"Napoleon as Psychopath / Balanced study deflates..." Topic

I'm still keen to hear more about these Austrian, Prussian and Russian naval victories. If there weren't any, I'm going to have to conclude that they were not "'willing to sacrifice' so many of their own people."

This was placed on the Napoleon Series:

Swedish & Russian Navies 1788-1809:

The Swedish Navy 1788-1809:

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Per Åkesson (April 2007). "The Swedish-Russian Sea Battles of 1790":

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Battle of Svensksund (9 and 10 July 1790):
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Articles Written by Göran Frilund:

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Sjöslaget vid Hogland (17 juli 1788):

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Illustrerad Svensk sjökrigshistoria: delen. Omfattande tiden intill 1680 by Gunnar Unger, 1908:

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Golovatjeff, V. F.: Ryska flottans operationer under kriget med Sverige 1788-90.

Correct Russian title:

Головачев, Виктор Филиппович (1821-1904). Действия русского флота в войне со шведами в 1788-90 годах : [Из лекций, чит. в зале Мор. уч-ща] [Соч.] В. Головачева – Санкт-Петербург: тип. Мор. м-ва 1871 [Морской сборник. 1871–1873.] 133 с.,

[1] л. план. ; 23 см. : prlib.ru/item/407339
Dag-Bok hållen på Kongl Galere Flottan åren 1789 och 1790 samt Fångenskapen i Ryssland. Av Anders Winberg. 1967. :

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Arméns flottas officerare under sengustaviansk tid. En socialhistorisk undersökning av officerskåren år 1809. :

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Hjalmar Börjeson (1881-1945). Biografiska anteckningar om örlogsflottans officerare 1700-1799. 1942. 230 p. : Did not find pdf copy.

Esbjörn Larsson. Arméns flottas officerare under sengustaviansk tid. En socialhistorisk undersökning av officerskåren år 1809. 1997. 43 p. :

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Русско-шведская война (1788—1790):

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Выборгское сражение [3.vii.1790] – наша полная победа в войне со Швецией:

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Шишков, Александр Семенович (1754-1841). Военные действия российского флота против шведского в 1788-1790 гг. Санкт-Петербург. 1826 г. [2], 291 с., 3 л. карт. ; 20. :

prlib.ru/item/403362
Аренс Евгений Иванович (1856-1931). История русского флота. Екатерининский период.

Санкт-Петербург. 1897 г. Did not find pdf copy.

Yevgenia Lupanova. Офицерский корпус русского флота: норма и девиация повседневной жизни. 1768–1812 гг. 2011. 263 p. :

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Лупанова, Евгения Михайловна. Служба офицера русского флота: нормы и нарушения норм: Вторая половина 1780-х гг. – 1812 гг. 2005. :

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oraya-polovina-1780-kh-gg-1812-gg

Гребенщикова, Галина Александровна. Балтийский флот в период правления Екатерины II: проблемы развития и роль в системе самодержавной монархии. 2008. :

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Many Russian and other pdf books on period:
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The fact that Wellington had an almost unbroken record of success in the Peninsula suggests that his army was of adequate size.

And that is only because of the support of the Portuguese and Spanish.

And it should also be noted that without the activities of the Spanish guerillas, Wellington would have been defeated just like Moore was.

Hmmm…

Cause and effect? Which is which?

You could easily turn that statement round the other way. Because of the activities of the Spanish guerillas and the support of the Portuguese and Spanish, Wellington didn't need a larger army…

And that is only because of the support of the Portuguese and Spanish.

So dear old Nappy had none but Frenchmen marching to his drumbeat in the Peninsula? The Duchy of Warsaw, Confederation of the Rhine and the Kingdom of Italy were what! Coat holders?

Moore was not defeated on the battlefield he had to retreat in the face of an army nearly 4 times the size but all the same, the British still remained in the Peninsula after the withdrawal of the main army.

I hate to bring this up, but naval battles in 1788 to 1790 predate the era.

Where's the evidence these port-skulking laggards were "willing to sacrifice" naval personnel on the same scale as Britain?

I previously overstated Austrian participation in the 1809 campaign at roughly 6 months. April to July is, of course, only three months. So the Peninsula was the only land front against France for three months more of the era than I had suggested. And, of course, throughout that period the British element was undefeated (I'm unaware of any tactical defeat of any predominantly British army during this campaign).

"And that is only…"

Suggests that the British were more adept diplomats than the Emperor then, and that the Army they fielded was ‘as big as it needed to be but as small as it could be', which seems eminently sensible and ultimately successful.

The title of this book is a mistake, obviously
link
It should read "Artillery of the Napoleonic Wars Vol II: Artillery in Siege, Fortress, and Navy, 1788-1815

because apparently the Napoleonic Wars started four years before the Revolutionary Wars….It's probably just a publisher's error.

The Peninsular War lasted 80 months, from late in 1807 to spring 1814. During that time, during only 23 months was there any other land theatre in which Napoleon was being opposed. So contrary to the claim above that Britain didn't place an army in the main theatre until 1815, in fact, for over 70% of the time it was fought, the Peninsular theatre was the only land theatre.

The years cited in the title are not a mistake. The series of wars began in 1792.

And there is information in both artillery books that predate 1792-it's called background information.

Have you read the book? Have you read Volume I?

The Royal Navy was defeated by the French Navy from time to time during the wars, such as at the first battle of Algeciras in July 1801 and the battle of Grand Port at Ile-de-France in August 1810 where the attacking British frigate squadron was completely destroyed losing all four frigates-one sank, one blew up, and the other two were captured.

There were also some ship-to-ship actions in which the French were successful, such as the action in which the French frigate La Venus defeated the Ceylon in the Indian Ocean in September 1809.

French privateers were very successful against the British (as were the American privateers in 1812-1814), capturing over 5500 British ships between 1793-1801 and a further 5300 from 1803-1814.

Nelson was defeated twice by Latouche-Treville in attacks against the Flotille National at Boulogne.

As for the War of 1812 against the United States, the Royal Navy lost most of the single ship actions at sea and in the two fleet actions on the Great Lakes, both British squadrons were destroyed.

Moore was not defeated on the battlefield he had to retreat in the face of an army nearly 4 times the size but all the same, the British still remained in the Peninsula after the withdrawal of the main army.

That goes back to the numbers of troops the British were willing to deploy to a campaign.

The British won the battle of Corunna, lost the campaign. And it should be noted, and taken into consideration, that Moore's army was not the only French target. They were still fighting Spanish armies at the same time. There were five Spanish armies in the field, the Army of the Left commanded by Blake; the Army of Estramadura commanded by Belveder; the Army of the Center commanded by Castanos; the Army of Reserve commanded by Palafox; and the Army of the Right commanded by Vives. Romana was also in the field with 20,000 Spanish. The total numbers of the five Spanish armies totaled at least 168,000.

And Moore did not face odds of four to one at Corunna. Moore had around 17,000 troops-Soult who faced him had 12,000 infantry available but attacked anyway. So, it looks like Soult was outnumbered, not Moore.

Further British failures:

The British won at Maida, lost the campaign.

The British lost in Flanders in 1793-1795.

The British lost in Holland in 1799.

The British lost in Holland in 1809.

The British failed in Holland in 1814.

The British failed in eastern Spain against Suchet.

Winning battles and then losing campaigns-which do you think is the more important?

That goes back to the campaign in the American south in the War of the Revolution-the American commander, Greene, never won a battle but did win every campaign and drove the British back to their only holdings-Savannah and Charleston, both of which were seaports. And they held them thanks to the Royal Navy.

And Wellington's campaigns in Spain were not a solid string of succesess, as he retreated as much as he advanced which is one of the reasons the campaigns took so long.

A good example is Wellington's victory at Talavera-he was forced to withdraw after the action as he could not maintain his position-another unsuccessful British campaign. After the failure at Burgos in 1812 after Salamanca, Wellington had to withdraw back to Ciudad Rodrigo.

Quite right Brechie me old mucker! Considering the inability of British military forces to win anything it's a miracle the old Empire covered a quarter of the Earth!

Maybe the rest of the world just felt sorry for us and gave in anyway?

"The British Lost in Flanders in 1793-1795"

That is a generalisation. It ignores thr Prussians, Austrians, Hanoverians and Hessians who were present at almost all the battles of that period in which the British were involved.

It doesn't ignore anyone. But it does highlight the fact brought up before that the British didn't field an army in the field that could operate without allied supporting troops.

You could easily turn that statement round the other way. Because of the activities of the Spanish guerillas and the support of the Portuguese and Spanish, Wellington didn't need a larger army…

Whatever you say…

4th Cuirassier- I've never been very interested in the Peninsular War but I'd never thought it as an 80 month campaign- that is genuinely quite impressive.

It's a fair point to make that the British didn't field an army that could operate without allied supporting troops.

But the French had also large numbers of troops from countries under their influence fighting in the Peninsula- lots of Poles, Italians, Neapolitans, Germans of various states, and of course substantial numbers of Spanish. If the French were able to field an army that could operate without allied supporting troops- why didn't they?

The Grande Armee was almost entirely French until 1807 which was after the formation of the Confederation of the Rhine, including the Duchy of Warsaw.

What Napoleon did with his great mistake of the Spanish 'adventure' was saddle himself with a continuous second front.

And the Peninsular War was not one continuous 80-month campaign, but a series of campaigns in Spain both in Spain and Portugal and with Suchet's campaigns in eastern Spain.

And when Austria decided to attack Bavaria in 1809, most of the Grande Armee was in Spain, with the exception of Davout's command in central Europe-90,000 troops including the heavy cavalry. To fight the campaign Napoleon had to organize two new corps under Massena and Oudinot and the allied states of the Confederation had to mobilize to add to the Army of Germany's combat power.

The British lost in Holland in 1799.

The British lost in Holland in 1809.

The British failed in Holland in 1814.

The British failed in eastern Spain against Suchet"

So please list the battles in those campaigns that the British lost. After all, one of the main reasons for an army is to win Battles and actions. Apart from Holland 1814, there isn't much battlefield excellence shown from the French /Dutch side.

The Grande Armee was almost entirely French until 1807

Up to 1808 what was the British army 'mostly' made up of?

Napoleon had to organize two new corps under Massena and Oudinot and the allied states of the Confederation had to mobilize to add to the Army of Germany's combat power

Again, you defeat your own argument Re British allies of the Spanish and Portuguese. Or is it excusable for Nappy to have allies but not for the British?

The British failed in eastern Spain against Suchet

But Suchet was as defeated and his French and their allies were kicked out. He didn't flee Spain for nothing. He had the ignominy of being beaten by the Spanish at Alcaniz. He was also Beaten at Castalla. Oh dear!

Oh for the want of you reading some better accounts of the Peninsula War.

@4thCuirassier

The title of this book is a mistake, obviously
link
It should read "Artillery of the Napoleonic Wars Vol II: Artillery in Siege, Fortress, and Navy, 1788-1815

because apparently the Napoleonic Wars started four years before the Revolutionary Wars….It's probably just a publisher's error.

The Peninsular War lasted 80 months, from late in 1807 to spring 1814. During that time, during only 23 months was there any other land theatre in which Napoleon was being opposed. So contrary to the claim above that Britain didn't place an army in the main theatre until 1815, in fact, for over 70% of the time it was fought, the Peninsular theatre was the only land theatre.

I hope you're not suggesting the British defeated Napoleon single handedly? That would require a heavy dose of egocentrism.

Well I'm glad you've finally got around to noticing the existence of the Royal Navy, Kevin. Presumably you now concede that manning the Royal Navy and the merchant marine, both of whom were equally in the front line, constituted significant continuous military mobilisations.

I'm not sure what the War of 1812 has to do with matters otherwise unless it's to concede this point. By the way, America lost more privateers to the Royal Navy than Britain lost merchant ships to privateers, and the Royal Navy did to US marine commerce what it had previously done to France. The big difference was that the French never lost their fleet flagship to an inferior British force in a single ship action, neither did any defeated French ship "unstrike" its colours and sail away after surrendering, neither did the French have to completely rethink the composition of their navy in the wake of their defeats.

It's good to see also that you can't refute the point about the Peninsular theatre being the only theatre for over 70% of the time. Likewise it's encouraging that you recognise that so much of the French army was in Spain that French troops became a minority in later "French" armies elsewhere. Quite an achievement for a non-existent theatre!

Incidentally, John Gill points out that in 1809 Bavaria fielded only 32,000 men out of a population of 3.2 million. That's 1%, despite Bavaria having no navy and no merchant marine that also needed manpower. Britain's regulars alone, according even to Elting, were double that despite having those to man and a militia besides.

So here's a little arithmetical problem for you. Whose military commitment is greater: someone who maintains an army of 40-50,000 men in the field for 80 months, or someone who maintains an army of 200,000 men for 3 months in 1809 then 8 months between August 1813 and April 1814?

@ MiniPigs: where did I say that?

@4th Cuirassier

I didnt say you "said" it. I said you "suggested" it. In the quote I re-posted from you above.

@Minipigs

"I said you "suggested" it. In the quote I re-posted from you above."

From where I am standing, you said you hoped he wasnt' suggesting-

-and he wasn't.

Oh, I see. Thus, 70% minimum British fighting Napoleon when everyone else was twiddling their thumbs, isn't quite single-handedly; it's more like "The Lions share"?

Something else, he, you and the dozen other UK posters on this thread also aren't suggesting is that they're all rabidly angry at Napoleon for some reason they don't seem to be able to fully verbalize.

Honestly, continental Europeans suffered a lot more during those wars and they don't get worked up nearly as much against Napoleon. I wonder what is really being channeled here?

Honestly, continental Europeans suffered a lot more during those wars and they don't get worked up nearly as much against Napoleon. I wonder what is really being channeled here?

I am from continental europe and see Boney as a git, he devastated large parts of Europe and a lot of non French soldiers had to die for his vainglory.

@ Minipigs

I have no idea where you are getting "70% minimum British fighting Napoleon" from, as I didn't write that and haven't said it. I suggest you reread. I said that between 1807 and 1814,

in 4.5 years of the seven…between Tilsit and Fontainebleau, the only theatre where the French were being confronted on land was the one where the British army and its Iberian allies were doing so.

My more precise calculation is that for 71% of the Peninsular War's duration (57 months out of 80), it was the only land front against France. It was therefore de facto the main theatre at those times, and British troops fought there, which refutes Kevin's misunderstanding that Britain didn't place an army in the main theatre until 1815.

At no point have I suggested the Peninsula was wholly or even predominantly a British effort.

The war at sea, in contrast, certainly was almost 100% a British effort. No nation other than Britain fought a naval action of any significance against France. It was the fact of total French defeat at sea that led to the Continental System, a diplomatic disaster that contributed significantly both to the initiation and the failure of the Spanish and Russian campaigns.

"You and the dozen other UK posters on this thread also aren't suggesting is that they're all rabidly angry at Napoleon."

Correct. I don't know which "dozen other UK posters" you have in mind, but I for one am not suggesting that. Quite right.

All,
In respect to assessing Napoleon's psycho/military character within the context of the British Army's overall performance during the Peninsula War, Wellington himself gave him high praise, when he commented after repelling Massena's Army of Portugal in 1811 that:

"If Boney had been there, we should have been beaten"
-Wellington to Wellesley-Pole, 2 July 1811.

Plus, you all have to try to keep in mind that fielding & sustaining 40-50,000 British soldiers in the Spanish Peninsula was probably the maximum number possible, given the limited transportation & resources available within the country. Made even worse, when you consider that Wellington (i.e. Great Britain) had to feed, equip and sustain another 40,000 Portuguese troops on top of that figure.

So- acknowledging that the British did not deploy a force in the Peninsula which operated without supporting allied troops, and acknowledging that the French did not do this either- what then is the difference between them in this respect?

Why would it be an issue of note that the British deployed with supporting allied troops in the Peninsula, but not an issue of note that the French deployed with supporting allied troops in the Peninsula? Both nations deployed in the Peninsula with supporting allied troops- what is the difference?

Actually one difference might be that the British were arguably more capable of supplying their armies and supporting allied troops by sea from UK than the French were capable of supplying their armies and supporting allied troops over the Pyrenees.

The difference was in the numbers deployed by both nations.

All,
In respect to assessing Napoleon's psycho/military character within the context of the British Army's overall performance during the Peninsula War, Wellington himself gave him high praise, when he commented after repelling Massena's Army of Portugal in 1811 that:

"If Boney had been there, we should have been beaten"

This presumes that psychopathy is a disadvantage in military command. It may be an advantage, or make no difference.

This very long thread seems to be an exercise in one poster not wanting the OP to be discussed and succeeding with the introduction of one non sequitur after another. Threads drift though.

There is a school of thought which derides the USA's part in the Second World War as the Arsenal of Democracy/Allied Paymaster, as Soviet troops died in their millions. It's not one I support, but I must assume Brechtel does. Strategic considerations tend to trump operational and tactical ones though and if we play the numbers without historical context game we end up with the Tiger as the best tank of WW2.

In this period France was dominant on land, Britain dominated the seas. Both needed allies to defeat the other but Britain was successful for a number of reasons. After the Franco-Spanish defeat at Trafalgar, Napoleon failed to secure the Danish and Portuguese fleets in turn and could not enforce the Continental System leading to catastrophic errors which undid his numerous successes. Britain on the other hand was able to secure a series of alliances to defeat their rival, an aim which was in their allies' interests too. Once imperialism replaced republicanism in France, Napoleon becomes one autocratic monarch amongst many and one who'd shown himself willing to betray and depose his peers, with a taste for nepotism. Their dynastic crowns are secure with a British victory though and they're given the necessary funds and supplies to help make this happen.That would appear to be a no-brainer if you were one of these monarchs, eager to return to a time when failure in war lost you a province or two rather than your birthright.

As for the British field armies (conducting operations around the world) the saying goes, amateurs study tactics, professionals study logistics. Britain's army was subect to a number of choices and contraints, as all are. As a collection of islands reliant on trade, Britain chose to prioritise its navy to secure its territory and wealth. Most serious historians would agree this was sensible and prudent. I also suspect the army's part post-civil war had not been forgotten – a large standing army sitting around can get restless.

Due to its navy Britain is able to exercise a degree of choice over theatres of operations, even if the loss of Hannover limits options in Germany. The most promising one (and which involves hundreds of thousands of French and allied troops) is the ongoing Peninsular campaign, fighting alongside Spain and Portugal. This war involves France committing between 8 and 10 times as many troops as Britain and still losing. Could a greater number of British troops have secured victory sooner? Maybe.

Constraints when fighting Napoleonic France in the Penisular are significant however:
- how many troops you can transport without seriously impacting maritime trade and operations.
- how many troops (and their allies) you can sustain and reinforce on campaign across the Bay of Biscay in the age of sail and whilst blockading French ports.
- how many troops you can quickly evacuate if necessary.
- how many trained support arms are available to conduct a range of operations, not just despatching infantry.

- finally, how many troops are required elsewhere around the world as Britain is deploying troops on every inhabited continent during this period (and the above constraints apply to these troops also).

It's interesting that when Britain does commit large land forces to Europe in the 20th Century it's as a junior partner to France or the US for the most part and the Channel ports are still a key factor.

In terms of the impact on Britain, Elting might claim on one occasion that the wars were no burden on manpower, but on page 311 he also claims that Britiah naval manning shortages were a factor in the war with the US. However, it should be noted that Swords is an older book with a specific and narrow focus and therefore we shouldn't expect too much from it.

And back on topic, I think Whirlwind makes an excellent point about psychopathy.

In previous discussione criticism has been directed at alleged apologists for Britain in this period, regarding the limited nature of parliamentary democracy in the United Kingdom and restrictions on civil liberties in this period.

I find it intriguing that in this thread such criticism is seemingly being matched by the complaint that the British government, in not imposing conscription, failed to honour some perceived obligation to field a greater percentage of the population in continental campaigns.

I'm not so convinced being a psychopath is always a beneficial trait in a general. While lack of empathy helpfully equips the psychopath to issue orders that get people killed, it also disables the psychopath's understanding of why some of his orders ("Fight to the last man") won't be obeyed.

The psychopath is then amazed when troops unexpectedly retreat or surrender in impossible situations, despite orders otherwise.

Being constantly surprised at what's happening is not a recipe for military success.

@4th Cuirassier,

Psychopathy doesn't have to mean that a psychopath doesn't understand other people's motivations, it just means that they don't care. One can empathize without sympathizing.

I believe inability to empathise, combined with extreme narcissism, are essential aspects of the psychopathic personality.

And are you 'assigning' these negative personality traits to Napoleon?

@ 42flanker

That's my understanding too. A defining trait of the psychopath is the inability to empathise. If they can empathise but not care, they're not a psychopath. They're just my wife's sister.

It's why, incidentally, the idea of the empathy test in Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep (part-filmed as Blade Runner) is so spot on. The replicant is born fully-grown but with no life memories or experiences, so it is given fake memories so that it will "remember" and approximate the correct responses to situations. As none of these memories actually happened to the replicant, none is actually capable of a proper response because they are so emotionally inexperienced. Analogously, someone with a karate master's memories wouldn't be very good at karate. The result with a replicant is an individual unable to exhibit empathy and who has to consult his or her memories to know what they are supposed to do in a given situation. Hence an empathy test that they do not know is an empathy test, which measures reaction time and involuntary responses, will detect them.

An individual without empathy in psychiatry is usually a psychopath, which explains why nobody wants them on Earth and they are killed on detection.

If the only people able to give orders that got people killed were psychopaths, only psychopaths could be army officers. It seems clear that in fact the required detachment can be schooled. Wellington and Napoleon were probably on the spectrum, but Wellington tried to preserve his mens' lives, and Napoleon realised the value of baubles, both of which argue against psychopathy, I'd say. I'm less sure of Zhukov.

@4th

Coffee snort re in-laws

Wellington tried to preserve his mens' lives, and Napoleon realised the value of baubles, both of which argue against psychopathy, I'd say

I'd agree that the preservation of men's lives would count against the idea of psychopathy. I am less convinced that realizing the importance of medals and so on is. That could be done for entirely instrumental reasons.

If the only people able to give orders that got people killed were psychopaths, only psychopaths could be army officers. It seems clear that in fact the required detachment can be schooled.

It would be a question of degree though, not an absolute, wouldn't it? A psychopath might have an advantage in not having the same qualms to overcome. A non-psychopath might have a more conservative level of risk in this regard, so the psychopath would appear as a bold, aggressive commander.

@ Whirlwind

True, a genuine clinical psychopath might have an edge. I do suspect he might also have offsetting disadvantages, though. Besides those I mentioned, how would a psychopath do when it came to second-guessing his opponents' intentions or dispositions? If he completely fails to "get" what drives and inhibits others, might he not be disastrously bad at that part?

With all that said psychopathy is apparently quite common. Murderous psychopathy far less so.

how would a psychopath do when it came to second-guessing his opponents' intentions or dispositions? If he completely fails to "get" what drives and inhibits others, might he not be disastrously bad at that part?

It is a good question. I think that it is possible that it might not actually be a disadvantage in assessing actual future actions in a particular environment (like military affairs), although it might be in others (his relationship with Josephine, for instance). Most people overweight immediate impressions in decision-making, so being distant could actually help. The other, empirical, aspect is whether Napoleon's particular style of command was actually based on successful prediction and pre-emption of his opponents' moves. My intuitive impression is that wasn't a particularly strong suite of his and his successes were based on other things: primarily an extraordinary level of personal activity and energy and also a nearly superhuman ability to make rational decisions under stress.

yes a psychopath or a person suffering from personal disorders lost his connections with the real world, according to Boney the Russian Emperor would be within three weeks on his knees and beg for peace, later it was – after une bonne bataille – later it was – after Moscow is occupied, complete delusions, regardless of reality, also like the Russian winter, Boney made jokes about the warning of Caulaincourt – and then reality hit.

However, it should be noted that Swords is an older book with a specific and narrow focus and therefore we shouldn't expect too much from it.

I would think that an organizational history of the Grande Armee was anything but a 'narrow focus.'

An 'older book'? Can you name a better one in English on the Grande Armee?

'an organizational history of the Grande Armee'

Brechtel, surely you can see that you've answered your own question? If we're discussing the geo-political context of the era why would you want to use Swords to discuss Britain in particular, especially when the text contradicts itself on this subject? It seems illogical.

Minipigs

Something else, he, you and the dozen other UK posters on this thread also aren't suggesting is that they're all rabidly angry at Napoleon for some reason they don't seem to be able to fully verbalize.

No, we just acknowledge him for what he was, the enemy. Good, bad, strategic genius, total cluster or whatever, he was the enemy. If you're American you won't see him as the enemy. It's no different to me writing about Ho Chi Minh and then wondering why Americans were getting excited,

If we're discussing the geo-political context of the era why would you want to use Swords to discuss Britain in particular, especially when the text contradicts itself on this subject? It seems illogical.

It's military history, not political history. I don't see that it's 'focus' is narrow at all. It covers a very large subject.

Where does the text 'contradict itself'?

'It's military history, not political history.'

And again you answer for me Brechtel. If you want to bring political alliances and motivations, as well as economic drivers into the discussion, then relying on Swords is akin to bringing a knife to a gunfight.

When Elting wrote this on P. 505 'As for manpower, these wars were no great burden on England' I can give him the benefit of the doubt and assume he just forgot writing this on P.311 'England was also running short of men for the ships it had'.

Getting into another land and naval war as a consequence of naval manpower shortages (as Elting writes) can hardly be seen as 'no great burden' though.

I am still intrigued by Kevin's belief that the Napoleonic wars began in 1788. Presumably there'll be an erratum insert to that effect in his books?

Where did I ever state that the Napoleonic Wars began in 1788?

Where are you getting your ideas? You're playing the red herring game…

Getting into another land and naval war as a consequence of naval manpower shortages (as Elting writes) can hardly be seen as 'no great burden' though.

Do you know what the maximum strength of the Royal Navy was during 1793-1815?

And comparing manpower requirements and standards between an army and a navy are two completely different subjects.

'Do you know what the maximum strength of the Royal Navy was during 1793-1815?'

A more pertinent question might be, did Elting?

Anyway, question asked and quotes given Brechtel. No differentiation between army and navy in the first one given. They can't both be right.