"Normandy 1944" Topic

LOL. You just cannot help yourself, can you?

B

I always challenge the lies about Monty by asking the accusers to reference their calumny. Monty is not beyond criticism but the visceral Monty-bashers always overplay their hand by posting outright fabrication(or something they saw in the film Patton) and never come back after a challenge. 99% of the time the fakers slink away making pathetic excuses as to why they 'choose' not to reference their claims. They (like you) will do anything to try and escape the fact they have been exposed. In this thread you are one of two posters who ran for the hills when they realised they had been rumbled. Makes no difference to me. My aim is to counter the ill-informed opinion on Monty and if the accusers decide to self-censor and de-platform themselves then my mission is accomplished. That they do it to save face rather than admit their error is of of no importance to me.
Tatty bye old bean.

Monty was very under rated full stop !!!

Looks like someone committed the reserves in the Montgomery argument.

"Lies … calumny … visceral Monty bashers … outright fabrications … fakers … pathetic excuses … ran for the hills … self-censor … de-platform … save face."

Wow – I can only imagine what you might have posted had I said anything that was actually critical of Montgomery.

I'm just guessing here, but it sounds to me like you didn't have a nice day on the 12th. You should give it another try.

B

So anyways, I ran across a minor but nevertheless interesting item from Eisenhower's 1945 summary report of the European campaign. Ike stated that, by the end of D+1, the Allies had landed 1,500 tanks plus an additional 6,000 other tracked vehicles over the Normandy beachheads in ~48 hours!

Those 1,500 tanks alone were numerically equivalent to the German tank force committed to the defense of France and Belgium.

B

Lee 494. Re; the Arnhem battle, I think it's reasonable to say that Urquhart's Divisional plan was poor and Lathbury's Brigade plan was weak at best and downright silly at worst. How much impact that had is certainly open to question.

Blutarski +1. Zetterling gives similar figures, IIRC he says the number on D Day alone was 750. That's what always cracks me up about the Panzer Reserve Legend. At best the Lehr, 12th SS and 21st Panzer fielded some 300 Pz IVs, about 66 Panthers (Lehrs were entrained on the way to the Eastern Front) and some Stugs plus Beckers Special Battalion. Versus the Allies 750 AFVs, hundreds of Jabos, Naval Gunfire. Not to mention intrinsic infantry division ATG which for the Brits included 17 Pdrs which shot up the 21st Panzsers counterattack quite nicely. Had the Germans thrown all three divisions in on D Day they would have most likely suffered catastrophic losses WITHOUT retaking the beaches. The Germans tried Driving Them Into The Sea in Sicily and Italy and similarly failed against Naval Gunfire and Air Support. Why should Normandy with WAY more ships and planes have turned out any differently? Cheers!

Hi Lee,
With respect to the defense of Normandy (IMO), Rommel's proposal to position the armored forces VERY close up to the beaches was probably the best available alternative. The only hope was to repulse the landing attempt. Once the Allies were ashore in numbers, Germany was playing a losing hand.

B

Zetterling gives similar figures

The total for June 6 was 1045 Commonwealth and 433 US. It was not until late August that the US culumative total matched the Commonwealth c 4000 each.

B. Interesting. I've always thought Von Rundstedt was right. Lure the Allies into a mobile battle in the center of France away from Naval and Air Support at the end of a long supply line. Closest they came to doing this was Market Garden. But Hitler probably would never have gone for fall back and then counterattack. Normandy remains a fascinating campaign. Cheers!

I've always thought Von Rundstedt was right. Lure the Allies into a mobile battle in the center of France away from Naval and Air Support at the end of a long supply line.

There would be no need to 'lure' the Allies into central France because they intended to fight the decisive battle there and defeat the Germans.The Allies expected to have to fight for the beaches and then endure counter-attacks whilst they established themselves securely. They believed the Germans would retreat into central France using the great rivers as natural stop lines. The Allies would use the French Atlantic ports (or Operation CHASTITY) to land US troops and supplies directly from The USA and once this was completed the entire Allied Army would advance and meet the Germans, a battle they were confident they could win. The problems started when the Germans fought for Normandy. This disrupted the plans and that is why the 'Phase Lines' were used as a club against Monty. Up to D-Day +90 everything was behind schedule. The advantage was that the German concentration of a forward defence meant that once their lines were breached they were unable to carry out a phased retreat and instead had to abandon most of France. This is what caused the Allies problems. They had to supply and occupy an area they had not planned to take for several more months. I believe they expected to cross the Rhine 1 year after D-Day and end the war in June 1945. In Allied terms the first 12 weeks were behind expectations and the next 2 weeks wildly beyond their most optimistic forecast. That the Germans fought for Normandy was an Allied bonus because it meant the destruction of their army happened well ahead of the planned date.

I don't think there is any doubt that the allies would have won a battle in the middle of France. Rommel had it right the invasion had to be stopped on the beaches. Once the allies had a lodgement there was no way the Germans could throw them back into the sea.