and the turret is an octagonal shaped FCM turret. There are also sloped protective skirting plates to protect the wheels. The FCM36 has a bigger autonomy and mobility (smaller turning circle) compared to the Renault R35 for example. The armament consists in a 37mm SA18 L/21 gun and a coaxial MG. The gun could engage the German light tanks at about 300m but had to go very close to have a minimal chance of penetrating the armor of a Panzer III Ausf.F.
Weight : 12.35t
Length : 4.51m
Width : 2.14m
Height : 2.20m
Crew : 2 men
Maximum armor : 40mm (turret is RHA+cast welded armor and hull is RHA welded armor)
Maximum speed : 24 km/h (Berliet-Ricardo engine, 4 cylinders, diesel, 91 hp, 8400 cm3, water cooled)
Transmission : 5 forward, 1 reverse
Autonomy : 225 km
Armament : a 37mm SA18 L/21 gun and a 7.5mm MAC1931 CMG (102 shells and 3000 cartridges)

In the French light tanks, intended for infantry support as primary task there were generally about 40% AP shells but in the 7e BCC the tanks had only 12 AP shells, at least in the 3rd company, as indicated by the war diary of the battalion. That does not say if they were 1892/24, 1935 or 1937 shells whose penetration performances are significantly different.

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7e BCC

The 7e BCC had been formed in Versailles on 25th August 1939 and garrisoned in Loges-en-Joses beginning September 1939. On 10th September 1939 the battalion is at Milly-sur-Bradon and Murvaux where the trainind goes on. The 7e BCC leaves for Verdun on 19th November 1939. The practrical and tactical level is improved on the training range of Le Chaume and on the firing range of Douaumont.

On 28th March 1940, the 7e BCC is sent to the Mourmelon camp to take part to different intense trainings and activities :
- Infantry / tank cooperation trainings with successive infantry regiments (1 different each week – e.g. the 3e RTM from colonel Desré on 18th April 1940 during a training in front of general Touchon)
- Courses for infantry battalion commanders about the tanks
- Manoeuvres with the DCRs (French armoured divisions of the French infantry)

On 14th May the tank battalion is engaged in a sacrifice mission to delay the German tanks and counter-attack to the Meuse River. The 7e BCC is engaged on a 5 km large front (divisional front usually) and advanced on 2 km. It resists during 4 hours to German tank waves. The remaining tanks retreated, out of ammunition and exhausted. The battalion had lost 50% of the crews and 75% of the tanks but delayed the Germans enough to allow the 3e DIM and the 3e DCR to deploy south of the Mont-Dieu woody hills.

On 15th May the battalion is reorganizing and on 16th May it joins the 36e DI on the Aisne River near Attigny. At first only 5 tanks are fully operational. After repairs 11 tanks are available and on 27th May 16 tanks are operational. Until beginning June, the reduced battalion launches several successful counter-attacks to defeat German assaults.

On 9-10th June, the French 36e DI is opposed to 3 infantry divisions (26.ID, 10.ID and SS-Polizei), which open the way to the 6.PzD and 8.PzD supported by the 20.ID(mot). The French division has to defend a front of 20 km whereas such a division should normally defend a front of 5-7 km. On the front of the 36e DI only 2 regiments (18e RI and 57e RI) defend the frontline (the 14e RI is on a second line) but they defeat the 26.ID and the 10.ID, which are replaced on 10th June by the SS-Polizei division and elements of the 6.PzD. The French stopped first all the German assaults in part thanks to very precise artillery support and counter-attacks from tanks of the 7e BCC and 4e BCC (FCM36 tanks). The French 36e DI captured 714 German POWs during these 2 days. The French 2e DI is deployed more west and faces 3 infantry divisions (17.ID, 21.ID and 52.ID) and the assaults of the 1.PzD as well as later the 2. PzD supported by the 29.ID(mot). The collapse of the 2e DI near Château-Porcien will force the 36e DI to retreat.

On 10th June, after a move of 20 km under German artillery fire, the 16 tanks of the 7e BCC assault the enemy north of Vouziers in support of the 36e DI. After 2 hours of combat and a progression of 7 km, all the assigned objectives are taken despite the German strong resistance and the attacks of 62 German aircrafts. The FCM36 tanks delay the Germans at Vouziers during 24 hours, but on 11th June only 4 tanks are remaining.
Two companies of the 4e BCC (also FCM36 tanks) intervene also for the benefit of the 36e DI. The 1/4e BCC are engaged with infantry elements from the 57e RI and the 14e RI (the groupe franc of the regiment) against the 78.IR (26.ID) next to Voncq and Les Alleux, north of Vouziers. The 26.ID looses 1,100 men, mainly in the 78.IR.

The remnants of the 7e BCC will retreat and the battalion is officially dissolved on 31st July 1940.
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Two German infantry companies from 1.Schützen Regiment (Balck) are already deployed between Chéhery and the Saint-Quentin farm on 13th May evening. On 14th May morning they are reinforced by various troops and AT guns, including the 14th AT company from "Grossdeutschland" regiment.
At 5h30, Panzer Regiment 2 (Oberstleutnant Breusing – 1.PzD) starts to move from Gaulier towards Bulson and Chémery. This regiment at full strength consists in :
- 4 Befehlspanzer
- 26 Panzer I
- 49 Panzer II
- 30 Panzer III
- 20 Panzer IV
The 1./s.Pz.Jg.Abt.8 (1.PzD) with its 8.8cm FlaK (Sfl) auf Sd.Kfz.8 is also engaged (and possibly the Sturmgeschütz-Batterie 640 from the "Grossdeutschland" regiment).

The last defenders of Sedan were still deployed in front of the German troops but will be quickly defeated by the German tanks. Several will manage to flee towards the west (Omicourt and cross the Bar River) or the east. But the soldiers who were in the Marfée woods and retreated to Chaumont realize at 8h00 that German troops are already behind them at Bulson. They are encircled. Hundreds of French soldiers are captured. Several of them will nonetheless manage to escape to the east and join the 3e DINA for the combats around Yonck on 15th May.

General Lafontaine, commander of the 55e DI, is in charge of leading the future counter-attack from his HQ in Maisoncelle. He is simply not aware of all these events during the beginning of the morning !
All the French movements are hampered by thousands of refugees and by soldiers fleeing the field after the "Bulson panic" among the artillery units of the French rears on the front of Sedan. The Luftwaffe is also very present, spotting and/or attacking all French movements. The communications are generally cut, the units are isolated. General Lafontaine will have huge problems in trying to coordinate this attack; he is even unaware of the location of the units placed under his command.

The 4e BCC (commandant de Saint-Sernin) is deployed around Beaumont-en-Argonne and the Sommauthe woods. The 7e BCC (commandant Giordani) is deployed south of Le Chesne, next to Les Alleux. On 10th and 11th May the area is bombed by the Luftwaffe 3 times per day. The 2 tank battalions would have about 20 km to cross, in about 1-2 hours in good conditions. The two infantry regiments would need about 3 hours by foot to reach the departure line on the Chémery-Maisoncelle line.

Except the 213e RI, which is not far away from general Lafontaine, the 3 other units meant for the attack cannot yet be reached by their new commander. The 7e BCC begins its movement only at 20h30 on 13th May, on the national road n°77 (Le Chesne – Tannay – Chémery) mainly because of the intense activity of the Luftwaffe. The very first elements of the tank battalion reach Chémery at 3h30 only but the tanks arrive only at 6h30. The 205e RI is around Raucourt during the night. The 4e BCC will only reach the 205e RI on 14th May during the morning. There is no cohesion between the 4 units.

On 14th morning the planned attack is very late. The 4e BCC and 205e RI did not arrive in time. There is no artillery preparation available. The French movements were heavily hampered on the road full of refugees and retreating troops. The 7e BCC will need all the night to reach the departure line and will nonetheless be engaged immediately with minimal intelligence about the enemy.

On 14th May morning, general Lafontaine is only in contact with the western wing of the planned attack (213e RI and 7e BCC) but nonetheless launches the attack at 6h15. Each infantry battalion is supported by 1 tank company (13 FCM36 tanks). The infantry regiment is much reduced compared to its theoretical men strength. There are no hand grenades available, no AT guns and no AA guns. Most of the LMG have only 2 magazines. It is rather a mission of sacrifice. When the first tanks of the 7e BCC finally reach the departure line, it is around 6h30.

On the left : the 3/7e BCC (13 FCM36 tanks – capitaine Mignotte) attacks on the Chémery-Connage axis. They are supported by the reduced II/213e RI battalion (commandant Couturier).

On the right : the 1/7e BCC (13 FCM36 tanks – capitaine Waitzenegger) and the 2/7e BCC (13 FCM36 tanks – lieutenant Join Lambert) attack from Chémery and Maisoncelle towards Bulson. They are supported by elements of the I/213e RI (commandant Desgranges) and III/213e RI (commandant Gauvain) battalions.

The French troops are constantly spotted by German aircrafts.

1) ON THE RIGHT (towards Bulson)

The French advancing troops reaches their first objectives. The 2/7e BCC and I/213e RI move to Font Dagot. The 1/7e BCC and III/213e RI move to hill 304 despite German infantry fire coming from the woods. 3 German MGs are destroyed. The progression goes on to the heights next to Bulson : hill 322 for the 2/7e BCC and hill 303 for the 1/7e BCC. But about 100 German tanks supported by 3 infantry battalions reach Bulson at 8h00 and will clash with the only 26 FCM36 tanks supported by 2 reduced infantry battalions.

** 1/7e BCC
The 1st platoon of aspirant Crémieux-Bach is frontally engaged by the German core force : light and heavy tanks supported by AT guns. 2 ennemy tanks are immobilized but the 3 FCM36 are knocked out.
The 2nd platoon of adjudant-chef Pierre engages the German tanks near the woods of La Réserve. 2 German tanks are damaged but 1 FCM36 is hit several times including two penetrating projectiles. The commander (caporal Bruneval) is KIA and the driver (Trouillod) is WIA, but manages to drive the tank in safety in the French rear lines. The 2 other tanks of the 2nd platoon move back to the woods of Blanche Maison where they fight along the 3rd and 4th platoons until 10h30.
From the initial 13 tanks, 9 have been abandoned or destroyed. Only 4 tanks are remaining, including one whose turret is damaged and blocked. The infantry of the III/213e RI retreats to the ditch of La Nacelle, 2 company commanders have been killed.

** 2/7e BCC
The 3 tanks of the 1st platoon move to hill 261 and cover the right flank towards Bulson.
The 9 tanks from the 2nd, 3rd and 4th platoons move to hill 322.
At the exit of Bulson, 6 Panzer IIIs are spotted by two 75mm Mle1897 field guns batteries (from the I/78e RA, 5e DLC) deployed in Maisoncelle. From long range they engage the German tanks in direct fire and 2 tanks are rapidly burning, the others take cover behind hill 322.
The FCM36 of the lieutenant Leclair (commander of the 3rd platoon) crosses hill 322 but is seen burning a few seconds later after having been hit by 4 shells. The 8 remaining FCM36 are engaged by numerous German tanks and AT guns. They engage a duel with the German tanks.
They locate the enemy tanks (while remaining hidden) thanks to the protruding radio antenna mast from the German tanks. Then they just advance, hull down, and fire on the located target at close range before moving back and repeating the process : advance, fire, move back behind the hill. The German tanks are hit numerous times, several are immobilized and others move back but they are not seriously damaged. Unfortunately the FCM36 is only armed with the 37mm SA18 gun and each tank of the 7e BCC has only few AP shells.
Several FCM36 tanks are also hit. On one of them the turret is first hit by projectiles which don't penetrate but finally a projectile unsolders the top of the turret (copula).
After 2 hours of combat, 10 FCM36 tanks are knocked out. The 3 remaining tanks retreat to Artaise-le-Vivier. On the way they skirmish again with Germans tanks around Maisoncelle..
Concerning the I/213e RI : 2 out of 3 company commanders are killed and the last one is WIA and captured by the Germans. The infantry battalion is heavily shelled by enemy mortars and also bombed. The I/213e RI retreats under the protection of the last French tanks. General Lafontaine leaves his HQ 500m north east of Maisoncelle amongst the last men.

2) ON THE LEFT (3 km on the west, towards Chéhery)

** 3/7e BCC
The II/213e RI starts the attack on the Chémery-Chéhery road at 6h15, without the tanks. Chémery is only occupied by the 7th company as well as by one 25mm AT gun from the 506th AT company (the divisional AT company from the 55e DI – capitaine Nicolle). These AT guns have probably retreated to Chémery on 13th May.
After having been on the move all night long, the 13 FCM36 have still about 10 hours autonomy with their diesel engine. The ammunition racks are full but there are only 12 AP shells per tank. No enemy tank has in fact been reported to the battalion as having crossed the Meuse River.

1200 meters north of Chémery, there is a bottleneck in the valley in which the tanks will have to advance : on the left the Bar River and on the right a woody hill where only infantry units could progress. The company commander, capitaine Mignotte, wants to reach this bottleneck before being eventually outflanked.

The platoon from sous-lieutenant Pagès is in front, on the Chémery-Chéhery road. Capitaine Mignotte is on the rear left, between the road and the Bar River. The 3 other platoons are still in Chémery (sous-lieutenant Lacroix, aspirant Loiseau, sous-lieutenant Levitte).

After an advance of several hundred meters the tanks are ambushed by German troops including an AT gun, which fires on the Pagès platoon. The French tanks fire back and the other platoons are deploying. The FCM36 of Pagès is hit several times without penetration but a damaged track immobilizes the tank.

A 2nd German AT gun opens fire but both German guns are quickly destroyed by the French tank company supported by a few 25mm AT guns. Many shells have hit the FCM36 tanks but none has penetrated the sloped armor. German troops are stormed and are killed or fleeing in the woods. The German troops present at the western and southern edges of the woods of Naumont are eliminated by the French tanks and infantry. The French advance can be carried on.

The 3/7e BCC reaches the bottleneck but the infantry did not follow the tanks and would be useful to control this position. Capitaine Mignotte moves back, sitting outside the turret on the turret hatch to show the infantry that the area is safe. He brings an infantry squad with him to the bottleneck.

The 2 tanks of platoon Pagès remain on the rear with the immobilized tank of the platoon commander.

The platoon of Levitte has been delayed during the combats against the German troops and 1-2 tanks are stuck in a marsh close to the Bar River.

7 FCM36 tanks move on towards Connage, the next town at 600 meters (Capitaine Mignotte, platoon Loiseau and platoon Lacroix). Connage is reached without problem; the German troops evacuated the town. The French tanks move on towards Chéhery. During the movement a German AT gun battery fired from a hill east of Connage but without damaging the tanks. The tank of Loiseau is at his turn stuck in a marsh next to Connage. The tanks of platoon Levitte will later tow the tank of Loiseau under enemy fire.

The 6 other tanks moves on :
- Platoon Lacroix (3 tanks commanded by Lacroix, Corbeil and Tirache)
- Platoon Loiseau, now under command of sergent Le Tallec (2 tanks commanded by Le Tallec and Boitard)
- The tank of capitaine Mignotte.

Platoon Lacroix is advancing on the forefront. The tanks of Le Tallec and Boitard are on the left and slightly on the rear. Capitaine Mignotte is in the centre of the deployment.

Suddenly, about 100m in front of Lacroix a Panzer III (or a Panzer IV according to the testimonies). Lacroix moves at full speed, stops at only 15 meters of the German tanks and opens fire. He has been followed by Corbeil and Le Tallec. Boitard and Tirache remains about 300m on the rear and provide fire support to the advancing French tanks. Mignotte joins the 3 tanks of the first echelon and engages the combat.

The German tank is reinforced by 2 other Panzer III/IVs. These 3 Panzers are 15-20 meters in front of the 4 French tanks. Behind these 3 German tanks there is a swarm of incoming Panzers. The combat is engaged on the road.
Each French tank rapidly fires its 12 AP shells. The HE shells are then fired to blind the enemy tanks. In the war diary of the company the German tanks are described as firing back extremely slowly. Apparently the German rate of fire was not always the theoretical one.

Many German shells are bouncing on the armor of the FCM36 tanks, even at this very close range, but those who arrive directly frontally penetrate the armor.
In Corbeil's FCM36 the driver (Lintanff) is WIA. Despite being wounded he continues to pass ammunitions to his commander in the turret.
In Lacroix's FCM36 the commander is WIA and bails out. The driver (Rochelle) replaces him I the turret and continues to fire until being hit at his turn.

One German tank is nonetheless burning. But at this moment new German units are involved and their shells are more efficient. They are described as having 75mm (Panzer IV) and 105mm guns. These "105mm guns" could very well be the 8.8cm self-propelled AT guns which are involved in this area. In Abbeville too the 8.8cm FlaK or often described as 105mm guns (although 105mm guns were really used as AT guns).
Corbeil's tank is hit by a heavy shell on the front hull and Lintanff is this time KIA. In the turret Corbeil continues t fire. A second shell damages his 37mm SA18 gun. Corbeil exits the tank and hides in a ditch beside the road.

Le Tallec's tank receives a projectile in the engine and starts to burn. During several minutes the crew nonetheless continues to fire. The heat becomes unbearable and the crew bails out. Le Tallec and Audoire manage to reach the French troops in Chémery.

At this stage, 2 French tanks have been destroyed (Corbeil and Le Tallec) and the tank of Lacroix is immobilized but still firing. At least one German tank has been destroyed. The tank of Mignotte is still fully operational despite the fact that 2 projectiles have penetrated the turret. These projectiles caused no real damage inside and the crew remains untouched.

Capitaine Mignotte orders to his driver (Heinrich) to execute a 180° turn, in order to expose the rear of the tank to the enemy. The mass and thickness of the engine are directed towards the threat. A German heavy shell (described as being a 105mm . 75mm or 88mm in fact ?) destroys the left track and moves the tank on several meters.
Mignotte orders Heinrich to leave the tank while he fires to cover his escape. Heintich is also ordered to tell the 2 last tanks (Boitard and Tirache) 300 meters on the rear to retreat to Chémery.
The 37mm SA18 gun of Mignotte fires HE shell after HE shell but jams. The Germans stop to fire at his tank, thinking probably that he is out of combat.
The breech is unblocked and about 30 HE shells are remaining (out of a total of 102 shells initially).
A German tank starts to move slowly on several meters. Mignotte fires again. The FCM36 from Le Tallec is still burning and hides partially Mignotte's tank to the Germans.
Many German shells are bouncing on the armor of the FCM36. Mignotte fires all his 30 HE shells and bails out, expecting to be fired at. Surprisingly the German tanks stop their fire. Did they just save their ammunition or di they want to show respect to the French officer who fought courageously ?
Sergent Corbeil, who was hiding beside the road, helps Mignotte. They manage to escape and 1 hour later they reach Chémery.

The 2 remaining platoons (Pagès and Levitte) are engaged later by many AT guns and 8.8 self-propelled AT guns.
At Connagen, Levitte's tank is immobilized by a 105mm shell (88mm ?). They try to tow the tank but a second shell hits the tank. While trying to move in a safer place the FCM36 from sergent Froussard remains stuck in the same marsh than the tank of Loiseau.

Only 3 tanks are recovered from the whole company. A few men from the repair unit and several motorcyclists defeat German soldiers trying to reach Chémery from the west of the Bar River. The 3/7e BCC has lost 14 men and 10 tanks after more than 2 hours of combat.

Between the bottleneck and Chémery the II/213e RI retreats while fighting and manages to avoid being encircled by Balck's soldiers supported by the German tanks. The men received ammunition supplies and successively each platoon covers the retreat of one other platoon. Despite being only a reserve unit the battalion shows discipline. The 7th company which remained in Chémery covers the retreat and fire at the Germans when they are at 200 meters. But the first German tanks enter in Chémery and the French troops have no means to stop them. The very few 25mm AT guns are not sufficient against the waves of German tanks. The battalion commander is WIA, his staff officer and 2 company commanders are KIA.

Surprisingly the Panzer Regiment 2 indicates having faced Renault B1bis tanks during the 14th May morning. This is not possible. The 3e DCR will arrive more south around Le Chesne only between 16h00 and 18h00. There are no B1bis tanks in the area. The French troops counter-attacking would certainly have like to have several ones with them instead of fighting tanks with the 37mm SA18 gun.

The Luftwaffe has also been very active against the French troops during all the morning. An attack led by Ju87 dive bombers is launched against Chémery, which is occupied by their own troops at the moment of the attack.
The HQ of the Panzerbrigade, the HQ of the Panzer Regiment and the HQ of the II.Abteilung are hit among other troops. Oberleutnant Graf Harrach, Oberleutnant von Fürstenberg, Leutnant Fritschen and 8 men are killed. Many other men are WIA, including Oberst Keltsch (commander of the Panzerbrigade 1). Several German vehicles are destroyed including at least one 8.8cm self-propelled AT gun, which has been photographed many times. The same day the commander of the Sturmpionier Battalion 43 (Mahler) is killed in Chéhery by Ju87 dive bombers.

At 12h00, the core of the "Grossdeutschland" infantry regiment reaches also Bulson. The last men of the 55e DI have roughly disappeared in these fights.

The orders given to the German troops on 14th May at 14h00 are followings :
- "Grossdeutschland" regiment with 2 heavy artillery groups : take the heights of Stonne and cover the southern flank.
- 1.PzD : attack to the west, cross the Ardennes canal at Malmy and Omicourt.
- 2.PzD : attack to the west, cross the Ardennes canal at Hannogne
- 10.PzD : this division is belated and still around Sedan

The small French counter-attack launched on 14th May was of course insufficient and improvised. From the 39 engaged FCM36 tanks 29 have been lost. This sacrifice enabled French reinforcements to deploy 15km south of Sedan, next to the Mont-Dieu hilly woods :
- At 4h00 : the 6e GRDI is at Stonne and in the Mont-Dieu woods
- Between 10h00 and 16h00 : the 3e DIM arrived in the area
- Between 16h00 and 18h00 : the 3e DCR is deployed

The situation could have been very dangerous for the Germans at that moment if the French had immediately launched a concentrated attack with these 2 divisions against Sedan. Only the "Grossdeutschland" regiment was covering the southern flank during this afternoon. The 10.PzD is belated, the 1.PzD and the 2.PzD would have been eventually cut from their rears and attacked on their left flank. But general Flavigny (21st Army Corps) wants to wait for the 15th May and the attack will not happen. The French high command in May had always the obsession of a continuous front. In the Mont-Dieu the German losses will be really very high but 2 very good French divisions are stuck in a battle of defense and counter-attacks while the German Panzerdivisionen are heading west.

4. The combats south of Sedan (15th – 25th May 1940)

TO BE CONTINUED … just several notes :

The woody hills of the Mont-Dieu area are dominating the plain 15 km south of Sedan. The town of Stonne and its hill called the "Pain de Sucre" (335m high) are located between the Mont-Dieu and the Mont-Damion. At Stonne the German advance could be stopped. From Stonne a French counter-attack could be launched on the flank of the German columns. The conquest of Stonne is therefore of importance for both German and the French armies.

[note : on 15th May there are also the battles of Flavion and of La Horgne]

The area of the Mont Dieu woods was held by the French troops facing German assault from 14th to 25th May. During this time there were important battles in Stonne, Les Grandes Armoises, Tannay and Le Chesne. During these battles the French lost about 3,000 men including about 1,000 KIA. The German losses were even higher, serious studies estimate them 3 times higher. During 23rd and 24th May, the German 24.ID had 1,490 losses (347 KIA, 1,086 WIA and 57 MIA). From 17th to 25th May the 1st battalion of the German 79.IR sustained 191 losses (41 KIA, 144 WIA and 6 MIA) near the Mont Damion. Most of the "Grossdeutschland" regiment losses of the 1940 Western campaign were around Stonne with 570 losses (KIA, WIA, MIA).

Guderian engages in the area the "Grossdeutschland" motorized infantry regiment, the 10.PzD and engineer elements from the 1.PzD. Later elements of the 2.ID (mot) and finally the 16.ID and 24.ID of the VI.AK (16.ID, 24.ID and 26.ID) are engaged. The presence of elements of both the 1.PzD and the 10.PzD is also confirmed by the Germans POWs captured by the French troops.
The 10.PzD has 275 tanks, Panzerjäger Abteilung 521 (18 Panzerjäger I) is attached to the 10.PzD and the "Grossdeutschland" regiment includes Sturmgeschütz-Batterie 640 (6 Sturmgeschütze III Ausf.A) for a total of 299 German tanks. Auflklärung Abteilung (AA) 90 (10.PzD) has a strength of 56 armored cars, AA 2 (2.ID mot.) contains 26 armored cars and the 16.ID has an armored car platoon of 3 armored cars, of which 2 are armed. There are therefore also 84 armored cars around Stonne, which makes a total of 383 AFVs. Other self-propelled guns and army / army corps elements may have been involved. The Germans troops had also strong support from the Luftwaffe.

To defend the Mont-Dieu area, the French troops include the 3e DCR (reduced to 138 tanks instead of 160 tanks), the 3e DIM and several reconnaissance groups.

Notes about Stonne :

Early in the morning of the 15th May 1940, the GD infantry regiment supported by tanks of the 10.PzD assaults the town of Stonne, which is defended by the first battalion of the 67e RI and several troops from the 6e GRDI. The French position is attacked on the front and on the flanks. The French are pulled back and 7 German AFVs are reported to be knocked out (e.g. Panzer IV n°711 is destroyed by the 25mm AT gun from Sergeant Durand but mainly due to the intervention of the 3/49e BCC with its B1bis tanks).

At 5h30, the 1st company of the 45e BCC (Hotchkiss H39 tanks) moves from the Grandes-Armoises to Stonne and they eliminate several German positions. At 7h30 they are next to the town but 2 Hotchkiss tanks are lost and they move back.

The 3rd company of the 49e BCC (Renault B1bis tanks) carries on. They move into the town and the Germans have to evacuate the town. At 9h30 the French tanks are deployed on the southern edge of the town. Since no French infantry has followed the heavy tanks, the town is later occupied again by the Germans.

A renewed attack is launched at 10h30 with several tanks from the 45e BCC (Hotchkiss), 49e BCC (Renault B1bis) and one platoon of the 4e BCC (FCM36) supported by 1 infantry company of the 51e RI. The town is captured and again in French hands. The combats are very intense and the infantry is fighting house by house. During their approach, the French tanks are already engaged by German AT guns (not from AT company of the GD IR in that case … other AT guns ? infantry guns ? AA guns ? tanks ?).
The 14th AT company of the GD infantry regiment (Lieutenant Beck-Broichsitter) is engaged later. This lieutenant describes a very confuse situation (in French in "Les combats du Mont-Dieu" by Gérard Giuliano), a German tank abandonned in a ditch, German guns hidden on a hill behind him and firing on the French troops, they hide behind a house to avoid a French tank which moves very closely etc.
Three 3.7cm PaK are deployed and engage 6 French tanks. The losses among the German infantry and gunners are increasing under the French fire. Then they report having engaged about 10 French tanks on a large front. The duel will last about 1 hour.
Several German infantry companies move gradually back. Lieutenant Beck-Broichsitter reports then the help of German "canons automoteurs" in the French version, which means self-propelled guns. Does that mean the StuG III of the Sturmgeschütz-Batterie 640 included in the "Grossdeutschland" IR, the Panzerjäger I of the Panzerjäger Abteilung 521 (10.PzD) or other elements ? He also reports that 4 infantry guns are deployed in support (7.5cm leIG or 15.0cm siG ?) to engage the French troops. The German losses are increasing, several AT guns are scattered with splinters but continue to fire. Until yet they do not report having destroyed a French tank.

At this moment the AT platoon of Hindelang is attacked by 3 Renault B1bis tanks. Corporal in Chief Giesemann targets an area on the 'right' side of one tanks and fire burst out of the tank. The two remaining Paks then target this area on the French tanks. Quickly a direct hit destroys one of the two German AT guns. Hindelang moves then back with its remaining AT gun and the 3 heavy tanks are said out of combat. The French troops take again the town of Stonne.

3 Squadrons of Ju-87 'Stuka' bomb then the town. This action is followed by heavy shelling of the German artillery. At 12h30 the French troops move temporarily back under this intense fire. About 3 hours later, B1bis tanks of the 49e BCC occupy the town again and the defense is now in the hand of elements of the 67e RI. The French tank move back and the town is only defended by infantry and AT guns.
During the evening a strong German attack takes again the town, the troops of the 67e RI are deployed on the southern edge of the town. The GD infantry regiment was supported by all the infantry companies of the 10.PzD.

The 14th AT company of the GD infantry regiment had following losses at the end of the day : 13 KIA, 16 WIA, 12 vehicles destroyed and 6 AT guns destroyed (50%). They claim the destruction of 33 French tanks on that day but the real number of knocked out French AFVs is about 3 times smaller.

The presence of Panzer IV of the 10.PzD and of Panzerjäger I is confirmed in the town and in the vicinity by various photographies of German wrecks, several of them being still abandoned and photographied in 1941.

Possession of the town on 15th May (according to Frieser – German time) :
8h00 : German
9h00 : French
9h30 : German
10h30 : French
10h45 : German
12h00 : French
17h30 : German

At the end of the 15th May the 3e DIM is now rather complete to face the German troops.

- 16th May :
7h30 : French
17h00 : German

The 16th May will see the involvement of 2 companies of the 41e BCC (and the action of Billotte and Malaguti) supporting the action of the 3rd battalion of the 51e RI. The attack is preceded by an artillery preparation of 45 minutes made by the 242e RA (155mm C).

The combats will rather be intense. In two days (15-16th May) the GD infantry regiment alone will loose 103 KIA, 439 WIA and 27 MIA (569 men). The GD and the 10.PzD are then replaced by the 16.ID in front of Stonne (beside the 24.ID).

- 16-17th May night : Stonne remained unoccupied

End Part 5

Part 6:

- 17th May :
9h00 : German
11h00 : French
14h30 : German
15h00 : French
16h30 : German
17h00 : French
17h45 : German

********* More detailed action on the 16th May 1940 in Stonne *********

On 16th May 1940, at 01h30, the 41e BCC is ordered to attack Stonne with its 1st and 3rd companies.

The 41e BCC was created on 16th November 1939 with troops of the tank park n°511 and Renault B1bis tanks. The battalion will be integrated in the 3e DCR, the last French armoured division formed before the beginning of the combats, on 20th March 1940. The battalion itself will have 6 months of intense training thanks to a good core of active officers and NCOs. The training at the company and battalion level is then rather good but the unit had only one training at the divisional scale on 9th May 1940.

Commander : commandant Malaguti
Staff commander : capitaine Cornet
Intelligence officer : lieutenant De Witasse
Signal officer : lieutenant Sery

1st tank company : capitaine Billotte
2nd tank company : capitaine Gasc
3rd tank company : capitaine Delepierre
Headquarters / Reserve company : capitaine Simo

During May/June 1940 all the tanks will be lost and the battalion will have 43 KIA (8 officers, 14 NCOs, 21 corporals and men).
The battalion will be engaged without interruption. The main engagements are in the Mont-Dieu area (15 km south of Sedan) during May, around Perthes and Rethel south of the Aisne River in a counter-attack against the 1.PzD during June and many smaller sacrifice missions (defense of bridges at Pogny etc.). The last tank of the battalion is lost on 15th June 1940.

The battalion has been awarded 8 Legion of Honour medals, 22 Military medals and mentioned in dispatches many times (64 times by the regiment, 34 times by the brigade, 43 times by the divisions, 13 times by the Army and 29 times by the Army Corps).

At 3h00, the 1/41e BCC and the 3/41e BCC are moving to the departure line in the woods of Fay. The Renault B1bis tanks will open the way to the III/51e RI of the 3e DIM (3rd battalion of the 51st infantry regiment). The infantry will be accompanied by Hotchkiss H39 tanks from the 2/45e BCC.

The troops could not perform a reconnaissance of the area before the attack and the intelligence about the enemy is very limited. The 41e BCC is not aware if the town is currently in French or German hands when it starts moving.

The B1bis tanks will advance in an inversed V formation. The B1bis "Vienne" of commandant Malaguti is leading the attack.

On his left the 1/41e BCC commanded by capitaine Billotte with 7 tanks :
- B1bis "Eure" (capitaine Billotte)
- B1bis "Lot" (lieutenant Delalande)
- B1bis "Vauquois" (lieutenant Bourgeois)
- B1bis "Volnay" (lieutenant Pignot)
- B1bis "Tarn" (lieutenant Rabin)
- B1bis "Beaune" (lieutenant Adelmans)
- B1bis "Sambre" (lieutenant Bramant)

On his right the 3/41e BCC commanded by capitaine Delepierre with 7 tanks :
- B1bis "Somme" (capitaine Delepierre)
- B1bis "Doubs" (lieutenant Bricart)
- B1bis "Meursault" (sous-lieutenant Guyhur)
- B1bis "Trépail" (lieutenant Dive)
- B1bis "Muscadet" (sous-lieutenant Soret)
- B1bis "Moselle" (aspirant Léonard)
- B1bis "Vertus" (lieutenant Hachet)

At 4h30 the 5th group of the 242e RATTT (12 155mm C guns) makes a 45 minutes artillery preparation on Stonne, the 'Pain de Sucre' hill (the dominating hill east of Stonne) and the south edges of the Grande Côte woods.

The woody hills of the Mont-Dieu area are dominating the plain 15 km south of Sedan. The town of Stonne and its hill called the "Pain de Sucre" (335m high) are located between the Mont-Dieu and the Mont-Damion. At Stonne the German advance could be stopped. From Stonne a French counter-attack could be launched on the flank of the German columns. The conquest of Stonne is therefore of importance for both German and the French armies on 15-16th May.

At 5h15, the 1/41e BCC encounters German elements. These troops are from the "Grossdeutschland" infantry regiment, supported by 2 tanks and an AT defense organized in depth. The 2 German tanks are quickly destroyed. Commandant Malaguti himself said about the Germans of the elite regiment : "beautiful warriors, they fired at us until we were at 100m of them. Then they ran away, fall down and simulated death or stayed in their foxholes until we killed them".

The 3/41e BCC reaches its first objective after 12 minutes and destroys the water tower of Stonne on which the Germans had deployed MGs. The French tank company stops and fires on the edges of Stonne to neutralize MGs and AT guns.

The 1/41e BCC outflanks Stonne by the north-west but capitaine Billotte is hampered by several cliffs and important slopes. He has to move to the right, arriving in Stonne itself (from the north-west) before the battalion commander. The B1bis "Eure" arrives nose to nose with 13 German tanks of the Pz.Rgt.8 (10.PzD) in column in the main street of the town. The first tank is only at 30m. Billotte orders the driver (sergent Durupt) to target the last tank with the 75mm SA35 hull gun while he destroyed the first tank with the 47mm SA35 turret gun. The first shots destroyed simultaneously the first and the last German tank of the column, the others could hardly move. In several minutes, the B1bis "Eure" advances in the street and neutralize the 11 remaining tanks while numerous shells are hitting the armor of the B1bis without penetrating it. 2 Panzer IV and 11 Panzer III are reported as being destroyed. Billotte crosses the whole town and destroys also 2 3.7cm PaK next to the 'Pain de Sucre'. The armor of the B1bis revealed later that it is scattered with 140 impacts and gouges, none of the projectiles penetrated the armor according to the war diary of the 41e BCC. One can see here a kind of small 'Villers Bocage'.

Malaguti entered the main street (from the south-west) a few minutes after Billotte and fired also at all the possible targets he could spot but none of the German tanks aligned in the street reacted anymore. Malaguti moves south, moves in two other streets and finally exits the town by the south. He spots 2 B1bis wrecks ("Hautvillers" and "Gaillac") from the 49e BCC (attack of the 15th May) and joins the 10th company of the 51e RI.

Billotte contacts the battalion commander (Malaguti) by radio to report that the woods north of Stonne are full of MGs and AT guns firing at him. He moves back to Stonne.

Delepierre, the commander of the 3/41e BCC contacts Malaguti by radio to know if he can carry on with its progression but he is ordered to wait for the French artillery. 10 minutes later, the French artillery lengthens its fire and the 3/41e BCC moves to its next objective. The company arrives in a very rough ground with many gullies and cliffs hidden by dense vegetation. The dangers are hidden and the visual contact between the tanks is made difficult. The B1bis "Somme" is isolated and attacked at 100m by 2 3.7cm PaK. In 2 minutes the armor is scattered by a dozen of impacts. None penetrated the armor but the turret is blocked and the optics of the observation copula are destroyed. One German AT gun is destroyed by a HE shell and the B1bis moves on. Due to a hidden gully the B1bis falls over and lies on the flank. The tank is abandoned, put on fire by the crew. The men manage to reach the French lines again.

On 16th May, the following B1bis tanks involved in the French attack have been lost during or will be abandoned after the attack :
- B1bis "Somme" : immobilized on the flank and scuttled by the crew
- B1bis "Vertus" : MIA (single tank lost possibly due to enemy fire)
- B1bis "Meursault" : first immobilized in a gully and against a big tree. It is towed by the B1bis "Moselle" and B1bis "Trépail". The tank will later be scuttled south of the Grandes Armoises due to important mechanical breakdown
- B1bis "Trépail" : the tank experiences engine mechanical breakdown and will be later scuttled

At 5h30 the III/51e RI (10th and 11th companies), supported by the 2/45e BCC (Hotchkiss H39 tanks), begins to move towards Stonne. They encounter German troops which have joined again their foxholes after the passage of the French heavy tanks. Around 7h00 the French infantry controls the town of Stonne.

At 10h00 and during more than half an hour the town is heavily bombarded by the German dive bombers. They are followed until 12h00 by the German artillery. At 15h00 the French tanks (41e BCC and 45e BCC) are ordered to move back to be used in other areas than the town of Stonne itself. At the end of the afternoon, the French infantry moves on the edges of the town because of the heavy German shelling. Reinforcements are arriving (III/5e RICMS from the 6e DIC) and north-west in the woods the German assaults have been defeated by the 67e RI.

Still on 16th May, around 17h00, the B1bis "Riquewihr" (lieutenant Doumecq) from the 49e BCC attacked towards Stonne and encountered a German infantry column, which fired at the tank with infantry weapons including anti-tank rifles, without effect. The B1bis crushed some German troops and pushed into the town defended by the Schützen Regiment 64. When the soldiers saw the bloody tracks of the tank they fled in panic and abandoned Stonne which remained unoccupied for the night. After that action Doumecq was nicknamed 'the butcher of Stonne' by his comrades. The B1bis "Riquewihr" will be the last one of the 3e DCR, abandoned on 18th June 1940 north-east of Dijon.

Sources :
- "1939-1940, batailles pour la France" (Patrick de Gmeline)
- "Batailles aériennes n°7" magazine
- "Blitzkrieg à l'Ouest, Mai-Juin 40" (Jean-Paul Pallud)
- "Fallait-il sauver le char Bayard ?" (René Boly)
- "Guderian's XIXth Panzer Corps and the Battle of France : Breakthrough in the Ardennes, May 1940." (Florian K. Rothbrust)
- "J'étais médecin avec les chars" (André Soubiran)
- "L'armée de l'air dans la tourmente – la bataille de France 1939-1940" (Patrick Facon)
- "La Panzers passent la Meuse" (Paul Berben and Bernard Iselin)
- "L'Arme Blindée Française (volume 1) : Mai-juin 1940 ! Les blindés français dans la tourmente" (Gérard Saint-Martin)
- "Le mythe de la guerre-éclair – la campagne de l'Ouest de 1940" (Karl-Heinz Frieser)
- "Les combats du Mont-Dieu – Mai 1940" (Gérard Giuliano)
- "Les Spahis au feu, la 1e Brigade de Spahis pendant la campagne 1939-1940" (Général P. Jouffrault)
- "Mai – Juin 1940 : les combattants de l'honneur" (Jean Delmas, Paul Devautour and Eric Lefèvre)
- "Une bataille 'oubliée' de la seconde guerre mondiale : Stonne, Le Mont Dieu, Tannay. 14-25 mai 1940" (Bernard Horen)
- War diary of the 41e BCC [on Antoine Misner's website]

End of Narrative.

Hope this helps those interested in this poorly understood period of WW2! My hat is off to both the author, and the membership of the France 1940 group at Yahoo! They are an amazing bunch, with several of the French members so kindly translating official records -aka "primary source materials- as well as other European members who have periodically translated other primary sources into English as well! I for one am privledged to associate with them (even if it is only *electronically*…)!!! :)

Leland R. Erickson
Metal Express
metal-express-net