"The Battle of Leyte Gulf’s Limited Tactical Legacy" Topic
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Tango01 | 25 Oct 2019 3:45 p.m. PST |
"Although of tremendous material consequence, the Battle of Leyte Gulf did not leave a lasting tactical or operational legacy. Some things became clear: The destruction of HIJMS Musashi confirmed that even the largest battleship could not survive concentrated carrier air power. Complex operations suffered from a lack of communications capabilities. The fog of war could intercede even in the context of otherwise good reconnaissance and communications technologies. But most of this was well understood before the battle began, and only confirmed impressions that naval analysts had already developed. The kamikaze was the big exception to this. On the late morning of October 25, 1944, Japan launched the first organized suicide attacks against the aircraft carriers of Taffy 3, which had just survived an assault by the battleships and cruisers of Admiral Takeo Kurita's Center Force. The attacks sank the escort carrier St. Lo, and damaged most of the others. These were not the first suicide attacks of the war, even in the Pacific, as pilots of damaged aircraft had often tried to inflict damage on their way out. Indeed, Germany developed similar units designed to ram American and British strategic bombers. However, they did represent the beginning of the most organized effort of any combatant to use suicide tactics for strategic effect. And just as important, they exposed a critical problem in how the USN thought about carrier operations…" Main page link Amicalement Armand
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