"Napoleon as Psychopath / Balanced study deflates..." Topic

The British manpower contribution for ground forces with a population of 15 million was not great and did not put any great strain on the native population.

And Great Britain was the coalitions' paymaster.

See Guineas and Gunpowder by John Sherwig.

So much for your 'ruins.'

If you don't know the answers to this may I suggest you do a little research on the subject which may both inform and surprise you? You should also try researching the Yeomanry, Volunteer Infantry, Artillery and Cavalry.

If you know the answer to the question, then perhaps you could supply the answer to it.

If you cannot or will not, then apparently you don't appear to know it either.

British subsidies to the major powers of the coalitions 1792-1816 (in pounds sterling not adjusted to present day value):

Austria: 13,435,327.

Prussia: 5,632,769.

Russia: 9,889,904.

Spain: 6,779,118.

Portugal: 3,468,606.

Anyone want to argue the point that Great Britain was not the allied paymaster?

It should also be noted that although the Royal Artillery (both horse and foot) were excellent, there was not enough of them and the British-subsidized, trained, uniformed, and equipped Portuguese artillery (also excellent) had to supplement it in Peninsula for Wellington to have an effective artillery arm.

So both parts of Kevin's eccentric claim – that Britain shirked fighting and paid others to do it – now lie in ruins.

Please point out where I stated that 'Britain shirked fighting.'

The British did not place an army in the main theater of war until 1815. Spain and Portugal were secondary theaters.

Spain certainly wasn't a secondary theatre, Boney himself went there with some of the best units of France, Britain fought on other fronts as well, the Low Countries, the Mediterranean, etc., Glover wrote a good book on this.

In case the Portuguese supplied an excellent artillery arm, to support Wellington's army, what else should an ally do, supporting a foreign nation that helped them to stay independent and not under the tyranny of Boney?

Britain fought on many fronts – this is pretty evident and not without success.

In case ignoring militia and volunteers is ignoring a lot of manpower which was precisely raised to fight off a French invasion. The Bavarian National Guards were initially raised to get rid of the tyranny of Boney, and then some of those battalions volunteered to serve with the regulars on foreign (French soil) – but should those armed forces ignored which stayed behind, certainly not.

And I agree that Le Breton demolished the myth about the British paymaster – no country would fight just for the money alone, there were much more geostrategic issues behind those wars other than mere money.

But the point is, especially in 1813-1814, the allies could not have taken the field without British subsidies. So the idea that Great Britain was the allies' paymaster is valid and accurate. And the reference for that has been given along with the subsidy totals for Austria, Prussia, Russia, Portugal and Spain.

The other countries that were given British subsidies were Hanover, Hesse-Cassel, Sardinia, Baden, Brunswick, Hesse-Darmstadt, Sweden, the various German Princes, Sicily, and Denmark as well as various minor powers.

See pages 365-368 of Sherwig's book mentioned above.

Spain might have been the main theater when Napoleon was there because that's where the action was. As soon as Napoleon found out that Austria was once again preparing for war, he left and the main theater once again became central Europe.

Spain and Portugal were secondary theaters from at least 1809-1814. If they were not, Napoleon would not have withdrawn troops from there in 1811-1812 and in 1813-1814.

For me it is an invalid argument, Britain was an Ally, so support in any way was a must, in contrast to Boney, Britain had the decency to pay for allies – in stark contrast to the man waster Boney, what had the Saxons to do in Russia, or the Bavarians, or the Prussians, or German troops in Spain, by Napoleon the terrible, they had to send soldiers without payment to be wasted for his megalomaniac goals. I cannot see that Saxony got millions of Francs to send their sons to insane military undertakings, for example.
in case of suggested reading, I refer you to the posts of Le Breton-
The Spanish and Portuguese fought for their indepence – a noble goal.

This goes on and on and on. Ultimately, Bonaparte won some wars (even though any sane person counts the revolutionary/empire period as one huge war) won a lot of battles, but in the end he lost and died a squalid death. And that's the fact that a few people find hard to swallow. I've no doubt that someone will be along in a minute to say that if I can't quote that from chapter, paragraph, sub-paragraph and numbered line, that it's an unqualified opinion.

Napoleon greatly regretted the distraction of the Peninsula, no? Did he not later refer to it as the 'Spanish ulcer.'

If it was a side-show it was a highly expensive side-show, diverting resources he could well have used elsewhere.

I'm confused, was the British strategy the wrong one?

Acting as the ‘paymaster' for other European nations (who were going to be at war with France anyway), using its navy rather than an army as its main strategic weapon, while conserving its manpower to keep the factories working to pay for it all, while using aforementioned navy to ensure the British Isles were never invaded (meaning the militia etc were never needed overseas in great numbers) all seems eminently sensible and ultimately successful to me.

Judging a nation's commitment to the cause by the numbers killed seems rather odd to me.

No, Brechtel thinks the British strategy was the wrong one because it led to the downfall of his hero Napoleon.

Brechtel thinks the British strategy was the wrong one because it led to the downfall of his hero Napoleon.

Where did I state that 'British strategy was the wrong one?

And sorry to disappoint, but Napoleon is not my hero. I admire both him and the Grande Armee, but he is not my hero.

Acting as the ‘paymaster' for other European nations (who were going to be at war with France anyway)…

Not without additional funding that the British government provided. Russia, Prussia, and Austria would have been unable to take the field in 1813-1814 without an influx of British money, supplies, uniforms, and weapons (including artillery) as they were bankrupt.

But British killed at sea and in Spain don't count. Militia don't count either if they're British.

the British Militia Volunteers & Yeomanry could hardly sustain the comparison with the Garde Nationale, Austrian Prussian Landwehr and others Opolchenie largely involved in the continental wars from 1792 to 1815,

the british militiamen could only see the war as enlisted volunteers into the regular army but their own units didn't serve at all in the various theaters of operations

it was not before the end of the period in november 1813 that the Parliament allowed the service abroad :
3 Provisional Battalions of Militia forming a brigade of the 7th Division sailed for the south of France in march 1814 but they arrived too late to participate in any combat and sent home shortly afterwards…

it was the whole British Militia Volunteers and Yeomany units contribution to the war in Europe, 3 battalions who didn't see the battlefield having landed in southwestern France few weeks and days before the Armistice in 1814,

only one poor rural under-populated French Departement has been maybe able to raise more battalions for the war to the National Guard in 1792-1815 than the whole United Kingdom

Great Britain's best weapon and unit has always been Saint Georges Cavalry

"For me it is an invalid argument, Britain was an Ally, so support in any way was a must, in contrast to Boney, Britain had the decency to pay for allies"

Like Portugal? Threaten to destroy their fleet if they didn't side with the British – but dare not play the man and land troops to defend their ally. How about the Danes? How did they fare without instigating hostilities against the British? And the Ottomans? It isn't just the money/subsidies paid, it is the underlined threat of violence of one does not cooperate. The British were not benevolent.

Napoleon's allies were for the most part, their own kingdoms and thus paid for their own troops.

So in review of additional facts, it appears it is you that has the invalid argument.

"No, Brechtel thinks the British strategy was the wrong one because it led to the downfall of his hero Napoleon."

And you choose to heap praise upon your own nation and belittle Napoleon. What, do you believe no one noticed what you were doing? No shame in it, just don't pretend you aren't also guilty.

I am interested in this use of the term 'paymaster,' where the invitation seems to be to focus on the generic element 'master,' rather then the specific 'pay.' Bearing in mind that a paymaster is an important administrative functionary within a military structure but in no way does he have an executive role.

The implication also seems to be that the funds provided by the British government constituted bribe, without which the allied armies would not have considered taking the field against France.

Breton's thorough posts on the subject (on a previous thread), referenced earlier, make clear that such a suggestion is simply not valid.

Guilty?

Ultimately, Bonaparte won some wars (even though any sane person counts the revolutionary/empire period as one huge war) won a lot of battles, but in the end he lost and died a squalid death

Hardly belittling Napoleon. The British/allies won, the French lost. It's fact not opinion.

Like Portugal? Threaten to destroy their fleet if they didn't side with the British – but dare not play the man and land troops to defend their ally. How about the Danes? How did they fare without instigating hostilities against the British? And the Ottomans? It isn't just the money/subsidies paid, it is the underlined threat of violence of one does not cooperate. The British were not benevolent.

Napoleon's allies were for the most part, their own kingdoms and thus paid for their own troops.

Both Portugal and Denmark were threatened by Napoleon. In both cases, Britain would have allied with them had they chosen to resist but would have been at war with them had they chosen to give in to Napoleon's threats, in which case they would have attacked the fleets anyway. Also in both cases, seizing the respective fleets was a specific aim of Napoleon, in addition to enlarging his continental system. So responsibility for both incidents ultimately lies with Napoleon. He merely had to respect their neutrality but didn't.

We aren't still pretending that any of the satellite states were meaningfully independent in any way, are we? The size of their armed forces was set by Napoleon, the amount of money they had to pay for French troops and to France directly was set by Napoleon and they had to join in military operations as decided by Napoleon. Do you seriously think that it was the wish of the Portuguese and Spanish to fight in Denmark and Russia? Do you seriously think that Westphalians and Neapolitans wanted to die for Gerona?

The implication also seems to be that the funds provided by the British government constituted bribe, without which the allied armies would not have considered taking the field against France.

You're reading too much into it and now resorting to semantics.

The British funded the coalitions in their war against France because the main continental allies could not have taken the field against France in 1813-1814 because they were financially bankrupt. Why do you think that Prussian troops wore modified imported British uniforms in 1813-1814?

I'm still intrigued by the wriggling going on in respect of Kevin's original sneer:

why were the allied nations 'willing to sacrifice' so many of their own people.

Except, of course, for the British as they preferred to be the coalition paymasters.

So what Kevin is saying here is that the British were unique among the allies in being averse to suffering battle casualties. They "preferred" to spend money.

When challenged on the first part of this offensive rubbish, Kevin's response was to cite the number of regulars in the British army, as though this supported anything.

When it was pointed out that the British military contribution was twice as great when properly including the militia (who provided a steady supply of trained men to the army) and the 120,000-strong navy, Kevin switched to arguing that the lack of a field army proved his claim.

When it was pointed out that there was a British field army in a place called Spain between 1807 and 1814, the claim morphed again, this time to the rather potty "but that wasn't the main theatre".

In fact this is also inanely inaccurate because in the latter part of 1807, and in all of 1808, 1810, and 1811, and in the first half of 1812, the Peninsula was the only theatre in which France faced military opposition. For half of 1809 the Austrians joined in, at which point Britain opened a tertiary theatre with the Walcheren expedition. So in 4.5
years of the seven (that's more than half, Kevin) between Tilsit and Fontainebleau, the only theatre where the French were being confronted on land was the one where the British army and its Iberian allies were doing so. In one of the other years, British troops were fighting in two of three theatres. And throughout the entire era, the only navy confronting France at sea and meting out defeats was the Royal Navy.

The only construction one can put on all these claims is that in Kevin's world view, being "willing to sacrifice" lives apparently doesn't count if the lives lost are those of sailors, or militiamen, or are lost in a theatre where the British army fought. Nope, they're the wrong type of lives lost, and can be ignored so as to reach the conclusion debunked by Le Breton that the British contribution was just money.

The main states of the Confederation of the Rhine (Bavaria, Wurttemberg, Baden, Saxony, and Hesse-Darmstadt) were independent states who joined the Confederation because they did not want to be ingested by either Austria or Prussia. Both Austria and Prussia wanted to dominate in Germany and the states previously wanted to maintain their independence and sovereignty, which Napoleon guaranteed.

Choosing Westphalia and Naples as examples of loyal French allies is absurd and clearly overlooks the overall contribution to the Grande Armee that the allied states provided.

And the contributions of the Duchy of Warsaw and the Kingdom of Italy should not be overlooked. The troops of these two states were excellent. The example of the performance of Napoleon's allied troops in 1809 says it all I think.

As for Denmark, Great Britain attacked her twice unprovoked and in the second attack conducted a terror bombing of Copenhagen, something Napoleon never did.

And here we go yet again. Kevin brings up "but the British bombarded Copenhagen" and then has the nerve to say "something Napoleon never did" So he didn't cause the deaths of untold numbers of civilians in Russia and Spain then? Hardly comparable are they.

The terror bombing of Copenhagen was not provoked and the British attacked a neutral country and bombarded a city in order to seize the Danish fleet.

The British and Portuguese forced the Portuguese peasantry to evacuate the territory in front of Massena's advance and made no plans to support the forced refugees. Over 40,000 of them died of starvation and disease in and around Lisbon because of that decision. And they were forced to evacuate on pain of death.

Napoleon never resorted to actions such as those. In point of fact, when it was recommended to him to conduct such a course of action in Saxony in 1813 he refused as Saxony was an ally.

This is getting tedious. So 600,000 civilians didn't die after Napoleon invaded Russia then. Or a couple of hundred thousand in Spain.

Sourcing?

And it should be remembered that Moscow was set on fire by its own mayor.

And how many Spanish civilians died during Moore's retreat to Corunna or in the sackings of Ciudad Rodrigo, Badajoz, and San Sebastien?

I would submit that all the belligerents were guilty of civilian deaths, some deliberate and some not.

Do you have credible sourcing for your numbers?

Sourcing

Do you have credible sourcing for your numbers?

It's like a broken record. Try the internet, or is that not highbrow enough. I give up.

And how many Spanish civilians died during Moore's retreat to Corunna or in the sackings of Ciudad Rodrigo, Badajoz, and San Sebastien?

Who was it who invaded Spain, again? But those deaths anyway weren't in the main theatre, Kevin. Deaths not in the main theatre don't count.

Casualties of the Napoleonic Wars:

David Gates estimated that 5,000,000 died in the Napoleonic Wars. He does not specify if this number includes civilians or is just military.

Charles Esdaile says 5,000,000–7,000,000 died overall, including civilians. These numbers are subject to considerable variation. Erik Durschmied, in his book The Hinge Factor, gives a figure of 1.4 million French military deaths of all causes. Adam Zamoyski estimates that around 400,000 Russian soldiers died in the 1812 campaign alone—a figure backed up by other sources. Civilian casualties in the 1812 campaign were probably comparable. Alan Schom estimates some 3 million military deaths in the Napoleonic wars and this figure, once again, is supported elsewhere. Common estimates of more than 500,000 French dead in Russia in 1812 and 250,000–300,000 French dead in Iberia between 1808 and 1814 give a total of at least 750,000, and to this must be added hundreds of thousands of more French dead in other campaigns — probably around 150,000 to 200,000 French dead in the German campaign of 1813, for example. Thus, it is fair to say that the estimates above are highly conservative.

Civilian deaths are impossible to accurately estimate. While military deaths are invariably put at between 2.5 million and 3.5 million, civilian death tolls vary from 750,000 to 3 million. Thus estimates of total dead, both military and civilian, range from 3,250,000 to 6,500,000.
link

@ Brechtel "You're reading too much into it and now resorting to semantics."

Well, I am glad about that, although semantics is a useful way to analyse loaded phrases like "pay master" or "terror bombing." ( No point repeating the through rebuttals of both that and the Torres Vedras outrage offered on Napoleon Series, since you stuck your virtual fingers in your ears then presumbly will again)

"Napoleon never resorted to actions such as those."
I wonder how the citizens of Saragossa felt as the French shells landed in their streets.

@ 42flanker

Saragossa doesn't count as it wasn't the main theatre. Only deaths in the main theatre count.

My mistake

I wonder how the citizens of Saragossa felt as the French shells landed in their streets.

The citizens of Saragossa participated actively in the defense of the city. Does that not make them combatants?

babys and children, old people, if any other than Boney would do it – outrage – but for him – of course excuses, as far fetched as they may be, well I see the thread has run the usual course, no need to contribute further.

"The citizens of Saragossa participated actively in the defense of the city. "

Reflecting on that observation would doubtless have made them feel a good deal better.

" So the idea that Great Britain was the allies' paymaster is valid and accurate"

It would also be no surprise to anyone who took O level history in the 1980s, it was part of the syllabus as I recall.

An estimated 34,0000 out of an original 55,000 population is thought to have died during the siege of Saragossa, the 'Florence of Spain'- which was substantially destroyed.

So the idea that Great Britain was the allies' paymaster is valid and accurate

It has already been shown conclusively to be invalid and inaccurate.

On the other hand, both Revolutionary and Napoleonic France and their armies were sustained by forced "contributions" (i.e. plunder) from occupied states.

Sam Mustafa's book gives the details on this for Westphalia, which are staggering.

So for instance, the already large Westphalian army cost just under 1 million francs a month to maintain; Westphalia had to contribute the same again to maintain French troops.

But on top of that, Napoleon levied extra charges, for the 1812 campaign; and then 24 million francs for his March 1813 campaign. All this is in addition to additional revenues paid to France, and interest payments on the "debts" that Napoleon had assessed that Westphalia owed to France from its creation.

The Kingdom of Westphalia is not a good example for the Confederation of the Rhine.

It was a kingdom 'constructed' by Napoleon out of other small German states, or parts of those states, and was not as cohesive as the major states of the Confederation.

It has not been 'shown conclusively' that Great Britain was not the allies paymaster. The data of the British subsidies for the major allied states has been posted.

On the other hand, both Revolutionary and Napoleonic France and their armies were sustained by forced "contributions" (i.e. plunder) from occupied states.

I have just been reading about the financial contributions made by the Kingdom of Italy to Napoleon. Military spending went up from 20 million lira in 1802 to 49.4 million lira in 1811 – 30 million of which went to the upkeep of the French (not Italian) army.

I'll quote the introduction:

It is by now generally agreed that Napoleon saw the satellite states primarily as ameans of financial support. Taxation in France could not provide sufficientrevenues to support imperial and military campaigns, particularly after 1806; thiscreated the need for contributions in money and supplies from the satellite statesto cover his military expenses. Naturally, the more resources the French rulerobtained from those territories, the less he needed to secure from France,thereby diminishing the risk of internal opposition to his policies. It is estimated that between 1804 and 1814 the conquered territories paid half of Napoleon's military expenses. In addition to taxes and cash requisitions, the French Emperoralso compelled the satellite states to maintain costly national armies, which he integrated into the Grande armie. In sum, without the massive financial support from occupied Europe, Napoleon would have been unable to maintain and expand his empire.

Britain's contribution to the Allies was relatively small beer compared to this massive extraction of resources. Only Britain's generosity in helping Portugal and Spain, victims of Napoleonic aggression, is of equivalent ratio, but on a much smaller scale. In fact, the simplest way of looking at is:
Britain used a small but significant portion of its wealth to help Europe fight off Napoleonic imperialism.
France extracted massive resources from Europe to facilitate Napoleonic imperialism.

The validity of Great Britain being the allied paymaster is demonstrated in the Introduction to John Sherwig's Guineas and Gunpowder, pages 11-12:

'In 1793 the combined armies of all France's opponents numbered about 350,000 men; during the climactic campaign of 1814, Russia and the German powers alone threw nearly twice that many troops against Napoleon. Without British aid in money and arms, this tremendous expansion of the allied war effort would scarcely have been possible.'

'The economic weakness of the continental powers in 1793 made their war with France less of an unequal struggle than it appeared. Prussia was on the verge of bankruptcy, while Austria had to borrow heavily abroad to meet her current expenses. Thanks to Catherine the Great's wars with Turkey, Russia's economic health was even worse than he neighbors'. The Tsarina staved off disaster only by massive loans from Dutch bankers and by flooding her country with paper money.'

'By the end of the first year of the war, the resources of the continental allies began to dry up and they turned to Britain for help. Thereafter, Britain had to bear not only her own war costs, but a part of her allies' burden as well…'

Regarding the British army, Sherwig is also both consistent and accurate in his assessment. As stated in pages 14-15, again in the Introduction of his book, he states:

'Why did the [British] army operate so often in the shadow of defeat, at least during the first half of the war? Part of the answer is to be found in the government's persistent misuse of its land forces. Pitt dribbled away manpower in expeditions to Flanders, the West Indies, Toulon, Corsica, and in amphibious attacks on the coast of France.'

'…The quality of the officers who led the raw recruit of 1793 inspired no confidence…Incompetence was more conspicuous at the higher levels, but was not confined there…Before the century ended the army began to show improvement, although poor management, bad training, and incompetent officers never entirely disappeared.'.'

'In Wellington's hands, the army in the Peninsula became a deadly weapon, but it was not exclusively a British force. By 1814 nearly half the men in that army were Portuguese and Spanish levies. The nationalists fought side by side with their British allies, and received their arms, clothes, food, pay, and supplies under the British foreign aid program.'

The Peninsula was a secondary theatre, Kevin, remember? Well, except for the 4.5 out of 7 years when it wasn't, but we'll ignore those.

Deaths there don't count. Nor do the deaths of sailors. What matters is how many regulars you have in your army. If you don't have many then you are, uniquely, not "willing to sacrifice" their lives, unlike the other continental powers.

Glad we cleared that up.

Being the ‘paymaster' still seems to me like a pretty sensible, and ultimately successful, strategy for the British to follow.

And going back to the OP, wouldn't a willingness to sacrifice the lives of his men be something a psychopath would be more prepared to do, compared to the average European despot of the period?

Then you'll have to at least add Alexander and Francis to the 'psychopath' listing. Francis pursued wars of revenge against France and Alexander couldn't have cared less how many Russians died as long as he achieved what he wanted.

And he had at least accepted the murder of his own father…

…except for the 4.5 out of 7 years when it wasn't, but we'll ignore those.

And which 4.5 years were those?

Deaths there don't count. Nor do the deaths of sailors. What matters is how many regulars you have in your army. If you don't have many then you are, uniquely, not "willing to sacrifice" their lives, unlike the other continental powers.

No one said that. And to infer that anyone did is wrong. Apparently you're constructing a strawman argument.

Being the ‘paymaster' still seems to me like a pretty sensible, and ultimately successful, strategy for the British to follow.

As in fight against Napoleon to the last Austrian, Prussian, and Russian?

"No British servicemen were harmed in the making of this motion picture."