"Worst Generals of WWII" Topic

Same old evasions dressed up in a big bold blustery front – just like clockwork. Maybe this will help you out on those tonnage statistics you questioned, but never actually presented data to refute -

"The strategic situation in early September mandated logistics support towards the upcoming MARKET-GARDEN operation in Holland—especially gasoline and cargo aircraft. Operationally, Hodges' American First Army received the lion's share of what limited supplies trickled in via the Red Ball Express to support an impending drive to the Rhine and Montgomery's Holland venture. At least 14,000 tons of supplies per day were required to support both the First and Third Armies though the amount arriving barely approached 7,000 tons; with two-thirds going to Hodges' troops."

Logistics and Patton's Third Army
Lessons for Today's Logisticians
Maj. Jeffrey W. Decker

PDF link

B

Montgomery had his own supply chain. No US supplies were diverted to Commonwealth troops. There was a failure in the US supply chain which meant they could not support 1st and 3rd Armies with the 12,000 tons a day they needed. They would still be short even if Arnhem had never taken place. Its the usual US obsession with blaming Monty for their own shortcomings.

All I can say is more accurate data is now availabe, which shows a lot of earlier works were incorrect and thus copied down through the years in other works. I only really read first hand accounts now due to this.

We are begining our Arnhem campaign when XXX Corps maps reach us. As you can imagine we have read extensively about Market & Garden.

Monty's memoires were an eye opener and I have changed my opinion of him a lot. He does though where things go wrong and right say 'it was down to me' that is a true Leader, as an ex military guy I like the way he used his troops wisely and not just wasted them, PLANNING is key to all.

The biggest mistake was spreading the army too thin accross a broad front from the end of August to September 17th, I have no dobt that we could as allies, good and true been into the Rhur industrial area well before christmas if we had.

Arnhem failed maybe not, it achieved;
1. Cut the V2 menace out which you all forget about.
2. Allowed a jumping off point into Germany.
3. Freed a large portion of Holland.

Nowhere in the document is any blame or fault-finding directed toward anyone. It is a straightforward and dispassionate account of the event from the point of view of the intelligence aspect (i.e., who knew what and when).

Not exactly. If Ike was fully in the picture about the increasing risks of the operation due to the changing situation then any blame for the operation rests with him. It is the man at the top that the buck stops with.
What surprises me about the intelligence side is that the allies could make the same mistake twice. When it came to the Ardennes Offensive there was considerable evidence that the Germans were building up a large force and that an attack was imminent, but it was ignored. The same complacency about enemy capabilities had permeated all the way up to SHAEF.
As far as the push to launch Market Garden the airborne lobby was a factor. There had been, I think, 17 proposed airborne ops, all cancelled as the situation on the ground had changed before the ops could be launched. There was pressure to get the Airborne in to action before it was all over. A case of being careful about what you wish for.

As requested.

The first item appears in a sidebar labelled "What Next?". Here is the paragraph as written: "The armored spearheads were supposed to be receiving 10,000 tons of supplies per day, but Montgomery already had to cut his quota to 7,500 while Courtney Hodges' 1st Army sputtered along on 5,000, and Patton drew a measly 2,000. The situation couldn't continue. In a secret message to the US Chief of Staff George C. Marshall on 24 August, Eisenhower confided: "We do not have sufficient strength and supply possibilities to do everything we would like to do simultaneously." "
Command Magazine Issue 44/August 1997 "To Hell With Monty: The Failure of Operation Market Garden by Paul S. Burdett, Jr page 44.

The second citation also appears in the same side bar, here it is in its entirety:

"That desire fit into Marshall's own thinking in two ways First, he pressed Eisenhower to use the new 1st Allied Airborne Army before conventional ground advances precluded all practical opportunities for its employment. A functional airborne army was a new thing in military history; it was SHAEF's only strategic reserve, and everyone wanted to do something decisive with it. Second, and more importantly, there was politics. Prime Minister Churchill and British Chief of Staff Alan Brooke -- spurred by the increasingly strident complaints appearing in their nation's press over the attention being devoted to Bradley and Patton at the expense of Montgomery -- pressured President Roosevelt for more strategically important action in the latter's sector. (Of course, Montgomery himself had played no small part in lobbying his old boys' network to bring that pressure to bear.)"
Ibid Burdett page 44.

Any errors in typing are mine and unintentional. Let me know if you need anything else.

Compare the magazine artice:

The British press was criticizing the attention being lavished on U.S. Generals Bradley and Patton at the expense of Montgomery. Prime Minister Churchill discussed this with President Roosevelt and requested that Montgomery's
sector be given more attention. Cite 7 Burdett, 44

With the way it is presented in the thesis:

Prime Minister Churchill and British Chief of Staff Alan Brooke -- spurred by the increasingly strident complaints appearing in their nation's press over the attention being devoted to Bradley and Patton at the expense of Montgomery -- pressured President Roosevelt for more strategically important action in the latter's sector.

An original bit of casual 'Monty-Bashing' is picked up and then amplified slightly in an effort to further disparage the man.

I also strongly dispute the claim that the 'British Press' were complaining about Patton & Bradley.
When I tried to source claims that 1944 US Newspapers were likewise complaining about Monty getting all the publicity I was bemused to find his copy was wholly positive. He was spoken about in glowing terms and indeed Marshall felt the need to speak to Eisenhower about it:

MARSHALL TO EISENHOWER, Aug 17 1944.

"Stimson and I and apparently all Americans are strongly of the opinion that the time has come for you to assume direct command of the American contingent because reaction to British criticism has been so strong by American journalists that it could become an important factor in the coming Congressional Elections. The astonishing success has produced emphatic expressions of confidence in you and Bradley but this has cast a damper on public enthusiasm."

Of course all this changed after Bradley had his hissy-fit over his troops being put under Monty's command during The Bulge and that was the start of a sustained organised campaign to destroy Montgomery in order to excuse Bradley's failure. This calumny went into overdrive in post-war US Memoirs and the widespread uncritical acceptance (no attempt to fact-check) of these lies means they live on in the many who grew up reading this falsification of history and have failed to keep abreast of modern scholarship on the matter.

No US supplies were diverted to Commonwealth troops

In an attempt to bring a bit of much needed levity at this point…..

My dad's unit was placed in reserve for a little rest. Yes, the Ardennes. Each company apparently had a drawing and two men from each company would be trucked back to Paris for several days R & R. My dad and a buddy of his were picked. Just before they were to leave a supply truck arrived. At least part of the load consisted of what my dad called "British field jackets"! Now the truckers were not going to make another trip back to the supply depot they picked this load up from so they were dumped there. One of my dad's sergeants told him and his buddy to each grab one and take it to Paris. There was a shortage of good, warm clothing and they could get a decent amount on the black market. So in perhaps my dad's only criminal en devour he and his buddy did just that. I can't comment on any US supplies being diverted to Commonwealth forces but apparently at least some Commonwealth supplies were diverted, intentionally or not, to US forces. :)

The story of how my dad and his buddy managed to get back to their unit when news of the attack was announced is another topic for another day.

The idea that Eisenhower, Montgomery or Patton should even be in the discussion of the worst generals of WWII is a joke. All of them made mistakes. On the whole all did well. That is not something that could be said for others.

Before the movie Patton came out I did not hear much Montie bashing. Montgomery was the general who beat Rommel at El Alemein and then chased him across Libya before the Anglo-American-French Armies finished him off in Tunisia. The one exception to this were men who were in the 1st Army on the northern flank in the Bulge. Bradley may well have had a hissy fit about Montgomery being put in command, but his views were shared by at least some of the men of the 1st who had to serve under Montgomery.

The one exception to this were men who were in the 1st Army on the northern flank in the Bulge.

I don't know about the men, but the commanders seemed perfectly happy with Monty. Both Hodges and Middleton got on with him fine. Hasbrouck was emphatic that Monty saved the US 7th AD by pulling it back from St Vith, before the Germans surrounded it. Bruce Clarke was appreciative of Monty's habit of pulling units out of the line for 24 hours to rest, which maintained their efficiency much longer rather than being ground down by continuous frontline duty.

I can't comment on any US supplies being diverted to Commonwealth forces but apparently at least some Commonwealth supplies were diverted, intentionally or not, to US forces. :)

Several British Trucking Coy. were diverted and used to deliver supplies to US Troops.

Monty's memoires were an eye opener and I have changed my opinion of him a lot.

Using Monty's memoirs as a justification to attack other generals, British or others, is a mistake. He used his memoirs to attack his detractors, justify his mistakes, and present himself in the best light. And this is the opinion of British historians given the years of additional research and available documentations.

Of course, this is true of the majority of memoirs!

If you're using his memoirs as a justification to excuse his failures or blame others, then you don't have much of a leg to stand on.

raylev3y sorry ! but you are talking through your rear.

Monty does not attack others at all in fact he priases many.

IMAO You need to read more, especially his memoires and german viewpoints, and also other non American blinkered views, it is relly more enlightnening!

Earlier another American in your words "attacked" Monty about operation Goodwood, yes it could have done more, but your guys were late in kicking off 7 days later than planned, but to keep the Germans pinned Monty said go, which was the right thing to do!

I do not attack, I state my opinion based on other data also.

What do you base your judgements on? Im sorry but you are a typical American, you guys appear to not take any critism because your militatry is soooo good. Ive worked with your military a few times so I have experience.

If I wanted to attack a General it would be Gavin for Market Garden, Browning said they must take the heights, ok fine, but he should have still sent enough to take the Bridge at Nijmegen on D1 with battlaion at least tghen XXX Corps would not have had to fight in the town.

Ping pong :)

"By Sep 44, 21st Army Group was receiving an average of 7500 tons per day against a nominal daily operational requirement of 10,000 tons. That rate of logistical support was in fact more than what both US Armies combined were receiving. US 1st Army (supporting 21AG and its right flank) was receiving about 5,000 tons per day; US 3rd Army was at subsistence level, averaging 2,000 tons per day."

So 21st AG and 12th AG were both receiving about the same daily tonnage.

I'd be a bit surprised (and worried) that the CGSC doesn't teach that Monty was right in wanting Allied concentration to try and achieve something decisive somewhere, rather than frittering resources away fighting all along the front.

Using Monty's memoirs as a justification to attack other generals, British or others, is a mistake. He used his memoirs to attack his detractors, justify his mistakes, and present himself in the best light. And this is the opinion of British historians given the years of additional research and available documentations.

A common tactic of the Monty -Basher. Find a British General who doesn't like Monty and hide behind him whilst listing your own personal shopping list of Monty faults. This way you can pretend its not (overwhelmingly) a US blood-sport because 'even his own' disliked and criticised Monty.
Strangely the same is never true in reverse. For example if I was to quote Patton on Bradley would that mean Patton's charges must be taken as 100% correct because it comes from a brother US General?.

Hi Raimondo,
That's one way to look at it. The other viewpoint is that 21st Army Group plus US 1st Army operating in direct support of 21st Army Group were receiving, on average, ~4200 tons per day per army, while 3rd Army was receiving only ~2000 tons per day (which essentially rendered it immobile).

B

"Montgomery had his own supply chain. No US supplies were diverted to Commonwealth troops. There was a failure in the US supply chain which meant they could not support 1st and 3rd Armies with the 12,000 tons a day they needed. They would still be short even if Arnhem had never taken place. Its the usual US obsession with blaming Monty for their own shortcomings."

Everyone was short of supplies by the time the German border was being approached, INCLUDING 21st Army Group, which had been forced to stand down three division and strip them of their organic transport and also had 1400 transport vehicles down with mechanical faults. And let not omit the point that, of all the elements heading toward Germany, 21AG had the shortest (relatively speaking) LoC.

Also, the reason that "No US supplies were diverted to Commonwealth troops" was that SHAEF turned down Montgomery's proposal to stand down 12AG and divert all possible supplies and transport from it to support 21AG in his proposed narrow front thrust to Berlin.

B

Anyone interested in the post-breakout logistical situation in NWE should read this -

link

B

Everyone was short of supplies by the time the German border was being approached, INCLUDING 21st Army Group,
Yes BUT Monty had decided that that his supply chain could keep his forces (i.e the ones he took forward) working . However the US supply chain was, in comparison, a disaster. The supply shortage did effect everyone but the the US Army was the hardest hit. It is a fact that the US supply shortage was their of their own own making and nothing at all to do with Monty. It needs repeating. Even if there had been no Arnhem there would be a US supply shortages.

21st Army Group…………….had 1400 transport vehicles down with mechanical faults.

Myth from Chester Wilmot and long since debunked. I mentioned it earlier that British trucks were diverted to help supply the US Army but you must have missed it.

Montgomery's "full blooded" narrow front thrust was reliant upon SHAEF rendering static and immobile all other forces not directly involved and transferring their gasoline and transport to Montgomery's operation. 21AG's logistic issues are detailed in the official histories, which I commend you to peruse. In fact, as I understand it, Montgomery's retrospective view of the campaign mentioned that his decision not to give top priority to opening Antwerp was a mistake.

See Ruppenthal, not Wilmot, re the 1400 transport vehicles (5t Austins) suffering from previously undetected manufacturing maladies.

B

See Ruppenthal, not Wilmot, re the 1400 transport vehicles (5t Austins) suffering from previously undetected manufacturing maladies.

See link

which is one page of a large thread dealing with this 'myth'

The poster 'Tom' has made this a speciality of his and there are a number of threads where he shown this '1500 faulty trucks' was in fact nothing special and, given the number of spare trucks 21 AG had in its depots, of no consequence in any transport shortage. He does the same on WW2 Talk and this is the last page of another thread:

link

All his information is sourced and referenced. The '1500 broken-down lorries' had no effect on any transport problems.

In fact, as I understand it, Montgomery's retrospective view of the campaign mentioned that his decision not to give top priority to opening Antwerp was a mistake.
Everyone makes mistakes. The trick is to make sure justified criticism about your mistakes is not being deliberately distorted so as to blame you for other peoples mistakes as well. The US supply shortage was of their own making.

See Ruppenthal, not Wilmot, re the 1400 transport vehicles (5t Austins) suffering from previously undetected manufacturing maladies.

Have you got a page number for that? As far as I am aware the number and problem was first mentioned in the November 1945 'Administration History of 21 AG' and then picked up by Wilmot ("The Struggle for Europe")and he is the one who makes it into a 'serious' problem.
Wilmot references the Administration History as the source of his claim.
Here is the original from the Administration History, page 47:
(c) VEHICLE MAINTENANCE.
During this intense period of activity the maintenance of vehicles inevitably had to be reduced, but partly due to the majority of vehicles being new no serious ill effects ensued. A major fault occurred in the engines of K-5 4x4, 3 ton Austins, 1,400 of which, as well as all the replacement engines, were found to be defective and have piston trouble.

It even specifically says that overall-no serious ill effects ensued-yet despite this it is used as another club to beat Montgomery. It is symptomatic of the way all problems (real or imagined) are dumped on Monty/Commonwealth Forces.

I'm surprised that any fault over M-G would be directed at Gavin.

It's my understanding that in England, and on the ground (Browning & Gavin were in touch in Holland), Browning made the area around Groesbeek the priority target. Gavin was following orders. Even so Gavin sent a battalion to make the attempt on the bridge. Unfortunately, they went the wrong way and were stopped by German opposition (no plan survives first contact…or so I've heard).

Besides, didn't XXX Corps still have had to deal with the Germans north of Nijmegen, as well as east and west along much of it's route?

This, and that above is just my opinion of course, but I don't see how any of it is Gavin's fault.

raylev3y sorry ! but you are talking through your rear.

Well, damn, I guess I lost this argument!

Im sorry but you are a typical American, you guys appear to not take any critism because your militatry is soooo good. Ive worked with your military a few times so I have experience.

I'd say that your own personal bias is showing big time. And I say your own bias because I know it doesn't represent the majority of Brits. And I'm not your "typical" American on this, even though I don't think you know what a "typical" American is.

I lived in England for 10 years, got my masters in War Studies from KCL, and spent years to include a year in Iraq working directly with the British military from Northwood to Iraq at a variety of levels…I won't even go into the research I've done. Don't assume….

But, like I said, your bias makes this entire argument moot and worthless. You're just coming across as a Monty Fanboy.

(BTW, I don't have a low opinion of Monty, he made mistakes like every other general did -- 20/20 hindsight is great for that. He definitely did well in every theater.)

And I say your own bias because I know it doesn't represent the majority of Brits.

Standard excuse from someone called out and unable to make a good case for their calumny. They retreat behind the (false) claim 'his own' did not like him either.

You're just coming across as a Monty Fanboy.

Standard charge laid against those villagers who don't grab a pitchfork and torch and join the Monty witch-hunt.
To the myopic there are only two ways of portraying Monty.

a) The correct version: A slow cautious General who only attacked if he massively outnumbered the enemy, made many mistakes and was the cause of all Allied discord from 1943-45.

b) The fanbois version: That is anyone who does not think Monty was 'A slow cautious General who only attacked if he massively outnumbered the enemy and the cause of all Allied discord from 1943-45'.

Any attempt to defend Monty against any slight (no matter how trivial) marks you as a fanatical fanboy who believes Monty was the greatest General in the history of warfare and a man who never ever made a mistake.

He used his memoirs to attack his detractors,
Any examples (from Monty's Memoirs) of these 'attacks'?

raylev3 well done for your service…

I did not say all Americans. A lot of civies do not have your knowledge.

As to a typical American i have wargamed in several US states with great guys, but find Joe Bloggs Americans to be uninformed on many items.

im not a fan of Monty as I said earlie rhis memoires have changed my view of him, is all.

The Austin lorry problem is hardly "debunked". Al mkenny is doing is carefully cherry-picked referencs that give the appearance that the problem caused no difficulties in the long run ….. which is true IF one considers a loss of 800t per day in supply deliveries inconsequential and the stand down of three US infantry division in order for their transport vehicles to be transferred to 21AG in order to cover the delivery shortfall.

Go here – link

Good Lord, this gets so tiresome.

B

The Austin lorry problem is hardly "debunked". Al mkenny is doing is carefully cherry-picked referencs that give the appearance that the problem caused no difficulties in the long run ….. which is true

The single source (as in the only source) distorted by Wilmot is given in full. It clearly notes 'no serious ill effects ensued.' The link I gave goes into great detail about 21st AG Truck holdings and how the problem was overcome. It never had the impact the Monty-bashers need it to have in order to peddle their 'Monty grabbed all the supplies' fiction so (as in this case) they simply ignore all the evidence and continue to peddle their fiction.

which is true IF one considers a loss of 800t per day in supply deliveries inconsequential and the stand down of three US infantry division in order for their transport vehicles to be transferred to 21AG in order to cover the delivery shortfall.

Lots of Divisions were grounded to enable the pursuit. It is well documented. For example 21st AG left behind all its Churchill Units and took the transport from its infantry Divisions. The same for the USA. What you are trying to do is conflate these issues in the hope some mud sticks. Your preferred version is:
because of greedy Monty entire US Infantry Divisons were taken out of the line in order keep him supplied with US supplies delivered by US Lorries.
It is complete and because of the links I gave you it is undeniable it is . The fact that you didn't read/can't understand the links is your problem. In fact transport was moving both ways with British lorries supplying US troops as well as the other way around.

Go here –

I did go there. In fact I gave you a link to that very same thread a few posts up. What you have done is linked to page 6 (2010) where it is first raised. Note that the 2 sources given for the 'problem' are in fact the original quote from 21st AG Administration History referenced by 2 US sources. It is in fact the single (as in the only) source again. Tom enters the thread and make sit his business to visit the Archives at KEW to see if there is any evidence that this was a problem . If you read the whole thread you will see he demolishes all the claims it was a serious problem that was not overcome. The same for the AHF link I gave you. It is hard to escape the conclusion you are being willfully ignorant here.

this gets so tiresome
Not for me. I always challenge this type lie. I have kept up to date with modern scholarship so can debunk all those stories grounded in the post-war US assault on Monty's reputation. If you are still using Monty criticism sourced from Ralph lngersoll, Gerhard L. Weinberg, Ambrose, Allan R. Millett et al then you are easily debunked.

it is obvious some opinions are set in stone and will not change. I changed my opio nion of MONTY after reading a few books on him. He was better than some would like to admit.

But it does seem that Patton is almost God like, even after he messed up Tunisia, and Sciliy and slapped shell shocked troops about". As to his drive to the Moselle region wow greta but what did he fight nothing on the way just guzzled precious fuel.

Thats my lot Im not carrying on its pointless now.

Interesting discussion. I learned a lot about post Normandy logistics. Always like to learn new things. IMHO Monty has always been shortchanged by us Americans. Maybe not the grearest WWII general but far from the worst. Patton and Rommel are way overrated, victims of Hollywood and myth making. I dont think Ike and Kesselring get enough credit. Bradley certainly gets too much. But the question was worst. MacArthur, Percival, Browning, Bomber Harris and most of the Italian Generals would be my list. And of course Hitler would top the list. Any Head of State that takes direct command of their armies and micro manages a War is a very bad general. For a modern example just look at LBJ and Vietnam! Cheers!

Montgomery was a decent divisional commander in 1940 but is the text book case for the Peter Principle.

1. His victory in North Africa was the result of superior logistical support and the effectiveness of the interdiction campaign in the Mediterranean against the Axis. It has nothing to do with Monty's skill.

2. He had great difficulty working with people. This shown time and again. Look at the mayhem he caused as Chief of the General Staff after WWII

3. His conduct in Sicily was plodding and timid.

4. His tactical skill was shown as considerably lacking around Caen. There was serious thought of sacking him in the first few weeks of Normandy.

As an aside I was appalled to see Rommel's name listed in this discussion. A first rate divisional commander who showed incredible ingenuity in leading the Africa Corps in North Africa. When Rommel was assigned to oversee Western defenses he immediately brought considerable energy and direction to stiffening of the Atlantic Wall. His strategic insight caused him to recommend putting German mobile forces close to potential landing sights proved correct. Had this been done the German response to Overlord would have been more effective and given them the only chance to turn it back. Whether he was a good or great commander is open to debate but certainly not one of the worst generals of WWII.

Sorry going to have to disagree with all of these.

1. His victory in North Africa was the result of superior logistical support and the effectiveness of the interdiction campaign in the Mediterranean against the Axis. It has nothing to do with Monty's skill.

It certainly had a large part to do with him. He restored the morale of 8th Army and gave it a belief in winning. Keeping a tight reign on the pursuit and not setting off hell for leather, over extending supply lines and falling victim to an Axis Reposte as had happened before ensured ultimate victory in North Africa and he arrived in time to rescue the Americans.

2. He had great difficulty working with people. This shown time and again. Look at the mayhem he caused as Chief of the General Staff after WWII

What people? At the risk of repeating myself the American generals who worked with him in the Ardennes had nothing, but good words to say about him. They certainly didn't find him difficult to work with.

3. His conduct in Sicily was plodding and timid.

As opposed to Patton who disobeyed orders and went haring off to Palermo on what was nothing more than a publicity stunt.

4. His tactical skill was shown as considerably lacking around Caen. There was serious thought of sacking him in the first few weeks of Normandy.

Again I think his tactical skill was superior to Bradley's grind everything slowly forward all along the line wearing down your units in the process. By switching the focus of the attack up and down the line he kept the Germans on their toes and allowed units to rest and recuperate before renewing the attack.

Sorry going to have to disagree with all of these.

1. His victory in North Africa was the result of superior logistical support and the effectiveness of the interdiction campaign in the Mediterranean against the Axis. It has nothing to do with Monty's skill.

It certainly had a large part to do with him.

I will also have to disagree with Marcus and chime in on the same side as Fred.

I find it remarkable that we can say that a general who wins consistently by using his logistical advantage is somehow not responsible for winning the battles he wins, is somehow unskilled, or is somehow not unworthy.

I could far more easily find fault with Rommel for consistently ignoring his own logistics, than criticize Montgomery for ensuring his. More credit to Montgomery for recognizing his advantage and playing to it, throwing materiel at the problem rather than the blood of his soldiers.

Being a good general is about WINNING in the real world. It isn't about wargaming with a game master who uses a rulebook to set up balanced-points scenarios.

-Mark
(aka: Mk 1)

Montgomery was a decent divisional commander in 1940 but is the text book case for the Peter Principle.

1. His victory in North Africa was the result of superior logistical support and the effectiveness of the interdiction campaign in the Mediterranean against the Axis. It has nothing to do with Monty's skill.

2. He had great difficulty working with people. This shown time and again. Look at the mayhem he caused as Chief of the General Staff after WWII

3. His conduct in Sicily was plodding and timid.

4. His tactical skill was shown as considerably lacking around Caen. There was serious thought of sacking him in the first few weeks of Normandy.

Out of curiosity what books led you to these conclusions?
For example what stands out as his biggest 'tactical failing' at Caen?

Had difficulty working with others. Really Fred? A simple search on Wikipedia manifests the problem. And I could find countless entries if I had too.

Montgomery was notorious for his lack of tact and diplomacy. Even his "patron", the Chief of the Imperial General Staff Lord Alanbrooke, frequently mentions it in his war diaries: "he is liable to commit untold errors in lack of tact" and "I had to haul him over the coals for his usual lack of tact and egotistical outlook which prevented him from appreciating other people's feelings".[193]

One incident that illustrated this occurred during the North African campaign when Montgomery bet Walter Bedell Smith that he could capture Sfax by the middle of April 1943. Smith jokingly replied that if Montgomery could do it he would give him a Flying Fortress complete with crew. Smith promptly forgot all about it, but Montgomery did not, and when Sfax was taken on 10 April he sent a message to Smith "claiming his winnings". Smith tried to laugh it off, but Montgomery was having none of it and insisted on his aircraft. It got as high as Eisenhower who, with his renowned skill in diplomacy, ensured Montgomery did get his Flying Fortress, though at a great cost in ill feeling.[194] Even Brooke thought it crass stupidity.[195]

In August 1945, whilst Brooke, Sir Andrew Cunningham and Sir Charles Portal were discussing their possible successors as "Chiefs of Staff", they concluded that Montgomery would be very efficient as CIGS from the Army's point of view but that he was also very unpopular with a large proportion of the Army. Despite this, Cunningham and Portal were strongly in favour of Montgomery succeeding Brooke after his retirement.[196] Prime Minister Winston Churchill, by all accounts a faithful friend, is quoted as saying of Montgomery, "In defeat, unbeatable; in victory, unbearable."[197]

There is certainly no doubt that Montgomery knew how to put on a show! His histrionics certainly raised morale in the 8th Army. But any competent general would have done as well and probably better with the advantages Montgomery had at the time El Alemain.

Being a good general is about WINNING in the real world. It isn't about wargaming with a game master who uses a rulebook to set up balanced-points scenarios.

Sorry, I don't agree. Given huge material advantages any marginally competent commander can win a battle or campaign. Rommel had to take big chances because his strategic situation was so poor. Montgomery's extreme caution in NA and Western Europe is inexcusable.

Montgomery's extreme caution in NA and Western Europe is inexcusable.

The utter rout of Rommel in NA and then the utter rout of Rommel in Normandy is 'extreme caution'?
More than anything these adsurd claims illustrate the extreme disconnect in the mind of the Monty-Basher. They who have no problem distorting history (I.E lying) in order to peddle their fictions.

You can make ad hominem attacks mkenny but it doesn't change the facts. After the failure Operation Goodwood Air Chief Marshal Tedder and the British Chiefs of Staff were prepared to sack Montgomery for his lack of drive and uber cautiousness. Only Eisenhower's restraint saved Monty.

The "rout" of Rommel in NA was made possible by the effective blockade of the Axis powers in NA and the strategic importance that Britain placed on Egypt. It had almost nothing to do with Montgomery's generalship. In fact Montgomery's generalship at El Alemain was mediocre at best. That is a fact my friend, not an opinion.

Take a look at p.297 in Carlos D'Este's Decision in Normandy where Montgomery's caution contributed to the overall ineffectiveness of 21st Army Group. "To the detriment of the British Army, this defensive mentality continued for the remainder of the Normandy campaign." The source of this defensive mentality was Montgomery himself as D'Este points out in this same section. "Montgomery's tactics in Normandy were a major factor in the cautious attitude which pervaded 21st Army Group."

You can make ad hominem attacks mkenny but it doesn't change the facts
I also asked you to list the books you read that gave you your information on Monty. Is there a reason why you can not do this?

After the failure Operation Goodwood Air Chief Marshal Tedder and the British Chiefs of Staff were prepared to sack Montgomery for his lack of drive and uber cautiousness. Only Eisenhower's restraint saved Monty.

The 'failure' of GOODWOOD'? How do you think the 'failure' of Bradley to get his act together and start his part of the masterplan whilst GOODWOOD was in play effected the outcome?
Do you believe this US 'slowness/failure' had any effect?
Did you even know Bradly failed to get his troops to the start line and the Commander (Montgomery) graciously gave Bradley more time and started with one half of the offensive missing?

It had almost nothing to do with Montgomery's generalship. In fact Montgomery's generalship at El Alemain was mediocre at best. That is a fact my friend, not an opinion.

I think you are addled. It is not'fact'. It is just your opinion. Given your inability/reluctance to share your reading sources I am beggining suspect you are getting most of your information from a DVD of the film 'Patton'.

Take a look at p.297 in Carlos D'Este's Decision in Normandy
I have the book. It is one long hatchet job on Montgomery. If you can not see it then that says everything about your partiality. D'Este made many mistakes in that book and one of the most shocking was his claim that 'The British' were hiding 100,000 fresh troops in the UK and holding them for post-war political use.

This is a very serious accusation and it was completely refuted in Hart's 'Colossal Cracks'(See D'Este 'Decision In Normandy Manpower Dilema chapter Page 268 for the outrageous claim and Hart 'Colossal Cracks' Chapter 3 page 49 for a systematic demolition of same.) where he showed D'Este was at best 'factually incorrect'/grossly misinformed or possibly he might have been making the whole thing up. The point is Hart exposed D'Este and destroyed any claim he might be an impartial Monty observer.
D'Este mellowed in latter years and his overly-critical view of Monty must have weighed on his mind because he wrote a follow-up where he revised his opinion. I bet you did not know that, don't wan't to know it and don't care to check it out. I leave a link to the more balanced D'Este view, 3 pages in total

link

Sample:

The First Army staff, already resentful of the change of command, is alleged to have been less than pleased to be under British command. Such resentments, and many seem to be of postwar creation, were not evident to James Gavin, the 82d Airborne commander, when he dined with Hodges and his staff several days later. "The staff spoke of Montgomery with amusement and respect. They obviously liked him and respected his professionalism." For his part, Gavin was impressed with Montgomery as a soldier. "I took a liking to him that has not diminished with the years."

I'll name Hitler. Considered sarcastically by many of his generals as "the greatest general of all times". He messed enough in the German army, its organization and strategy making it more vulnerable to the allied and soviet armies.

Also Fildmarshall Keitel, he followed every order Hitler gave him.

For the allies, Arthur Percival. Defended Singapore with a superior force against the japanese and lost.

WOW so much misinforamtion has mad ethis thread riddiculous.

mkenny is right.

Monty did not get on with fools no matter what the rank.

mkenny, you kept asking for sources. D'Este's Decision in Normandy is considered one of the better recounts of the Normandy invasion. It can't be simply dismissed because you don't like his take on Montgomery. Interestingly, Liddell Hart was not a big fan of Montgomery. Even in his one volume account of WWII there are several biting criticisms of Montgomery.

D'Este's Decision in Normandy is considered one of the better recounts of the Normandy invasion. It can't be simply dismissed because you don't like his take on Montgomery

So how do you explain the disgraceful way D'Este made a completely baseless charge that the UK was hiding 100,000 soldiers and refusing to send them to Normandy?
As you like the book so much can we presume you read that and believed it?

Liddell Hart was not a big fan of Montgomery. Even in his one volume account of WWII there are several biting criticisms of Montgomery.

I note that you are also unaware of the well-known'problem' with Liddel Hart. See this for a short summing up of his motives:

link

Always be wary of a man settling scores with those he believed denied him his place in History for inspiring and educating the German military.
Clue-his most famous post-war work is a hagiography of the German Generals.

you kept asking for sources.
Yes and you keep ignoring my request. So far you are using just one book. A book that claims the UK was deliberately hiding away 100,000 soldiers in the UK. What do you say about this despicable lie?

Given huge material advantages any marginally competent commander can win a battle or campaign.

You would think so, wouldn't you, and yet history has plenty of examples of generals who have squandered enormous advantages, including some of Monty's predecessors at 8th Army, so it is apparently not as easy as it seems. As for Rommel's poor strategic position that was largely of his own making. The plan, if you remember, was to halt Afrika Korps while the Axis captured Malta thus securing the supply route to North Africa, but that was cancelled after Rommel decide to push on after Gazala. By any account a poor decision on his part.
Yes Monty was not famous for his tact, but then that has applied to a lot of Generals down the ages. I suspect some of it was not so much a lack of consideration at another persons feeling, but an astonishment that anyone could take offence at what he was saying. Had been around now he probably would be diagnosed as "on the spectrum". However if you are saying that it prevented him from forming effective command teams I would strongly disagree. 21AG functioned effectively enough and as has been mentioned 1st Army got along with him just fine. If anything it was his superiors he rubbed up the wrong way.

His histrionics certainly raised morale in the 8th Army.

What "histrionics" are you referring to that raised 8th Army's morale? My great uncle served under Monty. When Monty came to talk to his unit it was the first time he had seen a general, let alone have one come and talk to them.
Finally perhaps you could enlighten us as to what Monty could have done differently at El Alamein and in Normandy? Considering both positions were fixed with no options for flanking moves or fancy manoeuvring and particularly in Normandy for much of the battle the Germans held the night ground making observation of the Commonwealth moves possible. Both positions were defended resolutely and skilfully by the Germans.

D'Este's Decision in Normandy is considered one of the better recounts of the Normandy invasion.

It was, but no longer. There are far better, more balanced accounts and some of D'Este's claims have been debunked as has been pointed out. I would suggest James Holland's Normandy 44: D-Day and the Liberation of Europe as a good starting point.
And please don't claim Liddell Hart as a reliable source. His influence on prewar Armoured doctrine is largely his own invention. That calls into question his credentials as an unbiased source.

Thanks Fred for the civil and thoughtful comments.

A couple of quick points.

D'Este's book is still considered an important account of the Normandy campaign.

Montgomery's consistent lack of tact is recounted in multiple instances. It is not a trivial issue.

By histrionics I mean the ability to act the role of general with his troops. He was consummate actor and I agree he did much to raise the troops morale in 8th Army. But the truth is that Auchinleck was the real architect of the revival of the 8th Army, in both moral and material concerns. Monty inherited improving conditions by the time he assumed command.

What could he have done differently at El Alemain? That is a more involved conversation than I have time for the moment. But consider the tardy and uber cautious advance after the victory. Monty let the opportunity for a quick and decisive rout of the Armee Afrika after its defeat at El Alemain.

Liddell Hart is an very important historian of WWII. That cannot be denied. If Liddell Hart's self own promotion calls into question his credentials then how does this not also call into question Montgomery's own self promoting claims, both during the war and afterwards (his memoirs for instance.)