"Tank Busting – Blowing Up the Myth of the Mighty...." Topic

I have not checked but I bet Cox & Naisawald used the survey of a grand total of 45 Shermans done in July 1944. The same type of survey done on the Tiger & Pz IV found a similar 'burn-rate' for them whilst the Panther did better at c.60%. The German 'burn-rates' are not as well publicised as the Sherman rate!

A contributing factor was undoubtedly the Make Sure Its Dead tactic of putting multiple shots into a target to guarantee a kill. There is a great video on YouTube of an M26 Brewing Up a Panther with multiple shots in the streets of Cologne.

L

Lee,
In the interview with the M26 gunner from Cologne, he said he kept firing because the Panther had its gun pointed at him and he had no idea if it was going to fire or not. I walked that engagement area when I was in Germany last year.

Blutarski,
The Panthers probably burned often because the Allies needed to get a flank shot on them. Ammo is stored in the side pannier from the driver position all the way back to the engine compartment firewall. A penetration in one side would likely also hit the ammo on the other side. The Panther at Cologne was hit in the side ammo storage and you could see the flames inside through the 90mm hole after only a few seconds from the hit.

Wolfhag

From "Armored Thunderbolt: The U.S. Army Sherman in World War II" by Steven Zaloga:
"An Army study in 1945 concluded that only 10-15 percent of the wet-stowage Shermans burned when penetrated, compared to 60-80 percent of the older dry-stowage Shermans."

And, once again, the water filled racks did not make a difference. The difference was both the design of the racks (the design better protected against small fragments, the water was superfluous) and the relocation of the ammunition lower in the hull. The fuel system was not the culprit.

Lee,
If you are interested in details of tank engagements check out "Data on World War II Tank Engagements Involving the U.S. Third and Fourth Armored Divisions".

Link: link

Here is a summary:

The BRL Report 798 study in fact shows exactly why the Sherman performed better. The gun penetration versus armor calculation are in fact just a very, very small part of the entire engagement cycle.

A tank vs tank battle does not begin and end with an anti-tank round trying to penetrate the armor of an enemy tank. The tank first has to find the enemy tanks, and then hit the enemy tanks. The former requires diligent reconnaissance, situational awareness, and better maneuverability. The latter requires good positioning (which is also dependent on maneuverability) and accurate + fast-firing guns. The Sherman proved to be the better tank in these regards by an enormous margin compared to the Panther.

To further elaborate, the Shermans were on the tactical defensive in 20 out of 30 examined engagements. This may seem paradoxical given that the American Army was on the offensive, but a close reading of the tactical practices of the US Army showed that the superior mobility of the Sherman tank allowed it to quickly seize key ground before the break-down prone Panthers. This forced the Germans to counter-attack against prepared Sherman tanks in ambush positions (otherwise they would give up the key ground), and the Shermans notched a 5-1 kill rate in their favor on the defensive.

On the attack, the Shermans should have suffered the same kind of losses in reverse, since it's the Panthers who would have been in ambush positions. And when the Panthers spotted and fired first, they were able to notch a 5-1 or higher kill ratio in their favor against the Shermans.

However, the data showed that the Shermans still fired first 50% of the time even when they were attacking, and in these instances the 5-1 advantage again swung back to the US Army! By contrast the Panthers only fired first once in the 20 engagements wherein they were attacking.

The disparity, based on accounts by people who worked with and rode on restored Shermans and Panthers, is the sighting system. The Sherman had a gyro-stabilized sighting system which allowed the gunner to quickly aim and fire on enemy tanks as soon as the tank had stopped (with trained crews and used properly). The Panther's gunner by contrast had poor sights (no panoramic periscope), requiring the commander's direction to re-acquire the target before aiming and firing on the targets. This accounted for the huge disparity in first-fire statistics – the Shermans were simply faster on the draw in terms of spotting and firing; and the maneuverability meant they were in the advantageous ambush position much more often than not (flashless powder did make the Germans harder to spot when concealed for an ambush).

Finally, much of the gunpower vs armor assessments are jilted because they assume guns being fired on the front armor. This is a completely flawed model as reports of hits on both the Soviet Army T-34s and US Sherman tanks show that the majority of hits were to the side and rear; even when the tank could theoretically be penetrated from the front. And given that the front is only 25% of the surface area of the tank, this makes sense. It's actually rare for the enemy to have no choice but to attack the front. Given this, it's rather clear that assuming front armor thickness if the prime determinant of battlefield survival is flawed, to begin with. In reality, most tanks that survive combat are never shot at, to begin with – the enemy either never saw them or missed.

When tanks are actually hit, "zones of immunity" are a more important measure of survival than front armor thickness – meaning the percentage of the tank's surface area that has armor thick enough to bounce the incoming shot. The Panther in fact was an abysmal tank in this regard as all the armor is in the front – which is why there are examples of Panthers knocked out by 14.5mm anti-tank rifles to the side and one case of a penetration by the same rifle from the front that found a hatch. To be fair, the Sherman's zone of immunity isn't fantastic but is better than often given credit for – the front is only an inch thinner with its slope than the Tiger's front. To get really good zones of immunity you have to look at the IS-2.

There are in fact very few studies that examine direct tank vs tank engagements; which only constitute a minority of engagements involving tanks. The only study that has been published and examined in published books is the United States Army's Ballistic Research Lab (BRL) study in 1946, which has been cited in several books by Stephen Zaloga (notably Armored Champion, published in 2015).

To expand, the BRL study looked at a series of engagements fought by the US 3rd Armored Division and 4th Armored Division in 1944. It was meant to give the US Army an accurate picture of how its armored units actually fought; and the data was used to help design future tanks and doctrine.

In total, the study recorded a total of 30 armor vs armor engagements fought between M4 Shermans and the Mk V Panther. Astonishingly, contrary to all popular notions of Sherman tank inferiority, these two Divisions in fact recorded a 3.6-1 kill ratio in their favor. Rather than the oft-repeated myth that it took five Panthers to kill a Sherman, the study showed – way back in 1946 – that the ratio was instead 3.6 Panthers were lost for every Sherman.

You need good tactics, trained crews and use your strengths against the enemy weakness. The Sherman had a lot to offer. Historically, getting to the battle, fighting and surviving to fight another day is not something reflected very well in the games we play.

Here is a generalized way to look at a battle that would take place over a few days. If the Sherman's outnumber the Germans 3-1 they would show up to the battle with 24-26 tanks (30 tanks at 80%-85% availability) and the German unit with 10 Panthers would show up with 4-6 tanks (about 50% availability). That 3-1 ratio effectively becomes a 4-1 to 5-1 advantage. The Germans could most likely count on 1-2 combat or non-combat losses because they would have a hard time recovering. If the Sherman's took 50% causalities on the first day (lose 12 of 25) the other 4-5 from the previous day are now ready so they now have 17-18 from the original 30 available with 14 serviceable (18 at 85%). If the Germans had 5 in the previous battle they might have 3 that survived added to the added to the 5 that were not able to make the previous days battle. Now they have 8 at 50% serviceable meaning they show up the next day with 4 against the 18 Sherman's with the Sherman's having a 4.5-1 advantage. The Sherman's losses would most likely be replaced 2-3x faster than the Germans could. How long do you think the Germans could keep up this attrition warfare? A breakthrough by the Americans means the Panthers in the repair depot are lost and they might lose a few more while withdrawing. The ones remaining will have very little logistical support to fight.

Now, who has the superior tank? Even though the Sherman is not a 1:1 match to a Panther it can use the right tactics, combined arms and superior logistical support to defeat it. The new Panthers attempting to arrive at the front (and their fuel) from the factory are forced to move at night because of Allied tactical air support and air superiority. It's a team effort.

Wolfhag

Very informative. And indeed never reflected in games I have seem.

Even more important in my opinion is all the times the Sherman was the only tank on the battlefield. In such engagements, and they would have been over 90% of engagements, the side with any effective tank has a huge advantage.

With hindsight, Germany never should have built Panthers or Tigers and stuck to building Pz IVs and StuGs.

In the East the heavier tanks might have been worth it on balance, but in the West I think they punched well under their weight.

In wargames we know what is in the enemy oob and often where everything is. The überpanzers can keep their heavy armour towards the enemy and use their guns at long range. Seldom so easy to do that in real
life.

I might add, that the evidence shows about a 1.4-to-1 loss ratio of US Armor vs. German Panzers, when viewed from a strictly numerical viewpoint.

If we look at percentages, then the "exchange rate" swings widely to the US's favor. This is because there are a lot more US tanks in the field than Panzers. So German units take a higher percentage of losses. It appears that this is amplified as we look at the heavier vehicle types. As an example all Tigers were lost in Normandy. Every Tiger (and Tiger II) sent was lost. Even the re-enforcements (so notably more than 100% of the original force). Not a single Tiger or Tiger II survived the retreat across the Seine.

And it is worth noting that US Army tankers in Shermans had a FAR better survival rate, and a lower injury rate, when the tank was penetrated, than any German crewman in any German AFV, whether Panther, Tiger, Pz IV, StuG or JgPzr.

And when their tanks were damaged or destroyed, they (and their critically valuable combat experience) were back in action faster, due in combination to their higher survival rate, their lower injury rate, the higher recovery/repair rate of their tanks, and the faster replacement of total write-offs. As a result, during the weeks and months of hard combat of the ETO campaign US armored units consistently improved in their combat skills, while German units consistently declined.

But again, was the Sherman a "superior tank"? It was not a 1:1 match to a Panther, and certainly not to a Tiger. But was it a superior weapon of war, a superior tool for the toolbox? I think it pretty clearly was.

-Mark
(aka: Mk 1)

all Tigers were lost in Normandy. Every Tiger (and Tiger II) sent was lost.

Some did escape only to end up lining the roads east of Paris but a couple made it back to Germany. Not enough to matter but enough to give an argumentative fanbois a chance to challenge you. I think Zaloga is the source of that claim and the equally incorrect claim US forces only met 3 Tigers (or only met Tigers 3 times?) in Normandy.

Mark +1. In a separate post here I asked about the accuracy of Zalogas data in Armored Thunderbolts. Let's assume for a moment its accurate in which case his loss data simply do not bear out the Deathtrap Myth. From other sources the "overall" losses of US/Allied AFVs in both Normandy and The Bulge are similar … which your post supports. On any given day the Panthers and Tigers may have scored big but over the entire campaign I just can't find stats that support a slaughter of US Tanks or Tankers. So I'm with you as I have posted here before. In reality the much maligned Sherman was a War Winner.

Cheers!

Allied tank losses were much higher than German losses because they had many more tanks. You have more you lose more. That and lots of things kill tanks. The obsession with panzer kill-ratios has seriously distorted research in this area and it is a mistake to follow the logic that re-defines 'the victor' as the side that loses the least tanks. If that were the only metric then the Battle Of Berlin was a Soviet wipe-out.

Then there's what never gets wide press like the great kill ratios do. IIRC in one battle in Italy Tiger Battalion 508 destroyed 15 Shermans for the loss of a single Tiger. Great! But what you never hear is that in the following few days they lost 20 Tigers during the retreat due to breakdowns and lack of fuel. I believe the CO was even sacked. Gotta add ALL the losses into the Who Won equation and those breakdowns and abandoned tanks rarely get reflected on the wargame table. Cheers!

Apologies. Haste hath made a fool of me again…

No sweat ! We all make mistakes in haste, etc. !

The critical fuel problems of the Germans in my opinion makes that you would go for larger more powerful tanks to get more bang for the buck.

To look at it from the German side of the experience they were for a long time the underdogs, facing allied heavy tanks at every turn.

Once they upgraded their existing tanks with better guns they started to look at the situation and figured that the T-34 and KV-1 were large enough with a sufficiently large turret diameter to accept a bigger gun, whereas German tanks were at the end of their useful upgrade cycle.

So in the face of a possible upgrade the Germans did not produce a better Panzer IV, but designed a vehicle that would skip that generation all along and be a match for whatever the Soviets would come up with to replace T-34.

Hence Tiger and Panther. The first issue was that the Germans could not afford full testing cycles like Ordnance and AGF's game of passes before release a new tank into service.

So while they were available in 1942-1943, they were not reliable (or as reliable as such heavy tanks could be made at the time) until 1943-1944.

Now the US and Soviets skipped the new tank phase for 1944, concentrating instead on upgrading a proven design. The KV had already been mostly passed over and only survived as the lighter KV-85, which ultimately begat a more effective IS series of tanks. The US found heavy tanks to more of a handicap and as per the documented story introduced them at a later date.

While they were critical vehicles in the East from 1943-1945. Their dominance in the West was measured in months. They reached their peak in the summer of 1944, but performed poorly from the end of 1944 into 1945, a few veteran units excepted.

From the German perspective I don't see how they could have done better other than try to slim down their designs into more manageable weights, but that would be like arguing the Sherman needs a bigger gun, they both functioned in spite of their handicaps they had a certain degree of inherent combat ability no matter what.

We have to change our outlook of the German war effort in the latter half from "How the hell did the Allies manage to defeat such a powerful army ?" to "How the hell did the Germans manage to hold on so long in spite of all the disadvantages the had to deal with ?"

We take mechanized warfare for granted, we gloss over how difficult it is to come up with a proper combined arms doctrine and implement it. Many tried most failed and the Germans got some of it right and had to implement many fixes before they could go onto the road to Barbarossa.

The German logistics situation was handicapped by a highly unfavourable geographic situation that could be staved off by quick overwhelming victories that allowed the Germans to rebuild their supplies. The German high command never felt comfortable dealing with supply issue, the fact that people like General Georg Thomas was pretty much a pariah for talking about "Kriegswirtschaft" instead of daydreaming of being one of Frederic the Great's field commanders, leading their army to victory is pretty much the final nail in the coffin.

Not that the Germans were entirely blind to the problem, they did find fixes like the most sophisticated railroad-based supply system of the war which was kept operational until the final days of the war and was part the reason why the Germans were able to hold on so long, far more than the use of elite SS Panzer Corps or hoping some wonder-weapon would come and sweep the battlefield of all foes with minimal effort.

One final thought, "Just ask the guys who had their Shermans shot from under them, how good it was !!!" Pretty much is the example of the wrong way to go about it. We don't evaluate something on its failures alone just like we don't evaluate on success alone. I'm not trying to downplay their harrowing experiences, but you will not learn the full picture if you don't compare it say the guys who never faced many tanks, but lost most of their tanks to mines or AT weapons or those who went against German units that lacked the ability to bite back in a significant way.

The Sherman was a successful tool of war, it was far from perfect but not totally useless either.

The Panther was another approach which suited the Germans better, it was successful within some of its operational parameters and properly used it was a powerful tool, but the Germans could not use it to dominate the battlefield as they had done in the early years of the war, forcing them to engage the enemy in unfavourable conditions such as Normandy where most standard German tactics had to be thrown out the door just to keep the enemy contained as long as possible.

Steven Zaloga provides a very well thought out and balanced Report Card on the Sherman in Chapter 12 of Armored Thunderbolt. He disagrees with me that it was a War Winner, so this isn't a self serving plug. But for those of you that haven't read this book its good stuff. And I do try to reflect some of the other factors such as reliability in my rules like making the Germans test for reliability when trying to move. You should hear the wails when they fail! I think we should all strive to get beyond simple armor and gun stats when writing rules. Many do. More should. Just my 2 cents. Cheers!

And I do try to reflect some of the other factors such as reliability in my rules like making the Germans test for reliability when trying to move.

And do you do the same for French and Brits in 1940, Russians 1941/42 and Brits in the desert up to 1942?

If the Germans were going to be fighting a strategic withdraw in the West probably their biggest bang for the buck would be to build anti-tank guns and tank destroyers, simpler and cheaper. They'd still be lacking in air, artillery, and infantry.

Wolfhag

Here is another important but overlooked tactic that Sherman crews could use when engaging non-armored targets, ricochet fire. The HE Delay Fuse had a 0.05 second delay. Under the right engagement and ground conditions, firing short would allow the round to travel about 30m before exploding about 10-15 feet above the ground for a good air burst.

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