"Perfidious Albion's Role in the Napoleonic Wars" Topic

The recent psychopath discussion did have one positive result for me.

It was in the form of the subliminal discussion about Great Britain's active participation and their role in influencing the outcome of the Napoleonic Wars.

A Far more interesting topic of discussion, for me, than the original.

So, let me 'tee' this new discussion topic up for you in following way.

At the macro level, wars throughout antiquity are fought with two (2) main commodities: #1-Blood: Soldiers/Sailors, Armies/Navies and National Will and #2-Gold: National Finances and Commerce. These two commodities are entirely interwoven and mutually dependent on each other.

Thus, for a nation like Great Britain, it might not appear on the surface that they are paying the same 'Blood' tax as the other European nations at any given time, however on the 'Gold' side of this coin, they are contributing as much as 2x or 3x the $$ amount of any their contemporary allies at any particular moment in time.

Plus, I'd categorize Great Britain's overall Strategy during the Napoleonic Wars as one of attrition.

Neither of their contributions in 'Blood or Gold' was singularly decisive in bringing down Napoleon's Empire, however it did serve to wear them down over time, ending in defeat.

Before jumping to any immediate conclusions, keep in mind that it was the USA's economy that ultimately brought the Cold War to an end.

This is basically the scope and nature of the discussion I'd like to have with you about the Napoleonic Wars this time around.

I do think that if we're discussing the 'whys' rather than just the 'what happened' in history you get a much deeper understanding and see that the principal actors often had less free will than we (or occasionally they, for the most astute statesmen) imagine when it came to decisions. I agree that the wars against Napoleonic France were attritional, but only became so after Austerlitz and Jena. It took time for the Allies to learn lessons and the Blockade (which gets used again in the 20th century) is a slow burn, which nevertheless provokes two fatal errors.

I think Napoleon's biggest error wasn't Spain or Russia though, but his insistence that Britain had no part to play in Europe when he lacked the means to challenge Britain's maritime dominance. You can see Britain's concerns over any one country having political hegemony on the mainland for centuries, whether it's Spain, France or Germany. I'm not saying I would have done differently in NB's boots but economically France was weaker and all the battlefield victories didn't change that. Similarly you can see Germany become the major threat in the later 19th/early 20th centuries when it's not just the growth of the German navy, but it's economic might which is a threat (there was a great deal of speculative fiction around this).

As for coalition warfare, trying to quantify contributions exactly is unrewarding as it's usually difficult to isolate one in particular. As they say of the Second World War, 'The US gave money, the Soviet Union blood and the UK time'. Without any one of those three, Nazi Germany has a reasonable chance of avoiding obliteration. Likewise, whilst British subsidies helped pay *for* its allies to fight Napoleon (rather than paying them *to* fight – a crucial difference) without their willingness to keep coming back (even if only to secure their thrones) then Britain has to come to terms at some point.

I have heard the case of Napoleon's downfall as lack of money rather than men.Seemed very plausible, don't remember the details. Gotta have coin to wage endless wars.

We know Spain lost 100 men a day. Would like to know the red financials, but suspect we never will.

There is an interesting document here, on the financial aspects of both countries.

PDF link

The issue for NB would appear to be lack of access to borrowing at a reasonable rate due to being seen as an unreliable prospect, unlike Britain. Something he inherited from a period after the intervention in the AWI and French Revolution and which needed a longer period to right. 'The apparent puzzle of French war finance is resolved with a twist: it was the nation's weakness as a borrower that kept it on a specie standard not its strength'. (p.6).

Thus taxation and levies on occupied territory and allies to pay the bills whilst attempting to re-build credibiilty. I assume this financial imbalance was known across the Channel and was a factor in the methods employed. Certainly on the economic front, this means a war of attrition favours Britain, provided that you maintain the conflict and avoid giving France the chance to pause and demonstrate its fiscal reliability.

"British subsidies helped pay *for* its allies to fight Napoleon (rather than paying them *to* fight – a crucial difference)"

Finally! In a nutshell.

Something that has only just occurred to me, being slow in these matters: if Bourbon France's bankrupting itself to discomfit Britain 177-1783, what resources did post-Revolutionary France have with which to fight its French Revolutionary Wars, and subsequently- given that there was a a certain amount of disorder at the heart of government.

I shall read link with interest.

I wish that people who write off Britain's contribution in terms of men would remember the tens of thousands of British sailors lost at sea during this conflict!

Including my g.g.g.grandmother's brother, a midshipman on HMS Defiance, drowned off Ushant in December 1803

Don't forget that 850 men made an infantry baffalion, or the crew of a first rate warship. The warship, however, sailed with 100+ guns, all heavier than land-based field pieces.

On a guns per 1,000 men basis the Royal Navy was the most heavily armed military force of the era. A 120,000 strong land army might have had 400 guns if it was lucky. Just one first-rate at Trafalgar carried a greater throw weight.

42Flanker – I think that's a key takeaway from the analysis. That sustained period of time where France isn't a credible borrower has longer-term consequences. On the other hand, you could say that Britain was the Lanisters, always paying its debts. ;)

Thus you can see Britain's need to avoid economic disruption which would damage its own reputation, contrasting with NB's approach, which relies on maintaining a large army and knocking out Britain's allies faster than she can form coalitions. I can't blame him too much for trying, given 1805-6, but it's a flawed strategy which should have been abandoned in favour of a settlement and approach which doesn't leave Britain feeling aggrieved. Then focus on rebuilding French capacity to fight the longer war, ready for the next round, of your own choosing.

I would say it's a similar situation to the Second World War, except in Nazi Germany's case, conquest is essential to maintain growth – a negotiated peace bankrupts the country, particularly so after 1940. Ironically, for all the opprobrium heaped on Hitler's strategic sense, especially by his generals, he does understand that without Soviet oilfields the war is lost and all the prisoners and captured cities don't change that.

I would dispute the notion that Britain's overall strategy was one of attrition. Britain wanted the war over and done with as soon as possible. It may have ended up being effectively a war of attrition, but a knock-out blow would have been far more preferable to the British people.

@La Belle Ruffian,

Very interesting link. One bit stood out for me:

The government's fiscal state is captured in its budget for October 1795 to September 1796…Expenditures totalled 582 million livres. Valued in specie, payment of direct taxes raised 41 million, the forced loan 14 million, and income from state lands 16 million. The bulk of revenue was derived from two sources: taxes imposed on conquered territories of 105 million and money creation of 304 million livres

Would someone like to tell me again about how the French wanted to spread liberty, equality and fraternity throughout Europe?

It's ironic that I'd miss the One MAJOR decisive battle that the British did singlehandedly make to the Napoleonic Wars on the very anniversary of the battle itself!

That of course was the "214th Anniversary of the Battle of Trafalgar on 21 October 1805."

I humbly apologies to you all for this major historical 'faux pas' and have firmly admonished myself to help ensure I won't forget or make this mistake in the future! ;^)

And what effect did Trafalgar have on the Grande Armee?

And it occurred after the Austrian surrender at Ulm…

A seapower without the army to support it, has little effect on a self-sufficient land power such as France. That is why Great Britain financed the coalitions against France.

"And what effect did Trafalgar have on the Grande Armee?"

I recall a quotation along the lines of "Napoleon's Empire extended as far as his horse could wade into the sea".

"A seapower without the army to support it, has little effect on a self-sufficient land power such as France"

Well, that sea-power scuppered Bonaparte's ambitions in the Middle East; thwarted the self-sufficent land-power's invasion of the homeland; ensured the logistical support of the campaigns in Iberia; and screened the sanction-busting traffic of goods into Europe, while sustaining the fight for the sugar islands in the West Indies and maintaining contact with the East Indies.

Apart from that, perhaps it had no effect all.

Analsim, some further thoughts on the money side of things came t mind when I was looking at the Napoleonic Wars Sourcebook and the expenses section on p.388.

British expenditure highlights for 1810:
Navy £20.00 GBP million
Army and ordnance £23.00 GBP million
Loans to Allied nations £2.00 GBP million
Interest on the national debt £21.70 GBP million

French expenditure highlights for 1812:
Navy 149 million francs
Army 483 million francs
Public debt and pensions 142 million francs

Haythornthwaite highlights pensions included in the last figure so an even smaller proportion on the public debt. It certainly points towards the issues which faced NB and which Britain managed to avoid, no doubt helped by having 40% (IIRC) of the world's merchant marine to help find new markets.

On your theme of population, casualty figures vary but British deaths normally seem to be around around 300k+ Summary here link

Bodart has British casulaties around 25% of Allied killed. I suspect the size of British casualties is less immediately obvious (I was surprised) because they occur over a decade of conflict rather than in large, high-intensity conflict of a much shorter duration in the case of Austria, Prussia & Russia, who all took their turn before 1813 – someone should have a word with Austria (population 21 million) and Russia (population a lot more than that).

@ LBR

I make you right about the reason for heavy British casualties.

The Royal Navy was in pretty much continuous action from 1792 to 1815 and the army, in addition to campaigns in India, north and south America and so forth, also fought France on land (in the Peninsula) for longer than any other Allied nation. Between 1802 and 1815, for example, Prussia fought France for 28 months, Austria for 17 months, Russia (actively) for 32 months and Britain for 84 months.

Well, that sea-power scuppered Bonaparte's ambitions in the Middle East; thwarted the self-sufficent land-power's invasion of the homeland; ensured the logistical support of the campaigns in Iberia; and screened the sanction-busting traffic of goods into Europe, while sustaining the fight for the sugar islands in the West Indies and maintaining contact with the East Indies.

Apart from that, perhaps it had no effect all.

How did the Royal Navy 'thwart' an invasion of Great Britain in 1805? Villeneuve was defeated in October 1805 after the Grande Armee had left the Channel in order to meet the Austrian and Russian invasion. It looks to me that the British raised a coalition to get the French off the Channel because the Grande Armee and Napoleon scared the bejeesus out of the British as a threat. And that coalition was yet another example of the British paying for allies to fight the French…

Subsidies paid to Russia for 1805 was 300,000 pounds and to Austria was one million…

Indeed 4th Cuirassier. One further thing that is not immediately clear is Austrian or Prussian casualties of 1812 are included in the French & Allies tally, or British & Allies. I don't think theyre a huge factor though. What I find interesting about the era is the transition to industrial warfare and the scale of it, as well as the ideology which comes (and contniues) after a more pragmatic approach in the previous century. Religion had been fought over, then commerce and colonies, so we see wars of liberaton and unification instead.

On a slight tangent I do think that the British victories on land and sea, particularly in Europe, could be a double-edged sword. I believe the RN developed a sense of complacency over the next century as a result and the lack of large Continental campaigns and colonial policing meant a steep learning curve on land 1914-18 due the lack of experience in handling large formations against peer forces.

"British Subsidies to Allies 1793-1816 (GBP-millions)

Country Amt % Ave/Year

Austria 12.1 22.1% 9 subsidy years 2.5
Portugal 9.4 17.2% 10 subsidy years .9
Russia 9.4 17.1% 9 subsidy years 1.0
Prussia 5.7 10.3% 5 subsidy years 1.1
Spain 5.3 9.6% 8 subsidy years .7
Sweden 4.8 8.8% 7 subsidy years .7
Others 8.2 14.9%

Total 54.9 100%

Anyway, with the exception of Sweden (and maybe sometimes Austria? – I really don't know the details), the notion of British gold "causing" resistance to Napoléon is pretty silly.

For Russia and Prussia, the amounts paid are really trivial in terms of their total military expenditure – averaging only about 3% for Russia for the years when any subsidy was paid, and a bit over 1% in totalover all the years. It was more "good faith" than necessary. Will anyone argue that Russia did not capitulate in 1812 because the British were prone to send them GBP 1 million per campaign year?…"

TMP link

One reason that Alexander didn't capitulate in 1812 is that he didn't wish to end up like his father.

And in 1813-1814 Austria, Russia, and Prussia could not have taken the field because they were bankrupt.

And that material has already been posted.

"And that material has already been posted."

And yet…

Interesting book here:

link

That is an interesting book indeed, indeed. One of the earlier and clear cut examples of Daddy Warbucks-ing.

So, the British had a large Navy, but a small Army. The Austrian's were the reverse. A quick glance at a map would sort of suggest why?

Posting partly because my link now seems to be playing up, but on review of this thread, a thought comes to mind after Brechtel198's comment:

Paying someone else to do your fighting for you does not inspire admiration.

I'm sure George Washington was of a similar mind when accepting 1.3 billion French livres' worth of support. link

The United States and Prussia perhaps have more in common when it comes to the late 18th/early 19th centuries than I'd initially thought. Both funded and supported against a superior foe who should/could have detroyed resistance without external factors, a number of myths arising as a consequence and fed into the national narrative (https://bluechermuseum-kaub.de/en/ where I saw the iron jewellery given to Prussian women in exhange for items of value) and then rapid growth and industrial development in the following century, to become the two main threats to British dominance.

And before anyone wants to point out that French money wasn't decisive in and of itself and just part of the piece, I point them to 42Flanker's breakdown of payments to the Alllies above.

France was not a belligerent when they began supporting the US in the War of the Revolution. And their support before declaring themselves in alliance with the US was clandestine, and not overt. They became a belligerent after the surrender of a British army at Saratoga.

And the French sent troops and a navy to assist the US after becoming an active belligerent and also fought the British in the Caribbean.

Different situation; different circumstances.

Paying someone else to do your fighting for you does not inspire admiration.

Your statement wasn't qualified. I'm sure George understood his role as a proxy. Do I need to explain the concept though?

Anyway, I look forward to your response condemning France for its role in the American Revolution. Clandestine support is something you regularly lambast Britain for doing with French Royalists.

Different situation; different circumstances.

That's a useful quote which will save me a lot of time in future.

Covert/overt/schmovert- it was French money, and a lot of it.
Only becoming an overt belligerent after your main foe has suffered a major defeat at the hands of those you are paying to fight is even less dignified and worthy of admiration.

As far as the Napoleonic era is concerned- I think that if if one added up the total 'soldier/sailor days' of active war service against Napoleon over all those years- the UK would have a very high total compared to many other states.

The Americans were already fighting the British before any French aid arrived. And the French weren't paying the Americans to fight. They were giving military aid which is quite different.

You're right about French aid arriving after the revolutionary Americans had already started fighting and were doing pretty well, and the French thus saw a great opportunity to take advantage of this and have a bite out of their old enemy Britain. Not condemning this realpolitik motivation- but it's not exactly a noble act either.

As to paying people to fight- the French were certainly giving the revolutionary Americans a lot of money as part of their 'military aid' package.
So just how is that case different from the UK giving lots of money- and large quantities of muskets, uniforms, accoutrements, swords, saddles, harnesses and other military equipment items as needed- to continental powers in the Napoleonic Wars??

I'm not saying that Britain was better than France in this respect, but they are definitely either just as good or just as bad as each other- it can't be ok for the French to do it but not ok for the British. Unless a double standard is applied.

I'm not saying that Britain was better than France in this respect

Indeed. Rather than debate the rightness, it is better considering the return on the investment. For France, there was some salve to pride after the Seven Years War but massive debt which contributes to the end of the monarchy. Definitely a case of second and third order consequences.

For Britain, financially it was costly, but it secured the gains of previous decades, brought a balance of power on the Continent and enabled Britain to continue to trade, innovate and industrialise, all key aims of the government and ruling class, who made a mint.

British policy from the mercantile era to the end of WW2 was to resist a hegemon in Europe. I expect they thought it important for two reasons: one was to keep the continent open for trade, the second to ensure their holdings on the continent weren't threatened. Their actions during the Napoleonic Wars were consistent with that policy. When France lost the ability to dominate Europe (by the rise of Germany) they became natural allies for the UK.

Exactly Murvihill. Whilst British propaganda of the time may have focused on Napoleon as a convenient personality, Anglo-French enmity went back centuries by this time. I do think having a constitutional monarchy stood Britain in better stead for the era than most rivals and less subject to the whims of any individual who wished to leave their mark.

As Britannia may have said to the Corsican, "Not everything is about you".

Indeed, almost all of England's and then Britain's involvement in continental wars have been to prevent the rise of a unifying continental power.

A quick look at the geography shows why. The southern English coast has many cliffs and defensible stop lines. Whereas East Anglia's coast is a lot less defensible and the land behind it largely flat. The low countries and the Scheldt can almost be seen as a pistol pointed at the weak underbelly. Who controls that area is very important to the British.

Didn't Napoleon refer to Belgium as the dagger pointed at the heart of England? No wonder it was the cockpit of Europe and certainly behind the guarantees given to Belgium in the 20th Century.

FurTher to Murvihill's comment. The first British force sent to Europe at the start of 1793 was a smal brigade of the Guards (less than 2000 men) with the specific obeject of protecting British mercantile interests. Indeed their orders were specific as to their duties and restricted their movements geographically to avoid direct conflict with the French.

The key English, later British, foreign policy objective of the last 1,000 years has been to ensure that the mainland coast between Brest and Denmark does not fall under the control of a single power, as it is impossible to defend such a long front. The aim of British diplomacy has been to prevent this happening, as it is an existential threat.

Napoleon at one point controlled the coastline from Portugal to Poland. It was fortunate for Britain that he was such an inept naval strategist.

Brechtel is right, the Americans were already fighting the British; it isn't like the French offered them money to keep hostilities going or ignite them where they had cooled down. The opposite was true of Britain during the revolutionary and Napoleonic wars where they would frequently bribe people to make war on France.

A more apt analogy to British subsidies during the Napoleonic wars would be the British attempt to buy Russian support against the colonists and eventually to hire Hessians. It is curious that the one powerful, organic source of ready soldiery, the colonial Tories, was poo-pooed until it was too late.

Eventually, France put her money where her mouth was, with her own armed forces and not hired hands.

This British "Balance of power" rationalization is a convenient myth which resides alongside the "noble cause" and "states rights." The idea that Britain was self-sacrificing and dedicated to some objective global peace is one of the greatest feats of propaganda to ever fugue a culture.

It isn't like the French offered them money to keep hostilities going or ignite them where they had cooled down.'

Ahem, 'The clandestine aid from France arrived at a time when it was desperately needed… Estimates place the percentage of French supplied arms to the Americans in the Saratoga campaign up to 90%, but the gunpowder used was for all practical purposes supplied by the French entirely.' link

My original link also pointed out that Saratoga was succeeded by six large loans at a crucial time and despite an improvement in American credit following Yorktown, it had to default on the payment schedule at times, although ultimately repaying the debt later.

Similarly, British subsidies helped pay *for* its allies to fight Napoleon (rather than paying them *to* fight – a crucial difference) without their willingness to keep coming back (even if only to secure their thrones).

On the issue of the Balance of Power 'myth', could you outline your rationale for this belief? This is the first time you seem to have disputed something I've been saying since I joined the forum. I'm curious, as in addition to the Napoleonic Wars, England/Britian spent a chunk of the late 17th and first half of the 18th centuries fighting a dominant France in the Low Countries, then fighting two ruinous wars in the 20th Century, to prevent German hegemony?

Whereas between 1815 and 1914 Britain wasn't involved in land warfare in Central Europe at all.

The British government did and should have looked after its own interests, first and foremost. Note the 1796 invasion of Ireland, Napoleon's trip to Egypt, the Continental System and his quote:

'[France] must destroy the English monarchy, or expect itself to be destroyed by these intriguing and enterprising islanders…Let us concentrate all our efforts on the navy and annihilate England. That done, Europe is at our feet.' 1797 (soon followed by presenting a plan to invade England to the Directory).

It should be noted, assuming the monarchy was the key position in Britain was an error.

The idea that Britain was self-sacrificing and dedicated to some objective global peace

If you could highlight where people are suggesting this as England/Britain's motivation, I'd appreciate it.