"Worst Generals of WWII" Topic

I see mkenny that you take after Montgomery in your personal insults and mocking manner. You actually accused me in a previous post of lying. I thought people like your were only found on the Napoleonics Discussion Board but I see I am wrong. Oh well.

And for the record, factual mistakes do not cancel out the overall historical reporting of an author. Colossal Records has its own problems and has been rightly criticized in too easily accepting Montgomery's own accounts.

Of course I have to say regardless, no one here could have probably done any better. Than any of the General mentioned here or others. I'm not only talking about the Vets here but all those who had not served.

But again hindsight is 20/20 …

And yes, everyone is entitled to an opinion. Regardless of it's "worth". We are having a discussion so generally all input should be welcomed.

D'Este's book is still considered an important account of the Normandy campaign.

Well I think it has been surpassed and certainly wouldn't recommend it to anyone as a single source. There remains the serious question of accuracy or objectivity.

Montgomery's consistent lack of tact is recounted in multiple instances. It is not a trivial issue.

We will have to agree to disagree on that. I don't see it impacting on his ability to command effectively. Rommel was apparently quite a bully. One of the generals that served with him after seeing James Mason's performance of him asked what he thought of it replied "Not bad, but there was no swearing or shouting!"
I would not dispute Auchinleck's role in restoring 8th Army's fortunes and holding El Alamein, but in that he was greatly helped by Rommel's headlong pursuit which meant Afrika Korps arrived exhausted, short of supplies and with insufficient strength to break through. As for the morale of 8th Army he did his bit, but he never visited my great uncle's unit. Taking the time to come and talk to them meant a lot to the ordinary soldier.
For any memoirs one should approach them with caution as it is inevitable that the author is going to paint themselves in the best light. One should never take them at face value. That would apply to Monty as much as a Manstein, Ike, Guderian etc. As for Liddell Hart the charges levelled against him are more serious. He is accused of inventing history by persuading German generals to credit him as a major influence on their thinking prewar when in fact he was virtually unknown. His role in the creation of the Rommel myth is also called into question. This calls in to question his objectivity as a historian. I wouldn't take anything he said without checking it first, which limits his usefulness as a source.
Finally Monty's conduct of the pursuit after El Alamein. The plan to defeat the Axis in North Africa had already been made. Monty's job was to get 8th Army to Tunisia in a fit state to fight and well supplied. 8th Army has also just fought a very tough battle and had suffered casualties, lost a significant number of tanks and was not in a good position to press a vigorous pursuit. Unlike the luxury Patton had in Normandy of launching a fresh Army in pursuit. In addition at that the time the British Army was a relatively blunt instrument just getting to grips with combined arms operations, close air support and mobile operations and I think Monty was rightly concerned that loosing the armour in hot pursuit would lay them open to losses for little return.

Colossal Records has its own problems and has been rightly criticized in too easily accepting Montgomery's own accounts

It is called'Colossal Cracks'. I bet you have never even seen the book and are just selectively using Amazon reviews? Anyway given that I never used anything in Hart's book to defend Monty what is your point?

link

You actually accused me in a previous post of lying.

You did lie. You said what you read made you form an opinion and this opinion was, in your opinion, now a'fact'. That is a lie. If you had just said 'I believe…………' then it would be an acceptable claim

It is glaringly obvious that the Monty-Bashers in this thread are relying old outdated sources/works. They seem to have one or two books they consider the final word. After finding 2 or 3 versions of this knocking-copy they accept it as 'fact' and stop any further reading on the matter. They store this 'slow/cautious/bad Monty' version in their heads to be trotted out and defended to the death in any forum debates. It is painful to see these silly fictions about Monty still being posted decades after they have been exposed as fantasy.

I agree Fred that one of Monty's strengths was connecting with the front line troops.

Where would you fault Montgomery as a general then?

The charges against Liddell Hart are rather complex and not easily resolved. There is no doubt that Liddell Hart was prescient in his thinking about mobile troops and the need for combined arms back in the 1920s. That is indisputable. The relationship between German tank enthusiasts such as Guderian and Liddell Hart was certainly established indirectly back in the 20s and 30s. Guderian very much kept abreast of British develops under General Hobart who himself was highly influenced by Liddell Hart. Did Liddell Hart overreach after the war in trying to establish a direct relationship between German developments in the 1930s and 40s. Perhaps (ego gets the best of all us.) It doesn't take away in my opinion from the incredible work he did after the war working with German officers in "The Other Side of the Hill" (which is an important and essential part of the WWII record.)

You did lie.

Was I mistaken? Possibly. Did I engage in hyperbole? Perhaps. But lie? That is a claim based on insufficient data. You should know better than make such a claim and in fact, you do know better. Or am I lying in stating that …? Perhaps you don't know better.

It doesn't take away in my opinion from the incredible work he did after the war working with German officers in "The Other Side of the Hill" (which is an important and essential part of the WWII record.)

Perhaps you should have paid more attention to this part of the book:

The Other Side Of The Hill

page 355

What did the German generals think of their Western opponents? They were diffident in expressing an opinion on this matter, but I gathered a few impressions in the course of our talks. In a reference to the Allied commanders, Rundstedt said: "Montgomery and Patton were the two best that I met. FieldMarshal Montgomery was very systematic." He added: "That is all right if you have sufficient forces, and sufficient time."
Blumentritt made a similar comment. After paying tribute to
the speed of Patton drive, he added: "Field-Marshal Montgomery was the one general who never suffered a reverse. He moved like this"-Blumentritt took a series of very deliberate and short steps, putting his foot down heavily each time.
Giving his impression of the different qualities of the British and American troops, Blumentritt said: "The Americans attacked with zest, and had a keen sense of mobile action, but when they came under heavy artillery fire they usualy fell back-even after they had made a successful penetration. By contrast, once the British had got their teeth in, and had been in a position for twenty-four hours, it proved almost impossible to shift them.
To counter-attack the British always cost us very heavy losses.

I had many opportunities to observe this interesting difference in the autumn of 1944, when the right half of my corps faced the British, and the left half the American."

And their opinion on Monty's single thrust:

In subsequent comment on the broad strategic situation after the collapse of the front in France, Blumentritt said: "The best course of the Allies would have been to concentrate a really strong striking force with which to break through past Aachen to the Ruhr area. Strategically and politically, Berlin was the target. Germany's strength is in the north. South Germany was a side issue. He who holds northern Germany holds Germany.
Such a break-through, coupled with air domination, would have torn in pieces the weak German front and ended the war. Berlin and Prague would have been occupied ahead of the Russians.
There were no German forces behind the Rhine, and at the end
of August our front was wide open.
"There was an operational break-through in the Aachen
area, in September. This facilitated a rapid conquest of the
Ruhr and a quicker advance on Berlin. By turning the forces
from the Aachen area sharply northward, the German 15th and
1st Parachute Armies could have been pinned against the estuaries of the Mass and the Rhine. They could not have escaped eastwards into German."
Blumentritt considered that the Allied offensive had been too widely and evenly spread. He was particularly critical of the attack towards Metz, pointing out that the forces available to defend this sector along the Moselle were better relatively than elsewhere. "A direct attack on Metz was unnecessary. The Metz fortress area could have been masked. In contrast, a swerve northward in the direction of Luxembourg and Bitburg would have met with great success and caused the collapse of the right flank of our 7th Army. By such a flank move to the north the entire 7th Army could have been cut off before it could retreat behind the Rhine. Thus the bulk of the defeated German Army would have been wiped out west of the Rhine.
Then the Allies' main attack could have continued towards
Magdeburg and Berlin, while the side-attack converged in the
same direction past Frank-furt-on-Main and Erfurt.
All the German generals to whom I talked were of the opinion
that the Allied Supreme Command had missed a great
opportunity of ending the war in the autumn of 1944. They
agreed with Montgomery's view that this could best have been
achieved by concentrating all possible resources on a thrust in the north, towards Berlin.
Student, who was placed in charge of that flank with the so called" 1st Parachute Army", emphasized this point. "The
sudden penetration of the British tank forces into Antwerp
took the Fuhrer's Headquarters utterly by surprise. At that
moment we had no disposable reserves worth mentioning either
on the western front or within our own country, I took over
the command of the right wing of the western front on the
Albert Canal on September 4th. At that moment I had only
recruit and convalescent units and one coast· defence division from Holland. They were reinforced by a panzer detachment of merely twenty-five tanks and self-propelled guns !" His front stretched a hundred miles.

Where would you fault Montgomery as a general then?

I would say he was not at his best with mobile/fluid situations and that meant he reacted a bit sluggishly at times. Monty was good at the set piece battle where his flare for detailed planning could be used to advantage. He was a good motivator of men and good at training. As has been mentioned his lack of tact, particularly when dealing with superiors was a fault and lead him into scrapes as he was not adverse to telling them where they were going wrong. He certainly doesn't belong on any list of the worst generals of WW2. He did care about the men's welfare too, which is one of his endearing features. While a divisional commander in France 1940 he wrote a memo recommending that the army establish facilities (brothels) where the men could get horizontal recreation as he euphemistically put it. That is likely to endear him to the majority of young soldiers!

I agree with you Fred that Montgomery doesn't belong on a list of worst generals of WWII. Neither does Rommel.

I have held Montgomery in pretty low regard. This discussion has provoked me to take another look at Montgomery's record.

The single thrust vs. broad front debate has been around since WW2. Either way, a decision had to be made, which is what generals are paid to do, and Ike went with the broad thrust. The bottom line is that it still won the war. Anything else is counterfactual and conjecture.

Either way, Monty, Ike, and Patton don't belong on the worse general list…they all successfully did their jobs and won.

I agree with a lot that has been said and lot that has.

in the end the war could have been finished in Dec 1944 if it had been supported by all.

Arnhem this is worth a watch ;
YouTube link

Also why General Beresford in charge of airdrops insisted on only day light drops when the RAF??

Im not sure what happened to the above???
I agree with a lot that has been said and a lot i do not agree with.
In the end the war could have been finished in Dec 1944 if it had been supported by all.
Arnhem this is worth a watch ;
YouTube link
Also why General Beresford in charge of airdrops insisted on only day light drops when the RAF wanted to do two days and night resupplies is beyond me ??

Corap. Simply remove the O.

Back to the original question , you wouldn't go wrong picking a Japanese General in Burma.

Gamelin. He was an utter and complete disaster, whose failure condemned his country to defeat and occupation. Before the fall of France, it was possible that the war might remain localized; after it, the war's globalization became almost inevitable, given the nature of the Axis.

I'd nominate the French general in overall command on the Western Front in 1940, if I could remember his name.

Gamelin.

Yep. Gamelin.

But generally the trick, if to become a legend, was to be appointed to command just as the tide was turning and supplies were pouring through. Imagine Slim as commander in Malaya, instead of Percival, in 1942. Imagine Monty in Egypt in 1941, with not one Sherman tank to his name. Send Patton to Bataan to try to hold out. Put any great WWII general in a slightly less favourable command and see how they do.

But I will come back to Gamelin. Poor old bloke, it weren't his fault. Except you should know when to quit. (Speaking as a retired surgeon)

Yes- he had been a general at the time of the Armistice; even if he was initially a young one, he was a general for longer than most modern military careers last. He had been the designated commander in chief since 1935, so he prepared the plans he was to execute, and prior to that he had been chief of staff, so he could have made all kinds of changes to training and doctrine. This wasn't a case of a general plopped into a tough spot: this is a case of a respected senior soldier who was in a position to set the stage for the war he was to fight. Very few leaders have as much continuity of responsibility, or the opportunity to wield the power that comes with it shape the instrument they will wield. He made little or no use of that opportunity, with calamitous consequences for France and the world.

X2 for Fred, Nine Pound Round and Deadhead.

Was Gamelin the one who sat in his chair and cried after the Germans broke through at Sedan?

I believe there were other instances of French generals crying too.

I think Air Mashall Barratt cried too when most of his RAF fighters got shot down on like the second day of the invasion.

And some of the things Alan Brooke wrote about Gort "before" the invasion of France were pretty critical of his capabilities to handle the role he was in, not to mention his assesment of the French during the phoney war

'Losing it' is not as uncommon as many might think. There is a recent account published by a soldier from a UK Tank Regiment where, in passing, he reveals his commanding officer had a complete mental breakdown and had to relieved for some time to get over it. I was amazed at this getting out because I know they are always covered up. I also know a very famous tank battle where one of the principles crewmen simply got out of the tank in battle and point blank refused to get back in-wise move because not long after it was hit and deaths resulted.
Then there is the Canadian General who was found blind drunk in the middle of a major attack on the floor of his command tank. It was his second offence but it was deemed too sensitive to make public or even to take any action against him. Generals are human………

mkenny….have you read Elstob's 'Warriors for the Working Day'? I think you'd find it interesting.

It is now generally accepted that one of the brigade commanders at Gallipoli who led a column in the attack on Sari Bair in August, 1915 was drunk. In one book, the official historian is quoted as having written subsequently words to the effect of "I of course knew the truth, but as the official historian, I couldn't just blurt it out." In the same campaign, one divisional commander, who had previously been hospitalized for a nervous breakdown, suffered another while in command- and there are hints in some of the preceding correspondence between the war minister and the commander of the expedition suggesting they knew he was in questionable shape before he even arrived in the theater.

They're human, too, and it's interesting to consider how some psyches stand up better than others to stress. That's at least as important a factor in command as intellect.

Perhaps this has been discussed already, and Im certainly no expert, but a couple of speculations based on general WWII lore that come across:

I believe the Russian Generals in the Winter War were supposed to have been considered pretty terrible.

Also, I think the Italian commanders in the earl N African fighting were also supposed to have been pretty bad.

I think these may be notable because in both cases they had a reasonable advantage in terms forces and firepower, etc…

It was General Alphonse Georges that broke into tears. He was the commander of all the field armies in 1940. Second in command to Gamelin. The French were certainly very poorly served by their military leadership in 1940. But it is hard to go past General Percival – he had enough stuff to stop the Japanese or at least hurt them significantly, like MacArthur did in Bataan. He had enough time to train his troops and identify the terrain and tactics to win. But he just couldn't see it.

Worst is a pretty high standard. Monty, Eisenhower, Patton are all right out. I don't think too highly of Macarthur, other than Inchon his performance was either pedestrian or worse but still not Worst quality. I still fall back on Fredendall, building a bunker a hundred miles from the front lines while his army is mauled. I wonder if the bunker is still there?

Gamelin was a Daladier's protégé, and Daladier had been ruling France (as Président du Conseil) since 1937. He had also been a very good officer during WW1, which explains why he'd been noticed (mostly staff postings, but at the end of the war he got command of an Infantry Division, and was good there as well).
The problem in WW2 is that he was a sick man : because of syphilis, his cognitive abilities were impaired, and he should have been removed, but Daladier kept him in place. A big what if is what would have happened if his second in command, Alphonse George, had been in charge. George, thopugh he executed it, was opposed to the disastrous Dyle-Breda plan which is, IMO, one of the 2 main causes of the FRench debacle, and would certainly not have dispatched the Theater reserve (the 7e Armée)…

"…his cognitive abilities were impaired, and he should have been removed,"
Sounds a lot like the current US "CIC"

Okay, I'll bite. What's the second main cause?

Related to the first reason, I wonder, would it have made any difference to the campaign if Belgium would have allowed the French/BEF to take positions inside Belgium prior to the May 10 invasion?

Probably not, because it was the wrong place, since the Germans came through the Ardennes.

I am familiar with the "Gamelin had syphilis" story, which I remember reading in Paul Johnson's "Modern Times," but I don't think I've ever seen it cited anywhere else (I don't think it's in Doughty's "Breaking Point," or Alastair Horne's account). Is it mentioned anywhere else? I've always been a little skeptical about it, because 1) Gamelin lived to age 85, dying in 1958, and 2) He managed to write a two volume memoir after the war.